JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. This is a defendant's second appeal in a suit for partition of two sets of property situate adjacent to each other and for demolition of a certain construction, which was in the course of being made,, on the northwestern side of the northern set of the property. The following are the allegations in the plaint, The parties belonged to the same family, the plaintiff being the son of Salik and the defendants being the sons of Salik's brother Harhangi. The entire property was joint in which the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other had a 1/2 share each. For some years past they were separate in mess and residence and were living in separate portions of the houses according to their convenience, but there was no regular partition between them and the entire property was the joint property of the parties. A rough site plan was drawn, up at the foot of the plaint with allegation that, if necessary, a plan made on scale, will be produced later on. This is followed by the allegation that at the place ka, which is on the northwestern corner of the northern one of the two sets of property, there was originally marhai belonging to the plaintiff, which fell down a few months ago, but he could not construct it so far. A few days ago, the plaintiff wanted to place another marhai at that place, but the defendants stopped him from doing so, and that was not all. On 2611967 they started a fresh construction at that place and want to speedily build it. The plaintiff requested them to separate his share by partition before raising any constructions, but they paid no heed, hence the suit. The cause of action was said to have arisen on 2611967. In defence, the relationship between the parties was admitted. The other allegations about separate living, but the property being joint, were not admitted in the form in which they were stated, and the map at the foot of the plaint was said to be incorrect and the rest of the allegations were denied as wholly incorrect. In the additional pleas it was asserted that the plaintiff way not entitled to partition of the property in suit. In the additional pleas it was asserted that the plaintiff way not entitled to partition of the property in suit. It was said that although the parties are descended from the same common ancestor, there was a separation between them more than 25, years ago and their parents had already divided the ancestral house and the land etc., appurtenant thereto, but the partition being oral, although each party was in possession over its portion, the plaintiff raised a dispute in the year 1954 and in that context certain respectable persons were collected and they justly divided the ancestral property between the plaintiff and the defendants in accordance with their respective shares, which they accepted and executed an agreement which contained a memorandum of the partition arrived at between them. It was signed by the parties and a copy thereof was given to the plaintiff and another to the defendants. The parties have continued to be in separate and exclusive possession of the property in their respective shares and had no connection with each other. The defendants made new pucca constructions at considerable expense on substantial portions of their property. No ancestral property, situate in the abadi, was left joint between the parties and there was no question of a fresh partition. This is followed by the further allegations that to the north and northwest of the defendants' bardaur there is a plot No. 292 which was a Garha. Its present number is 24 Kha. After partition, the defendant has obtained the southwestern part of the garha from the concerned Zamindars and had started cultivating it and plot No. 292 area 265, became the tenancy of the defendants' father and later on their sirdari. After the partition the defendants and their father acquired considerable agricultural land and their cultivation came to be carried on a large scale. They have been keeping about 20 heads of cattle, And when the ancestral house, the bardaur the marhai etc. After the partition the defendants and their father acquired considerable agricultural land and their cultivation came to be carried on a large scale. They have been keeping about 20 heads of cattle, And when the ancestral house, the bardaur the marhai etc. which they had received on partition, became insufficient for their needs, they levelled up a part of the graha at considerable expense and constructed marhais thereon which had been at that place for some 12 years, and the land at that place and between the marhais was used by the defendants as their sahan, and in this manner the defendants had been using the entire area of plot No. 292/2 as their abadi for more than 12 years past. Some parti land was situate to the south of plot No. 292 within the abadi. The defendants secured it from the concerned Zamindars and used it for making uplaas (cow dung cakes) etc. The plaintiff had no marhai to the west of the defendants' bardaur, nor did he get any marhai at that place, nor did he have any connection with the site of the defendants' marhais, nor was the land ever ancestral between the parties, nor was there any question of its partition. This is followed by the allegation that the plaintiff had even filed an objection along with certain other parsons in respect of the land of plot