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1981 DIGILAW 151 (MAD)

Annamalai Chettiar v. Union of India

1981-04-01

V.RATNAM

body1981
JUDGMENT:— The plaintiff in O.S. No. 220 of 1972, Sub-Court, Thanjavur, is the appellant in this appeal and the question debated relates to the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, to entertain the suit. The appellant booked 100 bags of green gram at Boodalur railway station of the Southern Railway on 10th May, 1970, to be carried to Naya Bazaar railway station in New Delhi of Northern Railway under railway receipt No. A 073860. The consignment reached the destination on 22nd June, 1970, and the consignee Vinodhkumar of New Delhi who had agreed to take delivery of the consignment by paying the hundi and producing the railway receipt, refused to do so as the green gram bags were in a damaged condition, as a result of which the appellant claimed that he had to be persuade Messrs. Mutsadi Pal to take delivery after an assessment of the damage to 74 bags of gram in respect of which a certificate was also issued. Alleging that the appellant sustained damages as a result of the negligence of the respondent the appellant laid the suit O.S. No. 220 of 1975 before the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, against the respondent herein for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 7,265. 2. That suit was resisted by the respondent herein on the ground that there was no negligence or misconduct on its part or on the part of its servants in the carriage of the goods and that the damages claimed were unreasonable and excessive. In an additional written statement, the respondent raised a plea that the Sub-Court at Thanjavur had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the alleged negligence was that of the Southern Railway against whom the suit had not been filed and the respondent did not have any place of business or office within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, but had its office only in New Delhi. Thereupon, the appellant filed a reply statement contending that the cause of action for the suit arose at Boodalur within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, and it is not open to the respondent to raise a question of jurisdiction belatedly. 3. Thereupon, the appellant filed a reply statement contending that the cause of action for the suit arose at Boodalur within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, and it is not open to the respondent to raise a question of jurisdiction belatedly. 3. On these rival claims of the parties the learned Subordinate Judge, Thanjavur, framed the necessary issues and held that the loss of and damage to the goods were caused by the negligence of the railways belonging to the Indian Union and that the appellant is entitled to damages as claimed. On the question of jurisdiction the learned Subordinate Judge held that the Sub-Court at Thanjavur, had jurisdiction to try the suit even though the suit was instituted against the Union of India, represented by the General Manager of Northern Railway. Consequent to these findings, the suit was decreed. Aggrieved by this, the respondent herein preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 65 of 1979 to the District Court, Thanjavur. Before the learned District Judge, the respondent raised the only plea that the Sub-Court, Thanjavur. did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and consequently, the decree passed by it cannot be sustained. This contention was accepted by the learned District Judge who held that the suit as laid could not be entertained by the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, as it did not have any jurisdiction, vacated the decree and directed the return of the plaint to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, deals with the local limits of jurisdiction of Courts to entertain suits and under section 20(c) thereof, having regard to the booking of the goods at Boodalur railway station within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of that Court and therefore, the suit can be maintained before the Sub-Court, Thanjavur. It is also further contended that section 20(c) , Civil Procedure Code, as well as section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, can co-exist and there fore, no valid objection could be taken to the territorial jurisdiction of the Sub-Court at Thanjavur. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in Ms. Assam Cold Storage Co. v. The Union of India1. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in Ms. Assam Cold Storage Co. v. The Union of India1. A further contention was also raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the objection as regards the jurisdiction should not be permitted to be raised unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the. respondent-railway administration, contends that though section 20 , Civil Procedure Code, may be a general provision with reference to the institution of suits, yet, having regard to the special provision in section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, that section will govern the institution of any suit claiming compensation against the railways and since the suit, in the present case had not been instituted in accordance with that provision before the Courts mentioned in that section, the Sub-Court at Thanjavur will not have any jurisdiction to entertain the suit instituted by the appellant. Reliance in this connection is placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the decision in Union of India v. C. R. Prabhanna 8 Sons2. In addition, it is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that the objection as regards the jurisdiction had been raised at the earliest point of time even in the course of the additional written statement and an issue had also been raised in that regard and therefore, the appellant cannot be heard to object that no plea touching the jurisdiction of the Court can be raised, unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 5. Before proceeding to consider these rival contentions it is necessary to advert to a few undisputed facts. The goods were consigned at Boodalur railway station within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, to Naya Bazaar, a place on the Northern Railway. The claim which preceded the suit and the suit were laid against the Union of India, represented by the General Manager. Northern Railway. New Delhi. Though prima facie it may appear that under section 20(c), Civil Procedure Code, part of the cause of action had arisen in Boodalur within the Jurisdiction of the Sub-Court. Thanjavur. and therefore, the appellant is entitled to institute the suit before that Court, vet a little further but deeper consideration of the matter would disclose that it cannot be so done. Thanjavur. and therefore, the appellant is entitled to institute the suit before that Court, vet a little further but deeper consideration of the matter would disclose that it cannot be so done. The respondent in the present case is the Union of India, represented by the General Manager, Northern Railway and it is certainly not the case of the appellant that the Northern Railway has any office within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court. Thanjavur. Therefore, the only basis upon which the appellant can seek to justify the institution of the suit before the Sub-Court. Thanjavur. is that part of the cause of action viz.. the booking of the poods at Boodalur arose within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court. Thanjavur. This may accord with section 20(c), Civil Procedure Code. But the provisions of section 80 of the Indian Railways Act have also to be taken into account as that section deals with suits for compensation. Such a suit for compensation for loss of the life or personal injury to a passenger or for loss, destruction damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods may be instituted in the manner provided thereunder. Broadly stated according to the provisions of section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, a suit may be instituted against the railway where the goods were delivered for carriage or against the railway administration on whose railway the loss, injury, destruction or deterioration occurred. The Court which has jurisdiction to entertain such a suit has also been specified. That section provides that the suit may be instituted in a Court having jurisdiction over the place from which the purchaser obtained his pass or bought his ticket or the animals or goods were delivered for carriage as the case may be or over the place in which the destination station lies or the loss, injury, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred. It is thus clear that one part of section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, provides that any one of the several administrations over which the goods travelled can be sued and the latter part provides that the Court having jurisdiction over the place at which the particular incident happened such as whether the ticket was purchased or goods were delivered or whether the damage had occurred would be the proper Court to entertain suits. In the present case, the appellant framed the suit in such a manner as to make it appear that the Northern Railway is the administration that is liable to pay compensation for the damage caused to the goods because the claim had also been earlier made only against that railway and the plaint also proceeded to allege that the damage to the poods was caused only by the Northern Rail way administration. It is therefore, obvious that the Sub-Court. Thanjavur. cannot have any territorial jurisdiction over the place. where, even according to the appellant, the damage to the goods occurred. 6. The question now is whether the provisions of section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, would make any difference. The appellant would seek to sustain the institution of the suit before the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, only on the ground that the goods were booked from Boodalur within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, and this, according to the appellant, would be covered by section 20(c), Civil Procedure Code. In my view, it is not possible to accept this contention, section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, was substituted for the then existing provision by Act XXXIX of 1961 , and it provides for a complete and self-contained code regarding the Courts before which the suit referred to in that section can be instituted. section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had been in existence at the time when section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, was substituted by Act XXXIX of 1961 and even so, the Parliament thought lit to provide for the institution of suits claiming compensation against railway only before certain Courts under the circumstances set out in section 80 of the Indian Railways Act. If it had been intended that section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should continue to be applicable even with reference to the institution of such suits claiming compensation against railways, there was no need for specifying and enumerating in section 80 such Courts before which alone, suits claiming compensation and referred to in section 80, could be tiled. This view expressed by me is supported by the decision of this Court in Union of India, represented through its General Manager, North Eastern Railway v. M/s. G. Swaminathan Mudaliar 8 Sons, through its My. Partner G. Maria Joseph1. This view expressed by me is supported by the decision of this Court in Union of India, represented through its General Manager, North Eastern Railway v. M/s. G. Swaminathan Mudaliar 8 Sons, through its My. Partner G. Maria Joseph1. in that case also, the respondent filed the suit against the Union of India, represented through its General Manager, North Eastern Railways, claiming damages in respect of loss of goods in transit consigned from