N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IT is not disputed that ever since the amendment in that Act Representation of the People Act the double member and multi-member constituencies have become a matter of the past. Sec. 33 (2) was there in this very form in those days and Mr. Advocate General with emphasis urged that the text of sec. 33 (2) was such as would be applicable only to the situation where in a constituency there were two or more parts one or more of which was or were reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. He in this connection stressed the word any occurring there. It must be fairly conceded that the word any denotes anyone and when there is reference to one ordinarily there would be reference to two or more seats also. When sec. 33 (2) was there prior to the constitution of the single member constituencies it was required to be interpreted to mean that where in a parliamentary constituency any one out of more seats is reserved for candidate of the Scheduled Caste or Tribe the member would be required to specify the specific caste or tribe so that out of a number of candidates in that constituency it could be ascertained at a sheer glance as to who are the candidates for a reserved seat and who are the candidates for a general seat. The argument in so far as it goes to this stage appears to be sound. The further argument of Mr. Advocate General however was that the provisions of sec. 33 (2) lost all significance and importance the moment there came to be provided the single member constituencies. He therefore urged that sec. 33 (2) should be treated as otiose by me. He for that purpose sought reliance on some observations of the Supreme Courts judgment in T. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora and Ors. AIR 1959 S. C. 1318 already referred to by me. In that case the illustration appended to sec. 54 (4) of the R. P. Act 1951 was treated by the Supreme Court as otiose in some respects. Said sec. 54 (4) had an illustration which is reproduced below (it is to be noted that this whole sec. AIR 1959 S. C. 1318 already referred to by me. In that case the illustration appended to sec. 54 (4) of the R. P. Act 1951 was treated by the Supreme Court as otiose in some respects. Said sec. 54 (4) had an illustration which is reproduced below (it is to be noted that this whole sec. 54 has been deleted from the statute by Representation of People Amendment Act 1961 being Act No. 40/61): illustration: At an election in a constituency to fill four seats of which two are reserved there are six candidates A B C D E and F and they secure votes in descending order A securing the largest number B C and D are qualified to be chosen to fill the reserved seats while A E and F are not so qualified. The Retur- ning Officer will first declare-B and C duly elected to fill the two reserved seats and then declare A and D (not A and B) to fill the remaining two seats. In paragraph 15 of the said reported judgment (V. V. Giris case Supra) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:"whilst we are dealing with sec. 54 we may incidentally refer to the appellants argument based on sec. 3 (2) (c) of the Delimitation Act which provides that in every two-member constituency one seat shall be reserved either for the scheduled castes or for the scheduled tribes and the other seat shall not be so reserved. It is urged that in view of this provision the case contemplated by the illustration to sec. 54 (4) is not likely to occur any more and in that sense the illustration has become Otiose. That may be true. But even so the significance of the illustration lies in the fact that it clarifies and explains concretely how the reservation of seats for the depressed castes and tribes will actually work out in elections in the constituencies". In one sense the Supreme Court agreed that the importance of sec. 54 (4) and the illustration appended to it was no more but the Supreme Court did not say that the provisions came to be effaced for all purposes. In one sense the Supreme Court agreed that the importance of sec. 54 (4) and the illustration appended to it was no more but the Supreme Court did not say that the provisions came to be effaced for all purposes. It has emphasised that the significance of the illustration lay in the fact that it clarified and explained concretely how the reservation of seats for the depressed caste and tribes will actually work out in elections in the relevant constituencies. The fact that sec. 54 (4) came to be deleted as a consequence of the amending Act No. 40/61 by sec. 12 thereof with effect from 20-9-61 shows that the Parliament is alive to the redundancy of any provisions. Despite the change in the constitution of constituencies the Legislature thought it wise to retain sec. 33 (2) on the statute book. Mr. Advocate General wanted me to hold that Parliament through over-sight forgot to delete this provision when the amending Act of 1966 came to be enacted. It is not ordinarily safe to attribute this sort of slip to an August body like Parliament. Apart from this general proposition there is a clear indication in sec. 33 itself about the Legislatures consciousness about the implications of the amendments of the year 1966. A big proviso came to be added to sub-sec. (4) of sec. 33 by the very Amending Act of 47/66 by sec. 29 thereof. It is therefore reasonable to assume that despite the change in the constitution of the constituencies by making them single member constituencies the Legislature wanted to retain sub- sec. (2) of sec. 33 of the R P. Act. If the purpose of sec. 33 (2) was the only purpose to distinguish the candidates for reserved seats from those for general seats the argument advanced by Mr. Advocate General perhaps would have held the field. The purpose of sec. 33 (2) however is not that only purpose to be served. Over and above the purpose already specified by Mr. Advocate General the purpose appears to give a choice to the candidate of the scheduled caste or tribe to opt for the additional benefit of contesting on the reserved seat. To me it appears that the major purpose of the Parliament in enacting sec. Over and above the purpose already specified by Mr. Advocate General the purpose appears to give a choice to the candidate of the scheduled caste or tribe to opt for the additional benefit of contesting on the reserved seat. To me it appears that the major purpose of the Parliament in enacting sec. 33 (2) in the mandatory form is that out of a number of castes and tribes which would be obvi- ously notified by the President the candidate must mention in his nomination form which one out of a number of castes or tribes he is belonging to. The election forms are open to inspection at the hands of a rival candidate. Such a rival candidate or his agent is empowered to object to the nomination paper of the other candidate. In order to effectively object to the claim