JUDGMENT B.N. Miitra, J – Two applications for pre-emption, which gave rise to Misc Cases Nos. 134 of 1973 and 186 of 1974, were filed for pre-emption under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The allegation was that Indu Bhusan Khan was the recorded tenant. After his death that property devolved on his widow, Gobinda Debi On the 22nd January, 1970, she gifted that property to Monoranjan and Bibhuti Bhusan. On the 10th April, 1971, Bibbuti Bbusan sold a portion of the property to the pre-emptor by a registered kobala. On the 22nd September, 1971, Monoranjan transferred the disputed property to the opposite party for Rs. 1500/- and this gave rise to the filing of Misc. Case No. 134 of 1973. On the 1st December 1971, the pre-employee opposite party before the learned Munsif purchased the property in question by a registered kobala from Monoraojan for Rs. 1500/-. Then Mise Case No. 186 of 1974 was filed. The allegation was that no notice of transfer was served. The petitioner was a co-sharer. 2. An objection was filed that opposite parties Nos. 2-4 were minors and hence, the applications for pre-emption were not maintainable. 3. The learned Munsif stated that only the opposite party No. 4 (Motibur Sk) was a minor. But he was not represented by a guardian. Hence the applications for pre-emption were not maintainable. On that finding both the Misc. Cases were dismissed. Two appeals were filed, namely, Misc. Appeals Nos. 43 and 44 of 1977. The learned District Judge allowed both the appeals and granted the prayers for pre emption. Hence these two revisional applications. 4. A short submission has been made on behalf of the petitioners. It has been slated that opposite party No 4 before the learned Munsif (Motibur) was a minor when the Misc. Cases were filed. Even the preemptors filed an application on the 27th February, 1974, stating that Motibur was approximately then 16 years old. But no representation was made and naturally a guardian was not appointed. Hence the decision of the learned Munsif, and not of the learned District Judge, Murshidabad, in this respect is correct. 5. Cases were filed. Even the preemptors filed an application on the 27th February, 1974, stating that Motibur was approximately then 16 years old. But no representation was made and naturally a guardian was not appointed. Hence the decision of the learned Munsif, and not of the learned District Judge, Murshidabad, in this respect is correct. 5. The case of Mukti Debi v. Monorama Debi in 40 CWN 1211 at page 1216 has been cited for the petitioner to show that where an order for preemption was passed without appointing any guardian-ad item of the minor opposite party, the High Court set aside that order and remitted the case in order that the same might be continued after appointment of a proper guardian of the minor. It has been stated that at best the court can send the cases back on remand so that a guardian of minor Motibur Sk. might be appointed. But that would not improve matters because the applications will become time-barred because the pre-emptors filed these applications on 27.2.1976 with a statement that Motibur Sk. was about 16 at that time. So the bar of limitation will be fatal to these cases. 6. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party has referred to the decision of Debendra Chandra v. Jamini in AIR 1939 Cal, 744 at p 745 to show that where the minor is not properly represented in a suit, any decree passed against him is a nullity. But a minor is not bound to treat it as a nullity if he does not desire to do so and third parties cannot say that it is void. Reference has been made to the Privy Council case of Raja of Deo v. Abdullah in ILR 45 Cal. 909 at p. 917 to show that the onus to prove minority is on the defendant, who asserts it. The opposite party asserted that Motibur was a minor, but that allegation could not be substantiated by them by cogent evidence. Reference has also been made to the case of Chiragh Din v. Mehtab in AIR 1934 Lah. 214 at p. 275 to show that where a minor is not in any way prejudiced by not having a guardian during the brief short period of 3 months when he was a. minor, the suit does not fall under Order 32 rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. 214 at p. 275 to show that where a minor is not in any way prejudiced by not having a guardian during the brief short period of 3 months when he was a. minor, the suit does not fall under Order 32 rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no question of prejudice because when the learned District Judge allowed the prayers for pre-emption, Motibur Sk. had already attained majority. 7. In the case of Raricharan v. M. Raman in AIR 1923 Mad 553 at p. 554 it has been stated that where before the court has decided that the plaintiff was a minor, he had become a major, there was no necessity thereafter to have a next friend for him. This decision was followed by our Court by D.N. Sinha J, in the case of Sanjib v. Principal, St. Paul’s college in 61 CWN 717 at pp 722 and 723. It has been stated that a preliminary objection was taken in that case that the petitioner at the time of making the application was a minor. It has been observed as follows : “It appears from his application that he was a minor at the time of making the application but during the pendency of the application he has attained majority. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that under such circumstances the application ought not to be dismissed. He has relied on a Madras case (Pupoth) Ririchand alias Ramanuani Kurup v. Vayisravanth Manakkal Raman and another, AIR 1923 Mad 553. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Chatterjee on this point.” 8. It is common ground that at all events the opposite party No.4 before the learned Munsif and also before the learned District Judge had attained majority when the applications for pre-emption were finally allowed by the learned District Judge, Murshidabad, on 22nd December, 1979. 9. There is another aspect of the matter. In the very case cited on behalf of the petitioner, namely, Mukti Debi v, Monorama Debi (supra) at p. 1216, it has been stated that where by reason of same act or omission On the part of the Court an injury has been done, it is the duty of the Court to relieve the parties against the injury caused by its own acts or defaults. This is a well established rule of law that none should be prejudiced by an act of the court and if a party suffers due to the mistake of the court, the court should rectify it and put the litigant in the position which it would have occupied but for such mistake. This principle was enunciated by the Judicial Committee in the case or Jai Bavham v. Kedar Nath in AIR 1922 P.C. 269 and by Gajendragadkar, J, In the case of Jagnapurdasji v. Muldas in AIR 1966 SC 1119 at p. 1124. Let us apply these principles to the facts of this case. 10. It has already been indicated that on the 27th February, 1974, an application was put in by the pre-emptor for amendment of the applications for pre-emption on the ground that Mutibur Sk was then 16 or so. It appears from the order No.5 of the learned Munsif dated 27.2.1974 that such application was to be kept with the record and it would be put up when moved. It was the duty of the court either to allow it or reject it. No order was passed on that application either by rejecting or allowing it. The net result is that such application is still pending Hence the question arises whether there is any necessity of any remand. The plain answer is in the negative because no effective purpose will be served by passing an order of remand because on receipt of the records after remand. the court will say that there is no longer any necessity of any representation or amendment because Motibur Sk. had attained majority long before the applications for preemption was allowed by the learned District Judge, Murshidabad So, there is no question of prejudice. In that view of the matter, the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. There is no question of limitation also because the pre-emptor cannot suffer for the default of the court became as stated before, the court did not pass any order either of dismissal or of disposal of the application for amendment of the applications for pre-emption, Moreover, it has already been indicated that Motibur Sk had attained majority before the prayers for per-emption were allowed. Hence it must be held that in view of such subsequent event, namely, that opposite party No. 4 attained majority during the pendency of the applications for pre-emption before the learned District Judge, both the applications are maintainable in law and there is no bar of limitation. The Rules are discharged without any order as to costs. Rules discharged.