JUDGMENT Sen, J. 1. An application for pre-emption having been dismissed by the two Courts below though on different grounds, the pre-emptors have obtained this Rule challenging those orders. 2. The land in dispute measures 0.23 acres recorded in different plots appertaining to 6 different khatians namely, Khatian Nos. 2133, 326, 1320, 1122, 357, and 468 of mouja Sikharbali, P. S. Baruipur, District 24 pargs. According to the pre-emptors the holdings recorded in the aforesaid khatians belonged to Rajani Pal and his co-sharers prior to the date of vesting and as an effect of the vesting Rajani acquired a separate tenancy in respect of his share which was inherited by his two sons Tarak and Bhairab. Tarak transferred his right, title and interest in favour of the pre-emptors and as such, the pre-emptors became co-sharers by purchase with Bhairab when Bhairab sold the disputed lands in favour of the pre-emptees on January 14, 1976. Hence, the pre-emptors claimed right of pre-emption in respect of the transfer in favour of the pre-emptees. The application as presented substantially made out a case for pre-emption under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act though it appears from the records that there was an alternative prayer for pre-emption under section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, which again appears to have been penned through. 3. The pre-emptees/opposite parties contested this application on various grounds raised in their objection including the grounds that they themselves being co-sharers, a transfer in their favour cannot be the subject-matter of pre-emption and also on the grounds that the land transferred not being agricultural there can be no pre-emption under the provision of section 8 of the Land Reforms Act. Incidentally it was claimed by the pre-emptees that the pre-emptors themselves being transferees like them, they cannot claim any right of pre-emption as against them. 4. The learned Munsif treated the application as one substantially under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act with an alternative prayer under section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. The learned Munsif, however, took the view that since the lands appertaining to different khatians constitute different holdings all those lands cannot be the subject-matter of a single pre-emption proceeding under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act. The learned Munsif, however, took the view that since the lands appertaining to different khatians constitute different holdings all those lands cannot be the subject-matter of a single pre-emption proceeding under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act. He further took the view that the pre-emptor themselves being purchases cannot claim .themselves to be the co-sharers and claim any right of pre-emption as such. On these two grounds, the learned Munsif overruled the pre-emptors prayer for pre-emption under section 8 of the land Reforms Act. So far as the alternative prayer is concerned, according to the learned Munsif since no case under section 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, had either been pleaded or proved there can be no pre-emption in terms of the said petition. This is how the application was dismissed by the learned Munsiff by his order dated September, 24, 1977, passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 42 of 1976. 5. The above pre-emptors preferred an appeal being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 668 of 1977 of the 11th Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Alipore. The learned Additional District Judge overruled the learned Munsif on both the points on which the learned Munsif had refused the prayer for pre-emption under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act. According to the learned Additional District Judge when lands appertaining to different holdings is the subject-matter of transfer by the same transaction the common co-sharer in respect of all of them could certainly prefer and sustain a single application for pre-emption in respect of that transfer. Obviously the learned Additional District Judge is well-supported on this point by the decision of this Court in the case of (1) Hari Charan Kar v. Abhoy Charan Dey and Anr., 59 CWN 849. Similarly, the learned Additional District Judge was of the view that the learned Munsif was wrong in thinking that a purchaser from a co-sharer does not become a co-sharer that position being limited to persons coming in by inheritance. According to the Learned Additional District Judge, the pre-emptors being prior purchases from Tarak became co-sharers by purchase acquiring the right of pre-emption in respect of any subsequent transfer of a part of the holding under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act. According to the Learned Additional District Judge, the pre-emptors being prior purchases from Tarak became co-sharers by purchase acquiring the right of pre-emption in respect of any subsequent transfer of a part of the holding under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act. Here again, the learned Additional District Judge appeared to be supported by the decision of this Court in the case of (2) Ram Krishna Kajarai v. Messrs Chandra Engineering, (India), 76 CWN 426. 6. Though both the ground on which the Learned Munsif had refused to entertain the prayer under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act were overruled by the Learned Additional District Judge yet he overruled the claim of the pre-emptors on two other grounds assigned by him. First of the grounds so assigned is that the pre-emptees themselves being the prior purchasers of a part of the holdings from Suren Pal and Nani Pal, co-sharers of Rajani, it must be held that on the date of transfer which is the subject-matter of pre-emption they were already co-sharers, and as such, the transfer in their favour cannot be pre-empted. The other ground assigned by the learned Additional District Judge is that since most of the plots are recorded in the record of rights as Bastu and pond the disputed land cannot be treated as agricultural land so that transfer in respect of such lands cannot be the subject-matter of any claim for pre-emption under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act. So far as the alternative prayer made under section 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act is concerned, according to the learned Additional District Judge the same having been penned through cannot be entertained. This is how the pre-emptors application was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge though on grounds different from those assigned by the learned Munsif, feeling aggrieved, the pre-emptors have moved this Court in revision and have obtained the above Rule which is being contested by the opposite parties. 7. Mr. Roy Chowdhury appearing in support of this Rule has contended that neither of the grounds on which the learned Additional District Judge had ultimately overruled the claim of the petitioners is sustainable in law. Admitting the position that the pre-emptees opposite parties had purchased as a co-sharer in Khatian No. 326 from some of the co-sharers of Rajani much earlier than the purchase of Tarak's share by the pre-emptors. Mr. Admitting the position that the pre-emptees opposite parties had purchased as a co-sharer in Khatian No. 326 from some of the co-sharers of Rajani much earlier than the purchase of Tarak's share by the pre-emptors. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has contended that those co-sharers of Rajani ceased to be co-sharers as a result of the vesting in view of the Full Bench decision of the court in the case of (3) Madan Mohan Ghosh & Ors. v. Sishu Bala Dutta & Ors., 76 CPW 1058. Therefore according to Mr. Roychowdhury the pre-emptees cannot be treated as co-sharers of Rajani or on his death after the date of vesting of his heirs and legal representatives, namely, Tarak and Bhairab by their purchase from the erstwhile co-sharer of Rajani. Incidentally it has been contended by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that even by such purchase the pre-emptors could be treated as co-sharers only in respect of the holding recorded in Khatian No. 326 but not in respect of the other Khatians recording the individual holding separately. Secondly, it has been contended by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the Learned Additional District Judge failed to read the entries in the revisional record of rights properly in holding that when some of the plots have been recorded as Bastu and ponds they cannot constitute part of a raiyati holding within the meaning of Land Reforms Act. It has been pointed out by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that in the R.S. records the interest of Tarak and Bhairab had been recorded as raiyati and this aspect has been totally overlooked by the learned Additional District Judge. Thirdly, it has been contended by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that even assuming for a moment that the disputed lands not being agricultural lands do not constitute part of raiyati holding, in that event the learned additional District Judge should have treated it as non-agricultural and all allowed the alternative claim for pre-emption under section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 'as a matter of fact. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has filed an application for amendment of the application for pre-emption itself for incorporating such a prayer in view of the fact that portion of the prayer was subsequently penned through. 8. Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the opposite parties had contested all the points raised by Mr. Roy Chowdhury. According to Mr. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has filed an application for amendment of the application for pre-emption itself for incorporating such a prayer in view of the fact that portion of the prayer was subsequently penned through. 8. Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the opposite parties had contested all the points raised by Mr. Roy Chowdhury. According to Mr. Chatterjee the mere fact that the status of the vendors of the parties have been recorded in the revisional record of rights as raiyati does not conclude the issue that the land in respect of which the pre-emption is being sought for is a part of a raiyati holding within the meaning of Land Reforms Act. Reliance is placed by Mr. Chatterjee on the provision of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, particularly those in respect of vesting and the definition clause of agricultural and nonagricultural land as in the said Act. Strong reliance is also placed by Mr. Chatterjee on the subsequent amendment of the Land Reforms Act which came into effect in February, 1971 when tanks are excluded from the definition clause, in section 2(7) of the Land Reforms Act. Accordingly, it has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee that in any event, the ponds cannot longer be treated as agricultural land and a holding incorporating a pond cannot be treated as a raiyati holding in respect of which pre-emption can be claimed under section 8 thereof. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court, it has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee that since there can be no partial pre-emption excluding those tanks the application must fail as a whole. Mr. Chatterjee has contested the alternative claim on two-fold grounds. In the first place it has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee that in the absence of any material to indicate that all the holdings constitute non-agricultural tenancies no claim as put forward in the alternative could be entertained. Secondly, having regard to the provisions of the two Acts, it has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee that prayers in the alternative under the two Acts cannot be entertained in a single application though the form in a given cause may be the same. 9. We have carefully considered the raival contentious put forward before us. In our considered opinion, however, on the materials on record the application for pre-emption cannot be disposed of finally by us. 9. We have carefully considered the raival contentious put forward before us. In our considered opinion, however, on the materials on record the application for pre-emption cannot be disposed of finally by us. As we have indicated hereinbefore the two reasons assigned by the learned Munsif in overruling the claim of pre-emption under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act are not sustainable in law as held by the learned Additional District Judge. Now the question is whether the ultimate decision as arrived at by the learned Munsif can be supported on the grounds assigned by the learned Additional District Judge. We have referred to the two grounds assigned by the learned Additional District Judge hereinbefore. So far as the first ground assigned by him, It appears to us that the same cannot be entertained if the holdings in dispute were raiyati holdings, It has been rightly pointed out by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that this Court in the case of Madan Mahan Ghosh & Ors. v. Sishu Bala Dutta & Ors., 76 CWN 1058 (supra) had ruled in the Full Bench that when the raiyats became intermediaries on the enforcement of Chapter VI of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, each of the co-sharers acquired the status of independent tenant under the state in respect of the land each is entitled to retain. In the present case, the pre-emptees undoubtedly purchased a part of one of the holdings from a co-sharer of Rajani but that co-sharer was a co-sharer prior to the date of vesting so that on the vesting of the intermediary interests the co-sharers ceased to remain co-sharers of Rajani on and from the date of vesting., Hence, in our view it has been rightly contended by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the pre emptees themselve, could not have been considered to be co-sharers by prior purchase by virtue of such purchase made from co-sharers of Rajani, the first ground assigned by the learned Additional District Judge" cannot, therefor, be entertained. 10. So far as the second ground assigned by the learned Additional District Judge is concerned, it cannot be disputed that in order to claim pre-emption under section 8, the claimant must establish that all that has been transferred is a portion of share of a holding of raiyat of which he is a co-sharer. 10. So far as the second ground assigned by the learned Additional District Judge is concerned, it cannot be disputed that in order to claim pre-emption under section 8, the claimant must establish that all that has been transferred is a portion of share of a holding of raiyat of which he is a co-sharer. Holding has been defined by the Act to mean the land or lands held by a raiyat and treated as unit for assessment of revenue. Land again has been defined to mean agricultural land other than the land comprised in a tea garden which is retained under subsection (3) of section 6 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, but includes homestead. This clause was later amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1972, which came into effect from February 12, 1971 to exclude a tank. Such amendment obviously has introduced an anomaly because the term' land though it includes homestead. it does not include a tank. The term 'homestead' under the explanation is given the same meaning as defined in the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and under the said definition clause 'homestead 'includes a tank which is a part of the homestead. Relying upon this amendment it has been strongly contended by Mr. Chatterjee that since some of the plots re-recorded as ponds those must necessarily go out of the term land and consequently out of the term 'holding' as defined in the Land Reforms Act, so that there can be no pre-emption under section 8 in respect of such ponds or tanks. In our view, however, the definition clause must be given a harmonious construction. When tank was sought to be excluded from the definition of land the Legislature necessarily intended to exclude such tanks as do not constitute a part of the homestead or part of an agricultural holding used necessarily for the purpose of agriculture. We cannot but take not of the fact that though the amendment has been effected in respect of clause (7) there is no amendment to the explanation which necessarily brings in the tanks constituting a pare of the raiyat's homestead itself. We cannot but take not of the fact that though the amendment has been effected in respect of clause (7) there is no amendment to the explanation which necessarily brings in the tanks constituting a pare of the raiyat's homestead itself. Such being the position we cannot straightway reject the application for pre-emption only because some of the plots have been recorded as tanks without any further evidence to find what is the true nature and character of such tanks and whether those are really parts of the raiyat's homestead or agricultural holding as such. Even so, in our view, there is still some difficulty in accepting the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that since the interest of the parties have been recorded as raiyati in the revisional record of rights, it must, necessarily follow that the lands appertain to raiyati holding. The revisional records have been prepared having regard to the state of affairs on the date of vesting. But one has to consider the effect of the vesting. On the enforcement of Chapter VI when the raiyats became intermediaries they became entitled to retain lands of different character some of which were agricultural in use and others not. Once so retained, the statutory rules clearly provide that such lands as are agricultural in use when retained would be treated as agricultural land to be held mutatis mutandis on the terms and conditions specified in the different sections of the Bengal Tenancy Act referred to in Rule 4(b)(3) while the others are to be treated as non-agricultural land of the intermediary raiyat under sub-rule (2) of the aforesaid Rule. In our view this Court in the case of (4) Misri Show v. Belur Nikujamoyee 'Cadar institution, (1978) I CLJ 532 had rightly pointed out that the settled principle of law to the effect that when the present lease is for agricultural purpose all sub-leases thereunder must necessarily be agricultural can have no application in cases like the present one where the statute has intervened to change their character with reference to the user. Hence, we are of the view that merely on the basis of the entries in the record of right and on the evidence now before us it is not possible for us to decide whether the disputed lands appertaining to different holdings as recorded in the different Khatians are really agricultural of not. Hence, we are of the view that merely on the basis of the entries in the record of right and on the evidence now before us it is not possible for us to decide whether the disputed lands appertaining to different holdings as recorded in the different Khatians are really agricultural of not. In order to decide this point it would be necessary to take evidence to find out the nature of user of these lands and the manner in which they were retained by the raiyat intermediary under section 6 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, the matter would require further investigation on this point. 11. The other questions raised before us by Mr. Chatterjee namely, whether the claim for pre-emption must fail on the ground of partial pre-emption or that an alternative payer for pre-emption under the provisions of the two Acts cannot be entertained in a single application, are points which cannot now be gone into since on the materials now before us, it is not such being the position, we express no opinion on these points raised by Mr. Chatterjee. The revisional application, however succeeds and the impugned orders of the two Tribunals below being set aside the application is remanded for rehearing on further evidence to be laid by the parties in the light of the provision of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and West Bengal Land Reforms Act, as indicated hereinbefore. The Rule is made absolute to the extent as above. There will be no order as to costs.