JUDGMENT : Nagerdra Prasad Singh, J. 1. The petitioners in this writ application are Development Officers of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter to be refer ed to as 'the Corporation') The said Corporation has been established under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'), which came in force on 1.9.1956. Some of the petitioners were employees of the then Insurers and after coming into force of the Act, their services stood transferred to the Corporation by virtue of section 11 (1) of the Act, the others Were appointed by the Corporation directly. The terms and conditions of the service of the petitioners have been altered by an ORDER :issued by the Central Government under section 11(2) of the Act and Regulations framed by the Corporation under section 49 of the Act. Copies of the ORDER :and the Regulations are annexures 1 and 2 to the writ application. According to the petitioners the said ORDER :and the Regulations are invalid, unconstitutional and have been issued and made without any authority in law. 2. Cause has been shown on behalf of the Union of India and the Corporation who have asserted that the impugned ORDER :and regulations have been issued and made in the interest of the Corporation and its policyholders, and, as such, they cannot be held to be invalid or unconstitutional. 3. In view of section 11(1) of the Act the employees of the Insurers whose controlled business was transferred to and vested in the Corporation, became employees of the Corporation and were to hold office on the same terms and conditions as they had held on the date of coming into force of the Act. However, sub-section (2) of section 11 vested power in the Central Government to alter their terms and conditions. However, sub-section (2) of section 11 vested power in the Central Government to alter their terms and conditions. The relevant portion of section 11(2) of the Act is as follows: Where the Central Government is satisfied that for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service applicable to employees of insurers whose controlled business has been transferred to, and vested in, the Corporation, it is necessary so to do, or that, in the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders, a reduction in the remuneration payable, or a revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable, to employees or any class of them is called for, the Central Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), or in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any award, settlement or agreement for the time being in force, alter (whether by way of reduction or otherwise) the remuneration and the other terms and conditions or service to such extent and in such manner as it thinks fit; Section 48 vests power in the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act. Section 49 empowers the Corporation to make regulations. The relevant portion of sub-section (2) of section 49 was as follows when the impugned regulations were made. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for : XX XX XX (b) the method of recruitment of employees and agents of the Corporation and the terms and conditions of service of such employees or agents; (bb) the terms and conditions of service of persons who have become employees of the Corporation under sub-section (1) of section 11. XX XX XX" 4. Under sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act, the Central Government issued an ORDER :dated 20.12.1957 called "The Life Insurance Corporation Field Officers (Alteration of Remuneration and Terms and Conditions of Service) ORDER :, 1957. A copy of that ORDER :is Annexure-4 to the writ application. This ORDER :, referred to as 'Blue ORDER :' on several occasions, contained provisions regarding the terms and conditions of the service of the Development Officer, then known as Field Officers'. In the year 1976, the Central Government issued another ORDER :dated 8.4.1976. A copy of that ORDER :is Annexure-4 to the writ application. This ORDER :, referred to as 'Blue ORDER :' on several occasions, contained provisions regarding the terms and conditions of the service of the Development Officer, then known as Field Officers'. In the year 1976, the Central Government issued another ORDER :dated 8.4.1976. This was known as Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) ORDER :, 1976. The terms and conditions as well as scale of pay of such Development Officers were further altered and modified. A copy of the said ORDER :is Annexure-6 to the writ application. This ORDER :was challenged in different High Courts of India and ultimately while the matter was pending in the Supreme Court, the Central Government withdrew the aforesaid ORDER :and on 19.12.1978 issued the impugned Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) ORDER :. 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the said ORDER :). For the employees including Development Officers who were appointed by the Corporation the Corporation framed Regulations under section 49 of the Act known as Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1956 which governed the conditions of service of such employees including pay and allowances. Later, it was replaced by Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960. A Notification was issued on 21.4.1976 by the Corporation amending certain provisions of the aforesaid Staff Regulation (annexure-7). This amended Regulation was also subject matter of controversy in the earlier writ applications and before the controversy could be finally decided by the Supreme Court those Regulations were also withdrawn and the impugned Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Sixth Amendment Regulations, 1978 (hereinafter- referred to as 'the Regulations) issued by the Corporation. 5. During the pendency of this writ application, the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment; Ordinance, 1981 came in force which has later been replaced by an (Act 1 of 1981). In view of section 3 of the said Ordinance the expressions "and the terms and conditions of the service of such employees or agents" occurring in clause (b) and clause (bb) of sub-section (2) of section 49 have been omitted and a new clause (cc) has been inserted in sub-section (2) of section 48. In view of section 3 of the said Ordinance the expressions "and the terms and conditions of the service of such employees or agents" occurring in clause (b) and clause (bb) of sub-section (2) of section 49 have been omitted and a new clause (cc) has been inserted in sub-section (2) of section 48. Now the Central Government has been invested with the power to make rules in respect of the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation including those who have become employees of the Corporation under sub-section (1) of section 11. A new sub section (2A) has been inserted in section 48 saying that the regulations and other provisions as in force immediately before the commencement of the said Ordinance with respect to the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents including those who became employees of the Corporation on the appointed day shall be deemed to be the Rules made under the aforesaid clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of section 48. 6. From time to time disputes have arisen between the Development Officers and other employees of the Corporation on one hand and the Corporation on the other which have ended in settlements arrived at between them. Such settlements are dated 10.5.1964 [Annexure 5 (i)], dated 20.5.1965 [Annexure 5 (ii)], dated 28.4.1970, [Annexure 5 (iii)], dated 25.9.1970 [Annexure 5 (iv)] and dated 19.11.1971 [Annexure.5 (v)]. According to the petitioners the impugned ORDER :and regulations cannot affect the service conditions of the petitioners which are governed by the ealier ORDER :, regulations and settlements referred to above. 7. The validity of the said ORDER :was first challenged on the ground that power under sub-section (2) of section (sic) can be exercised by the Central Government only for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service applicable to the employees, whose services stood statutorily transferred to the Corporation under sub-section(1) of section 11 of the Act. It was urged that the impugned ORDER :does not purport to bring any uniformity in the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions. It was urged that the impugned ORDER :does not purport to bring any uniformity in the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions. The object mentioned in the ORDER :is that the "central Government is satisfied that in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders revisions of the terms and conditions of service applicable to certain class of employees of the Corporation are called for." As such, it has to be examined whether the Central Government could have issued the ORDER :for that purpose. On a plain reading of sub-section (2) of section 11 it will appear that the ORDER :under that sub-section can be issued by the Central Government on being satisfied that such ORDER :was necessary, (1) for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remunerations and other terms and conditions of service applicable to the employees, or (ii) in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders- If the aforesaid two clauses are disjunctive then power can be exercised under that sub-section for either of the objects. On the other hand, if 'or' is to be read as 'and', then it has to be established by the Central Government that such power was exercised not only in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders but at the same time for securing uniforonity in the scales of remunerations and other terms and conditions of service of its employees the argument that 'or' has to be read as 'and' and requirements of both clauses nave to be fulfilled before the power under that subsection can be exercised was also urged before different High Courts in connection with the 1976 ORDER :which was subject matter of challenge. Reference in this connection may be made to the JUDGMENT : of Gujarat High Court in the case of Harivadan K. Desai and others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others [1977 (2) LIC 1072], the JUDGMENT : of Madras High Court in the case of K. S. Ramaswamy v. Union of India & others [1977 (1) LLJ 211] and the JUDGMENT : of Calcutta High Court in the case of Himangabu Kumar Chakraborty and others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others (1979 (2) LIC 1417]. It was held in the aforesaid cases that sub-section (2) of section 11 contained two distinct and separate powers which have to be exercised taking into consideration the condition prevailing. However, later the scope of that subsection was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of The Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D. J. Bahadur and others (AIR 1980 SO 2181). In that case the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of an ORDER :issued under sub-section (2) of section 11 curtailing the bonus of certain categories of employees of the Corporation. Krishna Iyer, J. and Pathak, J. by majority JUDGMENT : held that the ORDER :was invalid. Koshal, J. in his dissenting JUDGMENT : upheld the power of the Central Government to issue such an ORDER :. One of the submissions which had been made on behalf of the employees in that case, was that the ORDER :in question had not been issued for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of the service applicable to the transferred employees. While considering the scope of section 11 (2) it was pointed out by Pathak, J. : -- Sub-section (2) of section 11, by its first limb, confers power on the Central Government to alter the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service applicable to transferred employees. The power under this part of sub-section (2) if intended for the purpose of securing uniformity among them. The second limb of sub-section (2) is the source of controversy before us. It empowers the Central Government to reduce the remuneration payable or revise the other terms and conditions of service. That power is to be exercised when the Central Government is satisfied that the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders require such recuction or revision. Then it was observed :-- Now tuning to the notification dated 26th May, 1978 which inserted the new clause (9) in the Standardisation ORDER :, it is evident from the recital with which it opens that it is intended to apply to transferred employees only. It declares explicity that the Central Goverment is satisfied that a revision of the terms and conditions of service of the transferred employees is considered necessary. However, there is nothing to show that the amendment i related to the process of transfer and integration. According to Pathak. It declares explicity that the Central Goverment is satisfied that a revision of the terms and conditions of service of the transferred employees is considered necessary. However, there is nothing to show that the amendment i related to the process of transfer and integration. According to Pathak. J. the exercise of power under sub-section (2) of section 11 must be related to the process of transfer and integration, in absence of which the ORDER :has to be invalid. Koshal, J. on the other hand, held that the two parts of section 11, referred to above, are disjunctive and 'or' should not be read as 'and', as such, Central Government can also exercise the power under that sub-section if it is satisfied that it was in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders. Krishna Iyer, J., (sic) not express his view on this aspect of the matter. The result will be that the majority JUDGMENT : declaring the notification under challenge invalid rests on round other than one with which we are concerned. No doubt, the observation of Pathak J., supports the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners, but I may point out that even Pathak J. has found that sub-section (2) of section 11 has two limbs and has also held in paragraph 69 of the JUDGMENT : that the said power can be exercised more than once in my opinion, on some occasion the power can be exercised under a situation where both conditions can be fulfilled, i.e., when it is necessary for securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration as well as in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders, but that does not mean that later it cannot be exercised although the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders requires the exercise of such power by the Central Government. 