JUDGMENT : Swamikkannu, J.- This is an appeal by the accused Shanmugham against the judgment is S.C. No 27 of 1979 dated 31st July, 1079 on the file of the Court of the learned. Sessions Judge, Dharmapuri Division at Krishnagiri, finding him guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, convicting him thereunder and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The case against the accused appellant is that on 30th November, 1978 at about 8 p.m. he at the feet-hill of Pethathalapalli at about 4 k.m. north west of Krishnagiri, committed murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of his wife Chandra by dropping a stone on her head. When the charge was framed under section 302, Indian Penal Code, against the accused and was questioned by the trial. Court, the accused-appellant herein had denied the offence. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 14 and also filed Exhibits P-1 to P-32 and produced before the trial Court M.Os. 1 to 25.On the question whether the prosecution has proved its case, the trial Court held on the consideration of the evidence available on record, that the prosecution had proved its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and further held that the accused is guilty of the offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life as mentioned above. 3. The case of the prosecution against the accused is simple. The accused Shanmugham belongs to Errampatti village. About a year prior to the occurrence, the deceased Chandra, daughter of P.W. 3 Perumal was married by the deceased. After their marriage, both the accused and his wife Chandra were living together at Errampatti village itself. About a month thereafter both the accused and his wife, the deceased herein came to Moongilpathur and lived in the house of P.W. 5 Kaveri Ammal. From there, the accused brought his wife Chandra to Errampatti village for a function on Saturday, the second day of “Purattasi.” Both the accused as well as his wife were living at Errampatti along with P.W. 4 Nagammal, the “mother of the accused. The accused beat his wife Chandra. P.W. 3, Perumal, the father -in -law of the accused came to the house and took his daughter Chandra to his house. P.W. 3 is living in a garden near a garden shed near Pochammampalli. The accused beat his wife Chandra. P.W. 3, Perumal, the father -in -law of the accused came to the house and took his daughter Chandra to his house. P.W. 3 is living in a garden near a garden shed near Pochammampalli. About a week prior to Deepavalli, the accused went to the house of P.W.3and told that his wife has to be sent along with him. For the same, P.W. 3 assured the accused that he would be sending his wife about a week after the celebration of Deepavalli festival. In accordance with the compromise that was effected at the instance of one Pappathi Ammal, P.W. 3 Perumal sent the deceased Chandra with the accused Shanmugham on a Monday. Both the accused as well as his wife were living in the house of the accused. Thereafter, the accused as well as the deceased went to the house of p.W.3 and informed him that they were proceeding to Moongilputhur and left the place. When P.W. 3 left for his house, he found the wife of the accused wearing M.O.8 sari. She also took M.O.6 bag in which M.O. 9 saree was kept. The next day was Friday. On the morning of that day, the accused came and informed P.W.3 as well as P.W. 4 that his wife, the deceased Chandra was missing. P.W.3 Perumal went in search of his daughter to the adjacent villages and other places. But be could not ascertain the where as bouts of the deceased Chandra. 4. On the Friday, at about, 10.00 a.m. the accused went to the house of p.W.5 Kaveriammal at Moongilputbur. At that time, he took out M.O. 12 Shirt from his body and hung the same on the wall. He wore another shirt and then left the place. On a prior occasion, that is, in the month of “Aadi” itself, when the accused and the deceased Chandra were staying in the house of P.W.5, the deceased Chandra, the wife of the accused handed over M.O.13 series silver toe rings two in number to P.W.5. 5. P.W. 6 Kunjappan had seen the accused and his wife the deceased Chandra, proceeding near Taj Hotel situate in Krishnagiri-Bangalore Road. It was then 6.00 p.m. In order to go to his house, he was proceeding through Londonpettai at that time. 5. P.W. 6 Kunjappan had seen the accused and his wife the deceased Chandra, proceeding near Taj Hotel situate in Krishnagiri-Bangalore Road. It was then 6.00 p.m. In order to go to his house, he was proceeding through Londonpettai at that time. At that time, he had seen the deceased Chandra wearing M.O. 8 saree and the accused was wearing shirt M.O. 12. On 1st December, 1978, on the information given by the villagers of pcosaripatti that there was a dead body of a female lying near a stream in Pethathalapalli, P.W. 1 Raghavan, President of Pethathalapalli village Panchayat and P.W.2 Varadarajan, Village Munsif, went to the place where the deal body was lying. They saw a big stone kept on the face of the dead body of the deceased. P.W. 1 gave a complaint to P.W. 2 which was reduced to writing by the village munsif. The said complaint given by P.W. 1 to P.W. is Exhibit P-1. Thereafter, P.W. 2 prepared printed reports and sent the same to the police as well as to the learned Magistrate. Exhibits P-2 and P-3 are the printed reports. P.W. 2 sent Exhibits P-2 and P-3 which are printed reports to the learned Magistrate through Talayari, Samu. P.W 2 arranged for the guarding of the dead body till the arrival of the police at the scene. On receipt of Exhibits P-1 and P-2, P.W-13 Sub-Inspector of Police registered the same, as Cr. No. 1173 of 1978 under section 302, Indian Penal Code. Exhibit P.30 is the First Information Report. 6. On 1st December, 1973, at about 1.45 p.m. P.W. 14, Inspector of police Krishnagiri went to the scene place, supervised the place where the dead body was lying and prepared Exhibit P-4 observation mahazar. P.W. 2 had attested the same. He (P.W. 14) also prepared Exhibit P-31 rough sketch of the scene of occurrence. P.W. 14 the Inspector of Police, caused the place of occurrence and the deceased to be photographed by P.W. 10 Balasubrahmaniam. The copy of photo of the deceased is Exhibit P-8 and Exhibit P-20 is the negative. Thereafter, P.W 14 recovered M.O. 1 a stone, M.O.2 bloodstained earth, M.O.3 broken pieces of glass bangles, and M.O. 5 taps under Exhibit P-5 attested by P.W.I. P.W. 14 held inquest over the dead body of the deceased. P.W. 2 was one of the panchayatdars in the said inquest. Thereafter, P.W 14 recovered M.O. 1 a stone, M.O.2 bloodstained earth, M.O.3 broken pieces of glass bangles, and M.O. 5 taps under Exhibit P-5 attested by P.W.I. P.W. 14 held inquest over the dead body of the deceased. P.W. 2 was one of the panchayatdars in the said inquest. Exhibit P-32 is the inquest report. In order to identify the dead body of the deceased, torn tom was effected in the village as well as in the neighbouring villages. Though notices as well as through newspapers, P.W. 14 advertised about the occurrence in this case. P.W 14 entrusted the dead body to P.W. 11 Nethaji P.C. 720 for being taken to post mortem examination. On 1st December, 1378, the dead body was taken by P.W. 11, to the Government Hospital at Krishnagiri and it was produced before P.W. 7 Dr. Zamruth Begum, Civil Assistant Surgeon Government Hospital at Krishnagiri. 7. P.W. 7 Dr. Zamuruth Begum, Civil Assistant Surgeon attached to Government Hospital, Krishnagiri received Exhibit P-9 requisition from P.W. 14, Inspector of police, Krishnagiri for conducting autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. She commenced the postmortem examination at 11.30 a.m. on 2nd December, 1978. The condition of the body was that rigor mortis had passed of over face, upper and lower limbs. The doctor ascertained from the appearance of the dead body that the same was that of a female, aged about 20years. The dead body was lying or its back with one skirt around the waist. The head was soaked with dried clotted blood. There were also clotted blood found in both the ears. Fluid blood was present at the nose. P.W. 7 found the following external injuries: 1. A curved lacerated wound 5½? × 2? × scalp deep over the left side of forehead l½? above the left eye brow. Dried clotted blood over the face and both the ears was present. 2. A lacerated wound 1¼? ×½? 1-1/8? over the left temporal region ½? above the left ear with dried clotted blood. She suspected fracture of the skull. 3. An abrasion 1? × ¼? over the left side of chin. 4. irregular curved abrasion 5½ × 1? proximally and 1? in width distally over the right glutteal region’. 5. An abrasion ½? × 1/8? vertical 1 c.m. away from, the lower end of the vulval entroits on the right side. 6. An a brasion ¼? 3. An abrasion 1? × ¼? over the left side of chin. 4. irregular curved abrasion 5½ × 1? proximally and 1? in width distally over the right glutteal region’. 5. An abrasion ½? × 1/8? vertical 1 c.m. away from, the lower end of the vulval entroits on the right side. 6. An a brasion ¼? × ¼? over the left labia minora near the clitoris. 7. Multiple abrasions over the labia majora of the left side. 8. There was erythema 1? × ¼? over the mucocutaneous junction of vulval introitis on the left side. On di section of the wound, P.W. 7 found effusion of blood under-heath muscle fibres. P.W. 7 found the skull clotted and fluid blood over the surface of the brain and there was fracture of temporal bone of both sides and fracture of spehenoid bone on the left side. There was 4 ounses of fluid blood found it the base of the skull. 8. On internal examination, P.W. 7 found that the heart chambers were empty and the stomach contained four ounces of light black coloured fluid. In the brain, clotted blood and fluid flood was found over the surface of the brain corresponding to the external wounds of the scalp. When the vagine of the dead body was examined by P.W. 7, she found the vagina admitting more than two fingers, and old tear of the human was present. She took vaginal smear and preserved. She had preserved the following items for chemical examination: 1. Stomach and its contents. 2. Intestine and its contents. 3. Sample of liver. 4. One kidney. 5. Vaginal smear. 6. Skirt of the victim. She had reserved her opinion as to the cause of death pending report from Chemical Examiner with regard to the viscera and other items. After receipt of report of the Chemical Examiner (Exhibit P.11) with regard to the stomach contents of the deceased, she furnished her opinion Exhibit P-12 that the deceased wound appear to have died of shock and haemorrhage due to injuries to the skull. According to her Injury No. 1 caused the fracture, of skull, fracture of temporal bone and also sphenoid bone and, that injuries 1 and 2are fatal and they could cause death, and death could be instantaneous. Injury Nos. 6 to 8 could be caused by forcible sexual intercourse and due to struggle. According to her Injury No. 1 caused the fracture, of skull, fracture of temporal bone and also sphenoid bone and, that injuries 1 and 2are fatal and they could cause death, and death could be instantaneous. Injury Nos. 6 to 8 could be caused by forcible sexual intercourse and due to struggle. According to her, if the head comes into contact with M.O.1 stone and the head is pulled by hair and the head comes repeatedly into contact with the stone. Injuries 1 to 3 could be caused. P.W. 7 has further opined that the deceased would appear to have died about 36 hours prior to her post-mortem examination. Exhibit P-10 is the postmortem certificate issued by P.W. 7. After the post-mortem was over, P.W. 11, P.C. 720 took from the dead body M.O. 19 series two silver toe rings. M.O. 12 series glass bangle pieces, M.O. 20 ‘Manimalai’ and M.O. 21 yellow ribbon and entrusted the same in the police station. 9. On 11th December, 1978, at about 10.00 a.m. P.W. 14 arrested the accused in the house of the accused at Errampatti. When P.W. 14 had been to Errampatti, he took along with him P.W 9 Lakhsmana Gounder and some others. At the time of arrest, the accused gave a statement voluntarily, the admissible portion of which is Exhibit P-18. In pursuance of the said statement, the accused produced M.O. 16, gold kammal, M.O. 17, gold nose screw, M.O. 18 gold nose serew, M.O. 23 dhoti, M.O. 24 drawer and M.O. 25 panian from his house and they were seized by P.W. 14 at 12 noon as per Mahazar Exhibit P-19 atteted by P.W. 9. The dhoti M.O. 23 contained bloodstains. P.W. 14 also searched the house of the accused. Then P.W. 14 examined, P.W. 4 mother of the accused also. At about 4 P.M. P.W. 14 returned to Krishnagiri and the accused pointed out the well and went inside the well and from inside the water, he took out M.O. 6 bag which contained M.Os. 7 to 11 and they were seized under Exhibit P-6 mahazar attested by P.W.s 2 and 9. Thereafter, P.W. 14 at 6 p.m. went to Moongilputhur along with the accused and party. The accused from the house of P.W. 5 Kaveri ammal produced M.Os. 12 to 14 and the same were recovered under mahazar Exhibit P-7 altered by P.Ws. 2 and 9. Thereafter, P.W. 14 at 6 p.m. went to Moongilputhur along with the accused and party. The accused from the house of P.W. 5 Kaveri ammal produced M.Os. 12 to 14 and the same were recovered under mahazar Exhibit P-7 altered by P.Ws. 2 and 9. P.W. 14 also examined P.W. 2 Varadarajan, P.W. 5 Kaveriammal, P.W. 6 Kunjappan and P.W. 9 Lakhmana Gounder and others. P.W. 14 then sent the accused for remand on 12th December, 1978. He also submitted Exhibit P-13 requisition for recording confession statement from the accused under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. On 11th December, 1978, he examined P.W. 3 Perumal and he was shown the jewels M.Os 16 to 18andother clothings of the deceased and also the photo Exhibit P-8. P.W. 3 identified the deceased as that of his daughter Chandra from the photo Exhibit P-8 and other properties. Then he (P.W. 14) submitted all the seized properties to Court with a requisition for sending the same to the chemical analysis. 10. P.W. 8 Pasupathi who was the Judicial Second class Magistrate, Hosur during December, 1978 on receipt of Exhibit P.13 requisition from the Inspector of police on 13th December, 1978, caused the production of the accused Shanmugham before him on 15th December, 1978. He took all the formalities and gave necessary warning to the accused. Then he gave the accused time for reflection and remanded the accused back to the Sub Jail, Hosur, giving directions to the Super indent of the Jail, to cause production of the accused before him on 16th December, 1978 at 3 p.m. Accordingly, the accused was produced before him on 16th December, 1978 at 3.25 p.m. Thereafter P.W. 8 again after observing all the formalities as contemplated under law, explained to the accused that he is not bound to make a confessional statement before him and that if he does so, it might be used against him as evidence during trial. From the answers recorded from the accused P.W. 8 was satisfied that the accused was willing to make a voluntary statement and accordingly, he recorded the same. After recording the same the same was read over and explained to the accused and P.W 8 obtained his signature in the statement. P.W. 8 appended his certificate at the end of the statement. Exhibit P-14 is the preliminary warning addressed to the accused on 15th December, 1978. After recording the same the same was read over and explained to the accused and P.W 8 obtained his signature in the statement. P.W. 8 appended his certificate at the end of the statement. Exhibit P-14 is the preliminary warning addressed to the accused on 15th December, 1978. Exhibit P-15 is the final warning addressed to the accused on 16th December, 1978. Exhibit P-16 is the statement of the accused under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure, Exhibit P-17 is the certificate appended by P.W. 8 to Exhibit P.16. 10-a. P.W. 12, Head Clerk attached to Judicial Second Class Magistrate's Court on receipt of Exhibit P-21 requisition on 18th December, 1975, for sending some items of properties for chemical analysis, he, at the direction of the Magistrate, sent the same to the Chemical Analyst under Exhibit P-22, the office copy. Exhibits 23 and 24 are the reports of chemical Examiner and Sercologist respectively. On receipt of another requisition Exhibit P-25, some more items of properties were sent to chemical analysis as per the direction of the Magistrate. The office copy of the letter is Exhibit P-26. Exhibits P-27 and P-28 are the reports of Chemical Examiner and Serologist respectively. Exhibit P-29 is the further report received from the Chemical Examiner, from the report of the Serologist, it was found that M.Os. 1 to 3 contained stains of human blood of ‘O’ group. After completing investigation in this case, P.W. 14 Inspector of police, Krishnagiri laid charge sheet on 7th March, 1979, before Court. 11. When questioned under section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the incriminating circumstances available in the evidence or record, the accused denied the offence. The accused has stated that he did not beat his wife; but his father-in-law took his wife to his house. He called her to come from her parents’ house to his house. But his father-in-law refused to send the deceased with him. The accused also admitted that one Pappathi Ammal had effected compromise between himself and the deceased, but his father-in-law did not send his wife to his house on the Monday as promised by him. According to the accused, he was arrested in his house on the night of Saturday by the police. The accused also admitted that one Pappathi Ammal had effected compromise between himself and the deceased, but his father-in-law did not send his wife to his house on the Monday as promised by him. According to the accused, he was arrested in his house on the night of Saturday by the police. The accused specifically stated he was beaten and tortured by the police and that is the reason why he had given a confessional statement before the learned Magistrate as per Exhibit P-18 at the instigation of the police. According to the accused he had stated in Exhibit P-16, confessional statement under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure recorded by P.W. 8 that he killed his wife Chandra because the police instructed him to say so and as per the directions of the police, he had stated in that manner. The accused has denied knowledge about M.Os. 1 to 3, M.Os. 21 and 22. According to the accused, he has been falsely implicated in this case and that he is innocent. The accused did not examine any witness on his side nor file any document. 