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1981 DIGILAW 155 (KAR)

MOHD. OBEIPULLA M. v. SPL. DY. COMMR, BANGALORE

1981-06-04

K.S.PUTTASWAMY

body1981
K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 7-3-81, of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangajore district, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred to as the DC) in case No. HRC (Civil) A 182 (80-81 (Annexure-B) and the order dated 20-4-81 in Case No. HRC 676 ACC/80 of the House; Rent and Accommodation Controller, Civil area, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Controller) (Annexure-A ). ( 2 ) RESIDENTIAL premises bearing No. 46 of Viviyani Road, Bangalore City, ig the subject-matter of this writ petition. Prior to 29-6-79, one Noronha was the owner of the said premises. Some time in 1964, the Controller allotted the premises to respondent no. 3 in accordance with the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (Kar. Act No. 22 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on a rent pf Rs. 180 per month. ( 3 ) ON 29-6-79, the petitioner purchased the premises from Noronha fqr valuable consideration. According to the petitioner, on the date of purchase of the premises, respondent No. 4, who is no other than the wife; of respondent no. 3 but whose relationship is not what it should be, was in occupation of the same as tenant and she has recognized him as her landlord and that during a proceeding instituted by him against her under the Act before the Civil Courf, she had also delivered possession of the premises to him. ( 4 ) ON the above basis, the petitioner on 18-12-80 intimated the vacancy of the premises to the Controller and sought for self occupation. On receipt of the said intimation of vacancy, the controller notified the same by hjs notice or notification No. HRC 676 acc 80, on 19-12-80. The relevant part, of the said notice reads thus: ( 5 ) IN the aforesaid proceeding be fore the Controller, respondent No. 3 on 26-12-80 made an interveming application or an objection statement inter alia contending that an order made by the Controller on 29-6-77 in favour of respondent No. 4 was non est, that at all times he had continued to be in occupation of the premises as tenant and that no vacancy had arisen and therefore the proceedings be dropped. On that application, the controller made an order on the same day directing the relevant papers to be put up and thereafter on 31-12-80 made an order stating that the pleas urged by respondent No. 3 would bd considered on the date of hearing, viz. , on 11-1-81. ( 6 ) BUT, before the Controller could hold an enquiry and decide the matter, respondent No. 3 filed an appeal on 29-12-80 before the DC against the very notice of intimation issued by the Controller on the notice board itself under S. 12 of the Act arraying the petitioner ms respondent No. 2. In the preamble of the appeal-memo, respondent No. 3 stated thus:"under S. 12 of the Karnataka rent Control Act, 1961, the appellant above named begs to file the following appeal against the notification issued by the first respondent on 19-12-80 in respect of the alleged vacancy said to have been caused pertaining to the premises of the appellant, bearing. No.- 46, Viviani Road, Richards Town, Bangalore, in his notification No. HRC 676/acc|80 for the following among other grounds. "but, in the prayer of his appeal-memo, fee sought for the following reliefs:"wherefore, the appellant humbly prays, that the Honourable Authority be pleased to call for the entire records from the first respondent and to further pleased to grant the following reliefs to the appellant: (a) declare that the endorsement issued by the first respondent on 29-6-67 in favour of the, appellant's wife Ramalakshmi Prasad, transferring the appellant's tenancy to her name' as void abinitio and unenforceable; (b) direct the first respondent to initiate action against the second respondent as per S. 10a of the KRC act for violation made by the second respondent of S. 4 (1) of the K. R. C. Act and after taking possession of the premises to direct the first respondent to put the appellant in pos- ession of the premises; (c) set aside the notification issued in HRC 676|acc|80, dated 19-12-80. in the interest of justice and equity. "on 29-12-80, the DC evidently without hearing the petitioner but hearing respondent No. 3, made an order on the Index-sheet accompanying the appeal-memo itself in these terms:"appeal admitted. HRC Notfn. No. 676 ACC 1980 d,t: 19-12-80 is stayed until this appeal is disposed of. Communicate the same and issue notices. Fix up for hearing on 5-1-81, adhip Chaudhuri 27-12-80. "on 29-12-80, the DC evidently without hearing the petitioner but hearing respondent No. 3, made an order on the Index-sheet accompanying the appeal-memo itself in these terms:"appeal admitted. HRC Notfn. No. 676 ACC 1980 d,t: 19-12-80 is stayed until this appeal is disposed of. Communicate the same and issue notices. Fix up for hearing on 5-1-81, adhip Chaudhuri 27-12-80. " ( 7 ) AFTER entering appearance on 5-1-81, in the said appeal, the petitioner urged before the DC, that the appeal was not maintainable, which objection was overruled by him, in these terms: "counsel for App and Respt. 