8. It was then submitted on behalf of the petitioners that although sub-section (2) of section 11 has vested the power to issue such ORDER :in subjective terms to the Central Government still, the courts can enquire into whether such satisfaction was based on relevant materials. 8. It was then submitted on behalf of the petitioners that although sub-section (2) of section 11 has vested the power to issue such ORDER :in subjective terms to the Central Government still, the courts can enquire into whether such satisfaction was based on relevant materials. In support of this, contention reliance was placed on the well known cases of Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board ( AIR 1967 SC 295 ), Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agrawal ( AIR 1969 SC 707 ) and M.A. Rasheed v. The State of Kerala ( AIR 1974 SC 2249 ) where it has been pointed out that even in cases where powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same when "they are satisfied" or when "it appears to them" or when "in their opinion a certain state of affairs exists", the courts will not come to the conclusion regarding the conclusiveness of the opinion of the executive authority as to existence of such a situation, when the action is questioned and persons aggrieved, even under the aforesaid circumstances can point out to the court that no reasonable man could have come to the decision in question. It was urged that the business of the Corporation was increasing every year, and, as such, there was no recessity of curtailing the expenses or altering the terms and conditions of these petitioners. It cannot be disputed that if the power under that sub-section is held to be administrative or quasi-judicial then although heavy onus rests on the petitioners, of establishing complete lack of materials for formation of the opinion or satisfaction, this Court can examine that question. But, before entering into the question as to whether the Central Government was satisfied regarding the existence of the condition for exercise of the power under sub section (2) of section 11 and as to whether for that purpose some materials were before them, it is proper first to examine as to what is the nature of the power conferred on the Central Government under that subsection. On behalf of the respondents it was asserted that power under sub-section (2) of section 11 is legislative in characters and, as such, this Court need not investigate as to who there the formation of the opinion by the Central Government about the existence of the necessity for an action, was based on some material. 9. On behalf of the respondents it was asserted that power under sub-section (2) of section 11 is legislative in characters and, as such, this Court need not investigate as to who there the formation of the opinion by the Central Government about the existence of the necessity for an action, was based on some material. 9. On a plain reading of section 11 it appears that the employees of the erstwhile Insurers, statutorily became employees of the Corporation on the same terms and conditions which were available to them under the private Insurers, but then the Parliament has vested in the Central Government, the power to amend those terms and conditions. In my view, this power is in the nature of subordinate legislation, and, as such, legislative in character. In the case of Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St, Marylebone and others [1972 (3) AER 1019] a committee constituted under Solicitors Act, 1957 had power to make an ORDER :amending the remunerations of the Solicitors. When such power of alteration was exercised it was questioned on the ground that the power being administrative in nature, an opportunity to be heard should have been given to the Solicitors. Megarry, J., while rejecting the said contention observed : the committee in question has an entirely different function; it is legislative rather than administrative or executive. The function of the committee is to make or refuse to make a legislative instrument under delegated powers. Similarly, in the case of The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur ( AIR 1980 SC 882 ) a question had arisen as to whether the exercise of the power under section of the Uttar Pradesh Town Area Act by the State Government was administrative or legislative. It was held that the power to make declaration under that Act was legislative in character. Again, in the case of Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal and others v. State of Bihar and others] 1982 PLJR 32 (SC) (AIR 1981 SG 1127) the Supreme Court while considering the validity of a declaration, under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 declaring a market area, held that the exercise of power was neither administrative nor quasi judicial, but legislative. Again, in the case of Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal and others v. State of Bihar and others] 1982 PLJR 32 (SC) (AIR 1981 SG 1127) the Supreme Court while considering the validity of a declaration, under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 declaring a market area, held that the exercise of power was neither administrative nor quasi judicial, but legislative. In respect of this very section 11 (2), the Supreme Court in the case of the Life Insurance Corporation of India and others v. Suail Kumar Mukherjee and others ( AIR 1964 SC 847 ) observed as follows: It is plain that the provisions contained in S.11 (2) of the Act are paramount and would override any contrary provisions contained in the ORDER :or the Regulations. Subject to the provisions of S. 11 (2), the provisions of the Oredr will prevail, because the ORDER :has been issued by the Central Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it by S. 11 (2) itself. The provisions of the ORDER :in law partake of the character of the rules framed under S. 48 of the Act. In my view, the ORDER :under section 11(2) shall have the effect of a statutory rule, i.e., a subordinate legislation. 10. Once the power is held to be legislative in character, enquiry by the court must be of a very limited in nature and the validity can be questioned on the grounds which go to the root of the ORDER :. It has been pointed out by different courts that where the Statute vests power in a particular authority, which will be deemed to be a statutory authority, to judge and determine the situation under which particular ORDER :or subordinate legislation should be issued or framed. Court should not easily take upon it the responsibility to judge and assess whether such situation did exist or whether such ORDER :or legislation was called for. In the case of Attorney-General for Canada and another v. Hallet as Carey and another (1952 AC 427) the Act in question had vested power in the Governor in Ccuncil during continued existence of national emergency to make ORDER :s and regulations as he may deem necessary or advisable for the purpose of maintaining, controlling and regulating supplies and services. An ORDER :issued in exercise of that power was challenged. An ORDER :issued in exercise of that power was challenged. In that connection it was observed that when such power had been vested in the Governor in Council and the preamble of the ORDER :states that it was necessary to issue such ORDER :, "how, then can a court of law decide that the vesting was for another and extraneous purpose or hold that what the Governor in Council has declared to be necessary, is not in fact necessery for the purpose be has stated ?" Penance has been placed on behalf of the respondents also to the case of Mc Eldowney v. Forde [1969 (2) AER 1039] where a distinction between exercise of executive and legislative power under an Act has been pointed out and it was observed by Lord Pearson that limitations imposed on making executive ORDER :s under the Act in question did not apply to making of the regulations in exercise of the legislative power. 11. Even if it is assumed that it is open to the petitioners to establish that there were no materials on the basis of which the Central Government could have been satisfied about the necessity for issuing the ORDER :in question, no such material has been produced on behalf of the petitioners except an actuari report dated 25.6.1976, a copy whereof is Annexure-8 to the writ application, which says that the business of the Corporation was increasing every year. This report has been submitted to the Calcutta Division of the Life Insurance Corporation Field Officer Association, perhaps, at their request. This report was considered by the Calcutta High Court in connection with 1975 ORDER :in the aforesaid case of Hinangahu Kumar Chakraborty and others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, [ 979 (2) LIC 1417], and it was observed: It is not for this Court to make acturial calculations and determine the expense ratio in relation to first year's premium or renewal, I am in respectful agreement with the said observation. In the show-cause filed on behalf of the Central Government and the Corporation it has been stated that the Central Government had appointed a Committee known as Morarka Committee, which in its report said about the Development Officers as follows;-- that their achievements have been extremely unsatisfactory and totally incommensurate with the generous terms and conditions and facilities given to them and the various 'incentive scheme' that the Corporation derised to induce the Development Officers to increase their efforts. The said Committee suggested :-- it, therefore, becomes necessary that their remuneration and prospects should be related to the results of the efforts they might have put in, and consequently, among other things on the new business sum assured and the First Year Premium Income under their organisation. It has also been stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents that the percentage of expenses on the Development Officers was much higher in relation to the eligible premium of that year. A chart has been annexed to the affidavit showing the percentage of expenses of the petitioners for three years prior to issuance of the ORDER :. On behalf of the Respondents it was asserted that taking into consideration the said report and other materials the present ORDER :was issued to give more incentive to the Development Officers for procuring new business for the Corporation and to regulate the expenses incurred over the same. The salient feature of the ORDER :is that it defines expense limit as follows :-- expense limit, in respect of an appraisal year in relation to a Development Officer working in an operational area specified in column (1) of the Table below, means the percentage of the eligible premium of that year as specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof. Thereafter, a table is given of four types of operational area, A, B, C and D and the percentage of the eligible premium given are respectively 22%. 23%, 24% and 25%. Then it says that expense limit of a Development Officer for any appraisal year as expressed as a percentage of eligible premium of that year, will be deemed to have been exceeded if the annual remuneration in that year is in excess of the limit. Other clauses contain provisions for stopping the increment, termination of services" of the Development Officers, crossing of efficient bar and promotion. Other clauses contain provisions for stopping the increment, termination of services" of the Development Officers, crossing of efficient bar and promotion. All these conditions of service are linked with the expense limit, referred to above, and the ORDER :requires the Development Officer not to exceed the expense limit. However, powers have been vested in different authorities to condone the contravention aforesaid under certain circumstances. The condition of service of Development Officers, then known as Field Officers, was also linked to their over-all performance in the earlier ORDER :of 1957 which was held to be valid in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and others v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee and others (AIR 1964 SG 847). The present ORDER :is more stringent in some respects, but, in my view, it is difficult to hold that there was no material on the basis of which the Central Government could have been satisfied that alteration of the terms and conditions of the petitioners was called for, in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders. If the business of the Corporation increases and the expenses are curtailed, obviously it will be in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders. 12. Attacking the validity of the regulations, it was urged that there was no independent application of the mind by the Corporation and the said regulations have been framed at the dictate of the Central Government. In this connection, reference was made to the ORDER :of the Central Government (annexure 1) where the Corporation has been requested to make similar regulation. It was submitted that the Corporation could not have abdicated its functions under section 49 and should have acted on the direction of the Central Government. Reliance was placed upon the cases of Commissioner of Police. Bombay v. Gordhandan Bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ), The Cantonment Board, Ambala v. Pyare Lal ( AIR 1966 SC 108 ) and The Purtabpur Company Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and others ( AIR 1970 SC 1896 ) where it has been pointed out that the authority who has been vested with the exercise of such power by the Act should not abdicate his function and act on the dictates of others. In my view, the aforesaid principle is not applicable to the present case. In my view, the aforesaid principle is not applicable to the present case. Section 49 of the Act vests power in the Corporation to make regulations only "with the previous approval of the Central Government". In such a situation, there is no question of abdication of the power by the Corporation. Apart from-that the regulation are to govern the terms and conditions of Development Officers who have been appointed by the Corporation whereas the ORDER :under section 11 (2) is applicable to such Development Officers whose services were transferred after coming into force of the Act. Both now belong to the same category and there cannot be two different terms and conditions for them. In such a situation, the Corporation had no option but to frame regulations for the Development Officers appointed by them consistent with the ORDER :under section 11 (2) of the Act. 13. On behalf of the respondents it was also urged that after coming into forte of the aforesaid Ordinance of 1981 any enquiry as to whether the conditions mentioned under section 11 (2) have been fulfilled or that the Corporation has