12. On the point whether the prosecution has proved its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the trial Court had come 10 the conclusion for the reasons given by it from paragraphs 18 to 20 of its judgment that the guilt of the accused had been established to the hilt by the prosecution and as such, it is the accused who had caused the death of the deceased by dropping a stone on her face. Therefore, the trial Court found the accused guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, convicted him there under and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. 13. The trial Court also observed that as the accused is only aged 28 years, the extreme penalty under law is not called for in this case. 14. Aggrieved by the finding of the trial Court, the accused Shanmugham has preferred the appeal from the Jail inter alia stating that he has been convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence and that the circumstantial evidence available in this case against him is not adequate and proper for coming to the conclusion that he is guilty of the offence with which he has been charged. According to the accused, P.W. 6 is a tortured witness. According to the accused, P.W. 6 is a tortured witness. The accused-appellant herein has further stated in his grounds of appeal that the, police caught him and beat him and caused him unbearable sufferings and that is the reason why he gave a confessional statement before P.W. 8, the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Hosur. According to the accused-appellant herein, he gave the statement as tutored by the police. It is further stated in the memo of grounds sent by the accused-appellant fro m the jail that M.O. 1 is a stone which cannot be lifted and thrown by a single man and that if such a stone had been lifted and thrown on the deceased by her assailant, the whole body of the deceased must have been crushed. It is further stated in the grounds of appeal sent by the accused-appellant that a single individual cannot push a person against the stone repeatedly. 15. Mr. R. Subramanyam, advocate of this Court had been appointed as Amicus Curiae to defend the accused in this appeal. The learned Counsel took us through the entire evidence both oral and documentary. Mr. R. Subramaniam has vehemently contended that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution in this case is not adequate and satisfactory so as to point at the guilt of the accused and that the case of the prosecution put forward by the oral evidence let in by the prosecution witnesses bristles with vital contra dictions and material discrepancies. In support of his contention R.S. Subramaniam has referred to several passages from leading text book commentaries as well as decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court of India. 16. The point for consideration in this appeal is whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused Shanmugharn, the appellant herein who had thrown the store on the head of his wife, the deceased Chandra at about 8.00 p.m. during night on 30th November, 1978, and caused her death. Her body has been identified, both by P.W. 3, the father of the deceased and P.W. 5 Kaverianvmal. P.W. 3 states in his evidence that when the accused and the deceased left his house after staying for about half an hour, the deceased was seen wearing M.O. 8. Her body has been identified, both by P.W. 3, the father of the deceased and P.W. 5 Kaverianvmal. P.W. 3 states in his evidence that when the accused and the deceased left his house after staying for about half an hour, the deceased was seen wearing M.O. 8. According to him, his daughter had only two sarees and one of the sarees was held by her in her hand at the time when she left his house and the other was worn by her and it was M.O. 8. She was also taking M.O.6 a bag in her hand. The other saree which she was taking in her hand at that time was M.O.3. On the next day, the accused came to P.W. 3 and informed him that the deceased Chandra had been missing from the bus stand at Pochampalli. P.W. 3 searched for his daughter; but he could not find her out. Ten days thereafter, Krishnagiri Police came and asked him to go over to the police station at Krishnagiri. There he was shown a photo as well as clothes. P.W 3 identified them to be that of his daughter, the deceased Chandra. P.W. 3 was shown M.O. 8 from which he identified the dead body of the deceased as that of his daughter. P.W. 3 was also shown M.O. 9, Rose colour saree, M.O 15 blue skirt, M.O. 16 ear ring, M.O. 17 gold nose screw and another nose screw M.O. 18 which he identified as the properties belonging to his daughter the deceased Chandra. M.O. 13 series two silver toe rings and M.O. 19 series another two silver toe rings were shown to P.W. 1which he identified as belonging to his daughter Chandra. P.W. 5 Kaveriammal has stated in her evidence that the accused and his wife Chandra used to engage themselves as labourers under her. In the month of Purattasi, the accused and his wife Chandra left her house saying that they were leaving to attend a festival in the house of the accused According to P.W. 5, at that time, the deceased Chandra had entrusted to her M.O. 13 series two silver toe rings. When the police came she handed over M.O. 13 series two silver toe rings to the accused and the accused handed over them to the police. When the police came she handed over M.O. 13 series two silver toe rings to the accused and the accused handed over them to the police. The evidence thus available on record clearly shows that the corpus delicti is the deceased Chandra who is the wife of the accused. Now the point for consideration is whether the circumstances put forward by the prosecution through its evidence both oral and documentary are adequate and convicting and lead to the irresistible conclusion that it was the accused alone who had been responsible for dropping the stone on the head of the deceased and causing her instantaneous death. 17. In this regard, it is relevant to note that all judicial evidence is either direct or circumstantial. By direct evidence it is meant that the principal act is attested directly by witnesses, things or documents. To all other forms, the term circumstantial evidence is applied which may be defined as that modification of indirect evidence whether by witnesses, things or documents which the law deems sufficiently proximate to a principal fact or facts on issue to be receivable as evidentiary of those facts. Circumstantial evidence is also just as applicable in civil cases as in criminal. Yet on account of the fact that criminal cases affect not only the property but also the life and property of men, the controversies with regard to the value to be attached to circumstantial and direct evidence have risen almost entirely in connection with criminal offence. Both under English and American system of criminal jurisprudence, we find that circumstantial evidence being preferred to direct evidence. It is stated that “witness can lie; circumstances cannot.” 18. In Kenny's outlines of Criminal law, 19th Edition, 1966, it is stated as follows at page 465: “I. 508. These fourth and fifth hazards have impressed some writers so deeply as to make them urge that no conviction for any capital offence should be allowed to take place upon circumstantial evidence alone. But those who so contend have not always realized that in every criminal case the mens rea must necessarily be proved by circumstantial evidence alone (except when the prisoner actually confess). Nor have they realized how extremely obvious may often be the inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, as, for instance, in a case where the evidence is of an ‘alibi’. Nor have they realized how extremely obvious may often be the inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, as, for instance, in a case where the evidence is of an ‘alibi’. Moreover, it must be not overlooked that an item of circumstantial evidence can only arise in Court when some witness gives direct evidence as to its connection with the facts in issue.” Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law also deals with the defects of circumstantial evidence as follows at page 464: “I-506. The following are in3tances of some of the principal forms of circumstantial evidence familiar in criminal cases; the rank of the defendant, his disposition, his motives, his threats, his opportunities, his preparations, his attempts, his false statements, his silence, his fabrication or destruction of evidence, his fight, his possession of stolen property. But circumstantial evidence is just as applicable in civil cases as in criminal. Thus, in an action on a loan, the defendant may call evidence of the property of the plaintiff in order to help to prove that the money was not lent. Yet the controversies with regard to its value have arisen almost entirely in connection with criminal offences. For the much greater security of the penalties that may be inflicted for them has caused many persons to challenge the probative force of facta prcofanila as being, logically inadequate to support a conviction for (at any rate) any capital crime. Defects of circumstantial evidence. 1.507. The question thus raised is so fundamental as to need careful consideration. It is clear that in dealing with any testimonial evidence, whatever, whether ‘circumstantial’ or ‘direct’ a jury may be mislead. For they have to depend upon: (1) the accuracy of the witness's original observation of the events he describes: (2) the correctness of his memory; and (3) his veracity. But in addition to the risks of mistake, forget fullness and falsehood which thus arise when direct evidence is given, there are additional risks to run in dealing with circumstantial evidence. For here the jury have also to depend up on: (4) the cohesion of each circumstance in the evidence with the rest of that chain of circumstance of which it forms a part; (5) their own logical accuracy in deducing inferences from this chain of facts. ‘The more ingenious the jury man the more likely is he to strain his facts to fit his story’‘(Alderson, B). ‘The more ingenious the jury man the more likely is he to strain his facts to fit his story’‘(Alderson, B). For every fact has two faces’. Readiness in detecting them and seizing on the favourable aspect is an important qualification in an advocate. Thus excitement on being accused may be due either to consciousness of guilt or to indignant innocence. Lord Jeffrey, in defending Paterson for poisoning his Wife, was met by proof of his having once contemplated that murder; but this very fact he claimed as exculpative, urging that contemplation of so horrible a purpose must have made a husband ultimately recoil from it.” It is also observed at page 466 of Kenny's Outlines of Criminal law as follows: “I.510. No distrust of circumstantial evidence has been shown by English law. It does not even require that direct evidence shall receive any preference over circumstantial. Memorable instances of important capital convictions, whose correctness is unquestioned, that were based solely on indirect evidence are found in the trials of Courvoisier for the murder of Lord William Russell in 1640, and of Crippen in 1911 for the murder of his wife. Indeed some experienced English and American lawyers have ever, gone so far as to prefer circumstantial evidence to direct. ‘Witnesses’ say they, ‘can lie; circumstances cannot. ‘Moreover, perfectly honest witnesses may give quite inaccurate accounts of events which they have observed. Undoubtedly many famous cases may be cited where great masses of direct evidence have proved to be utterly misleading. Such cases have shown that the direct and explicit assertions, of scores of witnesses, by being given on opposite sides, may create a far greater uncertainty than circumstantial evidence.” 19. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, volume II in paragraphs 365 and 362 have been referred to in order to appreciate the English Law as prescribed by the Supreme Court to the extent to which those principles are applicable to Indian conditions. Paragraphs 361 and 362 runs as follows: “361. Absence of body in homicide cases:. It seems that a defendant cannot be convicted of murder or man slaughter unless either the body of the alleged victim is found or there is evidence, direct or circumstantial of the death of the person said to have been killed; there is no burden upon the defendant to account for the disappearance or the non-appearance of this alleged victim (See 3 Co. Iust. 232. 2. Hale P.C. 290; R. v. Hindumarsh1; R. According to Maule, J. in R. v. Burton6 the rule as to express proof is one of prudence in cases of homicide, and not an absolute rule of evidence.) If the evidence of death tendered is circumstantial it must be so cogent and compelling as to convince the jury that the facts cannot be accounted for on any rational hypothesis other than murder (R. v. Onufrejczvk1 approving R. v. Horry2; Mogrery Sec also R. v. Hodge4; R. v. Taylor Weaver and Donovan6 362. Proof of theft.-In indictment alleging theft or kindred offences such as handling stolen goods the theft may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (See Noon v. Smith7 While it is necessary to prove that the articles which are the subject of the indictment were stolen by someone (R. v. Dredge8), it is not essential to show that the owner missed any of them. If, from the facts proved, the jury is able to infer that they were taken from him(2. East,. P.C. 657; R. v. Burten9; C.C.R. v. Mockfotd11. It is not necessary, in order to secure a conviction, to prove that all items referred to in the indictment have been stolen; Machent v. Quinn12 A defendant is not to be convicted of a theft from an unknown person unless due proof is made that such a crime was committed”; (2. Hale P. C. 290.) 20. In the decision in Lachlman Singh v. Tie State13 it is held that as a matter of prudence and caution it was held not to convict an accused person on oral evidence unless there are some circumstances to lend support to the evidence of the eye witnesses. The corroboration is not of the kind which one requires in the case of the evidence of an approver or an accomplice but corroboration by some circumstances which would lend assurance to the evidence before the Judges and satisfy then that particular accused is really concerned in the murder of the deceased. 21. In Nisa Stree v. The State of Orissa13 on the date of the occurrence an hour before sun set, the accused was seen with the deceased. The accused was witnessed by two ladies proceeding with the deceased to the scene of occurrence but coming alone. Naulis of the deceased which she was wearing were recovered from the accused. 21. In Nisa Stree v. The State of Orissa13 on the date of the occurrence an hour before sun set, the accused was seen with the deceased. The accused was witnessed by two ladies proceeding with the deceased to the scene of occurrence but coming alone. Naulis of the deceased which she was wearing were recovered from the accused. It was held that the circumstantial evidence in the case was only consistent with the guilt of the accrued. 22. In Bhagat Ran, v. The State ofPunjab14, it was held that where a case depends upon the conclusions drawn from circumstances, it is well settled that the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and to bring the offences home to him beyond any reasonable doubt. 23. In Kedar Nath v. The State of West Bengal15 it was held that before a person could be found guilty with reference to mere circumstantial evidence each of the circumstance relied upon must be clearly established and the proved circumstances taken together must be such as reasonably to exclude the probability of innocence. 24. In Sunder Lal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh16 the accused and the deceased were seen together at 2 p.m. on the day of occurrence and immediately the accused went to dispose of the ornaments. Ornaments were established to be the Ornaments worn by the deceased and the accused was not in a position to give any satisfactory explanation as to how he came to be in possession of the same on the very same’ day i.e., on the day the murder was commuted. It was held that the circumstantial evidence therefore was sufficient to hold the accused responsible for the murder of the deceased. 25. In Mangleshwari Prasad v. The State of Bihar1 it was held that when there is no direct evidence and the whole case turns on circumstantial evidence, it is well settled that circumstantial evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. In that case only two persons, appellant and the peon R could do the forgery and embezzlement and it was proved that it has not done, then the appellant only is responsible for the act. In that case only two persons, appellant and the peon R could do the forgery and embezzlement and it was proved that it has not done, then the appellant only is responsible for the act. The capacity of the accused to do forgery and the opportunity to do the same were found sufficient to prove the guilt. 26. In Kutlahal Yadev v. State of Bihar2 it was held that if one woman died a natural death, the first thing which one would have expected from the appellant with wham the old lady was living was to have informed the son-in-law and the grand son of the old woman about her death and asked them to arrange for the cremation of the dead body. This circumstance is inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. And further the appellant insisted for cremation as early as possible, also show that he was aware of the manner, in which the old woman met her death and was anxious to dispose of the dead body so as to avert any suspicion or proof of her having met with unnatural death. The conviction and sentence of death of appellant in that ease was upheld. 