JUDGMENT On or about the 25th April, 1981 Mohamed Saleh Behbehari & Co. incorporated under the Jaws of the State of Kuwait instituted this suit against the Owners and Parties interested in the Vessel M. V. NOTIS also known as the "Broja Trader" (hereinafter referred to as the Vessel) in the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs: (a) Judgment against the Vessel and each of her tackle, apparel and furniture for the sum of Rs. 15,47,688.24 P. (b) Arrest of and/or an order of appraisement of the Vessel and her tackle, apparel and furniture. (c) Sale of the Vessel and payment of the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff in protanto satisfaction of its claim. (d) Interim interest and interest on judgment at 18 % per annum. (e) Costs. 2. The cause of action of the plaintiff in short is as follows: By and under a Time Charter dated the 19th January, 1981 the plaintiff hired the Vessel alleged to be a Greek Vessel flying Greek flag for reward for crriage of goods from Korea to Kuwait via Calcutta and Madras on stipulated terms and conditions. 3. It is alleged that in breach of the Charter-Party Agreement and the terms and conditions thereof the Vessel failed to sail on the stipulated date and could not maintain the stipulated speed of 12 knots per hour. Further and in breach of the said conditions the Vessel had a defective windlass, her Cargo Ships safety Equipment Certificate expired on the 23rd November, 1980 and her Ship Safety Radio Telegraph Certificate expired on the 23rd January, 1981. 4. As a result of the aforesaid the Vessel sailed from Korea after 37 hours of delay and it took 4 days and 14 hours extra by reason of her lack of speed for the Vessel to reach her destination. There was further delay of a day on account of her defective windlass and after having reached Calcutta the Vessel could not leave the Port in the absence of essential certificates. 5. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of the aforesaid the plaintiff had to incur extra hire charges and charges for extra consumption of diesel and fuel oil, resulting in loss and damages to the plaintiff assessed at U. S. $ 1,90,602 equivalent to Rs. 15,24,816/-. 6. 5. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of the aforesaid the plaintiff had to incur extra hire charges and charges for extra consumption of diesel and fuel oil, resulting in loss and damages to the plaintiff assessed at U. S. $ 1,90,602 equivalent to Rs. 15,24,816/-. 6. The plaintiff alleges further that the defendants were also guilty of misrepresentations, wrongful acts and fraudulent suppression of material facts, some particulars whereof have been set out in the plaint. 7. The plaintiff's claim for the said sum of U.S. $ 1,90,602 is made up of the following items :- (a) Hire charges for 37 hours US $ 6,000 (b) Extra diesel oil consumed during the said US $ 975 1½ days (c) Loss of hiring charges paid to defendants US $ 18,332 for four days and fourteen hours on account of the Vessel's less speed. (d) Costs of extra diesel oil and fuel oil US $ 38,460 consumed during the said 4 days and 14 hours (e) Hiring charge paid to defendants for one US $ 4,000 day's delay in arriving at the Port of Calcutta due to defective equipment namely "windlass" (f) Extra expenditure being the costs of the US $ 650 diesel oil consumed by the Vessel for the said one day's delay (g) Cost of diesel oil supplied to the Vessel at US $ 6,450 Calcutta for its outward journey to Madras which did not take place. (h) Loss of freight on 380 tons of cargo which US $ 10,735 could not be loaded in the Vessel due to wrongful mis-presentation of the defendants as to the capacity of the said Vessel. (i) Loss of profit due to the wrongful failure of US $ 1,05,000 the Vessel to sail from Calcutta to Madras and from Madras to Kuwait Total US $ 1,90,000 8. The plaintiff claims the said sum by way of compensation for loss and damages suffered on account of breach of the agreement of Charter Party by the defendants or alternatively as compensation for loss and damages suffered for the wrongful acts, misrepresentation, fraudulent suppression of facts and/or conversion and/or detention of the plaintiff's goods viz. diesel oil supplied to the Vessel at Calcutta. 9. diesel oil supplied to the Vessel at Calcutta. 9. On the day this suit was instituted an ex parte application in the suit was moved by the plaintiff when an order was made directing the Marshall of this Court to arrest the said Vessel and her tackle, apparel and furniture and to keep the same under safe arrest till further orders. It was made clear that the defendants would be entitled to apply for release of the vessel on furnishing security. 10. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the said Vessel was arrested. 11. Intraco Ltd., Georgetown, Grand Cayman, British West Indies have come up to oppose the application. An affidavit has been affirmed on the 28th April, 1981 by one Mohammed Iqbal who claims to be a Director and a constituted Attorney of Intraco Ltd. which has been filed in opposition to this application. 