made the regulations at the dictate of the Central Government has become academic. According to the learned counsel, under the said Ordinance, due to insertion of clause (cc) in sub-section (2) of section 49, the Central Government has been vested with the power to make Rules with effect from 20.6.1979 in respect of the terms and conditions of service of the employee of the Corporation including those who became employees under section 11 (1) of the Act. sub-section (2A) which has been inserted in section 48 of the Act says : The regulations and other provisions as in force immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance corporation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981, with respect of the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act, shall be deemad to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and shall subject to the other provisions of this section, hove effect accordingly. According to the respondents, the impugned ORDER :(annexure-1) and the regulations (annexure-2) which were issued and made by the Central Government and the Corporation under section 11 (2) and section 49, respectively, will now be deemed to have been made under section 48 of the Act by the Central Government, which prescribes no condition for exercise of such power. It was also pointed out that the rules under clause (cc) of sub section (2) of section 48 shall have overriding effect in view of sub section (2C) which has been inserted by the said Ordinance in section 48. The said sub-section (2C) is as follows:-- any rules under the said clause (cc) shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date, notwithstanding any JUDGMENT :, decree or ORDER :s of any court, tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force. In view of insertion of clause (cc) in subsection (2) and of sub-section (2A) in section 48 there should not be any difficulty in holding that the regulations framed by the Corporation and the ORDER :issued by the Central Government which will be covered by expressions "other provisions" and which were in force shall be deemed to be the rules under section 48 of the Act. But, whether ORDER :s and regulations which were invalid or had boon declared invalid for one reason or other shall also be deemed to be validated because of subsection (2A) and (2C) of section 48, needs a deeper examination, especially when in sub-section (2A) the expressions used are "the regulations and other provisions as in force." On behalf of the petitioners it was urged that only such regulations or other provisions which were in force, i.e., which bad been validly made, shall become the rules. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents it was urged that even regulations or other provision" which suffered from any informity will be deemed to be (sic) rules, because of the validating provision contained in sub-section (2C). On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents it was urged that even regulations or other provision" which suffered from any informity will be deemed to be (sic) rules, because of the validating provision contained in sub-section (2C). In my opinion, there is no necessity of deciding this question in this writ application, in view of my finding that the ORDER :under section 11 (2) issued by the Central Government and the regulations made by the Corporation under section 49 of the Act did cot suffer from any infirmity. As such, they will be deemed to be rules made under section 48 of the Act by the Central Government with effect from 20th June, 1979. The present application was filed after that date. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners then submitted that although the petitioners are Development Officers, but they will be deemed to be workmen for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the aforesaid agreement dated 19.11.1971 entered into on behalf of the petitioners and the Corporation will be deemed to be a settlement within the meaning of section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act which shall be binding on the parties to the agreement; as such, it was not open to the Central Government to issue the ORDER :and for the Corporation to make the regulations in question, superseding the terms of the said agreement. Reliance was placed on the aforesaid case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D. J. Bahadur and others ( AIR 1980 SC 2181 ) In that case, a settlement had been arrived at between the Corporation and its Class III and IV employees regarding payment of annual cash bonus. There was no dispute that the said settlement was a settlement within the meaning of section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act and is defined by section 2(p) of that Act, because Class III and IV employees of the Corporation were admittedly workmen within the meaning of section 2(s). In that background, the Supreme Court by its majority JUDGMENT : held that the industrial Disputes Act being a special law must prevail upon the general law, i. e., The Life Insurance Corporation Act. It was held that any ORDER :issued under section 11(1) of the Act shall not supersede or annul a settlement arrived at under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was held that any ORDER :issued under section 11(1) of the Act shall not supersede or annul a settlement arrived at under the Industrial Disputes Act. If it is held that the petitioners are also workmen, then there should not be any difficulty in holding that the case is covered by the aforesaid Supreme Court JUDGMENT :. But, on the materials on the record it is difficult to hold that the petitioners will be deemed to be workmen within the meaning of suction 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(s) defines 'workman' as meaning any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical, job for hire or reward. It further says that the said exprsaion shall not include four categories of persons mentioned therein. We are concerned with exception (iv), the relevant portion whereof is as follows: who being employed in a supervisor capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per men sem. The petitioners draw wages more than five hundred rupees per month, is not in dispute. What was disputed on behalf of the petitioners is that they are employed in a supervisory capacity, I may mention at the outset that in the main writ application there is no pleading regarding the nature of work of the petitioners. There is a vague statement in reply filed on behalf of the petitioners to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation that they are workmen. On the other hand, details of the duties of the Field Officers, who have now been designated as Development Officers, are mentioned in the aforesaid ORDER :of 1957 (annexure-4). There 'Field Officer' has been defined to mean a person wholly or mainly engaged in development of new life insurance business for the insurer" by supervising, either directly or through one or more intermediaries, the work of persons procuring or soliciting new life insurance business and who was remunerated by a regular monthly salary. Clause 3 of that ORDER :prescribes the duties of the Field Officers. Clause 3(i) says that the duties of the Field Officers shall be to develop and increase the production of new life insurance business through agent placed under his supervision by the Corporation. Clause 3(ii) says that the duties of the Field Officers shall be "to guide", supervise and direct the activities of all such agents". Clause 3(i) says that the duties of the Field Officers shall be to develop and increase the production of new life insurance business through agent placed under his supervision by the Corporation. Clause 3(ii) says that the duties of the Field Officers shall be "to guide", supervise and direct the activities of all such agents". It is an admitted position that these petitioners as Development Officers have been allotted different areas in which they develop the life insurance business through agents working under them. In such a situation, in my view, it has to be held that the petitioners are employed in supervisory capacity. It was urged on their behalf that they have no power to appoint or dismiss the agents or to take any disciplinary action against them. The power to appoints dismiss or to take disciplinary action are not essential ingredients of supervisory power. Even in absence of such power a person can supervise the activity of other employees working under the same master. Once it is held that the petitioners are not workmen the agreement in question shall not be deemed to be a settlement within the meaning of section 2(p) so as to be binding under section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In my view, there is no question of applicability of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D. J. Bahadur and others ( AIR 1980 SC 2181 ). 15. It was then urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Central Government and the Corporation on the principle of promissory estoppel are enjoined not to issue any ORDER :or regulation which in any manner supersedes or affects the agreement dated 19.11.1971. For this reliance was placed on the well known case of Union of India v. IndoAfghan Agencies ( AIR 1968 SC 718 ) and M/S Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ). I have not been able to appreciate as to how the principle of promissory estoppel is attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case the agreement had been entered into between the Corporation and the Union of the petitioners. The Central Government was not a party to that agreement. I have not been able to appreciate as to how the principle of promissory estoppel is attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case the agreement had been entered into between the Corporation and the Union of the petitioners. The Central Government was not a party to that agreement. Nothing has been stated as to how while entering into the agreement the Union of the petitioners altered their position on assurance given by the Corporation. On the other hand, it has been stated that the said agreement was to their satisfaction which is now being altered by the impugned ORDER :and regulations. Apart from that, I have already held that the issuance of the ORDER :by the Central Government amounts to an exercise of legislative power. Same is the position so far as the regulations are concerned because they are statutory. The principle of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against exercise of legislative power, primary or -subordinate. Id the case of M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Milk Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ), on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners, it was pointed out "there can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power". Once an Act vests power in an authority to alter terms and conditions of by way of subordinate legislation, then the exercise of such power shall override and supersede earlier agreements which are not statutory in nature. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Life Iasurance Corporation of Iadia and others v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee and others ( AIR 1964 SC 847 ) regarding the scope of section 11(2) of the Act, "It was thought that for a proper functioning of the Corporation, it was essential to confer upon the Central Government an overriding power to change the terms and conditions of employees." 16. The petitioners also questioned the validity of the ORDER :and regulations on the ground that they violate the principles of natural justice inasmuch as before issuance thereof no opportunity was given to the petitioners or their Union of being heard. The petitioners also questioned the validity of the ORDER :and regulations on the ground that they violate the principles of natural justice inasmuch as before issuance thereof no opportunity was given to the petitioners or their Union of being heard. Reliance was placed on the JUDGMENT :s of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Assam and another v. Bharat Kala Baandar and others ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) and Madan Mohan Pathak and another v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1978 SC 803 ). In the former case ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) by a notification issued under the Defence of India Rules the wages of certain category of employees had been regulated. In that connection, it was observed that effect of the exercise of such power was to unsettle settled relations between employers and employees; as such, the Government should have given notice to the particular interest and should have invited representations from those interests. The Court did not decide whether the notification had been issued in exercise of legislative, quasi judicial or administrative power. We are concerned with exercise of legislative power. In the latter case ( AIR 1978 SC 803 ) Chief Justice Beg observed, "A decision reached by the Central Government under section 11(2) of the Act is the result of a satisfaction on matters stated there and would imply quasi judicial procedure where the terms of a settlement had to be reviewed or revived". This does not appear to be the view of the other Judges who constituted the Bench. I have held that exercise of the power under section 11(2) of the Act is neither administrative nor quasi judicial, but legislative. It is well settled that exercise of the legislative power is not subject to the rules of natural justice. In the aforesaid case of Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone and others [1972 (3) AELR 1019] it was pointed out that the rules of natural justice do not run in the sphers of legislation, primary or delegated. The said observation was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur ( AIR 1980 SC 882 ). The said observation was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur ( AIR 1980 SC 882 ). Again in the case of Remesh Chandra Kachardas Porwal and others v. State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1981 SC 1127 ) the same view was reiterated and reference was made in this connection to prof. H. W. R. Wades, Administrative Law where it has been pointed out, "There is no right to be heard before making of legislation, whether primary or delegated, unless it is provided by the Statutes". Prof. S. A. De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd Edition) at page 163 has pointed out," It is generally assumed that in English Law the making of a subordinate legislative instrument need not be prescribed by notice or hearing unless the parent Act so provides". In my view, there is no question of breach of the principle of natural justice. 