27. In Machander v. The State of Hyderabad3 the following circumstances were relied upon by the prosecution: “1. That the appellant knows that the deceased M. had attended the Court at parenda on the 16th and that he had seen him there but when questioned about it he told a lie. 2. That thirteen days after the murder he knew that M. had been murdered. He also knows where the murder had been committed and where the body and certain articles belonging to the deceased were hidden. 3. That there was ill will between them, but ill will that other members of the appellant's family might be expected to share. 4. That he had full opportunity to commit the crime but the same kind of opportunity the other members of his family also had. It was held that the above circumstances are not sufficient to warrant a conclusion of murder by the appellant as these circumstances can be said to point with equal suspicion as other members of the appellant family. The appeal was allowed. 28. It was held that the above circumstances are not sufficient to warrant a conclusion of murder by the appellant as these circumstances can be said to point with equal suspicion as other members of the appellant family. The appeal was allowed. 28. In Eradu and others v. State of Hyderabad4 it was held that no charge of murder could certainly be entertained against a person by reason of such recoveries as silver Kardoda was an article in common use by the people. In this case there was recovery of silver Kardoda at the instance of the second accused and a white turban and a stick from the house of the third accused. The silver Kardoda alleged to have been removed from the person of the deceased was hurried in a secluded sport which had been removed as pointed out by the Accused No. 2 could be in the know of silver Kardoda after it had been removed from the person of the accused by whom so ever was responsible for doing the deceased to death. It was further held that the evidence is not sufficient to bold the accused guilty. 29. Goreinda Reddy v. The Slate of Mysore1, it was held that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence found by the Courts, particularly in view of the unacceptable explanation given by appellant No. 1 for the presence of bloodstains or his Pyjama and his failure to give any explanation in regard to the possession of the stolen goods a few days after the incident, leave no doubt in the minds of the Judges that the hypothesis suggested, namely, that appellants 2 and 3 might have committed the murder and given to appellant No. 1 a portion of the spoils, is more fanciful. In this case, the facts found are not capable of explanation upon any other hypothesis than that the first appellant participated in the commission of the offence of murder and robbery. 30. In Raghav Prapanna v. State of Uttar Pradesh2 the prosecution relied upon the following circumstances in order to establish that the murder of the deceased was committed by the appellants: 1. 30. In Raghav Prapanna v. State of Uttar Pradesh2 the prosecution relied upon the following circumstances in order to establish that the murder of the deceased was committed by the appellants: 1. On 5th April, 1961, Kamla and Madhusudhan were in the house of Ramanuj Das. Kamla was the wife and Madhusudhan was the son of Ragha v. 2. Kamla and Madhusudhan were last seen alive on 5th April, 1961, in the evening. 3. On 5th April, 1961 at about 5 on 6 p.m. three gun shots were fired on the roof of Ramanuj Das. 4. On 5th April, 1961, at about 9 or 10 p.m. Raghav Prapanna Mohan and Udham Singh left village Hamirpur Roora on the jeep of Raghav. 5. On 5th April, 1961, at about 11 p.m. Raghav Prapanna purchased petrol from Bidhuna Petrol pump. 6. On 6th April, 1961, at about 8.30 a.m. Raghav Prapanna crossed Rawatpur barrier in Kanpur. 7. On 6th April, 1961, Raghav Prapanna got a post card sent by his sister that Kamla had reached Lucknow safely. 8. On 6th April, 1961, bloodstained earth was recovered from the house of Ramanuj Das from 11 different places. 9. On 14th April, 1961, bloodstained earth was recovered from the house of Ramanuj Dass from 7 different places. 10. All the accused absconded after the alleged murder. 11. Bloodstained shirt and pyjama belonging to Raghav Prapanna were recovered from the possession of Snowwhite Dyers and Dry Clearners, Lucknow. 12. The police could not trace out the jeep of Raghav Prapanna in spite of best efforts. It was held that the above circumstances do not lead to reasonable conclusion that the murder of the deceased was committed by the appellants. 31. In Rajinder Kumar and another v. The State of Punjab3, it was held that the following circumstances were sufficient for maintaining the conviction: “(a) That the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. (b) Making contradictory statements as to where the deceased was. (c) That the recovery of the dead body was made at the instance of the accused. The death sentence was maintained in the above case. 32. In Charan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh1. (b) Making contradictory statements as to where the deceased was. (c) That the recovery of the dead body was made at the instance of the accused. The death sentence was maintained in the above case. 32. In Charan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh1. It was held that the circumstances relied on by the prosecution were sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused as they are consistent with the hypothesis of the grill of the appellant and the chain of circumstances is to complete as it does not leave any reasonable doubt for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the appellant. In that case, firstly the appellant was seen entering the house of Atar Singh, at about 8 or 8.30a.m. on 20th November, 1957, the morning on which the murder was committed, secondly, when he entered the house, he was wearing the shirt Exhibit p.2, but when he came out, be ha d a vest on and no shirt. Thirdly, the shirt, Exhibit P-2 stained with human blood was found near the dead body of Sarjiti. Fourthly when the appellant entered the house of Atar Singh he had carried something under his arm wrapped in a piece of cloth but when he came out, he had nothing in his hand or under his arm and later on a bloodstained chopper belonging to the appellant was found near the dead body; and fifthly both the shirt and chopper were stained with human blood. It was further held in that case that the hypothesis that a stranger or a thief other than the appellant had committed the murder is completely inconsistent with the finding of the bloodstained shirt and chopper belonging to the appellant near the dead body. 33. In Awadhi Yadav and another v. The State of Bihar2 the following circumstances were relied on by the prosecution to fasten the guilt on the accused appellants: 1. There was bitter enmity between the appellants and the deceased. 2. The deceased died as a result of injuries inflicted on him by sharp cutting weapons like Bhallas and Pharsas. 3. The Appellants and others were carrying the dead body. 4. On hearing a hue and cry, the appellants dropped the dead body and ran away from that place. 5. The appellants gave no explanation as to how they happened to carry the dead body of the deceased. 6. 3. The Appellants and others were carrying the dead body. 4. On hearing a hue and cry, the appellants dropped the dead body and ran away from that place. 5. The appellants gave no explanation as to how they happened to carry the dead body of the deceased. 6. That the witnesses saw the appellants with Bhallas and Pharsas. 7. All the injuries on the person of the deceased could be caused by bhallas and pharsas. It was held in that case that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. 34. In Bakshish Singh v. The State of Punjab3 the Supreme Court has held that in a case resting on circumstantial evidence the circumstances put forward must be satisfactorily proved and those circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again those circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In Rahman v. State of U.P.4 the proposition is that the circumstances placed before the Court by the prosecution should be sufficient to hold that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he has been charged. 35. The decision in Khashaba Maruti Sheike v. State of Maharashtra5 may usefully be referred in this regard. The appeal was allowed in the said case, because the circumstances placed before the Court were not pointing at the guilt of the accused. 36. The decision in Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. The State of Gujarat1 is an authority for the proposition that even in the case of circumstantial evidence, the Court will have to bear in mind the cumulative effect of all the circumstances in a given case and weigh them as an integrated whole. Any missing link may be fatal to the prosecution case. 37. Any missing link may be fatal to the prosecution case. 37. In Mohan Lal Pangasa v. State of U.P.2, it was held that when the evidence against an accused person, particularly, when he is charged with a grave offence like, murder, if it consists of only circumstances and not direct oral evidence, it must bee qualitatively such that on every reasonable hypothesis the conclusion must be that the accused is guilty not fantastic possibilities nor freak inferences but rational deductions which reasonable mind make from the probative force of facts and circumstances. Among the circumstances which go against the accused's innocence is the falsity of the plea that he put forward. It is not illegal to take into consideration this circumstance also if there are other compelling materials bringing home the guilt to the accused. It was further held in that case the accused was the person last seen with the deceased; his conduct of running away when challenged an d chased and crouching underneath a bogie when the Rakshaks were about to run him down, his wearing clothes which were bloodstained, the recovery of the knife, from his trouser pocket and his conduct in telling the Rakshaks that he murdered his companion are too overwhelming for any possible inference of innocence. Moreover, the accused led the police party to the discovery of the dead-body which also has an incriminating impact. So viewed, it was held by the Supreme Court that it was impossible to escape the conclusion that the circumstantial testimony adduced in this case is incompatible with the guiltlessness of the appellant. The appeal was dismissed. 38. In Mahmood v. State of Uttar Pradesh3 it was held by the Supreme Court that the conviction cannot rest on the solitary circumstance, namely, that the finger prints of the appellant were found on the gandle of the Gandass, P-1 which was found lying near the dead-body at the scene of occurrence. 39. The decision in Har Dayal v. State of U.P.4 is relied on for the proposition that the circumstances relied or by the prosecution should be capable of forming a chain so complete that there can be no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the deceased was kidnapped, murdered and his dead-body thrown into the well by none other but the accused. The following circumstances were relied on by the prosecution to fasten the guilt on the accused. 1. That the accused had a revengeful motive to commit the crime because his parents in-law intransigently refused to send his wife. 2. The accused held out a threat to wreak vengeance upon them in a manner which would make them repenat for the rest of their lives. 3. The appellant was seen inducing and taking away the deceased child from the house of his parents. 4. The appellant confessed (Extra-judicial confession) before P.Ws. that he had brought the child and that he would restore him. 5. After making this confession and promise for restoration of the child, the appellant accompanies but on way he slipped away and disappeared on the false excuse of bringing money for travelling expenses. 6. The dead body of a boy was found floating in a well in the town where appellant is residing. 7. The body and the clothes and shoes on it were later identified by P.Ws. to be that of the deceased. According to the medical officer, who conducted the autopsy, the body was of a boy, aged 11 years, who had been throttled to death four or five days earlier, and thereafter the dead-body was immersed in water. In that case, the death sentence was committed to the imprisonment for life. In other words, it was held, that the above circumstances relied on by the prosecution were adequate to uphold the case of the prosecution that it was the accused who had committed the offence. 40. In Ram Dass v. State of Moharashtra1 it was held that something more would be required to connect the appellant with the murders than mere possession of ornaments and other articles of Sujan Singh because it is quite possible that the appellant may have had nothing to do with the murders and he might have merely stolen the ornaments and other articles belonging to Sujan Singh after the murders were committed by some others. It was also held that where the circumstances are susceptible of two equally possible inference, the Courts should accept that inference which favours the accused rather than an inference which goes in favour of the prosecution. 41. The decision in State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh2, it was held that when the main planks in the circumstantial evidence gave way, no conviction could be sustained. 41. The decision in State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh2, it was held that when the main planks in the circumstantial evidence gave way, no conviction could be sustained. 42. The decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the accused mentioned above lay down the rule that circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution to fasten the guilt on the accused should be consistent and consistent only with the guilt of the accused and if the evidence is consistent with any other explanation, then there is an element of doubt of which the accused must be given the benefit. The above decisions also lay down the principle that the mere suspicion that the accused took part in a murder cannot take the place of proof particularly when the entire case depends upon circumstantial evidence. Where the case depends entirely on circumstantial, evidence, we have to be very carefully in scanning the circumstances to see whether they are so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. 43. When the prosecution case depends on the circumstantial evidence, then it is but necessary that in the said evidence not only should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established; but the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. 44. The Supreme Court in Anant Chintaman Logu v. State of Bombay3, has laid down the principles which govern the cases when the evidence is of circumstantial nature. In that case, quoting the observations of Baron Parke in Towells case4, where the learned Baron laid down the principles applicable to the case, the Supreme Court has observed that any circumstance which destroys the presumption of innocence if properly established can be taken into account to find if the circumstances lead to no other inference but guilt. But what Court has to see is whether taking the totality of circumstances which are held to have been proved against the appellants, it can be said that the case is established against the offender that is facts established are inconsistent with the innocence of the offender and incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than guilt (Vide Raghav Prapanno v. State of U.P.5 ). 45. 45. The inference or presumption of guilt upon the main charge of murder can be safely drawn where the accused is in unexplained possession of jewels or articles of the victim after the crime, and where is addition, there is some evidence at least connecting the movements of the accused with those of the victim, either before or after the crime, and in some manner or another, establishing a nexus between the accused and the offence. The mere unexplained possession or production of the jewels of the victim by the accused any not constitute a safe basis for a conviction upon a charge of murder when that is the only bare circumstances, proved in evidence. The reason for that is fairly obvious. The test of circumstantial evidence must be satisfied, the chain of links in that evidence must lead to only on reasonable inference, namely, that the accused was the murderer and all other probable hypothesis must be excluded. The murderer might have delivered the jewels to the accused for disposal shortly after the crime. Again it is even conceivable that the murderer might have fled when someone approached, and that the jewels might later have been taken away by the accused from the body, or from the spot of crime. In Chimappa Udayar v. State1, it was held that something may depend upon the time interval between the crime, and the recovery of the jewels from the accused. But it is quite probable that, even during the lapse of a few hours, the jewels might have changed hands. In this regard, the decision in In re, Thangaswami2 has also been referred to on behalf of the accused appellant herein. 46. The facts that the accused was in possession of the jewels, a possession which he has not explained, some hours later, and that he was apparently unaware of the bloodstains on the jewels, would give weight to support the inference that he must have been the murderer, or must have participated in the murder, or that he must have stolen, the jewels from the spot of occurrence or must have been commissioned to dispose of them. It was held so in the decision In re Thangaswami3. It was held so in the decision In re Thangaswami3. It was further held in that case that before it could be held by the Court that the circumstantial evidence establishes the guilt of the accused upon the charge of murder, some further evidence is necessary, establishing some connection between the accused and the victim, in relation to the time and locality of offence, or to the crime itself. 47. In cases of calculated and cold-blooded murder the culprit generally tries to conceal the deed committed by him and it is not a matter of surprise that there is only circumstantial evidence in support of the prosecution care. Therefore, the Courts are duty bound to be extremely careful in appraisal of evidence in case where the crime alleged, is of a ghastly nature generating a good deal of prejudice and ill-will against the accused. The circumstances on which the prosecution places its reliance must be such as are compatible only with the guilt of the accused and this must be proved beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt keeping always in view that the burden remains on the prosecution throughout to establish its case (Vide Rajander Kumar v. The State4). 48. In re, Singaram4 is also an authority for the proposition that the question whether the unexplained possession of the property by the accused would be evidence of participation in murder is a question of fact turning on all the circumstances of the case. Unless some kind of connecting link, however remove it may be, is made out between the movements of the deceased and the accused at or about the time of the murder, even if no reasonable explanation can be suggested by the Court for the possession by the accused of the stolen articles, it would be unsafe to convict the accused person of the offence of murder, Even the production of the property by the accused would not be itself be sufficient to charge the accused with murder. (Vide. In re Sainambu5). Usually some testimony world be forth-coming that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused or that the accused were found somewhere in the vicinity of the scene of the murder at a time which has sufficient proximity to the incident. Unless some such connection can be made out, the inference of murder cannot be drawn (Vide In re, Singaram1). 49. Unless some such connection can be made out, the inference of murder cannot be drawn (Vide In re, Singaram1). 49. In the decision in State v. Motia2 it was held that the mere possession of articles belonging to the murdered person, even supposing that they were bloodstained would not be sufficient to prove a case of murder against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, especially when it is not proved that the articles were in possession of the deceased or that they could not have been missing before the date of the offence. Similarly the presence of bloodstains on the coat and turban of the accused, seven days after the occurrence, does not necessarily indicate that they must have been received in the murder. In the above decision, it was also held that the emission to send a suspected blood stained article for examination by a Chemical Examiner and by a Serologist can have no effect on the prosecution when there is evidence to show that the article in question (an axe) was the very weapon with which the accused had committed the offence, and the accused, far from challenging the statement of this witness, admitted in his examination before the committing Magistrate that that was the axe with which he had committed the offence. 50. In Mangal Singh v. Emperor3 it was held that the fact that the accused assisted in burying the body of the murdered man and gave no explanation of this damning fact cannot, of course prove the crime of murder. But the fact that an accused does not explain very suspicious circumstances against him is certainly circumstantial evidence which may be taken into consideration against him. Circumstantial evidence of the nature is clearly evidence which ought to left to jury and upon which jury might reasonably find a verdict of murder. The question is one of fact and not of law. The above decision was affirmed on Special appeal by the Privy Council in Mangal Singh v. King Emperor4. 51. Circumstantial evidence of the nature is clearly evidence which ought to left to jury and upon which jury might reasonably find a verdict of murder. The question is one of fact and not of law. The above decision was affirmed on Special appeal by the Privy Council in Mangal Singh v. King Emperor4. 51. In Kutubal Yadav v. State of Bihar5 it was held that where in the case of the murder of an old woman there was no direct evidence, and of the two persons who could be suspected to have committed the crime, the accused and a better opportunity had stronger motive than the other, and the conduct of the accused, far from establishing his innocence showed that he was aware of the manner in which the old woman had met with her death and was most anxious to dispose of the dead body so as to avert any suspicion or proof of her having met with an unnatural death as was finally found by the Civil Surgeon on a post-mortem examination of the dead body, it was held that the circumstantial evidence established the guilt of the accused. 52. In Kalua v. The State of U.P.6 the accused was convicted for the murder of the deceased by shooting him with a country-made pistol. The High Court relying upon the circumstantial evidence upheld the conviction. On the facts found there was motive for murder. A few days before the killing of the deceased, the accused had held out a threats against him. A cartridge was found near the cot of the deceased. The accused was arrested fourteen miles away from his village which was the place of occurrence. He produced a pistol from his house in circumstances showing that he had deliberately kept it concealed. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that without the evidence of the firearms expert, the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime of murder. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in order to satisfy themselves that the evidence of the expert was reliable, referred to Kirk on Grime Investigation and Taylor on Medical Jurisprudence, 10th Edition, Volume 1 at page 459. The evidence of the firearms expert showed that he had fired four test cartridges from the pistol produced by the accused. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in order to satisfy themselves that the evidence of the expert was reliable, referred to Kirk on Grime Investigation and Taylor on Medical Jurisprudence, 10th Edition, Volume 1 at page 459. The evidence of the firearms expert showed that he had fired four test cartridges from the pistol produced by the accused. He found the individual characteristics of the chamber to have been impressed on the test cartridges and exactly identical markings were present on the paper tube of the evidence cartridge. He took microphotographs of the individual marks on the test cartridges and gave his opinion that the cartridge found near the cot of the deceased was fired from the pistol produced by the accused. The High Court, therefore, found no reason for distrusting the opinion of the expert which was based on the result of careful tests and which was challenged neither in cross-examination nor in the High Court. The Supreme Court decided that the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the cartridge found near the cot of the deceased was fired from the pistol produced by the appellant from his house and held that no one other than the appellant could have shot the deceased and that, therefore be was rightly convicted of the offence of murder. 53. In Sivarajan v. State1, the deceased was murdered between and 4 p.m. on a certain day. At the time when the murder must have been committed, the accused and the deceased were together at the place of murder and no one else was there. The accused had fastened the gate of the house from within and soon after the murder he spread a false story that the accused had gone out at 3 p.m. It was held that the circumstances were sufficient to bring home the guilt to the accused as they were consistent only with his guilt and were inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 54. 54. In Imam Sansher Hakim v. State of Maharashtra2 the accused were proceeded against for murder of a woman by strangulation and robbery with common intention and the alleged motive was not considered sufficient to convict one of the two accused who could be said to have a motive against the deceased and the second additional circumstances of presence in the vicinity at the time when murder must have been committed was also not considered sufficient to convict the other, conviction of the remaining two on the basis of the second and additional third circumstances of injuries on their person which could be caused by human nails, could not be sustained when no ornaments wore traced to them and the state in which the dead body was found clearly indicated that the deceased woman had been overpowered by her assailants. In such a case what was to be taken into account was that the accused were two men while the victim was a female. 55. In Tathu Garam v. State of Uttar Pradesh3, the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of the girl Kumari H, aged 14 years. On an appreciation of the entire circumstantial evidence on record, the Sessions Court as also the High Court, took the view that the prosecution had satisfactorily established the following facts and incriminating circumstances against the appellant-accused. 1. That on 10th April, 1975 at 8 or 9 a.m. H left her house with meals for her brother K who was working in the field. 2. That after serving food to her brother, she started with the utensils on her return journey at about 10 a.m. 3. That at about 11 a.m., she was seen entering the house of the appellant along with the appellant. 4. That the appellant was at his house at 3 or 4 p.m. on that day with the door of his house belted from inside. 5. That about 5 p.m. when the search party reached the house of the appellant, he was found sitting at the there should of his house and when questioned about H, he ran away. 6. That the dead body of H was found lying in an injured condition in the house and that the utensils (tiffin carrier, Leta, glass etc.,) were recovered from there. 7. 6. That the dead body of H was found lying in an injured condition in the house and that the utensils (tiffin carrier, Leta, glass etc.,) were recovered from there. 7. That from the house, apart from the bloodstained clothes of the deceased, a ‘lingi’ a spear and a stone stained with blood were recovered by the police in the presence of Panchas. 8. That the appellant was all alone staying in the said house where the body of H was found in the aforesaid circumstances. Relying on the aforesaid circumstantial evidence, the Sessions Court convicted the appellant under section 302 and confirmed the death sentence. In appeal to the Supreme Court by Special leave, it was held: (i) that it was clear that the cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances, enumerated above which had been established by the prosecution quite satisfactorily, would lead to the only inference that it was the appellant who was responsible for the murder of deceased H. The trial Court was right in drawing the inference that the appellant a bachelor of 28 years, living all alone must have lured the girl into his house on some pretext or another and tried to criminally assault her, but because of resistance, his attempt failed and thereupon, he killed her. Both the Courts below were perfectly justified in convicting the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code (ii) As regards the sentence, in the absence of any extenuating or mitigating circumstances, there was no justification for awarding any lesser punishment than a death sentence. 56. In State of Maharashtra v. Annappa Bandu Kavatage1, it was held that before a Court can act on circumstantial evidence the circumstances proved must be complete and of a conclusive nature so as to be fully inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and are not explainable on any other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. In a case where there is sufficient interval between the death of the boy kidnapped and the recovery of the body, the link in the chain of the circumstantial evidence cannot held to be fully complete so as to base a conviction thereon. In these circumstances, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 57. In a case where there is sufficient interval between the death of the boy kidnapped and the recovery of the body, the link in the chain of the circumstantial evidence cannot held to be fully complete so as to base a conviction thereon. In these circumstances, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 57. In Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra2 it was held that the principles governing the appreciation of evidence in a case dependent upon circumstantial evidence are that each circumstances relied upon by the prosecution must be established by cogent, succinct and reliable evidence, that the circumstances relied upon must be such as cannot be explained on any hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. In other words, the circumstances must be of an incriminating character. All the proved circumstances must provide a complete chain, no link of which must be missing and they must unequivocally point to the guilt of accused and exclude any hypothesis consistent with his innocence. 58. It was held in State (Delhi Administration) v. V.C. Shukla3 that in order to prove a criminal conspiracy which is punishable under section 120-B, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. This clearly envisages that there must be a meeting of minds, resulting in an ultimate decision taken by the conspirators, regarding the commission of an offence. It is true that, in most cases, it will be difficult to get direct evidence of an agreement to conspire; but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. 59. It is true that, in most cases, it will be difficult to get direct evidence of an agreement to conspire; but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. 59. The following cases are referred to by the learned Counsel for the accused-appellant herein connection with the circumstances that are placed by the prosecution in order to fasten the guilt on the accused on the basis of the authority and contends that the principles involved in the following cases referred to by him when applied to the facts presented before Court by way of evidence both oral and documentary, it can be stated that the prosecution has not established its case beyond all reasonable doubt: Prafulla Chandra Kharghoria v. Emperor1, Hawaldar Singh In re4, Gulam Mohammed v. Emperor5, Mohammed Azim In re12, Emperor v. Basangouda Yamanappa13, Kanakasabai Pillai v. Emperor16, Chandhari v. Emperor17, Emperor and Raghunandan Koeri v. Emperor21. 60. Bearing in mind the principles enunciated in the above decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts referred to by the learned Counsel for the accused-appellant, let us discuss the circumstances that are put forward by the prosecution as circumstances leading to the alleged guilt of the accused. 61. While discussing the evidence available on record, it is but necessary that even at the very inception of the discussion, we are constrained to observe that the investigation in this case is not up to the mark. Though various steps that are required by the procedural law have been applied in this case, yet in our opinion, some more diligent and prompt, approach ought to have been exercised by the Investigating Officer in this case. Generally let us discuss what an investigating Officer has to do when he goes to the scene of occurrence, especially when he suspects that the deceased who is a lady might have been subjected to violence, namely, rape, whoever it is, whether it was by her husband or somebody else. Generally let us discuss what an investigating Officer has to do when he goes to the scene of occurrence, especially when he suspects that the deceased who is a lady might have been subjected to violence, namely, rape, whoever it is, whether it was by her husband or somebody else. In the instant case there is no report from the Chemical Examiner or Serologist concerned, regarding the availability of stains of semen or woman discharge on the clothe: of the accused, who is related to the deceased as her husband and that when those clothes were seized by the Investigating Officer after arrest of the accused and thereafter sent for chemical analysis and in the said document, namely, the result of the said chemical Examiner, the semen does not find a place by way of evidence, we have to observe that this is a defective not only in the investigation but also the careless approach of the public prosecutor in not having marked the said document, if the said document had been available on record. We are unable to understand as to why there has been dearth of evidence available in the case of the prosecution. Exhibit P-24 reveals that item No. 1 a rough irregular stone with dark brown stains when tested for origin, item No. 2 each mixed with small stones on which there were dark brown stairs, item No. 5 pieces of broken glass bangles, on which there was dark brown stains, item No. 6 twelve pieces of broker glass bangles on which there were dark brown stains and item No. 9 an yellow silken ribbon stitched at both ends on which there were dark brown stains, exhibited blood stains of human origin. So for as item No. 8 Shining yellowish glass beeds on a cotton cord with a rusty metal safety pin attached to it, on which there were dark brown stains is concerned, they were disintegrated. So far as items 6 and 9 are concerned, the group of blood could not be ascertained as the result of test was inconclusive. So for as item No. 8 Shining yellowish glass beeds on a cotton cord with a rusty metal safety pin attached to it, on which there were dark brown stains is concerned, they were disintegrated. So far as items 6 and 9 are concerned, the group of blood could not be ascertained as the result of test was inconclusive. Exhibit P-26 is the letter written by the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Krishnagiri to the Director and Chemical Examiner to Government, Tamil Nadu State Forensic Science laboratory, Madras regarding item No. 1 white dhoti with bloodstains, item No. 2 white banian, item No. 3 dark green colour trouser, item No. 4 cotton bag, Item No. 5 two stone pieces, item No. 6 green colour saree (cotton), item No. 7 white colour jacket (cotton), item No. 8 white bra. with one nylon button, item No. 9 nylex saree, Item No, 10 white colour shirt and item No. 11 two silver metties. It is found that all these materials were sent for report to the following points by the Court: (a) Whether there is any blood on the above items and if so whether it is human blood or not. (b) It is human blood, the group of the blood and the same may be sent to the Court. (C) The blood-stains found on the clothing item A, B and C of Exhibit P-26 may be compared with the bloodstained earth, skirt etc., which were already despatched to the Laboratory on 18th December, 1978. (d) The two silver metties in item C may be compared with the silver metties already sent to Laboratory and to report as to whether they are one and the same and may be sent to the trial Court; (e) The nylon button in bra. (Item B) may be compared with the nylon button already sent to Laboratory and to report as to whether they are one and the same and the same may be sent to the trial Court; (f) The seminal stains found on the clothing of item A may be compared with item B. The seminal stain may also be compared with the seminal stain on the skirt and vaginal swab which were already sent to the Laboratory on 18th December, 1978. The contents of this letter clearly shows that the above items were sent for chemical analysis with specific reference to the availability or otherwise of stains of human semen. Exhibit P-27 is the report of the Chemical Examiner dated 28tb April, 1979. It is stated in this report that the Chemical Examiner had examined eleven items that were sent to him, namely item No. 1 a white cotton dhoti with red fancy b orders along two sides and b order stripes along the two ends, on which there were dark brown stains; item No. 2 white cotton sleeveless banian with stitched label “Chinthamani Co-operative-85; item No. 3 an yellowish green half trouser with black fancy designs; item No. 4 a torn white cotton cloth bag with some red printed letters; item No. 5 two rough irregular stones; item No. 6 a torn greenish blue silken saree with yellow fancy designs and with yellow and red fancy b order stringes along two sides and blue and yellow b order strips along one and with decorative fancy yellow and red b order stripe and with decorative red, blue and yellow fancy designs along the other end; item No. 7 a torn faded rose colour silken jacket with violetish fancy floral designs; item No. 8 a torn white cotton bodice with one transparent button having two holes; item No. 9 a faded rose colour floral design, or which there were dark brown stains and item No. 11 two partially crushed whitish metal toe rings. While remaining the above eleven items, it is stated in Exhibit P-27 that the above eleven items when examined for the presence or otherwise of semen and blood, the Chemical Examiner detected blood on each of items 1 and 10 but not of any of items 2 to 9 (both inclusive) or item 11, and that semen was not detected on any of the eleven items’. In this connection, we have to observe that it is not clear from the evidence of the investigating officer whether he had directed his investigation relating to the seizure of clothes of the accused which he was wearing at the time of occurrence near the foot of the hill where he had allegedly resorted to violance of rape on the deceased. Merely on the ground that the above items had been sent to the Chemical Examiner and they were examined for the presence or otherwise of seminal stains it cannot be said that the investigation in this case had been properly done with promptness that it is expected of an investigating officer in a case of this nature. We will presently deal with the various procedures that have to be followed by the investigating officer during the course of his visit in the place of occurrence. 62. A careful reading of the decisions rendered by both the Supreme Court of India as well as the other High Courts referred to in the course of our judgment lead us to enunciate the well-settled principles of Law relating to circumstantial evidence may be enunciated as follows: Circumstantial evidence should point inevitably to the conclusion that it was the accused and the accused only who was the perpetrator of the offence and such evidence should be incompatible with the innocence of the accused, in order that a conviction may be based on the same. A person may be convicted not only on the basis of direct evidence but also on a consideration of circumstances emerging from the evidence on record against him. “Where the main links in the circumstantial evidence give way, no conviction can be sustained. A Court of law has to be vigilant and should exercise effective control over the extent and manner of cross-examination of witnesses. It has the undoubted control and discretion to determine the length of time and the extent to which the witnesses should be cross-examined. It is the duty of the Court to protect the witnesses against the irrelevant enquiries and over rule a question repeated after being several times substantially answered. It is no doubt true that the cross-examination is one of the most important process for the illustration of facts and testing the veracity of witness and accuracy of the story unfolded by him. So, all reasonable latitude must be shown. But the Court has the discretion as to how far and how long the cross-examination can go. Under the pretence and guise of testing the circumstances placed by the prosecution, prolix examination and cross-examination have to be checked with a judicial discretion by the Presiding Officer of the Court even by putting questions as provided under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. Under the pretence and guise of testing the circumstances placed by the prosecution, prolix examination and cross-examination have to be checked with a judicial discretion by the Presiding Officer of the Court even by putting questions as provided under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. Irrelevant topics, regarding the circumstances relied on by the prosecution, sometimes pursued at great length and persistence shown in going over the same ground again and again in the hope of making the witnesses discrepant must not be endured or permitted. 63. Now as regards various procedures that have to be followed by the investigating officer during the course of his visit in the place of occurrence, or arrival at the place of occurrence, the Investigating Officer should cordon off the scene and post a guard to prevent unauthorised persons and curious spectators from trampling over it. In the instant case, apart from taking photographs, no attempt seems to have been made by the Investigating Officer in this direction. Taking the usual precautions not to disturb any clue or trace, the Investigation Officer should first examine the victim and make sure if death has actually occurred due to homicidal violence or due to some other cause at that place. In case of the slightest doubt, a doctor should be summoned immediately or the body sent to the nearest hospital or dispensary for medical attention. Before removing the body, a detailed note should be kept regarding its position, posture, condition, dress, injuries noticed etc. It should also be photographed from different angles before being removed. Except Exhibit P-8, no other photograph has been taken. Whether the position of the clothes were left as they were on the dead body before taking photograph or whether they were handled so as to conceal the private parts and other parts of the body as the dead body is that of a, woman, or the portions of the body which were required by the investigating officer had been purposely unveiled before actually photograph was taken, is not clear. The close-up photographs ought to have been taken in this case from different angles showing the actual position of the body where violence had been suspected on the deceased at the hands of the assailant. 64. The close-up photographs ought to have been taken in this case from different angles showing the actual position of the body where violence had been suspected on the deceased at the hands of the assailant. 64. The Investigating Officer should then observe the scene, photograph it and make a note of the position of everything that bears on the case and its relation to other things present. The photographs should be taken from all necessary angles and distances and should include the means of approach. In addition, a detailed plan of the place of occurrence should be prepared to scale. 65. No doubt, in the instant case, photographs had been taken and a rough sketch also had been exhibited. But in our view, some more attention ought to have been bestowed regarding the collection of the materials as they were exhibiting themselves at the place of occurrence. 66. A search for clues should include apparently unimportant things like match sticks, cigarette and bidi ends, pieces of rog or paper which should be carefully collected for future examination. In the present case, no doubt M.O. 22 broken bangle pieces had been seized. We have already indicated that though attempt has been made by the Investigating Officer for detection of stains of semen in the clothes that were seized from the accused, yet, no documentary evidence has been placed before the Court and led as exhibit so as to arrive at a definite conclusion that the deceased had bear subjected to sexual intercourse before she had met with her death. Gases have been lost because the Investigating Officer wrongly decided that a certain article or trace was unimportant and failed to collect and preserve it. It should be endeavour of the investigating officer to collect whatever materials by way of evidence available at the scene of occurrence and thereafter come to a conclusion regarding the omission of the offence and what is more, he is duly bound to place the entire materials available at the scene of occurrence which can be gathered by way of collection of material objects as well as taking photographs of the relevant objects that are in existence at the place of occurrence together with the finger prints and footprints available at the place. Even before examining the fingerprints, foot-prints and palm drints which are available either on the floor or in any other place in the alleged scene of occurrence, they have to be carefully preserved and photographed and then attempt should be made for the same being examined scientifically during the time of investigation. Cases are never lost because too much evidence has been gathered, and so, nothing at the scene must be overlooked as too insignificant or unimportant. All suspected food and finger-prints should be preserved carefully till the arrival of the expert or till they can be properly developed, packed, sealed and sent for expert examination. Similarly, anything suspected to be blood, seminal or saliva stains, should be carefully preserved and taken charge of. Nothing at the place of occurrence should be allowed to be taken away or removed by the relatives of the victim or by anybody else until everything has been opened and a detained inventory made and anything which may have the slightest connection with the occurrence retained by the investigating officer. 67. In the instant case, it is but necessary that we should know the place where the dead body of the deceased was lying with necessary details as description P.W. 1 who has given Exhibit P-1 describes the said place as part of Pethathalapalli, in that, it forms part of the Thulakkankuttai lake and there is also a stream which emanates from the mountain leading to Thulakkankuttai lake. It was there that the dead body of a woman was found with injuries and a stone placed on the face, and that the said dead body was lying in the pool of blood. The said passage in Exhibit P.1 read as follows: It is relevant in this connection to note that Exhibit p-8 does not show the existence of any stone near the head of the dead body. Therefore, it is clear that from the time when P.W.1 had seen and gave Exhibit P-1 to the time when Exhibit P-8 photograph had been taken we find that the stone placed as well as the dead body had been disturbed and the materials as well as the dead body cannot be said to be in their original place subsequent to P.W. 1 seeing the said place, till the photograph as per Exhibit P-8 was taken. This disturbance and the non-availability of the stone which was said to be found lying on the head of the deceased in the photograph Exhibit P-8 taken shows that much reliance cannot be placed with respect to the evidence available on record let in by the prosecution regarding M.O.1. 68. Exhibit P-2 is the printed form report sent to the Sub-Inspector of Police Krishnagiri. It had been received 6.00 p.m. on 1st December, 1978 by the Court. It bears the seal of the Court of the learned Magistrate with the date 2nd December, 1978. But as already noted, it bears the endorsement of the learned Magistrate that Exhibit P-2 had been received at 6 p.m. on 1st December, 1978. 69. Exhibit P-3 is the Village Munsif's printed form report sent to the Court of Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Krishnagiri. It bears the initial of the learned Magistrate with the date 1st December, 1978, and it shows that the same had been received by him at 9 p.m. on that date. Exhibit P-3 also bears the seal of the Court of the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Krishnagiri, with the date 2nd December, 1978, bearing number 554. 70. Exhibit P-4 shows that the scene of occurrence is on the southern side of Pathathalapalli hills and the same form part of the foot-hill with Survey Nos. 187 and 188. The contents of Exhibit P-4 shows that the dead body was lying in the stream which was running in between the hills form southern end to the northern end which is turn, is on the southern side of the road running there. It is stated in Exhibit P-4 that at the time when the dead body was found there, there was water flowing in the said stream to a depth of 3“. The dead body was found lying with its head towards east and the legs, stretched towards west with the face upwards. It is also mentioned in Exhibit P.4 that on the head of the dead body in a slanting posture a big bloodstained stone had been kept which was round shaped. Once again it has become relevant to point out that Exhibit P-8 does not show the existence of the said stone placed on the face of the dead body. The evidence on record does not show clearly as to the point at which the said stone had been removed. Once again it has become relevant to point out that Exhibit P-8 does not show the existence of the said stone placed on the face of the dead body. The evidence on record does not show clearly as to the point at which the said stone had been removed. But the facts remain that at the time of the preparation of Exhibit P-4 the stone was found kept on the face portion of head of the dead body which was lying in the aforement posture at the foot of the hills inside the stream. It is also relevant in this connection to note whether investigation has been directed towards the things that might have been got lost by way of evidence as a result of 3” depth of water flowing in the stream in which the dead body was found lying. It is also relevant in this connection to note that when there is no specific evidence available on record that at the place where the dead body was lying, there could have been existence of stains of blood, the contention raised, namely that the deceased could have been subjected to violence at some other place and thereafter either as a dead body or as a person having been sexually dealt with at some other place and brought and left in the place where the dead body was found at the time it was seen, is certainly a matter that requires much consideration which in turn can also be stated that raises a reasonable doubt regarding the important aspect of the prosecution case. In the above mentioned exhibits, when the existence of a round-shaped stone found a place, it is really strange as to how and at what stage the said stone had been removed to another place before the negative of Exhibit P-8 was taken by the photographer. In this regard, we have to observe that the evidence let in by P.W. 10 is not also satisfactory and it does nor: throw any light regarding this aspect of the matter. 71. In Exhibit P-6 it is seen that while investigation was being proceeded with under section 302, Indian Penal Code, relating to Crl. In this regard, we have to observe that the evidence let in by P.W. 10 is not also satisfactory and it does nor: throw any light regarding this aspect of the matter. 71. In Exhibit P-6 it is seen that while investigation was being proceeded with under section 302, Indian Penal Code, relating to Crl. No. 1178 of 1978 on the file of Krishnagiri Police Station at about 4 p.m. on 11th December, 1978, the accused Shanmugham, son of Errampatti Sevithan was arrested in his house out of suspicion and that at that time, the accused Shanmugham gave a voluntary confessional statement to P.W. 13 and in pursuance of the admissible portion of the said statement he had taken to a well which was near a milestone bearing No. 89/6 near Bangalore Road and from inside the water of about 10’ depth in the well, the accused had taken out and produced an old bag of yellow colour, two stones from inside the said bag as well as 10 cubit cotton saree with yellow-red border with a flower design printed saree, a white jacket, a white bodice and a rose nylex eight cubit saree. Even if those clothes which were recovered did not contain any stains of semen or blood because of their immersion in the water available in the well, yet it is not as if that they would have got completely relieved of presence of any stains of human blood or semen. The investigation seems to have not been directed efficiently in this direction and that is the conclusion which we can be arrived at in the circumstances. 72. Exhibit P-7 is the mahazaar for the seizure of M.Os. 12 to 14, namely, shirt, two silver toe rings and a bus ticket respectively which were recovered in pursuance of the admissible portion of the confessional statement given by the accused. They were recovered by the accused's taking the investigating officer and the witnesses to Moongilputtur, where the house of one Chinnasami is situated. The prosecution case is that the toe rings were entrusted by the deceased Chandra to the aunt of the accused. Exhibit P-7 bears the signature of P.W.9 Lakshmana Gounder and another P.W. 2 K.P. Varadarajan. 73. Exhibit P-9 is the requisition sent by the police along with the dead body for post-mortem examination. Exhibit P-10 is the original of post-mortem certificate. Exhibit P-7 bears the signature of P.W.9 Lakshmana Gounder and another P.W. 2 K.P. Varadarajan. 73. Exhibit P-9 is the requisition sent by the police along with the dead body for post-mortem examination. Exhibit P-10 is the original of post-mortem certificate. The said certificate issued by the doctor P.W. 7 shows that the dead body of the deceased was estimated of that of a female and about 20 years at the time of her death. At the time when the dead body was handed over for postmortem, it was found that the head of the dead body was soaked with dried clotted blood. Clotted blood was found in both the care and fluid blood was oozing out from the nose. As already described there were as many as eight external injuries and on dissection of the wounds it showed effusion of blood underneath muscle fibres. On opening the skull, it was found by P.W.7 that there were existence of clotted and fluid blood over the surface of the brain and there was also fracture of temporal bone of both sides and there was also fracture sphenoid bone on left-side. Four ounces of fluid blood was found at the base of the skull. There was also clotted bloom in the brain and fluid blood over the surface of the brain corresponding to the external wounds of the scalp. Exhibit P-10 further shows that the vagina admitted more than two fingers and there was an old tear of the hymen present. Vaginal smear was taken and preserved. P.W. 7 preserved the following for chemical examination: 1. Stomach and its contents. 2. Intestine and its contents. 3. Sample of liver. 4. One kidney. 5. Vaginal smear. 6. Skirt of the victim. As per contents of Exhibit P-10. P.W. 7, reserved her opinion, pending chemical examiner's report of the viscera and vaginal smear and skirt. It is relevant in this connection to note that when she ha d been thus waiting for offering her opinion on receipt of chemical examiner's report of the visera and vaginal smear and skirt when the allegation is that the deceased had been subjected to violence in that the deceased might have been to violent sexual intercourse, no report of any chemical examiner relating to the vaginal smear finds the light of the day. 74. 74. Exhibit P-11 contents the final opinion to the effect that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and hoemorrahage due to injury to the skull Exhibit P-11 further shows that it contained an enclosure with reference to the postmortem, dated 8th December, 1978 done by P.W. 7 with respect to Cr.No.1178 of 1978 of Krishnagiri Police Station and that the following articles were received on 23rd December, 1978, through police constable Neelakandan and that five bottles labelled as ‘unknown’ in Cr.No. 1178 of 1978, containing a stomach in a brownish turbid liquid, another bottle containing a piece of intestine in a brownish turbid liquid, one another bottle containing pieces of liver in a dark brown turbid liquid, a bottle containing a kidney in a reddish brown turbid liquid and another bottle containing a clear colourless and odourless liquid were received at the laboratory. According to Exhibit P-11, the above five articles did not contain any poison in any of them. Exhibit P-12 is the final opinion furnished by P.W. 7, saying that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and haemorrhage due to injuries to the skull. 75. It is not as if a woman may become a victim and die due to forcible sexual intercourse and that it is really sickening to see that the investigation has not been directed in that way so as to know whether the sexual intercourse to which the deceased might have been subjected to at the hands of her assailant could have also contributed as one of the causes for her death especially when symptoms of sexual intercourse had been noticed by P.W. 7 during the time of post-mortem. It is regrettable to note that even P.W. 7 had not taken into her head to ascertain and offer her opinion regarding this aspect before actually giving her final opinion as per Exhibit P-12. P.W. 7 seems to have been overwhelmed only with respect to the injury on the skull and had offered her opinion only on that basis. It is regrettable to note that even P.W. 7 had not taken into her head to ascertain and offer her opinion regarding this aspect before actually giving her final opinion as per Exhibit P-12. P.W. 7 seems to have been overwhelmed only with respect to the injury on the skull and had offered her opinion only on that basis. When the fact remains that the deceased had also been subjected to sexual intercourse and knowing fully well that there was such a sexual intercourse which she herself could explain as forcible sexual intercourse, it is rather strange as to why she had not further pursued in the matter to ascertain as to whether the said sexual intercourse had also contributed as one of the causes for the death of the deceased. We have no other alternative except to take this aspect of the prosecution case as one which goes to the root of it. Certainly, it is an infirmity which would go against the case of the prosecution. In her cross-examination P.W. 7 has admitted that if a stone like M.O. 1 is thrown on the face of a man, the entire face will be crushed. As a matter of fact, P.W. 7 fad opined that injury Nos. 1 and 2 is possible by a woman dashing against a stone herself and injury Nos. 3 and 4 would be caused by coming into contact with rough surface. Injury Nos. 5 to 8 could be caused by forcible intercourse and due to struggle. So, it will not be out of place if we have to conclude that the death in this case could have been caused also out of forcible sexual intercourse that had been perpetrated on her at the instance of her husband or at the instance of some one else. The same is certainly amounts to a doubtful, factor, in the evidence unfurled through the prosecution witnesses which amounts to reasonable doubt in this case. As a matter of fact, a perusal of the photograph Exhibit P-8 shows that the deceased had been subjected to a very violent treatment sexually also at the hands of her assailant. 76. P.W. 7 herself has stated that those injury Nos. 5 to 8 are possible by external instruments also and that injury Nos. 5 to 8 could be caused by forcible intercourse due to struggle. 76. P.W. 7 herself has stated that those injury Nos. 5 to 8 are possible by external instruments also and that injury Nos. 5 to 8 could be caused by forcible intercourse due to struggle. According to her, those injuries arc not possible by sharp edged weapon, that is, the injuries that were found in the delicate parts of the deceased. It is also relevant in this connection to note that P.W. 7 ha d ruled out the possibility that injury Nos. 5 to 8 could have been caused on those parts of the body of coming into contact with the nails of the assailant of the deceased. In her re-examination, P.W. 7 had stated that she had preserved one skirt for semen detection and the same was sent to the Chemical Examiner and she forwarded the same to the Court of Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Krishnagiri. It is relevant in this connection to note that further her evidence does not disclose as to what steps or instructions she had given regarding the said skirt after the same was returned from the office of Chemical Examiner. As a matter of fact there is no evidence relating to this aspect on the records. After forwarding the same to the Court of Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Krishnagiri, we do not know whether steps were taken to ascertain relating to the semen detection for which purpose it was sent by P.W. 7 to the Chemical Examiner. No doubt, we find that this skirt figures as M.O. 15 (blue skirt). Somehow, we are of the feeling that the interest, enthusiasm and above all the attention that is required has not been evinced in this case by the investigating and the other authorities concerned. 77. In this regard, the following passage which occurs at page. 251 of the Outline of Medical Jurisprudence by Lyon VIII Edition, 1928 is worth quoting- “Paragraph 343“.-In the case of a woman found dead, the question may arise as to her having violated prior to death. The reply to the question is by no means easy. Severe injury to the genitals is a presumption in favour of rape. The presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal mucus is good evidence of a late coitus, but is no direct evidence of rape. Collateral evidence will in most cases decided the point. The reply to the question is by no means easy. Severe injury to the genitals is a presumption in favour of rape. The presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal mucus is good evidence of a late coitus, but is no direct evidence of rape. Collateral evidence will in most cases decided the point. In the Indian Medical Gazette of 1st December, 1875, page 284, Surgeon Major R. Harvey relate the circumstances connected with cases of death from haemorrhage after rape. In one case, a girl, nine years of age, was raped by an adult. There was pain and considerable loss of blood caused by the introduction of the male organ. The left wall of the vagina was ruptured, from the orifice upwards, for 2½ inches, and the rent was an inch wide.” In the instant case, it is in evidence that frequently the deceased used to go away with the accused to her parents house and even there she had no opportunity of having coitus with her husband. Therefore, so far as the sexual intercourse portion of the evidence in the instant case is concerned, certainly the above passage throws some light of inferring that the fact of the deceased having been subjected to violent sexual intercourse could have also contributed to her death. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the death in the instant case was solely due to homicidal violence of the stone having been therein on the head of the deceased by the assailant as alleged by the prosecution through according to the medical evidence the death occasioned due to the injury on the head viz., injury Nos. 1 and 2. But yet it is quite possible that the forcible sexual intercourse that had been perpetrated on the deceased presumably against her wish, could have also contributed to her death. Under these circumstances, it cannot definitely be held that the deceased died due to homicidal violence. 78. The medical evidence in this case clearly shows that the deceased ought to have been subjected to sexual intercourse against her consent. If it was with consent, there is every possibility of subsequently both the husband and wife moving in a happy, congenial and affectionate manner which might usually follow after a willing sexual intercourse between the spouses. 78. The medical evidence in this case clearly shows that the deceased ought to have been subjected to sexual intercourse against her consent. If it was with consent, there is every possibility of subsequently both the husband and wife moving in a happy, congenial and affectionate manner which might usually follow after a willing sexual intercourse between the spouses. In the instant case, apart from the intercourse have been taken presumably with violence and pressure, there were wounds also on the head of the deceased which according to the prosecution were caused due to M.O.I stone. We have already indicated as to how this stone had been displaced and Exhibit P-8 does not show the existence of the stone on the hand as it was alleged to have been available at the time of investigating officer visiting the scene of occurrence. 79. In England, the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 as amended by the Mental Health Act, 1959 (Vide page 53 of Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Vol. II, 12th Edition, 1965) sets out that: “it is an offence…..for a man to have unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who is a defective.” For this purpose a defective means a person suffering from severe sub-normality within the meaning of the Mental Health Act, 1959, and in view of the distinction the drawn between “sub-normality” and “severe sub-normality” a defendant may sometimes have little difficulty in. establishing this defence based on lack of knowledge of her exact mental condition as R. v. Chapman.1 80. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused remained with his wife for three days at his house and on a Thursday he and his wife went to P.W. 3 and informed him that he is going with his wife to Moongilputhur and so saying, he and his wife left the house of P.W. 3. Therefore, when the deceased was in the company of the accused-appellant for a continuous period of three days just prior to the date of the occurrence, there might not be any possibility of the accused appellant inflicted with any sexual avidity and resort to such a violent form on that day that too under the foot of the hill. Therefore, when the deceased was in the company of the accused-appellant for a continuous period of three days just prior to the date of the occurrence, there might not be any possibility of the accused appellant inflicted with any sexual avidity and resort to such a violent form on that day that too under the foot of the hill. It is also relevant in this connection to note that under ordinary circumstances, it is not possible for a single man to hold sexual intercourse with a health adult female in full possession of her senses against her wish unless she is taken unawares, thrown accidentally on the ground and placed in such a position as to render her completely helpless, or unless she swoons, away from fright or exhaustion after long resistance. Modi in his Medical Jurisprudence an d Toxicology 20th edition at page 341 is of opinion that the act may be accomplished, if more than one man are concerned in the crime, or if the woman is too feeble to resist. In giving a definite opinion, it is necessary to take into consideration the relative strength of the parties and the community to which particularly the woman belongs. Modi further opines that a woman belonging to a labouring class who is accustomed to hard and rough work will be able to offer a good deal of resistance and to deal blows on her assailant and will thus succeed in frustrating his attempts at violation. On the contrary a woman belonging to a middle or rich class of an educated family and not habituated to go about along by herself, will not be able to resist for long and will soon faint or will be rendered powerless from fright or exhaustion. In this regard, it is relevant to note that there has no injury on the person of the accused so as to show that when the accused attempted to have sexual intercourse with the deceased, the deceased by way of resistance attacked the accused. As a matter of fact, at the time of the arrest, it is seen, that on injury was found on the person of the accused. The accused in his section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure. As a matter of fact, at the time of the arrest, it is seen, that on injury was found on the person of the accused. The accused in his section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure. Statement has stated that P.W. 3 refused to send his wife along with him and that it was true that one Parvathi Ammal mediated between himself and his father-in-law; but the deceased was not allowed to go with him by P.W. 3 on a Monday. The accused has specifically denied that his wife accompanied him on a Thursday. He has denied that on the next day, namely, Friday morning, he returned to the village and informed P.Ws. 3 an d 4 that his wife Chandra was missing. He has also denied that P.W. 5 is related to him. He has also denied that about eight months prior to P.W. 5 deposing in the trial Court, he went to the house of P.W. 5 at Moongilputhur removed his shirt and placed the same in the wall stand and put on another shirt. Even when the evidence unfurled through P.W. 5 Kaveri Ammal shows that when the accused and his wife Chandra were staying in her house somewhere in the month of Aadi, a year before P.W. 5 deposing in the trial Court his wife Chandra entrusted the toe rings with her, on that ground it may not be presumed that just prior to the occurrence both the deceased and the accused were found together. The accused had pleaded ignorance when the incriminating evidence available relating to M.Os. 12 and 13 were put to him by way of questions under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code. In other words, the accused has denied the evidence of P.W. 5 as false in that she had identified the shirt which was left by the accused, according to the case of prosecution, in her house as M.O. 12, and when she had also identified the toe rings which were alleged to have been entrusted by the deceased to P.W. 5 which are M.O. 13. We are not impressed with the evidence unfurled through P.W. 5 or with respect to recovery of M.Os. 12 and 13 in this case which do not very much advance the case of the prosecution. We are not impressed with the evidence unfurled through P.W. 5 or with respect to recovery of M.Os. 12 and 13 in this case which do not very much advance the case of the prosecution. In the same day, we are not very much impressed with the evidence of P.W. 6 when he states in his evidence that eight months before himself deposing in the trial