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Allahabad High Court · body

1981 DIGILAW 147 (ALL)

Committee of Management of Adarsh Uchchattar Madhyamic Vidyalya, Rasoolpur Chauraha, Jagan Patti Majhura v. State of U. P

1981-01-23

K.C.AGARWAL, M.P.MEHROTRA

body1981
JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This is a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking relief of certiorari quashing the orders dated 17-7-78 and 4-8-78 of the District Inspector of Schools, filed as Annexures 4 and 5 to tins Writ Petition. 2. The facts briefly stated are these. The Director of Education, U.P., Allahabad, vide his letter dated 20-10-77 created one post of teacher in L T. Grade and three posts of teachers in C. T. Grade Pursuant to the aforesaid sanction, the Management, the petitioner No. 1, vide its resolution no. 2 dated 5-11-77 proposed temporary appointment of petitioners 2 to 5. It was followed by a letter dated 23 11-77 recommending to the District Inspector of Schools for his approval for the temporary appointment of the aforesaid petitioners 2 to 5. The District Inspector of Schools accepted the recommendation and approved the temporary appointment of petitioners 2 to 5 up to 20-5-1978. The appointment, thus, was to last on 20-5-1978. In the mean time, Ordinance no. 10 was promulgated by the Government making provisions for recruitment of teacher kept in the service pool. The Ordinance lapsed as it could not be made an Act within the time prescribed by the Constitution. But just, thereafter, Ordinance no. 22 of i97S was promulgated with retrospective effect from 24-6 68. The provisions of this Ordinance with in peri materia with those of U. P. Ordinance no. 10 of 1978 with some minor changes. The Ordinance mainly provided that unless the service pool teachers numbering 2 to 5 and 7 were absorbed in the substantive vacancies, no body else could be taken in, 3. On account of promulgation of the Ordinances 10 and 22 of 1978, petitioner no. 1 could not make any appointment on the posts vacant and, therefore, by its resolution dated 28-5-78, petitioner no. 1 made petitioners 2 to 5 continue on the post on which they were appointed in December, 1977. For the said purpose, a letter was also written by the Manager of petitioner no. 1 informing the District Inspector of Schools of the same. 1 made petitioners 2 to 5 continue on the post on which they were appointed in December, 1977. For the said purpose, a letter was also written by the Manager of petitioner no. 1 informing the District Inspector of Schools of the same. On 17-7-78, the District Inspector of Schools refused to pay the alary to petitioners 2 to 5 and wrote that appointment had to be made from amongst the service pool teachers and petitioners 2 to 5 could not be paid the salary if they worked on the post despite the expiry of the temporary period for which they had been, initially appointed. By the letter dated 4-8-78, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 5, the Manager of petitioner no. 1 was again informed by the District Inspector of Schools that selection was going to be made for appointment of Assistant Teachers on the aforesaid four posts from amongst the service pool teachers and. therefore, the petitioners 2 to 5 were not entitled to receive any salary. It was, thereafter, that the present petition was filed challenging the validity of Ordinance 22 of 1978. 4. In U.P. Madhyamik Shikskak Sangh v. State, [(1979) ALJ, 178], a Division Bench of this court held the aforesaid Ordinance no. 22 of 1978 as ultra vires to constitution on the ground that the reservation for the pooled teachers was against the principles of equality granted by the Constitution. Therefore, the position is that the ground relating to the challenge of Ordinance 22 of 1978 has to be upheld. 5. The question that next arises is about the relief which could be given to petitioners 2 to 5 in the present writ. The petitioner's counsel contended that, as Annexures 4 and 5 refusing to permit petitioners 2 to 5 in the service had be passed by the District, Inspector of Schools on the ground that only teachers kept in the service pool had to be appointed, petitioners 2 to 5 were entitled to continue in service and to relieve the salary as of right. Admittedly, the appointment of petitioners 2 to 5 was temporary or on ad hoc basis The Management, petitioner I, had issued an advertisement for making regular selection for appointment on the posts which are at present occupied by petitioners 2 to 5. Petitioners 2 to 5 also made applications for appointment. Admittedly, the appointment of petitioners 2 to 5 was temporary or on ad hoc basis The Management, petitioner I, had issued an advertisement for making regular selection for appointment on the posts which are at present occupied by petitioners 2 to 5. Petitioners 2 to 5 also made applications for appointment. As U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder lay down the procedure and [manner in accordance with which a teacher has to be appointed, petitions 2 to 5 could not have any right on the posts held by them. The appointment, as noted above,, was temporary up to 20-5-78. Therefore, the position appears to be that petitioners 2 to 5 would have to appear before the Selection Committee and after they are appointed on the vacant post, they would be entitled to continue on the same post. 6. It may be true that the basis on which Annexures 4 and 5 were issued was washed off on account of ruling of this court, in U.P. Madhyamik Shik-shak Sangh, (supra), but that by itself would not confer any right on petitioners 2 to 5 to continue as teachers. The proper course in such an eventuality appears to be for the Management, petitioner no. I, to make selection of teachers at any early date under the directions of the District Inspector of Schools. This of course, has to be done in accordance with law. 7. In this background, following the decision of the U. P. Madhyamik Shikshah Sangh, (supra), we find that U.P. Ordinance 22 of 1978 is ultra vires the Constitution. But we are under to grant any relief to petitioners 2 to 5. 8. In the result, the petitioner fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances, we direct the parties to hear their own costs.