of a candidate to be belonging to one or the other of a number of castes or tribes he is to be given a legitimate notice or information so that he may ascertain whether the claim is well- rooted or not. A parliamentary constituency is ordinarily a very big one. Comparatively smaller but nevertheless quite extensive would obviously us the constituency for a State Legislative Assembly or council. In some cases arrival candidate may or may not be knowing the other rival candidate who aspires for a reserved seat. In order to give notice to the other intending objectionist the parliament provided that out of a member of castes or tribes the claimant of this additional benefit of candidature for a reserved seat must specify to what caste or tribe he belongs. The objectionist cannot be and is not intended to be allowed to remain in a nebulous state of mind. It is with this evident purpose in mind which must be existing even prior to 1966 sec. 33 (2) is retained by the Parliament despite being fully alive to the constitution of single member constituencies. ( 2 ) MR. Advocate General in this connection had emphasised the words any seat along with the words that seat occurring in the latter part of that sub-sec. and urged that the phrase that seat was obviously referable to the earlier words any seat. When the Parliament despite the constitution of single member constituency retained sub-sec. (2)of sec. ( 2 ) MR. Advocate General in this connection had emphasised the words any seat along with the words that seat occurring in the latter part of that sub-sec. and urged that the phrase that seat was obviously referable to the earlier words any seat. When the Parliament despite the constitution of single member constituency retained sub-sec. (2)of sec. 33 it is more advisable to read the section by reading a for any rather than ignoring the entire statutory provision. Ordinary pre- sumption of law is that the Legislature does not speak anything which is devoid of any meaning. The retention of sec. 33 (2)7 even after 1966 therefore is to be understood to be indicative of the parliaments desire to continue to achieve the earlier purpose of posting the would-be objectionist with the readily available material for his further search and scrutiny so that within a matter of a few days available to him between the date of filing of the nomination papers and the date of scrutiny he collects the requisite material and places it and presses his point. ( 3 ) AS an extension of his argument Mr. Advocate General urged that Article 14 of the Constitution of India would be attracted if one person fills in the form by writing Rathwa in the form and another person does not write so but the form is sufficiently indicative of the man being of that tribe. It is difficult to appreciate this argument. This argument proceeds on the assumption that both the forms are validly accepted. The argument further proceeds on the assumption that further evidence could be led before the Returning Officer in order to make good the deficit if any. When sec. 33 (2) cuts at the nomination forms itself the scope for any invidious different treatment would hardly arise. ( 4 ) MR. Advocate Generals further argument in this connection was that even though change in the constitution of constituencies was effected in the year 1966 the original form like Form 2-A continued to be ope- rative and. therefore the difficulty of the nature that has arisen in this case would arise. The argument was put forward in support of the plea that sec. therefore the difficulty of the nature that has arisen in this case would arise. The argument was put forward in support of the plea that sec. 33 (2) and other allied provisions of Rule 4 and Form 2-A had become nugatory in importance but when I do not uphold the main argument the subsidiary argument pressed by Mr. Advocate General cannot be accepted. ( 5 ) LASTLY it was urged that the Gujarati form as was supplied by the Office of the Returning Officer had misled the respondent who for no fault of his comes to suffer. In a society where rule of law prevails a man is presumed to know the law including sec. 33 (2) of the Act. A person who puts forth himself as a candidate for Parliament is expected to know the law of the land and this alleged mistake cannot be allowed to have its way in the matter of language. I hasten to add that at the hands of a careful candidate there is no possibility of Gujarati form causing misleading. ( 6 ) IT was then urged that a technical mistake like the one on hand should not be allowed to set at naught the cumbersome and costly procedure of election and reliance in this connection was placed on sec. 36 (4) of the R. P Act. It was urged with considerable and appreciable vehemence that the provisions or sec. 36 (4) had an over-powering effect over the provisions of sec. 33 (2) and the defect in this case should be held to be not of a substantial character. Sec. 36 (2) deals with the scrutiny of nominations. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 36 makes a general provision that if the defect is not of a substantial character it should not be allowed to sway the judgment of the Returning Officer. The question again would turn to the character of the requirement under sec. 33 (2) of the R. P. Act. When the Parliament in very emphatic language ordained that the nomination papers shall not be accepted it is to be presumed legitimately that the Parliament treated the requirement of sec. 33 (2) as of substantial character. The question again would turn to the character of the requirement under sec. 33 (2) of the R. P. Act. When the Parliament in very emphatic language ordained that the nomination papers shall not be accepted it is to be presumed legitimately that the Parliament treated the requirement of sec. 33 (2) as of substantial character. ( 7 ) IN above view of the matter the election petition is required to be allowed and the election of the respondent No. 1 is set aside because there was improper acceptance of his nomination paper and the result of the respondent No. 1 has been materially affected thereby. The election of the respondent No. 1 is hereby set aside. The respondent No. 1 to pay costs of the petitioner which are assessed at Rs. 500. 00. The High Court to intimate the substance of this decision to the Election Commission and the Speaker of the House of Parliament as soon as possible and as soon as may be thereafter to send to the Election Commission an auth- enticated copy of this decision. ( 8 ) AT this stage Mr. H. M. Mehta the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1 applied for stay of the operation of this order under sec. 116-B of the Representation of the People Act 1951 The operation of this order is stayed for a period of three weeks after the receipt of the certified copy of this judgment which shall be applied for and obtained urgently by the respondent No. 1. Petition allowed. .