Court, on a Thursday, he saw the accused and his wife Chandra going in the Bangalore Road near Raj Hotel. P.W. 6 who is aged 20 years is over enthusiastic in his endeavour to depose about what he alleged to have seen. Merely P.W.6's identifying M.Os. 8 and 12 as clothes worn by the deceased and the accused respectively, we are not inclined to hold that P.W. 6 did see both the accused and the deceased proceeding towards north near Taj Hotel in Bangalore Road. It was only about 12 days subsequent to the alleged sight he had seen, the police and the accused and P.W. 1 had come to his house. In his cross-examination, he says that till the police examined him, he did not tell about the same, namely, that he saw the accused and the deceased together and that they got into the bus at that place. The police themselves had examined him only about 12 days subsequent to himself seeing the accused and the deceased together proceeding towards Bangalore Road. When he says in his cross-examination on 26th July, 1979, namely, the date of his examination in the trial Court that he could identify all the persons whom he had seen on that date when he saw the accused and the deceased going together, this is an extravagant approach while giving evidence on oath and renders the evidence of P.W. 6 unacceptable. P.W. 6 has not given any special reason as to why he ha d been remembering the accused and the deceased going together on that particular day. It is not his case that he was acquainted with them previously. What is more is, his evidence gets itself self-condemned when he emphasises that it was M.O. 8 saree that was worn by the deceased Chandra at the time when he saw them together. Similarly he asserts that he saw the accused wearing M.O. ¡2 shirt at that time. It is not his case that he was acquainted with them previously. What is more is, his evidence gets itself self-condemned when he emphasises that it was M.O. 8 saree that was worn by the deceased Chandra at the time when he saw them together. Similarly he asserts that he saw the accused wearing M.O. ¡2 shirt at that time. Merely on the ground that he says that he belongs to Moongilputhur and that he was acquainted with the accused and the deceased it cannot in our view gives any sanctity for his evidence being accepted as a true version relating to the one link that is relied on by the prosecution to fasten the guilt on the accused. In short, we have to hold that the evidence unfurled through P.W. 6 is quite unnatural and unacceptable. If he had receipt for the transaction which he had with the go down belonging to one Veerannan relating to himself selling ground nut on that day, nothing prevented him to handover the same to the police in order to establish that he was actually present at that particular place which facilitated him to see both the accused and the deceased proceeding that way. When he had claimed that he ha d acquainted with the accused and the deceased, he had frankly admitted in his cross-examination that he does not know the name of the father of the accused, nor the same of the father of the deceased Chandra. He would further turn round and say that he knew the accused only for about three months. All these clearly show that he is a most unreliable witness. What is more when he deposes that himself and the accused were usually engaging themselves as coolies together, he has not mentioned under whom both of them were engaged thus, and what was the latest point of time when they were engaged together like that. Therefore when the suggestion had been put to him during cross-examination that it was only at the instance of the police he has been deposing falsely, implicating the accused in the offence, we have no other alter, native than to hold that this suggestion is not without substance. 81. Therefore when the suggestion had been put to him during cross-examination that it was only at the instance of the police he has been deposing falsely, implicating the accused in the offence, we have no other alter, native than to hold that this suggestion is not without substance. 81. Under Indian Law, Exception to section 375, Indian Penal Code, contemplates that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 15 years of ape, is not rape. In the instant case, of course, the deceased was aged about 20 years as could be gathered from the evidence of P.W. 7 who conducted the post mortem on the dead body of the deceased. 82. The second feature which makes us to entertain a doubt relating to the assailant whether it was the accused who would have resorted to violence on the deceased by having forcible connection sexually at or a bout the time of infliction of the injuries on the deceased is due to the fact that the clothes that were alleged to have been recovered at the instance of the accused and as belonging to the accused, were not proved to have contained stains of semen or the stains of the counter-liquid that might have emanated from the vaginal part of the deceased during the course of sexual intercourse, if really the male part of the sexual act was of the accused. Therefore, the possibility of somebody else violating her cannot be emphatically ruled out and it cannot also be completely brushed aside when it is suggested that the deceased might have been subjected to treatment by some other assailant than the accused. Now we are not quite convicted relating to the evidence that had been unfurled regarding this aspect unless the prosecution proves beyond all reasonable doubt that the circumstances placed by it through acceptable and convincing evidence are linked with one another in such a way that the case of the prosecution can be held to be true and even if one of the links gets broken because of the entertainment of reasonable doubt in judicial mind, certainly, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. In that way, we are definitely of the opinion that this is one of the features which prompt us to give the benefit of reasonable doubt that are arising with respect to various circumstances placed by the prosecution in order to fasten the guilt on the accused. 83. As a matter of fact we are also of opinion that from the nature of injuries found on the private parts of the deceased, the deceased ought to have been also subjected to intercourse against the order of nature. Exhibit P-8 also bears testimony to our inference in this regard. We are really sorry that the medical evidence had not been subjected to adequate cross-examination so as to bring cut all the aspects relating to the injuries that were found on the veginal parts of the deceased. When the injuries found on the deceased were such that no ordinary and prudent husband would have caused those injuries. Under the circumstances, ‘certainly, the irresistible conclusion that can be arrived at is that the sexual inter coarse was not committed by the husband as alleged by the prosecution, but it could have been quite possible that the same had been at the instance of some other person who had just in him and that to satisfy that lust, he had subjected the deceased to all cruel treatment, which writ large on the very face of the injuries found on the deceased especially in the region of her private parts. As already indicated, there is no certificate available on records relating to the availability of stains of semen or the relative liquid emanating from the woman if she was a willing party to the sexual act, and in the absence of such a necessary document on records, we are also once again inclined to have the entertainment of reasonable doubt in our mind. 84. For having a clear picture of the scene of occurrence and the place where the dead body was lying, the modem development of cinematography could have been used for photographing the place with the objects existing as they were at the time of the first visit to the place by the Investigating Officer. The appearance of the place of occurrence and objects present there and the conditions prevailing there, namely, the place where the dead body of a person is lying have to be kept as a matter of record. The appearance of the place of occurrence and objects present there and the conditions prevailing there, namely, the place where the dead body of a person is lying have to be kept as a matter of record. So the photograph should be taken as it is seen after the Investigating Officer visits the place of occurrence and not after any disturbance of anything connected with the dead body on the existence of materials at the scene of occurrence. This is very important aspect that should be borne in the mind of the investigating officer who investigates a case of murder or other serious offences. There is every possibility of tempering of the same by the interested persons. So this method of immediate photograph being taken is to be resorted to because even if there is any doubt, the existence of the materials as they were at the time of the initial stage of investigation will be revealed by the photographs taken immediately. I do not think that there is anything against adopting immediate photographing of the place of occurrence in the case of the investigation because the photograph thus taken, will serve the purpose more usefully. If Exhibit P-8 had been taken earlier with the stone on the head it would have been better. But it is relevant to note that Exhibit P-8 shows that there is no stone-lying on the head of the deceased, because it is the case of the prosecution that the head of the deceased had been injured due to the presence of M.O. 1 and that stone had been used as the weapon of offence by the accused it is not necessary that one would generally expect a photograph stone especially when the case of the prosecution rests entirely on the circumstantial evidence. 85. If there are acceptable evidence relating to the circumstantial evidence pointing at the guilt of the accused, certainly, the case of the prosecution will be uphold and the accused will be held liable for the offence with which he has been charged. If there are no circumstances, cogent, convincing and trustworthy without any kind of break in the chain of events and circumstances pointing at the guilt of the accused, certainly, the case of the prosecution would not be upheld by holding that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he has been charged. If there are no circumstances, cogent, convincing and trustworthy without any kind of break in the chain of events and circumstances pointing at the guilt of the accused, certainly, the case of the prosecution would not be upheld by holding that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he has been charged. On the other hand, if there are no sufficient materials available in evidence, so as to point at the guilt of the accused by way of circumstances, it is needless to say that the irresistible conclusion that can be arrived at is, that the case against the accused has been foisted on the innocent accused and that in the instant case when his wife had been violated an d done to death by her assailant, it cannot be ruled out that a false case of murder had been foisted on the accused at the instance of somebody else. 86. The medical evidence in this case is also not upto the elementary standard expected of a medical officer who conducted the autopsy. In the instant case, it is rather strange that P.W. 7 the Medical Officer had not pursued the matter relating to her investigation regarding the injuries mentioned by her on the delicate parts of the deceased. Her final opinion regarding the case of death has been adverted to without necessary materials on records, such as the chemical examiner's report regarding the availability or otherwise of the stains of semen and consequential symptoms of forcible sexual intercourse prepared on the person of the deceased. We are really feeling sorry regarding the tremendous failure on the rest of the persons concerned. 87. The pressing into service of detective dogs to ascertain the culprit may be usefully resorted to however much the scene of occurrence is separated by a distance from the place where the said dogs are kept by the department concerned. In the instant case, it is said that the dogs were reared and kept at Madurai. No attempt seems to have been taken by the investigating officer to bring the dogs for helping him in his investigation. What is more in the instant case, V.H.F. message could have been given to the concerned. There is absolutely to evidence available on record that any such attempt had been resorted to by the investigating officer in this direction. No attempt seems to have been taken by the investigating officer to bring the dogs for helping him in his investigation. What is more in the instant case, V.H.F. message could have been given to the concerned. There is absolutely to evidence available on record that any such attempt had been resorted to by the investigating officer in this direction. It is only the proper and prompt application of the equipment and devices available, that is expected of an investigating officer under the circumstances. He should not be entertaining a feeling that he might not get the dogs or any other useful device of detection and lose all the salient features of the scene of occurrence. It is strange that no precaution or any message ever entered into the mind of the investigating officer in this case, before causing removal of M.O. 1, if at all, he was responsible for removal of M.O. 1 which was alleged to have been found kept on the face of the deceased. Exhibit B-8 shows no stone available either on the head of the dead body at the scene place. In our view, this failure on the part of the Investigating Officer in not taking photograph with the stone as it was really available initially, that is prior to Exhibit P-8 is certainly an infirmity on the side of the prosecution. This would in turn go to show that the case of the prosecution that M.O.1 was the stone which was found on the face of the dead body when the investigating officer went to the scene of occurrence for the first time, cannot be relied upon. The coming into existence of Exhibit F-4 observation mahazar as if the stone was found on the head initially even at the time when the investigating officer had gone to the scene, cannot in any way said to be adequate and satisfy the ends of justice so as to hold that in fact M.O. 1 was found on the head of the deceased and only it was subsequently removed. 88. It admits of no doubt that the dead body of the deceased was that of Chandra, the daughter of P.W. 3 and the wife of the accused. As already seen it was P.W. 3 who has identified the dead body as that of his daughter Chandra. 88. It admits of no doubt that the dead body of the deceased was that of Chandra, the daughter of P.W. 3 and the wife of the accused. As already seen it was P.W. 3 who has identified the dead body as that of his daughter Chandra. As already stated, the entire case of the prosecution is on the basis of certain circumstances brought in the evidence available on record. P. W. 3 according to his evidence, the accused had taken along with him his wife, the deceased from his village Errampatti and had gone to the house of P.W. 3 and had remained for about half an hour. Thereafter, according to P.W. 3, they left the place of P.W. 3 saying that they were proceeding towards Moongilputhur. P.W. 6 who is also alleged to be a person who had seen the accused and the deceased together last prior to the dead body having been discovered, has stated that on a Thursday, he had seen both of them passing by the side of Taj Hotel at Krishnagiri in the Bangalore Road towards north. P.W. 6 has stated no doubt in his evidence that at the time when he saw both the accused and deceased adjacent to Taj Hotel, the deceased Chandra was wearing M.O. 8 saree and the accused was wearing M.O. 12 shirt. It is relevant in this connection to note that was the hour at which P.W. 6 had seen them thus wearing the above clothes. It was 6 p. m. when he was coming via Londanpettai in order to go to his house that he saw thus. It was only after 12 days, for the first time when he was asked by the police, he has stated about the above fact. Under these circumstances, when we put the evidence emanating from P.W. 6 to the acid test and also just rub the same on the touch stone, we find that his evidence does not stand scrutiny. We find that his evidence is nothing but a piece of artificial creation and that his testimony is nothing but outcome of figment of imagination. We have already seen that P.W.6 did not entrust the receipt which he claims as one issued in token of himself sold ground nut at the Mandi belonging toone Veerannan. He admits that the distance between Londanpettai and Veerannan Mandi is about one mile. We have already seen that P.W.6 did not entrust the receipt which he claims as one issued in token of himself sold ground nut at the Mandi belonging toone Veerannan. He admits that the distance between Londanpettai and Veerannan Mandi is about one mile. Though in his cross-examination at the initial stage he would state that he could identify these persons whom he had seen at that point of time at that place, in the very next sentence, he says that he identify only those persons who were standing by his side at that time. He does not know the name of the father of the deceased Chandra though he claims that he knew her. He would also state in his cross-examination that be knew the accused only for about three months, though he claims in his chief examination that he knew the accused as well. Though he had stated in his cross-examination that himself and the accused were working together as collies under a person, he has not further explained under whom and at what point of time, they were engaged thus. It has been suggested to him that he did not know the accused either prior to the occurrence or subsequently and that he had been deposing falsely implicating the accused at the instance of the police. We are unable to brush aside this suggestion as wholly unsustainable in the circumstance of the case and we do feel that no credence can be given to the testimony adduced through P.W. 6 in this case which evidence is relied on by the prosecution as a piece of circumstantial evidence connecting the link to fasten the guilt on the accused. 