17. Lastly, it was contended that the petitioners have been discriminated by the impugned ORDER :and regulations, inasmuch as the terms and conditions of other class of employees have not been altered. The petitioners constitute a separate class of employees of the Corporation and there is no question of discrimination, if any provision covers a class of employees. 19. In the result, the writ application is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no ORDER :for costs. Shivanugrah Narain, J.--I join my learned brother N.P. Singh, J. in repelling the attack on the validity of the Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) ORDER :, 1978 (hereinafter called 'the ORDER :') and the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Sixth Amendment Regulations, 1978 (hereinafter called 'the Regulations') issued by the Central Government and the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter called 'the Corporation') respectively. 1 also concur in most of the reasons given by him for repelling the attack. The questions raised are, however, res integra and of public importance. I would also like to give some additional reasons for rejecting some of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. I, therefore, add the following. 20. 1 also concur in most of the reasons given by him for repelling the attack. The questions raised are, however, res integra and of public importance. I would also like to give some additional reasons for rejecting some of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. I, therefore, add the following. 20. The relevant facts and the sarient and material provisions of "the ORDER :" and "the Regulations" which are identical, have been set out in the JUDGMENT : of my learned brother N. P. Singh, J. and need not be repeated. I, therefore, proceed straight away to consider the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. 21. The contention that the ORDER :and the Regulations are null and void because they are inconsistent with the agreement dated 19.11.1971 entered into by and on behalf of the Corporation and the workmen which, it is urged, was a settlement within the meaning of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the "I.D. Act") presupposes that the petitioners, who are Development Officers, are 'workmen' within the meaning of the expression as defined in Section 2(s) of the said 'I.D. Act'. It is conceded by Shri Chatterjee, who argued the case on behalf of the petitioners with great fairness and ability, that if the Development Officers are not workmen, the contention must fail. It is plain, as my learned brother has, if I may say so with respect, so clearly demonstrated that the Development Officers who were formerly designated as Field Officers must be regarded as employed in an industry to do a supervisory job and, as admittedly, they draw wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per mensum, they are excepted out of the category of workmen by exception (iv) in section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, 1 would only add that merely because the Development Officers supervise the work only of agents, who; it is contended, and which for the purposes of this case, I will assume, are not fellow employees of the Development Officers, it can not be said that they are not employed to do supervisory work. Section 2(s) includes among workmen persons employed to do supervisory work and exception (iv) speaks of per sons "employed in a supervisory capacity." It does not say that the work supervise (sic) must be done by follow employees. Section 2(s) includes among workmen persons employed to do supervisory work and exception (iv) speaks of per sons "employed in a supervisory capacity." It does not say that the work supervise (sic) must be done by follow employees. Of course, the supervisory work must be work in relation of the industry in which the person is employed but the work in relation to the industry may be done by independent contractors whose Work may also require some supervision. To hold that the supervisory work must be in relation to the work of persons employed in the industry would involve reading in section 2(s) those or similar words which are not there. There is no warrant for adding those words in section 2(s). 22. Nor can I agree with the argument advanced by Sri Chatterjee that the Development Officers cannot be said to supervise the work of the agents because they have no disciplinary powers over the agents nor the power to recruit them or to dispense with their services. The power of appointment and dismissal or disciplinary power are not necessary incidents of supervisory power, they more properly appertain to managerial power. Further, merely because it has not been shown that the Development Officers have no power of assigning duties and of distribution of work among agents working in their area, it cannot be held that their work is not supervisory in character. The decision of the Supreme Court in All India Reserve Bank Employees' Association v. Reserve Bank of India ( AIR 1966 SC 305 ) relied upon by Sri Chatterjee is no authority for the proposition that at person can in no circumstance be regarded as employed in supervisory work if he has no power of assigning duties and the distribution of work among other employees. What was observed therein by Hidayatullah, J. as he then was, speaking for the Supreme Court in that case was that "where there is a power of assigning duties and distribution of work, there is supervision" ( at page 315 of the report). The converse of a proposition is not necessarily true. 23. What was observed therein by Hidayatullah, J. as he then was, speaking for the Supreme Court in that case was that "where there is a power of assigning duties and distribution of work, there is supervision" ( at page 315 of the report). The converse of a proposition is not necessarily true. 23. Moreover, for an employee of any industry to be a workman, within the meaning of the expression as used in section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, it is, as pointed out by Bhargava J. speaking for the Supreme Court in the Burmah Shell case ( AIR 1971 SC 922 ), "manifest that he must be employed to do skilled or unskilled manual work, supervisory work, technical work or clerical work. If the work done by an employee is not of such nature, he would not be a workman." (at page 927 of the report). "Now if, as contended by Sri Chatterjee the Development Officers are not employed in supervisory work, they can be regarded as woramen only if they are required to do manual or clerical or technical work. It is conceded by Sri Chatterjee that the Development Officers are not employed to do manual work He however, contends that they do technical and/or clerical work. Now to quote Bhargava J. again, 'a workman must be held to be employed to do that work which is the main work he is required to do even if he has to do other type of work. (at page 928 of the report). There is no doubt that the main work to be performed by the Development Officers is the development of the business of the Corporation by promoting sales of the Insurance Policies through the Agents working in their area. That a person whose principal duty is of promoting sales is not engaged in clerical or technical work is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Burmah Shell (supra). In that case the Supreme Court held that the Sales Engineering representatives, whose chief duty was to promote sales of the products of the employer and give advice about the basis use of the products fold which might require technical knowledge were not engaged in doing clerical or technical work (at page 938 of the report). 24. In that case the Supreme Court held that the Sales Engineering representatives, whose chief duty was to promote sales of the products of the employer and give advice about the basis use of the products fold which might require technical knowledge were not engaged in doing clerical or technical work (at page 938 of the report). 24. Even if we assume, as contended by Sri Chatterjee that the relationship of the Development officers with their agents is of captain or leader of the team to the members of the team, it can not be held that they are engaged in clerical or technical work for the agents who are members of the team they are leading cannot be held to be engaged in, clerical or technical or manual work. The agents are employed for motivating people to take out insurance policies and thus are employed for promoting sales of policies and being persons employed in promoting sales of the industry, can not therefore in view of the decision in the Burmah Shell case (supra) be regarded an employed to do clerical or technical work even though incidentally they may do some clerical work. In the Burmah Shell case (supra) a person employed exclusively in canvassing sales for an industry was cited as an example of person who was not a workman as he was employed neither in manual, clerical or technical or supervisory work. He would not be a work-man even if the work of canvassing sales was his main work, though not exclusive work. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the Development Officers like the petitioners are not 'workmen' within the meaning of the expression as used in Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. 25. As regards the contention that the Government of India and the Corporation were, precluded from making 'the ORDER :' and 'the Regulations' respectively, because of the doctrine of the promissory estoppel, it is enough to state that both 'the ORDER :' and 'the Regulations' are acts done in exercise of legislative power and there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. Even in M/s. Motilal Pzdampat Sugar Mill Go. Even in M/s. Motilal Pzdampat Sugar Mill Go. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar pradesh and others (AIR 1979 SC G.1) which represents the high water mark of the doctrine of promissory estoppel Bhagwati, J. reiterated the principle that there could be no promisorry estoppel against the exercise of legislative power (at page 67 of the report). There is no warrant for limiting this exception to the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the exercise of the legislative power, by the legislature itself. The exception must apply to the exercise of legislative power even by a subordinate legislative authority like the Central Government exercising the power conferred by Section 11 (2) of the Act and the Corporation exercising the power to make regulation under Section 4(sic) of the Act. In M/s Jitram Shiv Kumar and others v. The State of Haryana and another (AIR 1980 SC 1985), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not estop the Municipal Committee from levying octroi duty by another resolution even though by an earlier resolution. the Municipal Committee had declared that that particular area would remain free from Octroi duty. In levying the duty, the Municipal Committee concerned was exercising legislative power as a subordinate legislative authority. 26. There is no doubt that the power of the Corporation to frame regulations under Section 49 of the Act. is a legislative power. And it was specifically held by the Supreme Court speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, in Sunil Kumar Mokherjee's case ( AIR 1964 SC 847 ) that the provisions of the ORDER :under Section 11 (2) of the Act partake in Jaw of the character of the Rules framed under Section 48 of the Act. That framing of a rule in exercise of legislative power is a proposition which admits of no controversy. On general principles a also an ORDER :under Section 11(2) of the Act changing the remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of the employees must be regarded as legislative in character It changes existing conditions of service by making a new rule to be applicable thereafter to all or some of the employees subject to the power of the Central Government. As it prescribes a rule for the future, it is an act legislative in kind. As it prescribes a rule for the future, it is an act legislative in kind. See the observations of the American Supreme Court in the case reported in 211 United States 210 at 226 relied upon by the High Court of Australia in the case reported in 10 C.L.R.266. 27. I now proceed to consider the contentions that "the ORDER :" is ultra vires section 11(2) of the Act. It is obvious that the Central Government does not possess plenary legislative power and as we have seen, under section 11(2) of the Act it has been vetted with the power of making subordinate legislation. It is well settled that "the authority vested with the power of making subordinate legislation has to act within the limits of its power and cannot transgress the same. The initial difference between subordinate legislation and the statute law lies in the fact that a subordinate law making body is bound by the terms of its delegated or derived authority and that Court of law, as a general rule, will not give effect to the rules, thus made, unless satisfied that all the conditions precedent to the validity of the rules have been fulfilled,"--per Khanna, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in Hukum Chand etc. v. Union of India (AIR 1974 SC 2427) (at page 2430 of the report). It is urged by Sri Chatterjee that one of the limits of the subordinate legislative power conferred upon the Central Government by Section 11(2) of the Act is that the ORDER :, made thereunder must be related to the process of transfer and integration of the employees of the Insurers whose business was, by the Act, transferred to the Corporation and, the argument runs "the ORDER :" is not related to the process of transfer and integration and is therefore, ultra vires Section 11 (sic) of the Act. 28. Section 11(2) of the Act has already been quoted by my learned brother. As pointed out by Koshal, J. in Life Insurance Corporation of India s. D.J. Bahadur ( AIR 1980 SC 2181 at 2224), sub-section 2 of Section 11 may be so far as if relevant split up as follows : (a) The Central Government may alter (whether by way of reduction or otherwise) the remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service (of.) to such extent and in such manner as it think-; fit. (b) xx xx xx (c) The action detailed in (a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied-- (i) that for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and the other terms and conditions or service applicable to trinsferred employee, it is necessary so to do; Or (ii) that, in the interest of the Corporation its policy holders a reduction in the remuneration payable or a revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable, to employees Or any class of them is called for. It is not contended, and as there are no compelling reasons it could not be contended, that the word 'or' must be interpreted as and. The word 'or', therefore, must, as pointed out by Koshal, J. in the aforesaid case, be given its ordinary meaning, that is, as a disjunctive. That being so, it is clear, to use the words of Koshal J. in the aforesaid case again, that The Central Government is empowered to take action under subjection (2) of section 11 of the Act if it is satisfied of the existence of either of two conditions. It may take such action if it is satisfied that for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration, etc. applicable to transferred employees it is necessary to do. But then if no action is intended to be taken for that purpose, it may still be taken provided the Central Government is satisfied that it is in the interest of the Corporation and its policy.-holders to make a reduction in the remuneration payable or a revision of the other terms and conditions applicable to its employees." (at page 2225 of the report) 29. It is manifest that Section 11(2) of the Act consists of two parts and the power of the Central Government to alter the remuneration or other terms and conditions of service applicable to its employees may be exercised for two distinct and separate purposes namely, (i) for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration etc, applicable to transferred employees and (ii) for the purpose of promoting and protecting the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders. The exercise of the power for the first purpose is by its very nature, applicable to the terms and conditions of service of the transferred employees only and the first part of Section 11(sic) of the Act expressly limits the power of the Central Government to transferred employees only. The use for the power on the second purpose is clearly by its nature not limited to transferred employees only and in the second part the legislature to use the word of Koshal J. "chose the comprehensive expression" employees or any class of employees. 30. The expression "employees or any class of employees" in its ordinary, grammatical meaning undoubtedly includes within its ambit not only the transferred employees but all employees or any class of them. That the context and object reinforce the plain grammatical meaning was clearly demonstrated by Koshal, J. in D. J. Bahadur case (supra) thus : The legislasure chose the comprehensive expression" employees or any class of them" in sub section (2) in spite of the fact that not only in sub-section (1) and (4) but also in sub-section (2) itself the detailed description "employee of an insurer whose controlled business has been transferred to and vested in the Corporation" or words to that effect have been used to denote a transferred employee. Again where ever a transferred employees was mean but a detailed description in relation to him was not given, the expression "such employee" was used with reference to that description. Examples in point are the proviso to sub-section (1) and the latter part of sub-section (4). If the expression "employees or any class of them" was intended to he restricted to transferred employees it would certainly have been preceded by the word 'such' so that it could be referable to the detailed description of employees of that kind occuring is an earlier part of the sub-section. From the circumstance that no such device was pressed into Service the conclusion is irresistable that the expression last mentioned was intended to convey a meaning different from that which was deducible from the detailed description otherwise employed in the Section.Now the first condition which envisaged the securing of uniformity in the scales of remuneration clearly applies to transferred employees but the same is not true of the second condition. At a particular juncture in the life of the Corporation, it may become necessary to make a deduction in the remuneration payable to its employees or a revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable to them. But then this must follow from the satisfaction of the Government it is in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders to do so. It is obvious that this conditions envisages the change in condition of service etc. of all the employees of the Corporation and not only the transferred employees." (at page 2225 of the report). 31. I am also in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Koshal J. that if the expression 'employees or any class of them', in the second part of section 11 of the Act were read as confined to transferred employees or any class of trasnferred employees only, Section 11 (2) of the Act may well be regarded as discriminatory and ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is true that the transferred employees constitute for the purpose of process of transfer and integration a separate class. But if, as I have held in agreement with Koshal, J, the power under he second part is a separate and distinct power, there is no reason to treat such transferred employees for the purpose of altering the terms and conditions of service in the interest of the Corporation and the policy holders, after the process of transfer and integration has been completed and the transferred employees absorbed in the general body of employees of the Corporation, separately from other employees of the Corporation. 32. And if, as I have held, the power in the two parts of Section 11 (2) of the Act is to be exercised for two distinct and separate purposes, and that the power in the second part is not confined to transferred employees only and extends to all classes of employees of the Corporation, there is no justification, much less necessity, for reading into the second part of section 11 (2) of the Act, the limitation that the exercise of the power must be related to the process of transfer and integration. No such limitation can be spelt out from the words used. No such limitation can be spelt out from the words used. The words used to indicate the purpose "in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders" are of wide and general applicability, the alteration, of terms and conditions of service of employees for various purposes and not merely for facilitating the process of transfer and integration may be in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders. And it would be incongruous to hold that the exercise of a power to alter the terms and conditions of all employees and not merely "transferred employees" must, or pain of invalidity, be related to transfer and integration. 33. The JUDGMENT : of Pathak, J. in D. J. Bahadur case [Supra) no doubt supports the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. In that case, though he recongised that section 11 (2) of the Act consists of two parts, Pathak, J. held that the second part of section 11 (2) of the Act also relates to transferred employees Only and that the ORDER :of the Central Government passed under the second part of Section 11 (2) of the Act also, must be linked up with the process of transfer and integration and struck down the ORDER :under Section 11 (2) of the Act in that case, also on the ground that the ORDER :was not related to the process of transfer and integration. But as I have already stated the aforesaid conclusion of Pathak, J. is opposed to the reasoning of and the conclusion arrived at by Koshal, J. on this point. Krisha Iyer, J. the other learned Judge who along with Pathak, J. and Koshal, J. constituted the Bench of the Supreme Court in D.J. Bahadur's case reserved his opinion on this point. Krishna Iyer, J. rested his conclusion regarding the invalidity of the impugned ORDER :s on the ground that "they stem from a general Act and can not supplant, subvert or substitute the special legislation which specifically deals with industrial disputes between workmen and their employees," He categorically stated that "in this view, other questions, which have been argued at length and considered by my learned brother do not demand my discussions." (at page 2202 of the report). Krishna Iyer, J. no doubt observed at page 2185 of the report: The office of S. 11 of the LIC Act was to provide for a smuoth cake-over and to promote some common conditions of service in a situation where a jungle of divergent contracts of employment and industrial awards or settlements confronted the State Unless such rationalisation and standardization were evolved the ensuing chaos would itself have spelt confusion, conflicts and difficulties. But in view of the express reservation made later by Krishna Iyer, J.' in hit JUDGMENT : to which I have already referred, the contention of Sri Chatterjee that these observations amount to an affirmation of the view expressed by Pathak, J. on this point can not be accepted. We arc, therefore, free to accept the view either of Pathak, J or Koshal, J., Both of which are entitled to the highest and equal respect. For the reatons already given above and further reasons to be given. I am in respectful agreement with the views of Koshal, J. and I am unabls, with great respect to agree with the conclusion of Pathak, J. that an ORDER :passed in second part of Section 11 (2) must be related to process of transfer and integration. 34. The principal reason given by Pathak, J. for holding that the second part of section 11(2) of the Act also relates to transferred employees only and the exercise of the power under the second part of Section 11(2) of the Act must be related to the process of transfer and integration is that both the parts of section 11(2) of the Act are intended to constitute a composite process for ration alising the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of transferred employees and that the need fur such a provision (the second limb of section 11(2) of the Act) arises because it (the burden imposed by the benefits conferred upon the transferred employees) is a burden by which the Corporation finds itself saddled upon the transfer, a burden rot of its own making." With respect, I am unable to agree. The first part of Section 11(2) of the Act is intended for rationalisation and standardisation of scales of remuneration etc. of the transferred employees by bringing about uniformity therein. The first part of Section 11(2) of the Act is intended for rationalisation and standardisation of scales of remuneration etc. of the transferred employees by bringing about uniformity therein. But the second part of Section 11(2) of the Act is not concerned with rationalisation, atleast in the sense of standardisation. It is concerned with promoting or protecting the interests of the Corporation and its policy holders. For the: protection of those interests, the Central Government may alter the remuneration etc. of the employees of the Corporation. The need to protect the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders may arise not only because of burden with which the Corporation finds its suddled upon the transfer to it of the business and the employments of the former insurers. The need may arise on account of a burden of its making. The interests of the Corporation and its policy holders may require a revision of the remuneration and other terms and conditions of service not only of the transferred employees but also of the. employees recruited by the Corporation itself. The object of the Second part of Section 11(2) of the Act can not be limited to deal with the problems encountered in the process of the transfer and integration of the transferred employees in the general body of the employees of the Corporation. The transfer and integration of the transferred employees into the general body of employees of the Corporation is not a perennial process. Sooner or later the process is bound to be completed. And even after the aforesaid process has been completed, alteration of the remuneration and other terms and conditions of Us employees may be called for in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders. This may be because of the fluciuation in the volume and profitability of the business of the Corporation or consequent upon re-organisation of its staffing pattern etc. On the above interpretation, the Central Government would be rendered powerless to alter the terms and conditions of service of the employees even though the interests of the Corporation and its policyholders may urgently so require. On the above interpretation, the Central Government would be rendered powerless to alter the terms and conditions of service of the employees even though the interests of the Corporation and its policyholders may urgently so require. The second part of section 11(2) is designed to confer a wide and general and almost unlimited power on the Central Government to alter the remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation subject only to the condition that it is satisfied that such alteration was called for in the interests of the Corporation and its policy holders. On the interpretation contended by Sri Chattrjee and accepted by pathak, J. section 11(2) of the Act would be left however less to effectuate the purposes for which it was enacted. 35. The other reason given by Palhak, J. in support of his conclusion that the second part of Section 11 (2) of the Act is also confined to transferred employees is that the power thereunder is vested in the Central Government "which by the provisions of Chapter IX, the Act has been appointed as the effective and direct instiumentality for bringing about the transfer and integration." Though the Central Government has been appointed as the effective- and direct instrumentality for bringing about the transfer and integration, 1 am unable to agree that its role under the Act is confined to being an instrumentality for bringing about the transfer and integration. The Corporation is an instrumentality of the Central Government and the continued welfare of the Corporation and its policy-holders is the proper concern of the Central Government. The original capital of the Corporation running to five crores of rupees has been provided by the Central Government-Section 5 of the Act. Section 2) of the Act requires the Corporation is to be guided in the discharge of its function under this Act by "such directions in matters of general policy involving public interest as the Central Government may give to it in writing." The sum assumed by all policies issued by the Central Government, including bonus declared in respect thereof, are guaranteed payment in cash by the Central Government--Section 32 of the Act. The Central Government is by Section 48 of the Act given the power to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. The Central Government is by Section 48 of the Act given the power to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. It is, therefore, manifest that the powers and functions of the Central Government do not come to an end after the transfer of the business of the existing insurers or their employees to the Corporation is effected. Therefore, the circumstances that power under Section 11(2) of the Act is vested in the Central Government does not warrant the conclusion that the power is limited to transferred employees only or that it can be exercised only in relation to the process of transfer and integration. 