No. 292/2 in consolidation of holdings proceedings. This was decided in favour of the defendants by the consolidation authorities. The plaintiffs' claim was barred by Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, and the civil Court had no jurisdiction. There are certain other allegations about the occurrence of a fire in the marhais during February 1967 which are not very relevant at this stage. The true fact was said to be that the plaintiff had, in the course of reconstructing his western marhai, encroached upon some land in the defendants' possession which led to a dispute between the parties and the suit was the result of the enmity. The plaintiff filed a replication. He denied the allegation that there was any partition 25 years ago, or at any time, between the parties. The plaintiff filed a replication. He denied the allegation that there was any partition 25 years ago, or at any time, between the parties. He also denied the family settlement of 1954 and the agreement said to have been executed between them it was in that context further alleged that the parties were litigating in Suit No 444 of 1953 in which a compromise was arrived at on 21111954, and the alleged agreement of 1954 was fabricated with the help of thumb impressions of the plaintiff taken on a number of papers in that context. The agreement was also said to be inadmissible for want of registration on the allegation that the value of the property, said to have been partitioned was not less than Rs. 1000/. It was further alleged that no effect was given to the agreement and the parties continued to be in joint possession of the property. The allegation of raising fresh constructions by the defendants was denied and it was further alleged that the parties had jointly raised abadi on garha of plot No. 292/2, of which they were joint Sirdar and which was held to be joint in the said Suit No. 444 of 1953 and in which the parties were given 1/2 share each. About the parti land in the abadi to the south of plot No. 292/2 also it was said that it was jointly acquired by the parties and was in their joint possession. The marhai in suit was claimed to be that of the plaintiff and it was reasserted that the plaintiff wanted to reconstruct it and the allegations to the contrary were wrong. The entire property in suit was said to be joint and in joint possession of the parties. The allegations about the plaintiff having encroached upon the land in possession of the defendants or there being any dispute about it, was denied. The following were the Issues on which the parties went to trial : "1. Whether the house, marhai sahan and trees in suit and plot No. 292/2 and the things contained thereon and the parti land lying to the south of it are joint property of the parties or are the exclusive properties of the defendants. ? "2. Whether the properties in suit have been partitioned as alleged in the written statement ? If so, its effect ? ? "2. Whether the properties in suit have been partitioned as alleged in the written statement ? If so, its effect ? "3, Whether the document 35Al is null and void and ineffective as alleged ? "4. Whether the construction in suit is liable to be removed ? "5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ?" The trial Court took up the first two issues together and on a consideration of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that "the house, marhai, sahan and trees in suit were partitioned nearly 25 years ago" and the parties are separate ever since. On Issue No. 3, the trial Court held paper No. 35Al, which is the original agreement, dated 20111954, to be a valid and effective document. On Issue No. 4, the finding of the trial Court was that the parties having admitted that the subjectmatter of the suit is a house, marhai sahan etc., the land was not agricultural and hence there was no question of the suit being barred by Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. On Issue No. 5, the finding of the trial Court was that the constructions in suit were raised by the defendants after acquiring the site from the Ex. Zamindar on payment of nazrana and on Issue No. 6 that in view of its findings, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. On appeal by the plaintiff, the following four points were raised by the lower appellate Court for its consideration, as the only points pressed by the parties before it, namely : "1. Whether there was any partition of the property between parties 25 years back as alleged by the defendant ? "2. Whether there was any agreement between the parties on 20111954 for the property in suit and whether the agreement deed paper No. 35Al was a genuine document ? "3. Whether the land lying north west of the house of the defendant in plot No. 292 has been self acquired property of the defendants as alleged ? "4. "2. Whether there was any agreement between the parties on 20111954 for the property in suit and whether the agreement deed paper No. 35Al was a genuine document ? "3. Whether the land lying north west of the house of the defendant in plot No. 292 has been self acquired property of the defendants as alleged ? "4. Whether the property in suit have been joint of the family of the parties till the date of the suit ?" Instead of dealing with the four points separately, the lower appellate Court took up all of them together, and held that there was no partition between the parties 25 year ago or in 1954, nor was there any agreement between them on 20111954, and that the property in suit lying in plot No. 292 was not the selfacquired property of the defendants, and hence the entire properties in dispute were joint and liable to be partitioned. The plaintiffs share was declared to be half and the suit was decreed for partition as "also for a mandatory injunction for the disputed wall which has been raised by the defendant without the consent of the plaintiff on the disputed land shown in the confirmed map of the Commissioner paper No. 125A2 which will be part of the decree and the disputed construction which has to be removed has been shown by red colour in his map." The first attack by the learned counsel for the appellants in this Court wa against the decree that has been passed by the lower appellate Court. It was urged that the mandatory injunction issued was "for the disputed wall which has been raised by the defendant without the consent of the plaintiff on the disputed land as shown in the confirmed map of the Commissioner, ''but the exact nature of the mandatory injunction, issued by the lower appellate Court, was not specified any where in the judgment; and yet the very last sentence of the operative portion of the judgment says that "disputed construction which has to be removed has been shown by red colour in his map." The learned counsel was further, rather critical, of the approach of the lower appellate Court and submitted that although the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court had observed that "the learned munsif has not properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence of the parties" and that "he has not cared to look into the contents of the alleged partition deed" and had "committed error in arriving at correct conclusion" and "wrongly decided the suit of plaintiff", it is in fact the lower appellate Court which has gone wrong on all these points. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I must say that there is force in the aforesaid criticism of the learned counsel. Under Rule 18 of Order 20, Civil Procedure Code "whether the Court passes a decree for the partition of property or for the separate possession of a share therein, then............(2) if and in so far as such decree relates to........................immovable property.....................the Court may, if the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required." The decree that has been passed by the lower appellate Court is a decree in a suit for partition, but it merely says that "the suit is decreed with costs for partition of the half share of plaintiff from the disputed property". The decree does not follow the abovequoted requirements of Rule 18 of Order 20, Civil Procedure Code. Even if it is treated, in substance to be a preliminary decree in a suit for partition declaring the plaintiff's share to be 1/2 in the property in suit, the decree fails to give the required directions for the partition of the property and the manner of preparation of the Final Decree. Even if it is treated, in substance to be a preliminary decree in a suit for partition declaring the plaintiff's share to be 1/2 in the property in suit, the decree fails to give the required directions for the partition of the property and the manner of preparation of the Final Decree. And further, having passed a preliminary decree for partition, the lower appellate Court could not have issued "a mandatory injunction for the disputed wall", which was said to have been raised by the defendants without the plaintiff's consent. Assuming that the injunction issued meant a decree for demolition of the constructions, shaded red on the commissioner's map which forms part of the decree, the settled practice in such matters is to allot the constructions made by a party on joint property against the wish of the other party, in the former's share, if it can be done conveniently or without any insurmountable difficulty. Coming to the merits of the case, the first point urged by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the finding of the lower appellate Court that there had been no partition between the parties, is vitiated in law. The first error of law, pointed out in this connection, was the ruling out of evidence, as inadmissible, the deed of agreement dated 20111954 between the parties, recording the fact of a completed partition between them arrived at by way of family settlement with the help of certain respectable persons. Learned counsel urged that it war not an instrument of partition. It was properly stamped as an agreement. Even if it were not properly stamped, having been admitted in evidence by the trial Court, its admissibility on account of want of proper stamp, could not be raised in the appellate Court. It did not bring about any partition in presenti and was as such not an instrument of partition. It merely recorded a partition which had already been arrived at with the mediation of certain respectable persons, consented to, acted upon and given effect to by the parties by way of a settlement of all their disputes, and was thus merely record of that family settlement. It did not require any registration. I agree, as much as the law on this point as declared by the Supreme Court in Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi etc. It did not require any registration. I agree, as much as the law on this point as declared by the Supreme Court in Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi etc. v. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi etc.( A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1077) (at page 1084, paragraph 23) is as unJer : "The records made by the Panchas about the division of the properties, it is true, were not stamped nor were they registered. It is, however clear that if the record made by the Panchas in so far as it deals with immovable properties, is "regarded as a nontestamentary instrument purporting or operating to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property, it was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act, and would not in the absence of registration be admissible in evidence. But in our judgment, the true effect of what are called awards is not by their own force to create any interest in immovable property; they recorded divisions already made and on the facts proved in this case, their validity depends upon the acceptance by the parties. The records made by the Panchas were documents which merely acknowledged partitions already made and were not by law required to be registered. On a perusal of Ex. 456A which is a translation of the Tippan book in which are recorded the decisions which are signed by the parties, it is evident that the Panchas were merely recording what had been actually divided and they were not seeking to set out their decisions relating to division of property to be made. The question whether the various decisions recorded in Ex. 456A and in the books of account were required by law to be stamped need not be decided. The documents were admitted in evidence by the trial Court and no question of admissiblility of those documents can be raised at a later stage of the suit or in appeal (see Section 36, Stamp Act).' The terms of the deed of agreement between the parties, Ex. A29. are very much similar. It is the plaintiff's own case that there was a suit between the parties, namely, suit No. 444 of 1953, in which a compromise was arrived at on 21111954 itself. A29. are very much similar. It is the plaintiff's own case that there was a suit between the parties, namely, suit No. 444 of 1953, in which a compromise was arrived at on 21111954 itself. But the plaintiff alleged in his replication that the deed of agreement had been fabricated on sheets of paper on which his thumb impressions had been obtained in connection with that compromise, and the finding of the lower appellate Court on this point is in these words : "In this way all these witnessess (the reference being to the defendants witnesses Sheo Pujan D.W. 2, Ram Nain D.W. 4 and Maneanu D W. 5) have contradicted on the material points about writing of this document and map etc. The circumstances disclosed by them also show that it was prepared under suspicious circumstances by the defendant, hence it was a forged document and the defendant cannot derive any title or right from it. I have already mentioned that all these D. Ws are interested and they have merely supported the case of the defendant. On the other hand, we find the testimony of Sita Ram P. W. 2 from the side of the plaintiff, who deposed that the plaintiff had no knowledge about this paper and his thumb marks and the signatures of these witnesses were obtained without any knowledge of the contents of this first leaf." This is immediately followed by the observation. "Moreover, this deed was inadmissible in evidence as it was not registered and not properly stamped, as its contents clearly show that it was deed of partition or settlement deed of partiton, hence it was compulsorily registrable. It is not understood as to how the learned trial Court has allowed this document to be read in evidence." Then the lower appellate Court follows up these observation by the further observation : "If we support this document to be genuine or admissible in evidence, then we find that it demolishes the case of the defendant altogether about the alleged partition because it has clearly mentioned that the houses, Sahan and huts etc. of the partites have been joint property till the date of execution of this agreement and they were divided as mentioned in it and as shown in the enclosed map. of the partites have been joint property till the date of execution of this agreement and they were divided as mentioned in it and as shown in the enclosed map. This document does not, at all, mention about any previous partition of 25 years back as alleged by the defendant, nor about any dispute of 1954, nor it has mentioned that case of defendant as taken up in the written statement now. Hence the entire theory of the defendant, is shattered by this document about the previous partition or the partition of 1954. This document also does not mention about the disputed property lying in west of the defendant's house as his self acquired property. Thus, this document does not help the defendant at all as it supports the case of the plainiff all right." The further question which, therefore, arises is whether the finding of the lower appellate Court that the family arrangement, dated 21111954, was a forged document, for having been prepared under suspicious circumstances, is vitiated in law. The signatures on the agreement being admitted by the plaintiff and in view of the further fact that the suit No. 444 of 1953 between the parties which related to agricultural land, had been compromised the same day, the burden of proving the case that the deed of family settlement had been fabricated with the aid of a blank stamp paper which had been thumbmarked by him lay on the plaintiff. The three sheets of stamp paper, on which the deed is written, show that they were purchased by the plaintiff himself. A compromise application in a suit is normally not required to be written on stamp paper. Moreover, the certified copy of the decree in Suit No. 444 of 1953, in the Court of the Additional Munsif III, Azamgarh, shows that the compromise application was in the usual form of an application submitted to the Court and, as is normal, is signed by the parties at the foot of the application. Moreover, the certified copy of the decree in Suit No. 444 of 1953, in the Court of the Additional Munsif III, Azamgarh, shows that the compromise application was in the usual form of an application submitted to the Court and, as is normal, is signed by the parties at the foot of the application. The deed of settlement, on the other hand, snows that it bears the thumb mark of the plaintiff only on the lefthand margin of the first sheet of the stamp paper and is not signed by any of the parties or the witnesses on the remaining two sheets of stamp paper which has been the usual practice in the case of deeds executed in Hindi or Urdu language. The plaintiff even denied the genuineness of his thumb impression on the deed of settlement in his bid to avoid the effect of that deed. He did not mention the deed of settlement at all in the plaint, but introduced the case that the deed was fabricated on blank sheets of stamp paper obtained in connection with the compromise in Suit No. 444 of 1953, byway of replication. The execution of the deed had been proved by the defendants witnesses. The lower appellate Court has merely said that they "have contradicted on the material points about writing of this document." The due execution of the deed had been held to be proved by the trial Court on a consideration of the oral evidence of the witnesses produced before it. The lower appellate Court has not specified or discussed the alleged compromise on the material points on the basis of which it found that the document was prepared under suspicious circumstances. The certified copy of the compromise in Suit No. 444 of 1953 discloses that the suit related to agricultural land. It is highly probable that the parties agreed simultaneously to settle all their disputes relating to house property and abadi land which was not the subjectmatter of the suit and if they did so, it is obvious the they would have executed a separate deed of settlement between them in respect of the property not covered by the suit. Therefore, in my view, the lower appellate Court was not justified in law in interfering with the finding of the trial Court that the deed of family settlement was in respect of the property not covered by the suit. Therefore, in my view, the lower appellate Court was not justified in law in interfering with the finding of the trial Court that the deed of family settlement was in respect of the property not covered by the suit. Therefore, in my view, the lower appellate Court was not justified in law in interfering with the finding of the trial Court that the deed of family settlement was genuine. See Sarju Prasad v. Jwaleshwari A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 120. Another point taken by the lower appellate Court is that the terms of the deed, even if held to be genuine and admisible in evidence, demolish the case of the defendants altogether because it mentions that the property was joint till the date of the execution of the agreement and that it was divided thereby whereas the case of the defendants was that the property was divided between the parties some 25 years ago and that there was dispute in the year 1954. This inference of the lower appellate Court is again based on a misconstruction of the deed of family settlement dated 20111954. The deed recites; and the provisions made by the deed in respect of different sets of the properties are in the following underlined words of clause 1 thereof: The word Mustaka is descriptive of the nature of the property and the word hai signifies that the properties do exist in praesenti. Fairly translated into English the recital means: "we the executants are possessed of joint houses, sahan and marhais about which there was continuous dispute between the parties." It is not disputed that originally these properties were joint. The recital that there was continuous dispute between the parties means that there was dispute about the separate use and enjoyment of these properties and accordingly the deed provides for a settlement of that dispute. The manner of settlement of the dispute was not by making a partition of the properties by the properties by the deed itself. Instead, the provisions made are declaratory of an existing state of affairs which had already been given effect to, for avoiding repetition of those disputes in the future. The language used in each of the provisions made by the deed is" malik wa kamil farik hai wa rahega. Instead, the provisions made are declaratory of an existing state of affairs which had already been given effect to, for avoiding repetition of those disputes in the future. The language used in each of the provisions