JUDGMENT - MOHTA, J:- This second appeal has been referred for disposal to a Division Bench in view of the importance of the point involved. 2. The appellants here are the legal representatives of original judgment debtor against whom a money decree in the sum of Rs. 3,370 was passed in Civil Suit No. 97-B of 1955 on 19-8-1955. The decree-holder/ respondent filed an execution petition for realisation of the decretal amount on 29-6-1956, but the same was dropped on 18-10.1956. The decree-holder kept silence and took no steps to execute the decree till 20-12-1966 when the fresh execution bearing No. 40 of 1967 was filed. Vide order dated 12-1-1967, the Executing Court dismissed the Darkhast as having been barred by time. Appeal under section 47, Civil Procedure Code was preferred before the Assistant Judge, Nagpur, who relying on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of (The Presidency Industrial Bank Ltd. v. The Hindustan Leather Industries Ltd.)1 came to the conclusion that the Darkhast was not barred by time as it was within 12 years of the passing of the decree in terms of Article 136 of the new Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, the first appeal was allowed. The present second appeal is directed against the said decision given by the learned Assistant Judge. 3. Shri Choudhari, the learned counsel for the appellants, brought to our notice the following relevant portion from the judgment given in Industrial Bank's case (supra), on the basis of which the first appeal was allowed:- The next objection of the judgment-debtors and the legal representatives of Vijayakar, the deceased judgment-debtor No.2, is that the execution application is time barred. The decree was passed on 12th December 1952. The present execution application was filed on 29th October 1964 within 12 years of the passing of the decree. Article 136 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, provides a period of 12 years for the execution of any decree from the time when the decree becomes enforceable. The present Limitation Act has considerably changed the law and while under the old Act an application for execution had to be made within a period of three years or, if the decree was registered, within a period of six years, under the present Act even the first execution application can be filed within a period of 12 years. The present Limitation Act has considerably changed the law and while under the old Act an application for execution had to be made within a period of three years or, if the decree was registered, within a period of six years, under the present Act even the first execution application can be filed within a period of 12 years. The execution application is, therefore, in my opinion, not barred by the Law of limitation as against the judgment debtors. It was contended that the aforesaid decision needs reconsideration as it ignores salient features of the new Limitation Act. It seems to us that the learned counsel is correct. 4. Before the new Act which was brought into force with effect from 1-1-1964, the law relating to the limitation for execution was contained in section 48 Civil Procedure Code and Articles 182 and 183 of the old Limitation Act 1908. Article 183 related to execution of decrees and orders passed by Royal Charter and the Supreme Court with which we are not concerned in this matter. Relevant Article 182 reads as under:- Description of Period of Time from which perio begins application. limitation. to run. 182. For the execution Three years; or 1. The date of decree or order, of a decree or order of where a certi- or any Civil Court not fied copy of the 2. (where there has been an provided for any Article decree or order appeal) the date of the final 183 or by section 48 of has been regis- decree or order of the Appel- the Code of Civil tered, six years. late Court, or the withdrawal Procedure, 1908. of the appeal, or 3. (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review, or 4. (where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment, or 5. (where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order, or 6. (where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment, or 5. (where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order, or 6. (in respect of any amount recovered by execution of the decree or order, which the decree-holder has been directed to refund by a decree passed in asuit for such refund) the date of such last mentioned decree or in the case of an appeal therefrom, the date of the final decree of the appellate Court or of the withdrawal of the appeal, or 7. (where the application is to enforce any apyment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date) such date. In terms of the said Article, the limitation for execution of such types of decrees was three years in the first instance. If any application for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree was taken within three years before the proper Court in accordance with law, period used to begin to run from the date of final order passed thereupon. Section 48, Civil Procedure Code provided for a maximum period of 12 years for making such application. Thus, it was necessary for the execution to be within time that it complied with both these provisions. New Act contains no provision corresponding to old Article 183 and has enacted Article 136 substantially reproducing provisions of section 48(1), Civil Procedure Code and replacing old Article 182 which had great potentiality to multiply litigations. Article 136 reads as under :- Description of Period of Time for which period begins application. limitation. to run 136. For the execu Twelve years When the decree or order tionor of any decree becomes enforceable where (other than a decree the decree or any subsequent granting a mandatory order directs any payment of injunction) or order of money or the delivery of any any civil Court. property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment of delivery. property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment of delivery. Thus, under new provisions necessity of keeping alive execution by filing application for execution or taking steps in aid of the execution of the decree or order within every three years has been dispensed with and the only requirement is of filing application within 12 years of the several causes of action specified in third column. 5. Were we to go by these changes alone, there was no difficulty in agreeing with the decision recorded by the learned Single Judge. But provisions in Part V of the new Act in general and section 31 in particular must change the course of the view. Section 31 reads thus :- “31. Nothing in this Act shall- (a) enable any suit, appeal or application to be instituted, preferred or made, for which the period of limitation prescribed by Indian Limitation Act, 1908, expired before the commencement of this Act, or (b) affect any suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made before, and pending at, such commencement”. Whereas section 30 deals with cases in which new Act prescribes a shorter period of limitation than the old Act, section 31 deals with different types of cases. It codifies the general principle of law of limitation that even in such cases the new law cannot revive the expired cause of action unless specific provision is made to that effect. It is true that every Limitation Act is generally retrospective in operation as rightly argued by Shri Munshi, the learned counsel for the respondents; but still considering the positive mandate contained in section 31, the conclusion is inevitable that applications which were barred on the date of commencement of the new Act cannot get fresh lease of life despite retrospectivity. 6. It seems that the attention of the learned single Judge was not drawn to section 31 and consequently, the observations referred to above came to be made and on that basis the execution application was held to be within time under new Act even though the limitation under the old Act had expired before commencement of the new Act. Thus disagreeing with the view taken in the said decision, we hold that since on 1-1-1964 application for execution was barred under old Article 182 (5), the same cannot be revived by new Article 136. 7. Thus disagreeing with the view taken in the said decision, we hold that since on 1-1-1964 application for execution was barred under old Article 182 (5), the same cannot be revived by new Article 136. 7. In the result, the present appeal is allowed, the judgment passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Nagpur, is set aside and that of the Executing Court is maintained. In view of the fact that the first appeal was decided following the judgment of this Court which the learned Judge was duty bound to follow we do not think it fit to pass any order as to costs. Appeal allowed. -----