36. To hold that the power under the second part cannot be exercised unless the ORDER :passed thereunder is related to the process of transfer and integration would amount to reading limiting words which are not there in the second part of section 11 (2) of the Act. As I have shown, rot only there is no necessity for reading such limiting words in section 11 (2) of the Act but, on the other hand, the introduction of such words would defeat the purpose of the enactment of the second part of Section 11 (2) of the Act. The requirement of first part of Section 11 (2) of the Act that the ORDER :made must be related to the process of tranfer and integration can not, therefore, be imported into the second part of Section 11 (2) of the Act and the ORDER :made under the second part of Section 11 (2) of the Act, which is otherwise validly made under the second part of section 11 (2) of the Act, cannot be impugned merely on the ground that it is not related to process of transfer and integration. This contention of Shri Chatterjee also must, therefore, fails. 37. I now come to the attack on the validity of 'the ORDER :' no the ground that the condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 11 (2) of the Act, namely that the Central Government is satisfied that in the interests of the Corporation and its policy holders a reduction in the remuneration payable or revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable to the employees is called for, was absent and, therefore, the ORDER :is null and void. I agree with Sri Chatterjee, notwithstanding the learned argument of Shri B.P. Singh, appearing on behalf of the Corporation to the contrary, that this Court has jurisdiction to enter into the question whether the Central Government was so satisfied and to strike down 'the ORDER :' which is a subordinate legislative instrument, if this Court comes to the conclusion that the Central Government was not so satisfied. It cannot be doubted that the satisfaction of the Central Government that, in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders, a reduction in the remuneration and a revision of other terms and conditions applicable to employees is called for is a condition precedent to the validity of the exercise of the power to issue 'an ORDER :' under section 11 (2) of the Act like 'the ORDER :' altering the remuneration and revising the other terms and conditions of service of the employee concerned. 38. If the satisfaction has not been arrived at, i.e., opinion has not been formed, honestly or it has been formed without application of mind to the relevant facts or on the basis of irrelevant considerations, the Court can disregard that opinion and hold that the condition precedent to the exercise of the power, namely, the satisfaction or the opinion of the competent authority, the i.e., Central Government did not exist. And the Court can do so even though the impugned ORDER :recites that the competent authority had formed the requisite opinion. "When powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same when 'they are satisfied' (That). a certain state of affairs exists: the courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of the executive authority's opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated" per Ray, C.J. in M.A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1974 SC 2249 at 22). Or, as Bachawat, J. observed in the case of Rohtas Industries Ltd. "The opinion is displaced as a relevant opinion if it could not be formed by any sensible person on the material before him. The reason is that Court may then infer that the authority either did not honestly form the opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts" ( AIR 1969 SC 707 at 721). 39. The reason is that Court may then infer that the authority either did not honestly form the opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts" ( AIR 1969 SC 707 at 721). 39. Shri Singh concedes that would be the position if the act the condition precedent to the exercise of which is the opinion or subjective satisfaction of the competent authority, is an executive or administrative act. He, however, contends that, where as in this case, the act is legislative in character, once the ORDER :of the competent authority recites that it has formed the requisite opinion, there is no scope for any enquiry by the Courts as that would amount to usurpation of the function of the competent authority by the Courts. I am unable to agree. Where the existence of the condition precedent to the exercise of the subordinate legislative power is challenged, the Court, as I have shown, is entitled and, indeed, bound to decide whether the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power have been fulfilled. The declaration by the competent authority that the condition precedent has been fulfilled, though entitled to great weight can not therefore, be conclusive, A condition precedent to the exercise of the power is intended to be a restraint on the power conferred upon the authority. And, to use the words of Radcliffe who spoke for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nakknda AM v. Tayaratna (1951 AC 66) "If the question whether the condition has been satisfied is to be conclusively decided by the man who wields the power, the value of the intended restraint is in effect nothing. As we have seen, the satisfaction of the Central Government as to the alteration etc. of the remuneration and other terms and conditions of the employees of the Corporation being called for in the interest of the Corporation or its policy holders is a condition precedent to and a restraint on the exercise of the power under section 11(2) of the Act. If the opinion of the Government as to such satisfaction was conclusive, 'the value of the intended restraint is in effect nothing'; this would cease to be a condition precedent. If the opinion of the Government as to such satisfaction was conclusive, 'the value of the intended restraint is in effect nothing'; this would cease to be a condition precedent. Further, as I have shown, though it is difficult to rebut the presumption regarding the existence of the opinion or satisfaction where the impugned ORDER :recites the existence of the satisfaction or the opinion of the authority, as we have seen, it can in exceptional cases be rebutted. I see no reason why the presumption regarding the existence of the satisfaction can be rebutted if the ORDER :is admini strative in character and not if the ORDER :is legislative in character the object of enacting the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power, either legislative or administrative, is absolutely the same, namely, to impose a limit or restraint on the power conferred upon the competent authority. 40. I am fortified in this conclusion by the decision in Read v. Smith (1959) NZLR 996 in which, as pointed out by Hedge, J. in the case of Rohtas Industries Ltd. (supra) (at page 719 of the report), it was held that the Governor-General's power under the Education Act to make such regulation as 'he "thinks necessary to secure the due adminisiration" of the Act' was invalidly exercised in so far as his opinion as to the necessity of such regulation was not reasonably tenable. 41. None of the decisions relied on by Shri Singh run counter to the aforesaid conclusion. In A.G. for Canda and another v. Hallet & Garey and another (1952 AC 427) the Privy Council was called upon to decide the validity of an ORDER :in Council made by the Governor in Council which provided that all Oats and barley in commercial positions in Canada, with certain exceptions, be vested in the Canadian Wheat Board. The ORDER :by the Governor in Council was made in exercise of the powers conferred by an Act which empowered and authorised the Governor in Council "to make such ORDER :s and regulations, as he may, by reason of continued existence of the national emergency,. deem necessary or advisable for the purpose of. maintaining, controlling and regulating supplies and services prices, transportation, use and occupation of property to ensure economic stability and ORDER :ly transition to conditions of peace". deem necessary or advisable for the purpose of. maintaining, controlling and regulating supplies and services prices, transportation, use and occupation of property to ensure economic stability and ORDER :ly transition to conditions of peace". The impugned ORDER :in Council recited that the Governor in Council deemed it necessary to make the ORDER :for maintaining controlling and regulating supplies and prices etc. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council repelling the attack on the validity of the ORDER :and speaking through Lord Radcliffe observed: "How. then can a Court of law decide that the vesting was for another and extraneous purpose or hold that what the Governor in Council has declared to be necessary, is not in fact necessary for the purpose he has stated (emphasis supplied). After pointing out that the ORDER :showed on its face compliance with the conditions of exercise of those powers Lord Radcliffe further observed: "An ORDER :so expressed leaves no ground for a judicial enquiry whether the Governor can have intended to exercise those powers. "But his Lordship had also stated: "The true question is whether it can be said that the Governor in Council could not have deemed necessary to take this step as a means incidental to the realisation of the purposes stated in the ORDER :" (at page 444-445 of the report). Lord Radcliffe also pointed out "Parliament has chosen to say explicitly that he shall do whatever things he may deem necessary or advisable. That does not allow him to do whatever he may feel inclined for what he does must be capable of being related to one of the prescribed purposes:. But then expropriation is altogether capable of being so related" (at page 450--emphasis supplied). 42. Even in such a case, the Court is, therefore, according to Lord Radcliffe, entitled to enquire whether what the authority has done in exercise of its power "can be related to one of the prescribed purposes and if no reasonable person could think that what the authority has done can be related to one of the prescribed purposes, it must necessarily be held that what ha-s been done is not capable of being related to one of the prescribed purposes. In the present case, section 11(2) stated in explicit terms that the power to alter the remuneration etc. In the present case, section 11(2) stated in explicit terms that the power to alter the remuneration etc. of the employees is to be exercised in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders, that is to say, for the purpose of protecting or promoting the interest of the Corporation and its policy holder. And if the Court comes to the conclusion that 'the ORDER :' is incapable of being related to the purposes of promoting or protecting their interests, this Court is entitled, applying the test laid down by Lord Radcliffe to strike down the impugned ORDER :. 43. In McEldowttey v. Forde [1969 (2) AELR 1939], Law Lords in the majority who upheld the ORDER :impugned in that case drew a distinction between the making of an ORDER :under sub-section 1 of the relevent Act and the making of the regulations under sub-section 3 of section 1 of the Act and Lord Pearson observed that the limitation imposed on the making of the executive ORDER :s by the words 'as may be necessary for preserving and maintaining' etc. did not apply to the making of the regulations under tub-section 3. But this was because sub-section 3 did not impose any such limitation on the exercise of the powers to make regulations. The test laid down by Lord Radcliffe in A G of Canada v. Hallet and Gorey (supra) whether the ORDER :impugned was capable of being related to one of the prescribed purposes was accepted as correct and applied by the Law Lords in majority in that case also. 44. But to say that this Court is entitled to enquire whether no reasonable person could have been satisfied or could form the opinion that the alteration of the remuneration And Other terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corpration made by 'the ORDER :' was called for in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders, is one thing. To arrive at the conclusion that no reasonble person could form such opinion or be so satisfied is an altogether different thing. The ORDER :' recites that the Central Government was so satisfied. To arrive at the conclusion that no reasonble person could form such opinion or be so satisfied is an altogether different thing. The ORDER :' recites that the Central Government was so satisfied. The principal ground on which Shri Chatterjee asks this Court to hold that no reasonable could be satisfied that an alteration was called for is the circumstance as disclosed by the materials placed by the petitioners, that the business of the Corporation was expanding and its profitability was increasing and so also the bonus payable to the policy holders. It is urged that in such circumstance to reasonable person could be satisfied that an alteration in the remuneration etc. of the employees to their disadvantage was called for because that might jeopardise the growth and profitability of the business by creating feelings of discontent and resentment among the employees, on whose performance the growth and profitability of the business depended. Though in these circumstances, one reasonable person may be of the opinion that no alteration was called for in the interests of the Corporation or its policy holders, I am unable to agree that another reasonable person could not form the opinion that an alteration was called for Another reasonable persons may not be satisfied with the extent of growth and probability and well be of the opinion that the volumes of business and the profitability could be further increased at a higher rate if the performance of the employees engaged in the development of the business was more satisfactory. And he might well be of the Opinion that the linking of the remuneration of the employees with the profitability of the business would spur those employees to better performance. It must be remembered that in the report of the Morarka Committee relevant passages form which have been quoted by my learned brother, the Central Government had before it expert opinion that the performance of the Development Officers was not satisfactory and that their remuneration should be altered by linking it up with the cost and fixed with reference to the costs incurred in procuring new business. It may be that the belief of the Central Government that the alteration would promote the interests of the Coproration and its policy holders may turn out to be unfounded but it could not be said that the facts are such that no reasonable person could have so believed if it had applied its mind to the relevant facts. The circumstance that in "the ORDER :" the normal remuneration of the Development Officer shall not exceed 25% of the cost of the first year's premium while according to the Insurance Act the development expenditure may be upto 90%thereof cannot be regarded as completely unrealistic. 90% is the outer limit and it includes expenses over agents which according to the supplementary affidavit of tie respondents is 35% thereof Further, the chart Annexure A to the supplementary counter affidavit of the respondents shows that the expense ratio of several Development Officers was below 25%, Therefore, it cannot be said that the expense ratio of 25% is palpably unreasonable. 45. Whether the belief of the Central Government is justified, except within the narrow limits, stated above, is not open for enquiry by this Court. I must state that the condition precedent to the exercise of the power under section 11(2) of the Act is the satisfaction of the Central Government that the alteration is called for, and not the satisfaction of the Court that the alteration is actually called for in the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders. The words used in section 11(2) of the Act are plain and unambiguous "where the Central Government is satisfied." To adopt the words of Bachcha-wat, J. in the Rohtas Industries Ltd case (at 721 of the report) "To hold that the factual existence of such matters is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power is to rewrite the section." Though at one time Sri Chatterjee attempted to argue that the validity of 'the ORDER :' has to be judged with reference to the objective test of the alteration being called for in the interest of the Corporation and its policy holders, he fairly conceded later that the subjective test (sic) was applicable. This contention of ri Chatterjee must, therefore, also fail. 46. This contention of ri Chatterjee must, therefore, also fail. 46. For the reasons given by my learned brother, I repel the argument that 'the ORDER :' is invalid because neither the Development Officers nor their representatives Association were consulted or given an opportunity of making representation before 'the ORDER :' altering the terms and conditions of service of the employees was issued. I would only like to add a few words about the decisions relied upon by Sri Chatterjee. In the Bharat Kala Bhandar case (AIR 1967 SC 1767), the Supreme Court struck down the notification under sub-rule 4 of Rule 126 A of the Defence of India Rules by which the conditions of services of some persons employed in essential services were altered to their disadvantage because there was no consultation with the persons whose interests were affected nor were those persons given any opportunity of making representations in the matter. This decision was arrived at on the footing that the power conferred by sub-rule 1 of Rule 126 AA was not a power which could be exercised merely on the subjective opinion of the Government. The Supreme Court speaking through Wanchoo, J- as he then was, observed "that the real question is whether the power under sub-rule (4) is a power which can be exercised merely on the subjective opinion of Government or whether sub-rule (4) requires any thing more (at page 1772 of the report). After pointing out that a perusal of the language of sub-rule (4) will show that there is nothing in the words themselves which plainly and unambiguously indicates that the power exercised thereunder depends purely on the subjective satisfaction of Government, and referring to various other considerations, the Supreme Court held that "Even so, in the absence of express words in sub-rule (4) to show that the power thereunder depends for its exercise entirely on thesubjective satisfaction of Government, we would not be prepared to hold that is what sub-rule (4) indicates." The conclusion, therefore, that it was the requirement of the exercise of the power under sub-rule (4)' that the power should be exercised after consulting the employees concerned and giving them or their representative Association an opportunity of making a representation in the matter was based on the finding that the power could not be exercised merely on the subjective opinion of the Government. In the present case, as I have already said, the words used in section 11(2) of the Act clearly and unambiguously indicate that the exercise of the power thereunder depends purely on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. The decision in Bharat Kala Bhandar (supra) is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 47. As my learned brother has pointed out, the observations of Chief Justice Beg in Madan Mohan Pathak and another v. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 803 ) that the decision under section 11(2) of the Act "would imply quasi judicial procedure where the terms of a settlement had to be reviewed and altered was not concurred in by the other learned Judges who constituted the bench of the Supreme Court in that case. It also appears to be an incidental and tentitive observation of the learned Chief Justice for he did not base his decision regarding the invalidity of the ORDER :impugned in that case on this ground. Further, the aforesaid observations run counter the decision of the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar Mukherjee's case (supr) where Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking for the Supreme Court, held that the ORDER :s made under section 11(2) part-take of the character of rules. And, as my learned brother has shown, it is well settled that, in the absence of a 'provision to the contrary in the statute, the making of subordinate legislation need not be preceded by notice or hearing. 48. Sri Chatterjee next contended that 'the Regulations' have been framed by the Corporation without exercise of independent JUDGMENT : merely at the dictate of the Government of India and are, therefore, invalid. On behalf of the respondent-Corporation it was urged that the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise this point because there is no foundation of essential facts in the petition on which this contention can be raised and, of course, the fact has not been established. It is, however, rot necessary to hold that on the pleadings, the aforesaid contention can be raised. Nor is it necessary to decide whether the Regulations are not invalid because they have framed in accordance with the directions as, they have to be framed with its previous approval and under section 21 of the Act Central Government had the power to issue directions to the Corporation to frame the Regulations. Nor is it necessary to decide whether the Regulations are not invalid because they have framed in accordance with the directions as, they have to be framed with its previous approval and under section 21 of the Act Central Government had the power to issue directions to the Corporation to frame the Regulations. This contention presupposes that the Regulations must be regarded as Regulations purported to be made by the Corporation under section 48 of the Act. Similarly the contention that 'the ORDER :' is ultra vires section 11(2) of the Act assumes that 'the ORDER :' must be regarded as ORDER :made under section 11(2) of the Act. Uptill now, I have proceeded on the basis that these assumptions are correct. But after the promulgation of the Life Insurance Corporation Amendment Ordinance 1981, which was repealed and replaced by the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, hereinafter called the Amendment Act, in the eye of law, neither the ORDER :nor the Regulations can be so regarded. They have been lilted out of the category of, and ceased to be, an ORDER :made under section 11(2) of the Act or a Regulation made under section 9 of the Act and have, in the eye of law, been transformed into Rules made under section 48 of the Act. these grounds of attack, therefore, have been rendered otiose and are no longer available to the petitioners. I proceed to elaborate. 49. The Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance 1981 was published in the official Gazette on 31 January 1981. Its material provisions were identical to the corresponding provisions of the Amendment Act which repealed and replaced it. The Amendment Act, except for certain provisions, came into force on 31 January 1981. Section (2) of the Amendment Act runs thus :-- 2. Amendment of Section 48.-In the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1936 (31 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), in section 84 : (a) in sub-section (2), after clause (c). The Amendment Act, except for certain provisions, came into force on 31 January 1981. Section (2) of the Amendment Act runs thus :-- 2. Amendment of Section 48.-In the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1936 (31 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), in section 84 : (a) in sub-section (2), after clause (c). the following clause shall be inserted and shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the 20th day of June, 1979, namely;- (cc) the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of the Corporation, including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act; (b) after sub section (2), the following sub-sections shall be inserted namely :-- (2A) The regulations and other provisions as in force immediately before the commencement of the Life It insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointee day under this Act, shall be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and shall, subject to the other provisions of this. section, have effect accordingly. (2B) The power to make rules confined by clause (cc) of sub-section (2) shall include-- (i) the power to give retrospective effect to such rules : and (ii) the power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-section (2A), with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the twentieth day of June, 1979. (2C) The provisions of clause (cc) o: sub-section (2) and sub-section (2B) and any rules made under the said clause (cc) shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date, notwithstanding any JUDGMENT :, decree or ORDER :of any court, tribunal or other authority, and notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1917) or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument' for the time being in force By Section 3 of the Amendment Act clauses (b) and (bb) of section 49 of the Act under which the Corporation was empowered to frame regulations with respect to the terms and conditions o' its employees and agents were deleted. 50. Thus by the Amendment Act the power of the Corporation to frame regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of its employees and agents was taken away and the Central Government was empowered to make rules in respect of those matters. By section (2A) of Section 48 of the Act as amended, "the regulations and other provisions with respect to the terms and conditions of service Of all employees and agents of the Corporation as in force immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 were to be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub section (2)". It is manifest that the Regulations are 'regulations' within the meaning of the expression as used in" sub section 2A of the Act, and the ORDER :made und'-r section 11 (2) of the Act is included within the ambit of the expression other provisions within the meaning of the expression as used in sub-section 2A of the Act with respect to the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation It follows, therefore, that unless the Regulations' and 'the ORDER :' are excepted out of the an bit of subsection 2A of Section 48 as amended, by the qualifying phrase "as in force immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981", they must be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub section (2) of Section 48 of the Act and shall have effect like its rules subject to the other provisions of section 48 of the Act. It is not contended that there is anything in the other provisions of section 48 which stands in the way of these deemed rules taking effect. It is, however, contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Regulations and the ORDER :s were not 'in force' immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act because they were null and void for the reasons advanced in support of the various contentions in support of their invalidity. It is contended that only regulations and other provisions 'in force' are deemed to be rules made under section 48 (2.) (cc) and 'in force' means legally in force' and any provision which is a nullity can not be said to be 'legally in force'. Now, the expression 'in force' may mean legally in force'. It is contended that only regulations and other provisions 'in force' are deemed to be rules made under section 48 (2.) (cc) and 'in force' means legally in force' and any provision which is a nullity can not be said to be 'legally in force'. Now, the expression 'in force' may mean legally in force'. It may also mean 'actually in force' because in is promulgated and enforced by the competent authority. A problem of interprotation, therefore, arises. 