Judgement D. K. KAPUR, J. :- This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the Union of India and others in respect of some orders passed under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), relating to Terminal Tax. The respondent M/s. Mahabir Pershad and Sons had imported some sanitary goods in July 1971. On Aug. 10, 1971 the Terminal Tax Officer noted that the statement of Shri Kunj Behari Lal, belonging to the first respondent firm, showed that there was a misdeclaration for the purpose of evading Terminal Tax and he imposed a penalty at the rate of ten times the tax. An appeal was taken by M/s. Mahabir Pershad and Sons to Shri M.K. Chawla, Additional District Judge, Delhi, under Section 169 read with Sections 178 to 183 and other sections of the Act. The appeal was rejected by order dated July 20, 1972. Thereafter a review application was filed which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge on Sept. 1, 1973. Therein it was noted that there was Rule 39 of the Terminal Tax Rules which applied to the particular case i.e., of wrong declaration. That Rule provided that on conviction a fine of Rs. 100/- could be imposed by a Magistrate. As it was a case of wrong declaration to which a particular Rule applies, the Additional District Judge accepted the review and held that the Terminal Tax Officer was not competent to impose ten times penalty. Another point discussed by the learned Additional District Judge was that there was a judgment of the Punjab High Court in Gian Chand v. State, (1958-60 Pun LR 539) in which it was held that when dutiable articles were introduced within the octroi limit of the Muncipality the Municipality had to prove that the accused attempted to do so with intent to defraud and unless the intention was established there was no offence. 2. In the case of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, Section 464 shows that evading payment of tax by introducing goods within the octroi limits of Delhi also involves a punishment which may extend to ten times of the value of the goods imported. Furthermore, it shows that any person who does it or abets such introduction can be liable to this penalty. Furthermore, it shows that any person who does it or abets such introduction can be liable to this penalty. It was urged before us that this is not a criminal offence because it is a penalty and not a punishment. We do not go into this question and would leave it open for a better case. It was brought to our notice that there is a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s. Prakash Roadlines (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India (C.W.No. 906/73)*wherein it would appear that the Terminal Tax Officer was competent to act under Section 464 of the Act, but, the judgment only states that a show cause notice could be issued by such officer. We do not know what actually happened in that case at the end as to whether the punishment was actually imposed by the Terminal Tax Officer or not. As to which Court and which authority can act under Section 464 of the Act will have to be decided in some other case. * Reported in ILR (1974) 1 Delhi 516. 3. For the present, we are proceeding on the basis that the Terminal Tax Officer could take action in this respect but the ground on which the Additional District Judge has set aside the action under S.464 of the Act is on the ground that the Municipality has not proved the ingredients of section 464 of the Act. He stated as follows:- "I am left with no option but to hold that the respondents have miserably failed to bring on the record any fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioner to import the goods in the territory of Del. It was a bona fide allegation of the petitioner that their goods were stone-wares and not sanitary wares which allegation, even if proved to be unfounded, cannot justify a finding that there was an intention to defraud." 4. We now revert to the language of Section 464 of the Act. It opens with the words "Where any goods imported into Delhi are liable to the payment of terminal tax, any person who, with the intention of evading payment of the tax introduces or attempts to introduce or causes or abets the introduction of any such goods within the Union Territory of Delhi... . .." The important words in the section are "the intention of evading payment of the tax". . .." The important words in the section are "the intention of evading payment of the tax". Unless this intention is established, the section does not apply and this would lead to the result arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge. Learned counsel urges that in fact there was an intention, but as there has been no evidence led and there are no circumstances on record which is only because the goods has not gone to a Magistrate it is not possible to find out whether the intention has been established by any evidence led by the Municipal Corporation. It is obvious that if an offence under S.464 of the Act has to be established the necessary prosecution evidence must be on record to establish the circumstances in which the intention can be inferred from the facts. It is very difficult to draw an inference of this type from a mere statement in a short order of a few lines recorded by the Terminal Tax Officer. In the circumstances, we do not think it is a fit case to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. In ending, one other point can be noted in our judgment. It was urged that there was no power of review. It seems that this case according to the learned counsel for the petitioner is not governed by any procedure but Section 457 of the Act provides that the procedure provided in the Civil P.C. shall be followed in the Court of the District Judge, Delhi. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code are not satisfied in the present case. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents contends the case is either covered by Section 114 of the Code or by Section 171 of the Act. The latter section reads, in its proviso as follows :- "Provided that it shall be lawful for the Court, upon application or on its own motion, to review any order passed by it in appeal within three months from the date of the order." This proviso seems to be unrestricted and gives full power of review to the District Judge under the Act. 6. 6. To put the question in a different way, either a case falling under Section 464 of the Act is criminal in nature and has to be tried by a Magistrate with appeals under the Criminal P.C. in which case the orders passed by the Terminal Tax Officer are without jurisdiction and in which case the appeal will also not lie to the Additional District Judge as the order would be a complete nullity. Alternatively, the case is one which is within the jurisdiction of the Terminal Tax Officer in which case it would be an order passed as a taxation order. If it is a taxation order it would be appealable to the District Judge under Section 169 and consequently a review lies under Section 171 of the Act. 7. Once we have held that a review lies and the finding of the Additional District Judge that the intention has not been established, it becomes a pure question of fact and we do not think this is a fit case to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction and accordingly dismiss the petition but leave the parties to bear their own costs.