N. D. VENKATESH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed under S. 438 crl. P. C. , 1973, on behalf of one A. Prasad of Lakkondahalli, Hoskote taluk, Bangalore Dt. On the allegation that he and others, forming themselves into an unlawful assembly, had assaulted and caused the death of one Satish on 25-4-1981 at about 23-00 hours (11p. m.) in a house in the H. M. T. Colony in Bangalore City, the Jalahalli police station has registered a case against them for offences under Ss. 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 448, 427 and 302 IPC and has sent an F. I. R. , to the court. Prasad apprehends arrest by the police in this connection and hence has moved this Court for an anticipatory bail. His case is that the accusation against him is false; that it has. been made in view of party feelings; that the police were pursuing this matter with vengeance and were trying false and baseless evidence against him that he is a member of a family, having a respectable status and owning houses and other properties; that he is the holder of B. A. , degree from the Bangalore university and is studying Law, being a student of the 1st LL. B. , class; that he is an innocent person and does not have any past record of crime and that his reputation and character are impeccable; that he is also a chronic patient suffering from severe piles; that he has to sit for the Law examination which is likely to take place soon; that he will abide by any terms and conditions that may be put by the Court; and that, in the circumstances, he may be granted anticipatory bail. ( 2 ) IN support of these averments Sri R. N. Byra Peddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, very persuasively and forcibly argued, placing reliance on a number of decisions of the Supreme court touching the question of granting of anticipatory bail by superior Courts and also drawing my attention to (the evolution of law in this regard not merely in this Country but also outside and in particular the United States of america, that granting of bail is the rule and refusal, an exception. ( 3 ) THE learned Government Pleader opposed this petition arguing that this petitioner was the leader of that unlawful assembly which had indulged in this heinous crime in the dead of night when the victim was sleeping in his house, by gaining entrance into the house forcibly. It is his further case that the fatal blow that had taken away the life of the victim had been given by this petitioner and that he and his friends had indulged in this act of violence due to past enemity between himself and his people on the one side and the victim and possibly a few others on the other. ( 4 ) THE law touching the question of the powers of Courts to grant anticipatory bail under S. 438 of the code can now be said to be a settled one. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Pubjab AIR 1980 SC 1632 a Bench consisting of five Judges of the Supreme Court, after referring to several decisions of that Court, lays down as follow:"we would, therefore, prefer to leave the High Court and the Court of Session to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion which, by their long training and experience, they are ideally suited to do. The ends of justice will be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consronance with principles governing the grant of boil which are recognised over the years, than by divesting them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. It is customary, almost chronic, to take a statute as one finds it on the ground that, after all, the legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit to use a particular expression. A convention may usefully grow whereby the high Court and the Court of Session may be trusted to exercise their discretionary powers in their wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted to their care by the legislature in its wisdom. If they err, they are liable to be corrected. A convention may usefully grow whereby the high Court and the Court of Session may be trusted to exercise their discretionary powers in their wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted to their care by the legislature in its wisdom. If they err, they are liable to be corrected. " (underlining (italics) supplied) (para-33)THEN, dealing with the factors that are to weigh with the Court in considering an application under S. 438 of the Code, the Court observes as follows: - in regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, consider ing the antecedents of the applicant that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides: and equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that the witnesses will be tampered with and the larger interests of the public or the state are some of the consideration which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail. The relevance of these considerations was pointed out in State vs. Captain Jagjit Singh ( AIR 1962 SC 253 ) which, though, was a case under the old S. 498 which corresponds to the present S. 439 of the Code. The relevance of these considerations was pointed out in State vs. Captain Jagjit Singh ( AIR 1962 SC 253 ) which, though, was a case under the old S. 498 which corresponds to the present S. 439 of the Code. "it is of paramount consideration to remember that the freedom of the individual is as necessary for the survival of the society as it is for the egoistic purposes of the individual. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may think fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail" (para-31) (underlining italics supplied) ( 5 ) HAS the law relating to granting of bail, either anticipatory or otherwise, changed so much as is sought to be made out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner? Is granting of bail in all types of cases a rule and refusal an exception? There are cases and cases and what the Supreme Court states in Gurbaksh Singh's case is that courts while dealing with the matter should "exercise their jurisdiction by wise and careful use of their discretion and "act objectively and in consonence with principles governing the grant of bail which are recognised over the years. A careful reading of Gurbaksh Singh's case discloses an apprehension in the mind of the Court that swayed by liberal sentiments and concepts such as freedom of the individual that courts may, regardless of the nature of the offence and the circumstances leading to the crime, exercise their discretion very liberally in favour of persons accused or charged with offence or in favour of persons apprehending arrest on that account. That is why an emphasis, at more than one place, in the decision (Gurbaksh Singh's case) on the principles governing this subject "which are recognised over the years" (at para-33 extracted above) and on their (Courts) right to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warrant on considerations similar to those mentioned in Sec. 437 or which are generally considered to be relevant under Sec. 439 of the Code" (para-13 in Gurbaksh Singh's case), and again on the relevance of considerations that had weighed with the Court in Jagjit Singh's case (at para-31 extracted above ). In Jagjit singh's case AIR 1962 SC 253 the facts were: He was a former Captain of the Indian army. At the time of his arrest he was in employment of a French Company. He and two others had been accused of offences under Sec. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and also secs. 3 and 5 of the Indian Official secrets Act No. XIX of 1923. The allegation was that the aforesaid three persons, conspiring together, had passed on official secrets to a foreign agency. It may be noted that the two other co-accused had been admitted to bail. But Jagjit Singh's application for bail was rejected by the Sessions Judge. He applied to the high Court. It took the view that it was arguable whether the accused had committed the offence under Sec. 3 (non-bailable) or under sec. 5 (bailable) of the Indian Official secrets Act. It also took the view that as the other accused persons had been released on bail, as there was a likelihood of some delay in the case reaching the trial stage and as the accused was not likely to abscond, he was entitled to bail and ordered accordingly. The Supreme Court felt that these were not the only considerations which should have weighed with the High Court and that that Court should also haye taken into consideration the serious nature of the charge involving an offence under Sec. 3 of the Indian Official secrets Act entailing punishment upto 14 years of imprisonment, if proved, and the surrounding circumstances. The Supreme Court in that case, while allowing the appeal preferred by the State, observed as follows: "among other considerations, which a Court has to take into account in deciding whether bail should be granted in a non-bailable offence, is the nature of the offence; and if the offence is of a kind in which bail should not be granted considering its seriousness, the court should refuse bail even though it has very wide powers under S. 498 Crl. P'. C. The Court further observed that:"the case against the respondent is in relation to the military affairs of the Government, and 'prima facie therefore, the respondent if convicted would be liable upto fourteen years' imprisonment. P'. C. The Court further observed that:"the case against the respondent is in relation to the military affairs of the Government, and 'prima facie therefore, the respondent if convicted would be liable upto fourteen years' imprisonment. In these circumstances considering the nature of the offence, it seems to us that this is not a case where discretion, which undoubtedly vests in the court, under S. 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should have been exercised in favour of the respondent. " (para-5) ( 6 ) WITHOUT stating anything on merits, let us now examine the case against this petitioner in the light of the observations of the Supreme court referred to above. The allegation is that during the dead of night, leading a few of his followers, the petitioner had forcibly gained entrance into the house in which the victim was said to be sleeping, and had hit him with a sharp edged weapon causing an injury which had led to the victim's death. It is further alleged that there was previous enmity between the petitioner and the victim. Considering the nature of the offence alleged and the circumstances under which it is said to have taken place, I am of the view that this is not a fit case for grant of bail under S. 438 Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) AS already mentioned above, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that his client has to take an examination and that if he is arrested he would be prevented from doing so. If the petitioner is arrested and thereafter if any request is made on his behalf to permit him to sit for the examination, I am sure, the authority concerned would pass appropriate orders in this regard. Likewise, placing reliance on Nandini satpathy v. P. L. Dani AIR 1978 SC 1025 it was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even at the stage of questioning by the police his client is entitled to have his Counsel by his side and that his privilege to defend himself properly should not be curtailed in any fashion. This is too early a stage to consider that request. As observed above if such a request is made at the relevant time to the appropriate authority I am sure that will also be considered in accordance with law. This is too early a stage to consider that request. As observed above if such a request is made at the relevant time to the appropriate authority I am sure that will also be considered in accordance with law. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons mentioned above, this petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .