Judgment S.Shamsul Hasan, J. 1. The petitioners are aggrieved by an order dated the 7.02.1979, by which they have been summoned for being tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi. 2. The case was initiated on the basis of an information lodged by one Mahanth Sah regarding commission of a dacoity in his house between the night of 12/13-9-1975, being Sitamarhi P. S. Case No. 9(9) 75 under Sec.395 of the Indian Penal Code. After investigation the police submitted final form stating that the accusation was false. During the pendency of the proceeding a protest petition has been filed by the informant. 3. On 6-1-1978 the Magistrate passed the following order ; Seven accused persons have filed their attendance. The final report, and the protest petition are put up. Heard the learned advocate of the informant, of the accused and the learned A. P. P. In this case police has submitted final form as "F. R. true-accusation false." It is submitted by the learned advocate of the informant that the final form, the case diary and the statements of some witnesses recorded under Sec.164 Criminal Procedure Code will disclose a prima facie case under Sec.395 I.P.C. True it is that the accused persons have been named in the F. I. R. and the inmates of the house named the accused persons before the police, but on supervision by the S. P. it was .found that though the factum of dacoity is true, the accusation is false. In fact, it appears from the case diary that even a police dog was requisitioned but without any result. It appears further from the case diary that the accused persons are close neighbours of the informant having long standing dispute and no incriminatting article was found from their possession. In the above circumstances I am of the opinion that it would be expedient to accept the final form and proceed with the protest petition dated 1-2-1977 which is on the record. Though there is reference of another protest petition dated 27-9-1975 in the aforesaid protest petition dated 1-2-1977, the said protest petition is not on the record. In the above circumstances I am of the opinion that it would be expedient to accept the final form and proceed with the protest petition dated 1-2-1977 which is on the record. Though there is reference of another protest petition dated 27-9-1975 in the aforesaid protest petition dated 1-2-1977, the said protest petition is not on the record. As the protest petition has all the ingredients of a complaint, the complainant will be examined under Sec.200 Criminal Procedure Code on 1-2-1978, when put up for further order." As stated above, by this order the Magistrate accepted the final form and then proceeded to initiate a proceeding treating the protest petition as a complaint. 4. In the above situation it was submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioners that having passed judicial order accepting final form the Magistrate was not justified in summoning the petitioners on the basis of the protest petition. The learned Counsel be relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court and the one of this Court, namely, Tula Rnm V/s. Kishore Signh -- . Bindeshwari Prasad Singh V/s. Kali Singh -- and Bulak Sharma V/s. Ram Baran Earn Cr. Misc. 2120 OF 1978. disposed of by this Court. In the case of Tula Ram (supra) it was held in paragraph 14 as follows ; In these circumstances we are satisfied that the action taken by the Magistrate was fully supportable in law and he did not commit any error in recording the statement of the complainant and the witnesses and thereafter issuing process against the appellants. The High Court has discussed the points involved thread-bare and has also cited number of decisions and we entirely agree with the view taken by the High Court. Thus on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case the following legal propositions emerge: 1. That a Magistrate can order investigation under Sec.156(3) only at the pre-cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Section 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of chapter 14 he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under Sec.156(3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by Sec.202 of the Code. 2. 2. Where a Magistrate chooses to take congnizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives: (a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Sec.200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 3. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnessess or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 4. Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before talking cognizance under Sec.156(3) of the Code and receive the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightway issue process against the accused or apply his rniad to the complaint filed before him and take action under Sec.190 as described above. In the case of Sendeshwari Prasad Singh (supra) the Supreme Court held as follows in paragraph 4: We might mention that the order dated 23rd November. 1968, was a judicial order by which the Magistrate had given full reasons for dismissing the complaint. Even if the Magistrate had any jurisdiction to call this order, it could have been done by another judicial order after giving reasons that he was satisfied that a case was made out for recalling the order. We, however, need not dilate on this point because there is absolutely no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (which applies to this case) empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. Code of Criminal Procedure does contain a provision for inherent powers, namely, Sec. 561-A which, however, confers these powers on the High Court and the High Court alone. Unlike Sec.151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate Criminal Courts have no inherent powers. In these circumstances therefore, the learned Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order dismissing the complaint. The remedy of the respondent was to move the Sessions Judge or the High Court in revision. Unlike Sec.151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate Criminal Courts have no inherent powers. In these circumstances therefore, the learned Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order dismissing the complaint. The remedy of the respondent was to move the Sessions Judge or the High Court in revision. In fact, after having passed the order dated 23-11-1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate became functus officio and had no power to review or recall that order on any ground whatsoever. In these circumstances, therefore, the order even if there be one, recalling order dismissing the complaint, was entirely without jurisdiction. This being the position, all subsequent proceedings following upon recalling the said order, would fall to the ground including order dated 3-5-1972 summoning the accused which must also be treated to be a nullity and destitute of any legal effect. The High Court has not at all considered this important aspect of the matter which alone was sufficient to put an end to these proceedings. It was suggested by Mr. D. Gobardhan that the application given by him for recalling the order of dismissal of the complaint would amount to a fresh complaint. We are however, unable to agree with this contention because there was no fresh complaint and it is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out. This has been held by this Court in -- . For these reasons, therefore, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court maintaining the order of the Magistrate dated 3-5-1972 if set aside and the order of the Magistrate dated 3-5-1972 summoning the appellant is hereby quashed. This Court followed the propositions of law as enunciated in the aforesaid two cases of the Supreme Court in the case of Bulak Sharma case (supra). In this view of the matter the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners has force and must be accepted. 5 Another point raised by learned Counsel for the petitioners was that since the procecution under Sec.395 I. P. C. is triable by the Court of Sessions it was incumbent upon the Magistrate to examine all the witnesses on behalf of the informant. This point has been concluded in Latifur Rahman and Ors. V/s. Pabitar Roy and Anr., Cr. Misc. No. 4924 of 1976. This point has been concluded in Latifur Rahman and Ors. V/s. Pabitar Roy and Anr., Cr. Misc. No. 4924 of 1976. in which on difference of opinion between C.N. Tiwary, J. and Ch. S.S. Sinha, J. Uday Sinha, J. concurred with the view of Ch. S.S. Sinha, J. by his judgment dated 20-9-1978. In that case it has been held that it is not necessary to examine all the witnesses on behalf of the complainant under Sec.202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a matter in which an enquiry under that section is held since sections are triable by a Court of Sessions thereby requiring the initiation of a proceeding under Sec.209 of the said Code. Thus this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners has no merit. 6. In view of the fact that I have already held on the first point that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate fresh proceeding and summon the petitioners after accepting the final form. The proceeding in question pending against the petitioners has got to be quashed. 7. In the result, the application is allowed and the order dated 7-2-1979 passed by the Magistrate to the extent that proceeding on protest petition has been started as well as the entire proceeding is quashed.