Hansaria, J.- Every decision of a court is meant to be a voyage in the quest for truth. The main apparatus to chart the path is the assistance rendered by the Bar, or to put it differently, counsel act like light houses and save the ship from wrecking. For want of proper guidance, a court, like Columbus, may however land at a wrong place thinking it to be the destination of its journey. 2. I was confronted with an important question in this case: whether mens rea was needed to convict the petitioner under section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, here­inafter "the Act" When I heard the matter on 8.12.81, Shri Barua referred to Nathulal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 43 , which had dealt with the question of mens rea for an offence under the Act. The court stated that: "having regard to the scope of the Act it would be legitimate to hold that a person commits an offence under section 7 of the Act if he intentionally contravenes any order made under section 3 of the Act. So construed the object of the Act will be best served and innocent persons will also be protected from harassment''. (Emphasis supplied) This view was taken after referring to the well established principle that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. It was, however, recognised that a statute may exclude the element of mens rea but it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision which creates an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded mens rea. It was then observed: "The mere fact that the object of the statute is to pro­mote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil is not by itself decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of an offence......................" The Court proceeded to say that the nature of the mens rea, that could be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and the provisions thereof. Having regard to the object of the Act which is to control in general public interest, the production, supply and distribut­ion of, and trade in certain commodities, it was felt by the Supreme Court that it cannot be said that the object would be defeated if mens rea is read as an ingredient of the offence. 3. Thus, on the language of section 7(i) of the Act as it had then stood, this was the final pronouncement binding on all concerned, under Article 141 of the Constitution. As despite the profoundest respect which a Supreme Court decision com­mands, I did not feel fully assured if this was the only or latest thinking of the highest court of the land on this subject, I requested the learned Public Prosecutor on 8.12.81 to find out if any other view had been taken by the Court in any other or later decisions; so also, to acquaint me if there be any decision of this Court on this aspect qua the Control Order with which we are seized. The succeeding day saw no further enlightenment from across the table. I, therefore ven­tured my traval unaided, and I found that section 7(1) of the Act had been amended by the Essential Commodities (Second Amendment) Act, 1967 (Act 36 of 1967) which had inserted for the words and figure "If any person contravenes any order made under section 3", the words and figure "If any person contravenes, whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any order made under section 3". To know the intention behind the amendment, I looked into the Statement of Object and Reasons (published in Gazette of India, Extraordinary dt. 14.11.67, Part II, Sec. 2 p. 1007) and this is what had been stated: "Persons committing offence under the Act sometime escape punishment for contravention of orders made there­under on the plea that the offences were not committed by them deliberately. It was felt necessary to amend the Act so as to make contravention of an order made there punishable whether the order was contravened knowingly intentionally or otherwise." 4. Even on the ratio of Nathulal, it has therefore to be held that after section 7(1) of the Act was amended in 1967, mens rea was not required inasmuch the same was expressly excluded. Even on the ratio of Nathulal, it has therefore to be held that after section 7(1) of the Act was amended in 1967, mens rea was not required inasmuch the same was expressly excluded. Before entering into the facts of the case, it may be stated for the sake of completeness that section 7(1) under­went another change brought in by Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974. This sub-section assumed its earlier form, namely, "If any person contravenes any order made under section 3"; but then section 10-C was inserted which required presumption of culpable mental state, and left it to the accused to prove that he had no such mental state. Thus, although aid of section 10-C could not have been available to the prosecution in this case as the aforesaid amendment had come into force from 22nd day of June/74 whereas the occurrence was of 20th February, 1974, mens rea was none-theles not required when the offence was committed in view of the amendment in 1967. 5. The main submission made by Shri Barua in this revi­sion, therefore, fails, but this is not all. The materials on record do establish that the petitioner had knowingly violated clauses 3 and 16 of the Assam Food Grains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1961, the Control Order for short. What had happened was that on the aforesaid day the accused was driving a truck (bearing No. ASD 4111). The truck carried some bags of rice and paddy. On check up, no permit for movement could be produced and so the truck was taken to North Jamuguri Co-operative Society, and the rice and paddy were unloaded there for weighing and seizure. A quarrel was, however, picked up by 15/20 persons who were on the truck, and as PW-4 Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Society, who had detected the matter was accompanied only by one Makhbul Husain, Branch Manager of the Apex Marketing Society, they could not face them and so they went to the local police station, but on return with a police party found that the truck had left with the paddy and rice. A chase was made towards Balipara and the truck was found in the act of unloading the rice and paddy. The 15/20 persons who were on the truck earlier were, however, not found. But the petitioner was arrested and the truck was seized. A chase was made towards Balipara and the truck was found in the act of unloading the rice and paddy. The 15/20 persons who were on the truck earlier were, however, not found. But the petitioner was arrested and the truck was seized. Defence of the petitioner was that he was merely driving the vehicle which had been taken on hire and the rice and paddy belonged to the persons who had hired the vehicle. 6. The evidence of the P.Ws about the above happenings on 20.2.74 has been believed by the two courts below and no infirmity in the same has been brought to my notice by Shri Barua. The facts of the case thus clearly speak about the guilty mind of the petitioner. 7. The only other contention of Shri Barua was that sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Clause 16 of the Control Order at the relevant time were subject matter to "notifications and restrictions, if any, under clause 17", and so without any Notification under clause 17, violation of clause 16 could not have taken place. No doubt in 1974 clause 16 stood as pointed out by Shri Barua, as would appear from the First Amendment to the Control Order made in 1971 published in Assam Gazette on 3rd .February, 1971 Pt. II at page 283, and no Notification under clause 17 for Tezpur Sub-division in which the occurrence was said to have taken place is also on record, but this is not at all material, according to me, because when clause 16 of the Control Order stated that no person shall move or transport or cause to be moved or transported any food grams except under order and in accordance with the permit, the rider that this would be "Subject to notification and restriction, if any under clause 17'' could not have meant that the movement without permit would be an offence only if some notification had been issued under clause 17. That clause visualises declaration of "notified areas" within some districts, on which declaration no movement could take place even into a notified area without a permit. So, though clause 16 does not stand in the way of free movement of food grains within a district (in some cases, sub-division), the same may be restricted with the aid of notification under claues 17. So, though clause 16 does not stand in the way of free movement of food grains within a district (in some cases, sub-division), the same may be restricted with the aid of notification under claues 17. Non-issue of notification under clause 17, cannot, therefore, affect the operation of the prohibition imposed by clause 16. 8. I would not, therefore, find any infirmity in the con­viction of the petitioner under section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. Shri Barua is, however, right that the learned Sessions Judge wrongly felt that the provisions of the Act as it stood at the relevant time required him to impose a minimum imprison­ment of three months. This is, however, not so as the amend­ment to section 7 imposing minimum sentence was first inser­ted by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 which had come into force from 22.6.74, whereas the offence, as already noted, had been committed on 20.2.74. On that day section 7 of the Act as amended by Essential Commodi­ties (Second Amendment) Act, 1967 was in force which had contained a proviso reading: "Provided that in the case of first offence, if the court is of the opinion that a sentence of fine only will meet the ends of justice, it may, for reasons to be recorded, refrain from imposing a sentence of imprison­ment and in the case of second or subsequent offence..." It was urged by Shri Barua that so far as the petitioner is concerned this was the first time offence and as he was merely a driver and as the quantity of foodgrains involved were 29.49 quintals of rice and 2.51 quintals of paddy, the petitioner may be let off with a fine, specially when the occurrence had taken place in 1974. Though at one stage I had felt like accepting this submission of Shri Barua, I have ultimately decided not to concede this prayer as the petitioner had after all commit­ted a white collared offence affecting distribution of essential commodities, and that too knowingly, and had even wanted to escape from the clutches of law. Keeping, however, in view the fact that he was merely a driver and the traders to whom the food grains had belonged could not be brought to book, I am of the opinion that a sentence of R.I. for one month and a fine of Rs. Keeping, however, in view the fact that he was merely a driver and the traders to whom the food grains had belonged could not be brought to book, I am of the opinion that a sentence of R.I. for one month and a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default to R.I. for 15 days would meet the ends of justice; and therefore I reduce the sentence accordingly. 9. The last submission of Shri Barua related to the forfei­ture of the truck as ordered by the trial court and upheld by the learned Sessions Judge. I am not inclined to go into this aspect of the matter in this proceeding inasmuch as the truck had admittedly belonged to one Harminder Singh, who himself had approached this Court in Criminal Revision No. 71 and 1977, which must have been against that part of the impugned order which related to the forfeiture of the truck which peti­tion was rejected on 20.4.77 on withdrawal. The petitioner can have no grievance of his own about the forfeiture of the truck, as according to him he was merely a driver of that truck. 10. For these reasons, the petition stands dismissed subject to above modification in sentence.