Madurai station to a place on the North Eastern Railway. An objection was raised that the suit was not maintainable under section 80 of the Railways Act, before the District Munsif's Court at Madurai and that was overruled. In revision, the railway contended that since the Southern Railway was not a party to the suit, the Court at Madurai had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That objection was upheld by this Court. In the present case also, it has already been seen that the Southern Railway, to which the goods were delivered, had not been made as a defendant in the suit instituted by the appellant and therefore, the Sub-Court at Thanjavur, certainly did not have any jurisdiction. So far as the Northern Railway is concerned, it has already been pointed out that the Northern Railway does not have any office within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, and therefore, the only other course that was open to the appellant was to have instituted a suit in accordance with section 80 of the Indian Railways Act. The suit in the present instance should have been brought as against the respondent herein before a Court having jurisdiction over the place in which the destination station lies or the loss, injury, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred. That would mean, the suit laid by the appellant against the respondent would be certainly not entertainable by the Sub-Court, Thanjavur. The mere circum stance that the Union of India is the owner -of all the railways in this country would not enable a person claiming compensation to institute suits against the railway administration wherever he may think fit, as such an interpretation would lead to complications and would also render section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, which had been enacted to assist not only the suitors to claim compensation but also to afford protection to the railways, nugatory. In Union of India, represented through its General Manager, North Eastern Railway v. M/s. G. Swaminatha Mudaliar 8 Sons, through its Mg. Partner G. Maria Joseph2the impact of section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, on section 20 , Civil Procedure Code, was not considered in detail by this Court, but was dealt with in just one sentence to the effect that the question of jurisdiction under section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure would also be in conformity with it. From the above discussion on the scope and purport of section 80 of the Railways Act, it is obvious that both sections 20, Civil Procedure Code and 80 of the Railways Act, cannot co-exist and be given effect to for the purpose of institution of suits claiming compensation against railways. As stated earlier, the provisions of section 20 , Civil Procedure Code, were in force at the time when section 80 of the Railways Act, was enacted and the object of section 80 of the Railways Act, was to specify the Courts having jurisdiction to try suits for compensation and to this extent the provisions of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, have to be read as not being applicable to suits falling under section 80 of the Railways Act, after the coming into force of section 80 of Railways Act, introduced by Act XXXIX of 1961. This view is supposed by the decision of Venkataramiah, J., in The Union of India v. C. R. Prabhanna and Sons1, where the learned Judge has referred to the decision in M/s. Assam Cold Storage Co. v. The Union of India2, and expressed his inability to agree with the view taken in that decision. It may also be stated that the Civil Procedure Code, contains general provisions with reference to the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of institution of suits. The provision under section 80 of the Railways Act, has been enacted thereafter in 1961 and as pointed out earlier, the two provisions cannot stand together particularly when the Parliament had in mind the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it enacted section 80 of the Railways Act, and it may even be stated that section 80 of the Railways Act, is an exception to section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. with reference to the institution of suits claiming compensation against railways. with reference to the institution of suits claiming compensation against railways. It is in this view that the decision in M/s. Assam Cold Storage Co. v. The Union of India3, cannot be applied to the present case. With respect, 1 agree with the view expressed by Venkataramiah, J., in The Union of India v. C. R. Prabhanna 8 Sons4. Under these circumstances, the learned District Judge was perfectly correct when he held that the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, did not have any jurisdiction to try the suit. 7. The other objection raised by the appellant as regards jurisdiction has no merit. It has already been pointed out that the question of jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Thanjavur, was clearly and pointedly raised in the course of the additional written statement filed by the respondent and an issue was framed touching that aspect. The parties had gone to trial on that issue being fully alive to the objection raised. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appellant had either been taken by surprise or did not have any adequate opportunity of meeting the objection raised by the respondent. Consequently, it cannot be said that the objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be permitted to be raised by the appellant. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the learned District judge directing the return of the plaint to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court is perfectly correct. The civil miscellaneous appeal, fails and is dismissed. Both the parties will bear their costs throughout. The appellant is granted two months’ time from this day to take return of the plaint and for representing it before proper Court. R.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.