51. It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together, and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself". Pe. Mukherjee, J., as (sic) then was, speaking for the Supreme Court in the case of Poppatlal Shah (A1R 1953 SC 274 at 276). Tie aforesaid section 2A firms part of section 48(2) of the Act, which also contains section 2C which also was incorporated in the Act by the Amendment Act. Now section 2C provides "that the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-section (2).and any rules made under the said clause (cc) shall have effect. notwithstanding any JUDGMENT :, decree or ORDER :of any court, (sic) or other authority and notwithstanding any thing contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force". The JUDGMENT :, decree or ORDER :referred. to in the inserted section (2C.) of Section 48, obviously refers to a previous JUDGMENT : etc. 52. Sub section 2A of Section 48 enacts a statutory fiction by which we are required to treat regulations and provisions which were not rules as rules made under section 48 of the Art. In view of Section 2C of the Act, it is manifest that the object of the statutory fiction was to render the Regulations and other statutory provisions which were to be deemed to be rules made under section 48 of the Act immune from attack on the ground that they were ultravires section 11(2) or 49 of the Act and to ensure that they shall continue to have effect notwithstanding any such legal infirmity. To adapt the words Mahajan, J., as he then was, in State of Bombay v. Pandurang ( AIR 1953 SC 244 at 246).if the purpose of the statutory fiction is kept in view, then it follows that the purpose of the statutory fiction would be completely defeated if the 'rules deemed to be made' are not held to be included within the ambit of the expression 'any rules made under the said clause (cc). Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1952) AC 109 (B), in a passage quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Pandurang (supra) observed as follows: If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine' as real the consequences and incident’s which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have A wed from or accompanied it. The statute says that you roust imagine a certain state of affairs it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. We must, therefore, give full effect to the statutory fiction and carry it to its logical conclusion and if we do so, and do not permit our 'imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corrollaries of the enactment of the fiction, there is no escape from the conclusion that the expression "rules made under the said clause (cc), in section 2C of section 48 inserted by the Amendment Act, includes within its ambit, regulations and other provisions which by virtue of section 2A of Section 48 are deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section 48. I must also state that our attention has not been drawn to any rule relating to the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation actually made under section 48(2)(cc) of the Act. If, therefore, 'deemed rules' are not included within the expression "rules made under the said clause (cc)", section 2C would for all practical purposes remain a dead letter. 53. If, therefore, 'deemed rules' are not included within the expression "rules made under the said clause (cc)", section 2C would for all practical purposes remain a dead letter. 53. By virtue of section 2C, therefore, the Regulations and other statutory provisions, the rules deemed to be made under clause (cc), of section 48(2) shall have effect notwithstanding any JUDGMENT :, decree or ORDER :of any court, tribunal or other authority. Now if sub section 2C requires that a deemed rule shall have effect notwithstanding any JUDGMENT :, decree or ORDER :in the Court, that is, to say that it shall have effect, even though the courts have declared that it shall have to effect, can it be doubled that the intention of the legislature was to continue in force also rules which were legally vulnerable even though they had not been actually struck down by any competent court ? The intention of the legislature would be completely defeated and the provisions of section 2C would be rendered almost completely nugatory if it is held that only those regulations and other provisions shall be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section 2 which were not legally vulnerable and were legally in force. Construed in conjunction with clause 2C of Section 48 of the Act and in the light of the object and purpose of the enactment, the expressions 'in force' in section 2A cannot be interpreted as 'legally in force' but only as 'actually in force' as promulgated by the competent authority. 54. It may be that the meaning 'legally in force' is etymologically more appropriate but the true meaning of an expression is that which is more in accord with the object and purpose of the enactment. "Where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence" Tirath Singh v. Bachchittar Singh A.I.R. 1955 SC 830 at 833 quoting Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edn. p. 221 Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness orignorarce of the law except in case of the absolute intractability of the language used Maxwell on Interpretation of Statues 11th Edn. p. 221. The main intention of Section 2 A and C of Section 48 are clear and the language used is 'not intractable' and is capable of meaning 'actually in force though legally vulnerable.' The circumstance that the expression 'in force' forms part of the expression 'as in force' further lends come support to the conclusion regulations and (sic) were (sic) The use of the expression 'as' shows that the emphasis is on the form and the content of the regulations and not on whother the regulations and other provisions were legal. Otherwise the legislature will have merely said 'in force' and not 'as in force.' 55. The 'Regulations' and 'the ORDER :', therefore, must be-deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section 2 of Section 48 of the 'Act and, therefore, this validity has to be decided not with reference to the provisions of section 11 (2) of section 49 of the Act but with reference to the provisions of section 48 of the Act. It is not urged that even though they are regarded as rules under section 48 of the Act, the ORDER :and Regulations are not valid or ultra vires, except on the ground of contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution and on the ground of being repugnant to the settlement made under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 56. It remains now to consider the contention that 'the ORDER :and Regulations' impugned are ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Both the Articles safeguard the right to equality of a person. Both forbid discrimination between persons similarly situate in the matter ol employment without there being a reasonable basis for the same. It was contended by Shri Chatter-jee on behalf of the petitioners that the one of the classes of the employees of the Corporation viz. the Development Officers have been singled out for hostile discriminatory treatment in the matter of remuneration and other conditions of service like security of tenure. It was contended by Shri Chatter-jee on behalf of the petitioners that the one of the classes of the employees of the Corporation viz. the Development Officers have been singled out for hostile discriminatory treatment in the matter of remuneration and other conditions of service like security of tenure. It is clear that the remuneration and even security of tenure of the Development Officers have, by 'the ORDER :and the Regulations', been linked up with their operational efficiency judged with reference to the ratio of the expenses incurred upon their remuneration etc. to the eligible premium i.e., the first year's premium of new business or renewal premium secured through agents working in their area, if, in an appraisal year their remuneration etc. exceeds the expense limit, i.e, its ratio to the eligible premium is more than 22%, or 23%, or 24%, or in some case 25%, as the case may be, the Development Officers may not earn the increment in the scale, and if the excees is very great may even have their salaries reduced and in same circumstancts, may run the risk of termination of their services. The remuneration and tenure of other staff of the Corporation is not so linked up. Shri Chatterjee contends that this amounts to discrimination prohibited by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because as recognised by the settlement of 1971, the Development Officers are an integral part of the establishment of the Corporation and they should have the same security of tenure as the other classes of the employees of the Corporation. 57. It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not prohibit reasonable classification. In ORDER :, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilied, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things which are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to this object sought to be achieved by the statute Sri Ram Krishna Dalmia's case ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ). 58. That there is an intelligible criteria differentiating the Development Officers from the other imployees of the Corporation cannot be gain said. They form a well recognised class, separate and distinct from all other classes of employees of the Corporation. 58. That there is an intelligible criteria differentiating the Development Officers from the other imployees of the Corporation cannot be gain said. They form a well recognised class, separate and distinct from all other classes of employees of the Corporation. The only question is whether the differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by 'the ORDER :' and the Regulations. The object of 'the ORDER :' and the Regulations is, as I have said, to link up the remuneration and security of tenure of a class of employees viz. Development Officers with the income derived from the new business procured and thereby regulate the costs of development of business with which Development Officers are concerned. The question therefore, is if there is a reasonable basis for so linking up the remuneration and tenure of service of one class of employees of the Corporation viz. the Development Officers, alone. In my opinion, there is. As has been pointed out in the counter-affidavit showing cause on behalf of the respondents, unlike the other classes of employees, the Developments Officers have no fixed hours of work, and are not subject to the daily discipline of office and as such their performance can be judged only with reference to the business brought in by the agents working in their area under their supervision. And it cannot be denied that for judging the operation efficiency of the Development Officers we have to take into consideration not only the amount of business procured by the agents working in their area but also the costs inru-rred in procuring the business. Their remuneration and tenure of service may, there (sic) well be linked up with the income from the new business even though the (sic) and tenure of other employees is not so linked up. There are other methods available for determining the efficiency and devotion to work of other classes of employees. The classification cannot, therefore, be said to be unreasonable. There are other methods available for determining the efficiency and devotion to work of other classes of employees. The classification cannot, therefore, be said to be unreasonable. It is well settled "that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be clearest." per Das, C. J. in Ram Krishna Dalmla's case (supra) (at 548). In view of the circumstances stated above, it can well be said that according to the deemed need for linking up the remuneration and security of tenure with the income derived from the development of the business it was their concern, was clearest in the case of the Development Officers. It must also be remembered that the Central Government and the Corporation had before them the report of Morarka Committee that the performance of the Development Officers was not satisfactory and its recommendations their remu(sic)erations should be linked up with the cost of procuring new business. The contention based on Articles 14 and 16 must, therefore, also fail. 59. I am fortified in this conclusion by the decision of a Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Harivadan K Desai & others) v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others ( 1977 LAB 1. C. 1072 ) and the bench decision of the Calcultta High Court in Himanshu Kumar Chakrabarty and others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others (1979 LAB J. C. 1417) and also by the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in M. R. Das v. Union of India (LLJ Mad 211) (sic). In all these cases, the validity of the ORDER :dated 8.4.1976 of the Central Government under section 11 (2) of the Act and the Regulations dated 22.4.1976 of the Corporation changing the remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of Development Officers were challenged as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on the ground that the terms and conditions of service of the Development Officers alone had been altered to their prejudice while the terms and conditions of other employees had not been so altered. In the case of the Madras High Court Mohan, J. pointed out that the Development Officers formed a distinct class by themselves and they cannot be compared with other employees to make out a case of discrimination (at page 26 of the report). In the Gujarat High Court case (supra) it was pointed out that the Development Officers are given certain facilities which are denied to the administrative staff of the Corporation and that earlier also. In Calcutta High Court case (supra) Morkerjee, J. observed as follows : It is undoubtedly clear that the nature of the works and duties performed by different categories of employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India is of diverse kind. Therefore, the employees have been validly classified into different classes. Their scales of pay and terms and conditions of service are not identical. Accordingly, it is palpably absurd to suggest that all classes of employees must receive their remuneration on the same basis on the other hand, it is logical and reasonable to make separate provisioins for determination of remuneration and modes of payment thereof according to other terms and conditions of service of different categories of the employees 60. The observations of Peg, O. J in Marfan Patbak's case (supra, that the Life Insurance Corporation ( Modification of Settlement) Act, 1974 which took away the claim of right to bonus of class III and IV employees of the Corporation "is nothing more than selective discrimination practised against the lower level of the staff of the Life Insurance Corporation" (at p. 811 of the report) are not applicable. In that case apart from the fact that this was the opinion of Beg, C. J. alone (sic) not of the majority of the Supreme Court, the question whether the Development Officers could be treated separately for the purpose of remuneration and security of tenure did not at all arise for consideration. I, therefore, agree that the writ application be dismissed, but without costs. Application dismissed