12. It is, inter alia, alleged in this affidavit that the Vessel had been acquired by purchase by Intraco Ltd. on the 16th April, 1981 from the previous M/s. Not is Shipping Corporation of Monrovia in Liberia. It is further alleged that the Vessel was delivered to the present Owners on the 16th April, 1981 at Calcutta on signing a Protocol of delivery. It is alleged that the Vessel was thereafter registered in Panama on the 21st April, 1981 under her new name 'Broja Trader' and was also granted a provisional radio licence No. 10878 on the 21st April, 1981 by the Director of Tele-Communications, Republica De Panama. It is alleged that Intraco Ltd. purchased the Vessel free from all encumbrances and that it had no knowledge of any prior or maritime claim against the Vessel. 13. It is alleged that the present Owners have nothing to do with the Charter Party between the previous Owners and the plaintiff. It is denied that the plaintiff has any cause of action against the present Owners of the Vessel. 14. It is contended that the alleged claim of the plaintiff against the previous Owners of breach of contract did not give rile to any maritime lien enforceable against the Vessel in rem or adjudicable in the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court nor are the present Owners in any way liable for such claim. The dispute between the plaintiff and the previous Owners in any event is referable to arbitration in terms of the Charter Party. The dispute between the plaintiff and the previous Owners in any event is referable to arbitration in terms of the Charter Party. It is al1eaed that the Vessel had been lying in the Port of Calcutta, K. P. Dooks since 15th March, 1981 and the plaintiff did Rot take any steps for arrest of the Vessel prior to her sale on the 16th April, 1981. It is contended that the ex parte order of arrest of the Vessel without notice to the present Owners should be vacated and that the application should be dismissed. 15. An affidavit affirmed by one Ravi Agarwal on the 30th April, 1981 has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff in reply to the said affidavit of Mohammed Iqbal. 16. At the hearing learned Counsel for the present Owners contended further that the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court was limited and a dispute arising out of a Charter Party agreement could not be entertained by this Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction. Learned Counsel contended further that only a quantity of diesel oil which was found in the Vessel when the same was purchased could conceivably be stated to be an item on which the plaintiff could make a claim referable to the Admiralty Jurisdiction. The plaintiff had claimed US $ 6450 on this item and that without prejudice to their rights and contentions the present Owners were willing to furnish security for the said amount subject to final adjudication. The rest of the plaintiff's claim it was contended was not adjudicable in the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the Court. The same did not attach to the Vessel nor constituted any maritime lien. 17. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs contended to the contrary and submitted that the Charter Party itself provided for certain liens which could attach to the Vessel. He submitted further that the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court was wide enough and would cover the plaintiff's claim in the suit. It was lastly contended that once the Court exercised its jurisdiction in Admiralty and an order for arrest of the Vessel was passed, the Vessel could be released only after securing the plaintiff's full claim and that the Court did not even retain its jurisdiction to vary or alter the amount of security. 18. Various decisions have been cited from the Bar in support of the respective contentions of the parties. 19. 18. Various decisions have been cited from the Bar in support of the respective contentions of the parties. 19. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff cited and relied on Clause 26 of the Charter of 1774, establishing the Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, which reads as follows: "And it "is our further will and pleasure, and we do hereby grant ordain, establish, and appoint that the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, shall be a Court of Admiralty, in and for the said provinces, countries, or districts, of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and all other territories and is lands adjacent thereunto, and which now are, or ought to be, dependent thereupon and we do hereby commit and grant to the said Supreme Court of Judicature, at Fort William in Bengal, full power and authority to take cognizance of, hear, examine, try, and determine all causes, civil and maritime, and all pleas of contracts, debts, exchanges, policies of assurance, accounts, charter-parties agreements, loading of ships, and all matters and contracts, which in any manner whatsoever relate to freight or money due for ships hired and let out, transport-money, maritime usury or bottomry or to extortions, trespasses, injuries, complaints, demands, and matters, civil and maritime, whatsoever, between merchants, owners, and proprietors of ships and vessels, employed or used within the jurisdiction aforesaid, or between others contracted, done, had, or commenced, in, upon or by the sea, or public rivers, or ports, creeks, harbours, and places over flown, within the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and high-water mark, within, about, and throughout the said three provinces, countries of districts, of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa and all the said territories or islands adjacent thereunto and dependent thereupon, the cognizance whereof doth belong to the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, as the same is used and exercised in that part of Great Britain called England, together with all and singular their incidents, emergents and dependencies annexed and connexed causes whatsoever, and to proceed summarily therein with all possible despatch, according to the course of our Admiralty of that part of Great Britain called England, without the strict formalities of law, considering only the truth of the fact, and the equity of the case." 20. Relying on the aforesaid clause learned Counsel for the plaintiff contended that the jurisdiction conferred by the Charter was wide enough to cover and take cognizance of all civil and maritime causes including the pleas of contracts, debts, charter-party agreements, and all matters and contracts relating to freight or money due for ships hired and let out. 21. Next was cited the following passages from Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 1 at p. 49. "88. Origin of actions in rem................It is difficult to determine the exact source from which the present law as to maritime liens is derived, but whatever may have been the origin and process of development of a maritime. lien for damage and the same is equally true for all claims within the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty, such as damage, salvage bottomry, and wages-there is no doubt that the doctrine of such a lien is now established; and the right to enforce it differs from the ancient right of arrest to compel appearance and security in this, that it is confined to the property by which the damage was caused or in relation to which the claim arose, and may be enforced against that property in the hands of an innocent purchaser. A maritime line has been defined as a privileged claim upon a thing in respect of service done to it or injury caused by it, and is carried into effect by special legal process." "90. Proceedings in personam. The inherent jurisdiction possessed by the Court of Admiralty was not only exercised by proceedings in rem brought to enforce the maritime liens attaching to the res in each case; but, where the ship was lost or for some other reason could not be arrested, a plaintiff having a claim cognizable by the Court, other than a claim on a bottomry or respondentia bond or to the possession of the ship, might take proceedings in personam against the Owners of the property which would have been arrested if the proceedings had been in rem.” 22. Relying on aforesaid passages learned Counsel contended that this Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction could enforce maritime lien against; the Vessel to the extent of the claim of the plaintiff and that the present action was factually and effectually an action in rem. 23. Learned Counsel also cited a passage from Halsbury Vol. Relying on aforesaid passages learned Counsel contended that this Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction could enforce maritime lien against; the Vessel to the extent of the claim of the plaintiff and that the present action was factually and effectually an action in rem. 23. Learned Counsel also cited a passage from Halsbury Vol. 35, third edition at p. 324, which deals with liens arising out of Charter Parties. The material portion of the passage is as follows: ''The cesser clause is usually followed by a lien clause, which expresses the consideration received by the ship Owner in exchange for his release of the charter. The liens usually conferred by the clause are for freight, advance freight, dead freight, demurrage and general average, but other liens are sometimes included." 24. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff next cited a decision of this Court in (1) Rungta Sons Private Ltd. v. The Owners, Masters & Parties interested in s.s. "Edison Mariner" & Anr. reported in 66 CWN 1083. In this case the Owner of the goods shipped filed a suit in this Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction claiming the price of the goods at the contract rate. The question arose whether this Court had jurisdiction to entertain such a suit in its Admiralty Jurisdiction. After considering various causes of action for which the jurisdiction of the English Courts of Admiralty could be invoked and also considering the law on the question as stated in Halsbury's Law of England, third edition, Vol. 1 the learned Judge observed as follows : "It cannot be disputed that this Court can exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction in rem or in personam in respect of claims arising out of any agreement for the use or hire of a ship or relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or in respect of claims in tort with respect to goods carried in a ship". 25. Learned Counsel for the present Owners of the Vessel on the other hand, cited a decision of this Court in (2) National Co. Ltd. v. Asia Mariner, M.S. The Owners and Parties interested reported in 72 CWN 635 where another single Judge of this Court considered the scope and ambit of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court and came to the conclusion as follows : "The High Court at Calcutta as a Court of Admiralty is, therefore, a Court of prescribed jurisdiction. Ltd. v. Asia Mariner, M.S. The Owners and Parties interested reported in 72 CWN 635 where another single Judge of this Court considered the scope and ambit of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court and came to the conclusion as follows : "The High Court at Calcutta as a Court of Admiralty is, therefore, a Court of prescribed jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is prescribed by Clause 26 of the Charter of 1774 and by section 2(2) of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890. The jurisdiction has not been extended or modified by any statute. None of the subsequent British statutes by which the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Court in England has been extended or affected have been made applicable to India". 26. The learned Counsel for the present Owners next cited an unreported judgment passed in an interlocutory- application in Suit No. 727 of 1979 in (3) Peoples Republic of Bangladesh v. Bedford Shipping Corporation of Hong Kong, where the scope of the Admiralty Jurisdiction M this Court was considered by me and I had come to a conclusion similar to that in Asia Mariner (supra). 27. Learned Counsel also contended that by reason of change of ownership prior to the action in the instant case the lien claimed by the plaintiff could no longer touch the res and as such the order of arrest must be vacated. In support of this proposition learned Counsel cited Thomas on Maritime Liens, 1980 Edition and relied on the following passage at page 31 : "A right to invoke the Admiralty Jurisdiction by an action in rem, in respect of a claim which is not in the nature of maritime lien, subsists as a statutory right of action in rem. Such rights are also on occasions described as "statutory liens", and although the label is not wholly apposite it is none the less of a certain utility for it well conveys the idea that even in respect of a statutory right of action in rem there arises a security by way of charge in the form of an "irrevocably accrued statutory right of action in rem". Although maritime liens and statutory rights of action in rem are similar in that they involve the admiralty process in rem, there none the less exist fundamental differences between the two categories." 28. Although maritime liens and statutory rights of action in rem are similar in that they involve the admiralty process in rem, there none the less exist fundamental differences between the two categories." 28. The law on the subject, it appears, is thus fairly settled; but in view of the extensive arguments made on both sides and in view of the various decisions cited I venture again to reiterate the fundamental aspects of the law as stands settled. 29. It is ancient knowledge that the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court was founded under Clause 26 of the Chapter of 1774 to which I have adverted earlier. The said clause no doubt sets out a number of pleas including pleas in the nature of contracts, debts, charter-party, etc. which could be invoked in this jurisdiction but the latter part of the clause categorically limit or restrict the jurisdiction by the following words, "as the same is used and exercised in that part of Great Britain called England......... according to the course of our Admiralty of that part of Great Britain called England." 30. This jurisdiction has been continued successively by Clause 31 of the Letters Patent of 1862 and Clause 32 of the Letters Patent of 1865 and thereafter by the successive Government of India Acts culminating in our Constitution which has continued the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts as they were immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. It is also to be noted that in 1980 the Imperial Parliament passed the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act. Section 2 of the Act provided that :- "Every Court of law in a British possession, which is for the time being declared in pursuance of this Act to be a Court of Admiralty, or which if no such declaration is in force in the possession, has therein original unlimited civil jurisdiction, shall be a Court of Admiralty, with the jurisdiction, in this Act mentioned and may, for the purpose of that jurisdiction, exercise all the powers which it possesses for the purpose of other civil jurisdiction, and such Court in reference to the jurisdiction conferred by this Act is in this Act referred to as a Colonial Court of Admiralty." 31. Under section 18(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1899 the expression "British possession" was stated to mean any part of Her Majesty's dominions exclusive of the United Kingdom and where parts of such dominions were under both a central and local legislature, all parts under the Central Legislature. 32. Under section 2 of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891, the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal was declared to be a Colonial Court of Admiralty. 33. By the operation of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891 the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court was for the last time finally determined. Such jurisdiction, in my view, has stood frozen as at that stage and continued to remain in stasis right up to the present. It is for this reason that from time to time our Courts were constrained to observe that legislation had become necessary to extend or modify such jurisdiction in the light of subsequent experience of other countries including England. 34. The jurisdiction conferred by section 2 of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 was as follows :- "The jurisdiction of Colonial Court of Admiralty shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be over the like places, persons, matters and things, as the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England, whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherwise, and the Colonial Court of Admiralty may exercise such jurisdiction in like manner and to as full an extent as the High Court of England, and shall have the same regard as that Court of international law and the comity of nations". 35. The jurisdiction in Admiralty conferred on this Court by the Charter of 1774 in my view was further determined and/or modified by the above Act. The scope and ambit of such jurisdiction is therefore identical with the jurisdiction exercised by the Courts of Admiralty in England in 1891. 36. Drawing inspiration from the language of Clause 26 of the Charter of 1774 learned Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the jurisdiction of the English Courts of Admiralty at the relevant time must have been wide inasmuch as otherwise the various pleas and causes of action would not find a place in Clause 26 of the Charter of 1774 in the manner as it appears. This submission, however, cannot be sustained if we follow the development of the Admiralty Jurisdiction in England. 37. Between the 17th and the 18th century the Admiralty Courts in England emerged from a long struggle with the Common Law Courts of that country on the question of their respective jurisdictions. At about the time of William IV it appears that the Admiralty Courts in England exercised jurisdiction only over the following matters: (a) Collisions between ships and injurious acts committed on the high seas outside the body of any county; (b) Salvage services rendered to property on the high seas and between high and low water mark; (c) Droits of Admiralty; (d) Possession of ships where no title was in question. (e) Bottomry and (f) Respondentia bonds on cargo and (g) claims of seamen's wages where there had been no special contract. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume I, page 48, paragraph 87. 38. The Admiralty Courts had jurisdiction also over the goods of pirates and goods robbed by the pirates. Admiralty Courts also had criminal or disciplinary jurisdiction against Masters of ships for assault and battery committed on the high seas. Actions were also contemplated in respect of necessaries supplied on the high seas and in port. 39. The English Admiralty Court Act, 1840 was passed to improve the practice and extend the aforesaid jurisdiction of the High Courts of Admiralty of England. It would not be correct to say that the Admiralty Courts in England had initially a wider jurisdiction which was curtailed by the Act of 1840. 40. It is by the Admiralty Court Act, of 1840 that statutory right of an action in rem was confirmed for the first time. Section 6 of the Act of 1840 conferred such statutory right in respect of claims for towage and claims for necessaries supplied to foreign ships within a county or on high seas. 41. The English Admiralty Court Act of 1861 created further and similar statutory rights of action in rem in respect of claims for building, equipping or repairing a ship under arrest of Court and also in respect of claims for necessaries supplied to ships elsewhere than in the Port to which the ship belonged 42. Sections 6 and 7 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 further provided as follows: "Section 6. Sections 6 and 7 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 further provided as follows: "Section 6. The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim by the Owner or consignee or assignee of any bill of lading of any goods carried into any Port in England or Wales in any ship, for damage done to the goods or any part thereof by the negligence or misconduct of or for any breach of duty or breach of contract on the part of the Owner, master, or crew of the ship, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that at the time of the institution of the cause any Owner or part Owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales: Section 7. The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim for damage done by any ship". 43. The jurisdiction of the English Admiralty Courts, the actions entertained by them and the, rights enforced by them as above prevailed up to 1891 when the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act was passed and it was this limited jurisdiction which was inherited and continued by the High Courts in India in their Admiralty Jurisdiction. 44. For the reasons above the claim of the plaintiff in the instant case alleged to have arisen out of breach of a charter-party cannot in my view by pursued in the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court and prima facie this suit is not maintainable in the said jurisdiction. 45. Even if I assumed that the plaintiff has a right to avail of an action in rem in the Admiralty Jurisdiction the question which still remains is whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the Vessel arrested in this suit. That the Vessel has changed ownership prior to the institution of the suit is not disputed. The plaintiff has to establish that it has a lien which would prevail over the rights of the subsequent purchaser of the Vessel. 46. Maritime lines recognized in English law prior to the Admiralty Act of 1861 matched the claims adjudicable or causes of action available in the English Admiralty Courts at that time. Such Maritime liens were in respect of bottomry, respondentia bonds, salvage, seamen's wages and damages caused by a ship. Whether claims on towage or pilotage or even supply of necessaries resulted in a maritime lien was however a matter of controversy. Such Maritime liens were in respect of bottomry, respondentia bonds, salvage, seamen's wages and damages caused by a ship. Whether claims on towage or pilotage or even supply of necessaries resulted in a maritime lien was however a matter of controversy. 47. In the instant case, the plaintiff's claim is not one which would give rise to any of the recognised maritime liens as considered above. The plaintiff has to fall back on a statutory lien against the claims of the subsequent purchaser. Can the plaintiff claim a statutory lien in respect of its claims over the Vessel in support of its right to institute an action in rem in the Admiralty Jurisdiction? A statutory lien undoubtedly arises when a ship is arrested in an Admiralty action in rem. Such a lien is founded on the action itself and mayor may not coincide with the recognised maritime liens which arise irrespective of any action. A statutory lien arising on an action however cannot be of avail against a subsisting charge on the ship and cannot override the claims of a bona fide purchaser for value in the mean time. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 35, pages 786-787, Article 1211. 48. An extensive resume of the English law on statutory lien under the English Admiralty Act, is to be found in the (4) Monica reported in 1967(3) AER 740. Whether a lien arising from a statutory right of action in rem over a ship would override an existing right over the same ship was understood to depend either on the date of the institution of the suit or the date when the cause of action arose. The English decisions expressed divergent views. 49. The conflict was finally settled by the House of Lords in the (5) Heinrich Bjorn reported in 1885 (10) P.D. 44 and the (6) Beldis reported in 1935 AER 766. In the House of Lords case Lord Watson observed the position of a creditor who has a proper maritime lien differs from that of a creditor in an unsecured claim in this respect that the former, unless he had forfeited his right by his own laches, can proceed against the ship notwithstanding any change in her ownership whereas the latter, cannot have an action in rem unless at the time of its institution the res is the property of the debtor". A change of ownership of the Vessel admittedly having taken place prior to the institution of the present suit, in my view, prima facie the plaintiff's lien if any cannot affect or override the rights of the present Owners. 50. For the reasons as aforesaid, I modify, the ad-interim order of arrest and dispose of this application as follows : 51. On the present Owners of the Vessel furnishing security covering an amount of U.S. $ 4450 in equivalent Indian currency with the Regstrar, Original Side, Calcutta, within a week from date in cash or by a Bank Guarantee the Registrar is directed to issue the necessary Instrument of Release on which the Marshall will release the Vessel forthwith. The plaintiff is directed to provide for the payment of costs, expenses, charges and remuneration of the Marshall. 52. The plaintiff's submission, that once a Vessel is arrested by the Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction the same cannot be released until the entire claim of the plaintiff is secured and that the Court had no jurisdiction to vary the quantum of security cannot be accepted. This Court in its inherent jurisdiction has always power to modify, reduce the amount of security and also to waive it altogether. The Admiralty Rules of this Court provide that the Code of Civil Procedure would apply where the Rules are silent and section 151 of the Code is necessarily attracted. The order of arrest had not fixed the quantum of security to be furnished. The settled practice of this Court, has been that the amount of security to be furnished can be reduced and in some cases the Court directed release of ships without any security. The Registrar, Marshall and all parties to act on a signed copy of the Minutes.