made by the deed is" malik wa kamil farik hai wa rahega. It means that each of the parties to the deed recognised the title and possession of the party concerned to that property and declared that that party will remain its owner in possession in future. This is not the language used in a deed of partition and the lower appellate Court is not right in holding that the deed makes a partition of the property. The provisions made are clearly provisions settling past disputes and declaring the position which had come to exist by reason of the settlement in order to avoid any dispute in future. Coming to the property in dispute in the present suit, namely, plot No, 245 Kha having an area of .247 Acres, the defendants case stands on an unassailable footing. Learned counsel for the defendantappellants contended that it is indisputable that the plaintiff's objection in respect of the area of 247 Acres, out of plot No. 292/2 was dismissed by the consolidation and he had a share therein but, he did not lead any evidence in support thereof and accordingly it was rejected. The effect was that in the triennial khatauni of 137476F, Ex. A 12, the land continued to be recorded as the sirdari holding of the defendants. It was contended before me that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties in respect of abadi land, and reliance was placed on Ex. A10, which appears to be a copy of the khasra chakbandi wherein both the portions of plot No. 292/2, namely, plot No. 245 Ka having an area of 130 Acres and plot No 292/2 having an area of .247 Acres are shown to be abadi in the last column. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the plaintiff did file an objection before the consolidation authorities and that objection was decided against him. The consolidation authorities certainly have the jurisdiction to decide whether any piece of land was abadi or not? Be that as it may, the fact remains that the plaintiff did file an objection before the consolidation authorities and that objection was decided against him. The consolidation authorities certainly have the jurisdiction to decide whether any piece of land was abadi or not? Even if they wrongly decided that the land was not abadi, in spite of the objection taken by the plaintiff, it is not possible, in the suit giving rise to second appeal, to hold that the orders of the consolidation authorities were without jurisdiction. If the plaintiff was aggrieved by the order dismissing his objection, he ought to have taken up the matter in appeal or revision under the Act and if he was unsuccessful even there he could have filed a writ petition. I say so because in the plaint of this suit or even the replication that was filed by the plaintiff it has not been pleaded that the order of the consolidation authorities was without jurisdiction. Indeed, with regard to the area of .130 Acres of plot No. 292/2, which has been given the number 245 Ka by the consolidation authorities, both the parties are recorded as cosirdars, although that plot is also shown to be abadi in the Khasra chakbandi Ex. A10. I am, therefore, of the opinion that it is not possible to hold in the present case that the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties in respect of the area of .277 Acres of plot No. 292/2 numbered as plot No. 245 Kha on the ground that it was not agricultural land. There is a further reason why I say so. Land docs not cease to be agricultural, so long as it is held or occupied for the purposes of agriculture, and even if sirdar raises constructions on the land held by him as such, it cannot be said that the provisions of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act cease to have an application thereto. Land docs not cease to be agricultural, so long as it is held or occupied for the purposes of agriculture, and even if sirdar raises constructions on the land held by him as such, it cannot be said that the provisions of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act cease to have an application thereto. A Bhumidhar could use land for any purpose other than agicultural, but so long a declaration under Section 143 is not obtained by him, it continues to be governed by the provisions of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act, and he could not make a transfer of the land or deal with it otherwise on the ground that the land had become abadi and he could deal with it in any manner he liked. And the jurisdiction to grant a declaration under Section 143 vested exclusively in the revenue Courts. If the question whether certain land has ceased to be used for agricultural purposes is raised before a Civil Court it is bound to refer the question to the Revenue Court vide Section 331A of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. The position of a sirdar was, I apprehend, even inferior. I, therefore, do not agree with the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff's claim could not be said to be barred by Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act because the land was not agricultural. I am of the view, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, that the plaintiff's claim to the land of plot No. 245 Khas was barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the result, this appeal must succeed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court, dismissing the suit, is restored with costs throughout.