89. It is relevant in this connection to note that subsequent to P.W. 6 seeing the deceased and the accused together, none had seen the deceased alive thereafter. It is contended on behalf of the prosecution that on the basis of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, M.Os. 8 and 9 together with a bag M.O. 6. 89. It is relevant in this connection to note that subsequent to P.W. 6 seeing the deceased and the accused together, none had seen the deceased alive thereafter. It is contended on behalf of the prosecution that on the basis of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, M.Os. 8 and 9 together with a bag M.O. 6. M.O. 10 jacket and M.O. 11 bodies were taken and produced before the investigating officer only in pursuance of the admissible portion of confessional statement given by the accused, section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, reads as follows: “Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police office, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” This section is founded on the principle that if the confession of the accused is supported by the discovery of a fact it may be presumed to be true and not to have been extracted. It comes into operation only: (1) if and when certain facts are deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from an accused person in police custody; and (2) if the information relates distinctly to the fact discovered. 90. The broad ground for not admitting confession made under inducement or to a police is the danger of admitting false confessions, but the necessity for the exclusion disappears in a case provided for by this section when the truth of the confession is guaranteed by the discovery of facts in consequences of the information given. It is immaterial whether the statement is sufficient to enable the police to make the discovery by themselves, or is only of such a nature as to require further assistance of the accused to enable them to discover the fact (Vide The Legal Remembrance v. Chemma Nashya1, Queen Empress v. Nana2 91. The object of section 27, Indian Evidence Act, is to admit evidence which is relevant to the matter under inquiry, namely, the guilt of the accused, and not to admit evidence which is not relevant to that matter. The object of section 27, Indian Evidence Act, is to admit evidence which is relevant to the matter under inquiry, namely, the guilt of the accused, and not to admit evidence which is not relevant to that matter. The discovery of a material object is of no relevancy to the question whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged against him unless it is connected with the offence. It is therefore, the connection of the thing (discovered which renders its discovery is a relevant fact. The connection between the offence and the thing discovered may be established by evidence other than the statement leading to the discovery but that does not exclude proof of the connection by the statement itself. (Vide Puransingh v. King Emperor3.) 92. Kottaya v. Emperor4, is an authority on the subject. The Privy Council has held that section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enable certain statements mace by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that the discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer must be deposed to, and so much of the information as relates to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly be safely allowed to be given in evidence, but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally, the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, weapon or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime, of which the informant is accused. The proviso to section 26, added by this section, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. 93. The proviso to section 26, added by this section, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. 93. In re., Athappa Gounder5, the accused made a statement to a Sub-Inspector that he himself and one G., killed S by gagging his mouth with cloth and throttling his neck with hands and also by putting a rope and pressing it, that, that night they got two bottles of illicit arrack by Rs. 2, to G who got it from some other place, that a small quantity was left over in one bottle only, that they buried (i) the empty bottle (2) a rope and the cloth gag (the cloth which was used for gagging the mouth) in a dung-hill next to the cattle shed in the same compound and the other bottle with some arrack in a heap of mud near a log of wood in a corner of another compound and that he produce them. Subsequently, the Sub-Inspector took the first accused together with the village munsif to the dung-hill and the accused took out a rope, a cloth, and an empty bottle. The first accused then took the Sub-Inspector to the other compound and from near a log of wood dug up and produced another empty bottle. It was held that the whole of the statement was admissible in evidence and could be taken into consideration as against the second accused also. 94. In Abdul Basha Sahib, In re1 it was held that wherein a case of murder, the first accused made a confession to the Circle Inspector which led to the discovery of certain jewels of the murdered women, and also a blood-stained brack which, the first accused stated, the second accused had used to bear her with and in consequence of which she died, it was held that the statement of the first accused so far as it related to the discovery of the jewels was admissible under this section, and that it could not be taken into consideration as against the second accused under section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. 95. 95. It is also relevant in this connection that in Pratap Misra and others v. State of Orissa2 it was held that the fact that the Saya and the underwear of P.W. 1 had same blood or seminal stains or even the chadhi of the accused had similar stains is not by itself conclusive to prove the case of rape and is quite consistent with the appellants having had intercourse with the prosecutrix with her consent. In the instant case before us, we have no evidence to show that the clothes recovered under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act contained stains of semen and the matter had not been persuaded by P.W. 7 in further and there is also death of evidence relating to the same on record, in as much as no report from the Chemical Examiner relating to this aspect has been filed as an exit on the side of the prosecution in this case. 96. As a matter of fact in Rahim Beg v. The Stale of U.P.3 the accused is a young boy 22 years. The langota on which semen was found was dirty at the time it was taken into possession. It cannot be said as to bow old was the semen stairs on the Lengota. The semen stains on the Langota of a young man can exist because of a variety of reasons, so would not necessarily connect him with the offence of rape. 97. With respect 10 recovery, the following decisions which emanated from the Supreme Court of India, can usefully be looked into: Trimbak v. The State of Madhya Pradesh4; Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra5; Pershedi 6. 1957 Crl. L.J. 328: A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 211. 7. 1957 Crl. L.J. 481: A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 216. 8. 1960 Crl.L.J. 1504: A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1125. 9. (1963)MLJ. (Crl.) 209: (1963) 1 S.C.J. 454: (1962) 2 Crl.L.J. 251: A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1116. 10. (1963) 1 Crl.L.J. 8: A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1788. 11. (1963) 2 S.C.J. 165: (1963) MLJ. (Crl.) 365: (1963) 2 Crl.L.J. 182: A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1113. 12. (1966) 1 S.C.J. 304: (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 240: 1966 Crl.L.J.93: A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 108. State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey and another1; Kapil Singh alias Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P.2; Bakshish Singh 98. 11. (1963) 2 S.C.J. 165: (1963) MLJ. (Crl.) 365: (1963) 2 Crl.L.J. 182: A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1113. 12. (1966) 1 S.C.J. 304: (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 240: 1966 Crl.L.J.93: A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 108. State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey and another1; Kapil Singh alias Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P.2; Bakshish Singh 98. Bearing in mind the principles embedded in the above decisions when viewing the recovery in the instant case, we have no hesitation to hold that the alleged recovery of Mos. 8, 9, 6, 10 and 11 are artificial in nature and no importance can be given to the same, so as to take it as a circumstances pointing at the guilt of the accused nor as a connecting link or a conduit pipe in the chain of events leading to the irresistible conclusion that the accused had committed the crime. The recovery alleged of the articles from inside the wall cannot be taken as sure in this case. The evidence available on record relating to the same is unacceptable and artificial. The evidence emanating from P.W. 14 in this 3. (1971) 2 S.C.J. 369; (1971) MLJ. (Crl.) 578; 1970 Crl.L.J. 601; A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 535 4. (1971) 1 S.C.J. 433; (1971) MLJ. (Crl.) 212; 1970 Crl.L.J. 1659; A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1934 5. (1971) 3 S.C.R. 914 : 1971 Crl. L.J. 913: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1050. 6. 1971 Crl.L.J. 1452: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2016. 7. 1972 Crl.L.J. 1045: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1557. 8. (1974) 1 MLJ. (S.C.) 32; (1974) (1974) 1 S.C.J. 96; (1974) 1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 32; A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 501: (1974) 1 MLJ. (S.C.) 32: 1972 Crl.L.J. 1296 9. (1973) S.C.C. (Crl.) 468: (1973) 3 S.C.C. 662 : 1973 Crl.L.J. 1136: A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1385. 10. (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 60: (1974) 3 S.C.C. 582 : 1974 Crl. L.J. 512: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 777. 11. 1974 Crl. L.J. 674: (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 382: (1974) 4 S.C.C. 213 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 791. 12. (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 657: (1974) 4 S.C.C. 747 : 1974 Crl.L.J. 1010: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1545. 13. 1976 Crl.L.J. 691: (1976)1 F.C. C. 750: (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 182: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 951. 14. 1976 Crl. L.J. 1757: (1976) 4 S.C.C. 369 : (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 646: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2304. 15. 1977 Crl.L.J. 439: (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 290: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 674. 16. 13. 1976 Crl.L.J. 691: (1976)1 F.C. C. 750: (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 182: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 951. 14. 1976 Crl. L.J. 1757: (1976) 4 S.C.C. 369 : (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 646: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2304. 15. 1977 Crl.L.J. 439: (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 290: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 674. 16. 1977 Crl.L.J. 705: (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 368: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1085. 17. 1977 Crl.L.J. 950: (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 286: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1116. 18. (1977) Crl.L.J. 1206: (1977) 3 S.C.C. 68 : (1977) MLJ. (Crl.) 462: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1579. 19. 1977 Crl.L.J. 1144; (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 284; A.I.R. 1977 S.C 1753 20. 1977 Crl.L.J. 1575; (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 551; (1977) 4 S.C.C. 56 ; A.I.R. 1977 S.C 2005 21. 1977 Crl.L.J. 1578: (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 571: (1977) 4 S.C.C. 293 : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2096. 22. (1978) S.C.C. (Crl.) 58: (1978) I S.C.C. 130: 1978 Crl.L.J. 347: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 315. 23. 1978 Crl.L.J. 1693: (1978) 4 S.C. C. 90: (1978) S.C.C. (Crl.) 523: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1574. 24. 1978 Crl. L.J. 1411: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1390. regard is not by itself adequate, in our opinion to uphold the case of the prosecution that the said recovery is true. 99. The next point that requires deep consideration in this appeal is as to how-far we can take the judicial confession given by the accused to P.W.8, the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Hosur. The accused has stated that during enquiry by the police, the police had beat him and ill-treated him and that was the reason why be had given the above statement before the Magistrate. It is no doubt true that from the evidence it is seen that all the formalities required under the procedural law of the land has been complied with by P.W. 8 while recording the confessional statement of the accused. It is the evidence of P.W. 8 that it is only after satisfying himself that the accused was in a fit condition to give voluntary confessional statement and there was no influence from any one, he recorded as per the narration of the accused. Yet we are unable to attach any importance to that because the concession has lost its value in that, it had been retracted by the accused at the relevant time. Yet we are unable to attach any importance to that because the concession has lost its value in that, it had been retracted by the accused at the relevant time. The learned Sessions Judge, has no doubt held that certain pieces of evidence available on record afforded as general corroboration to the contents of Exhibit P-16 confessional statement of the accused under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure recorded by P.W. 8, the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Hosur. On a Friday, at about 10.00 a.m. the accused had gone to Moongilputhur where the house of P.W. 5 Kaveriammal is situated and removed his shirt M.O. 12 and hung it in the hanger attached to the wall there. Thereafter, the accused was arrested by the police and he gave a confessional statement, the admissible portion of which is Exhibit P-18 in pursuance of which it is alleged that he took out M.O. 12 from inside the house of P.W. 5 and produced the same to the Investigating Officer and the said M.O. 12 contained stains of human blood. This is seen from the report of the Serologist. In the confessional statement it is stated that the accused has also produced from inside his house in pursuance of Exhibit P-18, the admissible portion of the confessional statement given by him to the police, M.O. 16, a pair of gold ear rings, M.O. 1 7 and MO. 18 old nose screws M.O. 23, Dhoti, M.O.24, drawer. M.O. 25 banian and before the police. The above material objects were recovered under Exhibit P-19. It is also from the seized saree, gold ornaments and silver toe rings, P.W. 3 had identified the dead body of the deceased as that of his daughter, Chandra. M.O. 12, the shirt of the accused, M.O. 23 dhoti of the accused, M.O. 1 stone, M.0.2 blood stained earth andM.0.3series broken glass bangle pieces contained stains of human blood. P. W.7 had seen eight injuries on the dead body. Exhibit P-10 is the post mortem certificate. P.W. 7 is of opinion that the injury Nos. 1 and 2 could have caused the instantaneous death of the deceased and as such they were necessarily fatal. P. W.7 had seen eight injuries on the dead body. Exhibit P-10 is the post mortem certificate. P.W. 7 is of opinion that the injury Nos. 1 and 2 could have caused the instantaneous death of the deceased and as such they were necessarily fatal. She is also of opinion that the said injuries should have been caused by her assailant with a stone like M.O. 1 and when the head was turned, the injuries 1 to 3 could have been sustained and the injury Nos. 5 to 8 could have been actually sustained on the private parts of the deceased due to forcible sexual intercourse and that while she was attempting to wriggle out, the deceased would have sustained the same. P.W. 7 is also of opinion that certain injuries could have been cause due to the nails of the assailant of the deceased. According to P.W. 7, the injury Nos. 3 and 4 could have been sustained by the deceased by her body coming into contact with the surface of the earth. It is also in evidence that the deceased could have breathed her last about 36 hours prior to the commencement of the autopsy in this case. The learned Sessions Judge has taken the above factors into consideration and held that they had afforded general corroboration to the contents of judicial confession that had emanated from the accused and recorded by P.W. 8 as per Exhibit P-16. 100. For the reasons stated above and for the reasons discussed above, we are unable to agree with the learned Sessions Judge when he took the above pieces of evidence as general corroboration to the contents of judicial confession in this case. We have no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has not established its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant herein who is aged only 28 years is certainly entitled to acquittal on the ground that the prosecution has not established its case against him beyond all reasonable doubt. Under these circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the conviction under section 302, Indian Penal Code, recorded against the accused-appellant as well as the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on him. The accused-appellant herein will be set at liberty forthwith. R.S.R. ----- Conviction and sentence on accused set aside; Accused acquitted.