2 present. Latter files power. Raises preliminary objections to the filing of the appeal itself. The objections are overruled. The stay granted continues. Adjourned for hearing on 2-2-81. Adhip Chaudhuri, 5-1-81. In due course, the DC heard the said appeal and made an order on 7-3-81 granting all the reliefs sought by respondent No. 3. ( 8 ) ON receipt of the order of the dc, the Controller made a reference to the DC on 6. 4. 81, seeking instructions or a clarification of the order made on 7-3-81. On that reference, a note was put up by the office on which the DC made an order on 10-4-81 in these terms; "when we say there is no vacancy and the appellant should be put in possession the matter becomes simple. The Respondent is to be brought under S. 10-A and evicted. 10-4-81 adhip Chaudhuri, in conformity with the aforesaid order of the! DC, a communication was issued by his office to the Controller on 18-4-81 and on receipt of the same the controller made an order on 20-4-81, in which he found that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the premises and therefore he should be evicted from the same. On the same day an order or delivery warrant was issued to forcibly take possession of the premises from the petitioner and deliver the same to respondent No. 3 (Annexure-A ). ( 9 ) SHRI S. K. Venkataranga lyengar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 before the DC was not maintainable and even if. maintainable he should not have blindly accepted the case of respondent No. 3 even before the original authority that was seized of the matter had decided the questions and made an order thereto. maintainable he should not have blindly accepted the case of respondent No. 3 even before the original authority that was seized of the matter had decided the questions and made an order thereto. ( 10 ) SHRI K. Jagannatha She/tty, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 sought to support the order made by the DC and the further orders made by the Controller. ( 11 ) SHRI Shetty submits that on the petition presented by respondent No. 3, the Controller had observed that he has already, decided the question of vacancy and it was not open to him to re-examine the same, for which reason his client rightly filed the appeal before the DC. ( 12 ) AS noticed earlier, the Controller had not made any order accepting the claim of the petitioner or rejecting the claim of respondent No. 3. Before the controller the proceedings were pending in which he had even stated that he would consider every one of the questions to be urged by the parties. ( 13 ) ALL that had happened was a notice of intimation of vacancy given by the petitioner had been published by the) controller. A notice of intimation of vacancy by one person and initiation of proceedings thereto by the Controller under the Act, does not and cannot by itself determine the vacancy reported by one and disputed by another. A notice or notification issued by the controller on his notice board, cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as an order determining the vacancy of a premises, that too in a case, as in the present one, in which there is a dispute on that very question before him. A mere publication of the intimation of a vacancy given by one would not amount to an order that can be agitated in an appeal under the act. An appeal lies only against an order and not against a notice or a notification merely publishing an intimation of vacancy. ( 14 ) ALONG with his appeal, respondent No. 3 had only annexed an un- authenticated and an uncertified notification issued by the Controller publishing the intimation of a vacancy given by the Controller. A tenable and a serious objection raised by the petitioner on the maintainability was rejected by the DC, without really applying his mind and making an arbitrary and laconic order to the effect "the objections are overruled". A tenable and a serious objection raised by the petitioner on the maintainability was rejected by the DC, without really applying his mind and making an arbitrary and laconic order to the effect "the objections are overruled". An appellate authority under the Act, "whose order is reviewable by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, cannot make such arbitrary and laconic orders. I am distressed at the same and I do hope that the DC will avoid making such orders in future. ( 15 ) FROM the foregoing, it follows that the criticism of Sri lyengar that there was no order made by the Controller to be appealed under S. 12 of the Act and the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 before the DC was incompetent and the order made thereto is wholly without jurisdiction is well founded. On this ground alone, the order made by. the DC is liable to be quashed without examining the other question. But, I will assume that the appeal filed by: respondent No. 3 was maintainable and examine whether the order made by the DC is legally sustainble. ( 16 ) ON the intimation of vacancy given by the petitioner, the Controller as required by the Act and the Rules, has only notified the same. When respondent No. 3 filed an intervening application or objections urging that there was no vacancy, the Controller, without making any order, has kept open that question for consideration and decision. An examination of the papers of the Office of the Controller, clearly shows that the Controller had "not decided the question of vacancy, the plea of petitioner for self occupation or the final question that arises in such a proceeding, viz. , allotment of the premises to a needy applicant if he had reached the conclusion that a vacancy had arisen and the request of the petitioner for self occupation should be rejected. ( 17 ) WHILE the above is the position that emerges from the proceedings before the Controller, the DC in appeal holds that a vacancy had not arisen as urged by respondent No. 3 and accepts the other pleas urged by him, as if the controller had determined all those questions and there was material to decide them finally. ( 17 ) WHILE the above is the position that emerges from the proceedings before the Controller, the DC in appeal holds that a vacancy had not arisen as urged by respondent No. 3 and accepts the other pleas urged by him, as if the controller had determined all those questions and there was material to decide them finally. Before the DC, the petitioner had seriously urged that he had purchased the premises, that respondent No. 4 had lawfully delivered possession of the premises to him, that a vacancy in fact and law had arisen and, therefore, he should be permitted to occupy the premises. On these questions, the Controller had not collected any material, recorded any evidence, considered them and had riot expressed his opinion. When this was the position, it passes my comprehension as to how it was open to the DC to accept the ipse dixit of respondent No. 3. As to how and on what basis the DC reached his conclusions is rather difficult to gather. All that I can gather is that the DC seems to blindly accept every one of the pleas urged by respondent No. 3 on fact and law which was plainly impermissible. ( 18 ) ON the above analysis, it follows that the order made by the DC, assuming that the appeal filed by respondent no. 3 was maintainable is manifestly illegal, and is liable to be quashed any the case has to be decided by the controller. ( 19 ) SHRI lyengar next contends that the reference made by the Controller, the order made thereon on 10-4-81 by the DC, the instructions issued thereto to the Controller and the orders made thereto for delivery are manifestly illegal. ( 20 ) EARLIER I have reached the conclusion that the order made by the dc on 7-3-81 on appeal cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. The reference made by the Controller, the order made thereon, the instructions issued thereto and the. further orders made by the Controller depend and have their source to the order made by the DC on appeal and have no independent existence. When that is so, the order made by the DC on 10-4-81 and the orders made by the controller on 20-4-81, have to be quashed without any further examination. further orders made by the Controller depend and have their source to the order made by the DC on appeal and have no independent existence. When that is so, the order made by the DC on 10-4-81 and the orders made by the controller on 20-4-81, have to be quashed without any further examination. But, it is necessary to point out that it was improper for the controller to have sought guidance or clarifications from the DC in judicial and quasi-judicial matters. A fprciori, it was improper for the DC to have entertained the reference made by the controller, make an order on 10-4-81 and issue instructions to the Controller in conformity with that order. I fervently hope the authorities will avoid the same in future. ( 21 ) IN this writ petition as also in certain civil and criminal proceedings, there is dispute between the contesting parties on the actual occupation of the premises. On 24-4-81, while directing issue of rule nisi in the case I made an interim order in these terms:"while the petitioner asserts that respondent-3 is a trespasser, respondent 3 asserts that the petitioner is a trespasser and therefore they have no right to occupy the premises. Whether the order is legal and valid and what rights the contesting parties derive from that order is a matter that has to be decided at the final hearing of the case. Admittedly both sides are not in occupation of the premises in dispute. In these circumstances, the proper order to be made is to restrain the petitioner and respondent-3 from occupying the premises till the disposal of the writ petition. I, therefore, issue injunction restraining the petitioner and respondent-3 from occupying the premises in dispute till the disposal of the case. Both sides admit that the premises has been locked and sealed by the Rent Controller. I direct the Rent Controller not to open the lock and seal till the disposal of the Writ petition. Emergent notices to respondents 1 and 2 returnable in ten days. Call for the records. Statement of objections of respondent-3 if any to be filed on or before 25-5-81. Post this W. P. for hearing on 28-5-81 on the top of the hearing list subject to any part heard cases. Emergent notices to respondents 1 and 2 returnable in ten days. Call for the records. Statement of objections of respondent-3 if any to be filed on or before 25-5-81. Post this W. P. for hearing on 28-5-81 on the top of the hearing list subject to any part heard cases. "according to the aforesaid interim order this Court had issued an injunction restraining the petitioner and respondent No. 3 from occupying the premises and that the Controller should continue to keep the lock of the premises with him. As to what was the factual position as on 24-4-81' or today cannot be decided by this court in this petition and those questions have to be decided by the appropriate civil or criminal courts that are seized of the matter or" the controller along with the other questions that arise before him. In this view, I do not express any opinion on this question and leave open the same. ( 22 ) SRI lyengar, lastly contends that this Court should permit the petitioner to occupy the premises till the matter is decided by the Controller. Sri lyengar submits that the petitioner and his family consist of 18 members and they are in dire need of accommodation, which in the very na,ture of things, is seriously opposed by respondent No. 3. ( 23 ) BEFORE the termination of the proceedings, the Controller cannot permit the petitioner or any other person to occupy the premises. When the Controller cannot make an order permitting the petitioner to occupy the premises, this Court cannot also permit the petitioner to occupy the premises, whatever may be the hardship that is caused to any of the parties. Any such order in favour of one, would seriously, prejudice the case of the other. For these reasons, i reject this prayer of Sri lyengar ( 24 ) IN para-16 of this order, I have briefly indicated the principal questions that arise for determination before the Controller. A satisfactory decision, in particular oh the question of vacancy and self occupation, cannot be reached in the absence of evidence, for which purpose it is necessary to give opportunity to the parties to place their evidence also. A satisfactory decision, in particular oh the question of vacancy and self occupation, cannot be reached in the absence of evidence, for which purpose it is necessary to give opportunity to the parties to place their evidence also. After recording all such evidence as may be placed by the parties and collecting such material, that he may deem necessary, it is proper for the controller to decide all questions together though law permits him to decide any one of jurisdictional facts, like question of vacancy; as a preliminary question. But having regard to the fact, that the order of the Controller is subject to an appeal and judicial review, by this Court, it is more desirable for the Controller to follow the former course, though the question of permitting the petitioner to occupy the premises or allotting the same to others, would not arise, if he accepts the case of respondent NO. 3 on the question of vacancy. In deciding the principal questions, the Controller is bound to examine all other incidental questions that may be urged by the parties. I have no doubt that the Controller will bestow his earnest consideration and decide all questions satisfactorily. ( 25 ) AS seen earlier, both the parties are agitating to occupy the premises and continue to live there. As to whose case has to be accepted has necessarily to be decided by the controller But, in deciding the questions, the Controller cannot allow the matters to drift and he is required to decide the same with utmost expedition. ( 26 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner and respondent No. 3 seek for a direction to the Controller to decide the matter within a month from this day. But, in my opinion, the period suggested by counsel is too short and it is necessary to allow at least 3 months time to decide the matter. ( 27 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I make the following orders and directions; (i) I quash the orders dated 7-3-81, 10-4-81 on the reference made by the Controller and the communication bearing No. Appl. (Civil) PR 2|1981-82, dated 18-4-81, of the Deputy Commissioner, bangalore, in HRC No. (Civil) A 182/80-81 (Annexure-B) and the consequent orders No. HRC 676 acc|80 dated 20-4-81 made by the controller by issue of a writ of certiorari. (Civil) PR 2|1981-82, dated 18-4-81, of the Deputy Commissioner, bangalore, in HRC No. (Civil) A 182/80-81 (Annexure-B) and the consequent orders No. HRC 676 acc|80 dated 20-4-81 made by the controller by issue of a writ of certiorari. (ii) I direct the Controller, Civil area, Bangalore respondent No. 2, to dispose of the proceeding in Case no. HRC 676/acc|80 pending before him in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order with all such expedition as is possible in the circumstances of the case and in any event within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. ( 28 ) RULE issued Is made absolute. ( 29 ) IN the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. ( 30 ) LET a copy of this order and recordts of the case be transmitted to the House Rent and Accommodation controller, Bangalore within ten days from this day. ( 31 ) SRI L. Srinivasa Reddy, learned high Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance for respondents 1 and 2 within 15 days from this day. --- *** --- .