JUDGMENT U.L. Bhat, J. 1. These two writ petitions are filed challenging an order dated 5-1-1980 in C. P. Nos. 480 of 1976 and 71 of 1978 passed by the Labour Court, Kozhikode under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act). 2. The petitioner in O. P. No. 566 of 1980 was working as the Manager of the Tellicherry branch of the North Malabar District Cooperative Supply & Marketing Society Limited, Calicut (for short the 'Society') (Petitioner in O. P. No. 1117 of 1980 and the first respondent in O. P. No. 566 of 1980). The petitioner in O. P. No. 566 of 1980 and the petitioner in O. P. No. 1117 of 1980 will be referred to herein as the petitioner and the first respondent Society respectively. While so, the first respondent reverted the petitioner as Inspector. The petitioner filed an arbitration case before the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies challenging the order of reversion and obtained an order of stay. On the strength of the stay order he continued in office as Manager. On 11-1-1971 the President of the first respondent again passed an order of reversion reverting the petitioner as Inspector and directing him to report for duty as Inspector at Thariyod Depot, allowing four days joining time. The order was served on 13-1-1971. The petitioner entered on privilege leave for 13 days. On 19-1-1971 he filed another arbitration case as 7-70-71 before the Deputy Registrar, who passed an order staying the reversion order until the disposal of the case. Apprehending delay in communicating the order of stay on account of strike in the office of the Deputy Registrar, on 22-1-1971 the petitioner sent an affidavit to the Secretary of the first respondent informing the first respondent about the stay order. Meanwhile on 20-1-1971, the first respondent's Secretary issued a Memo to the petitioner directing him to join duty at Thariyod Depot on the expiry of the leave. Leave expired on 26-1-1971. In view of the stay order the petitioner did not join duty as Inspector at Thariyod Depot on 27-1-1971. On the other hand, he went to the Tellicherry Branch of the first respondent and marked his attendance there. Leave expired on 26-1-1971. In view of the stay order the petitioner did not join duty as Inspector at Thariyod Depot on 27-1-1971. On the other hand, he went to the Tellicherry Branch of the first respondent and marked his attendance there. The first respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on two charges, viz., he disobeyed the first respondent's order directing him to rejoin duty at Thariyod Depot and in violation of the order he went to the Tellicherry Branch and signed the attendance register. The petitioner submitted an explanation denying the charges. A domestic enquiry was conducted and the same ended in an order dismissing the petitioner from service of the first respondent with effect from 22-2-1971. At that time an industrial dispute was pending between the first respondent and the workmen. The first respondent did not seek approval for the action of dismissal under S.33(2)(b) of the Act. In view of the non compliance with this provision of law, the first respondent suo motu cancelled the dismissal order on 10-5-1971 and on the same day, issued a fresh order of dismissal. One month's emoluments of Rs. 530/- was sent by Money Order and an application was filed before the Labour Court for approval under S.33(2)(b) of the Act. On 18-5-1976 the Labour Court passed Ext. P1 order rejecting the request for the approval, holding the dismissal order to be invalid and improper. O. P. No. 3912 of 1976 filed by the first respondent challenging this order was dismissed by this Court (Ext. P2 judgment). In the two arbitration cases filed by the petitioner challenging the two reversion orders, the first respondent raised a contention that the Deputy Registrar has no jurisdiction to decide the disputes. The Deputy Registrar overruled this objection and upheld his jurisdiction. In the appeal filed by the first respondent against that decision before the Cooperative Tribunal, it was held that the Deputy Registrar has no jurisdiction and the two arbitration cases were dismissed. This order was challenged by he petitioner in this Court in O. P. No. 418 of 1979. Though this Court held that the appeal before the Cooperative Tribunal was incompetent, it declined to interfere under Art.226 of the Constitution and dismissed the original petition on the ground that the Deputy Registrar has no jurisdiction to decide the cases. This order was challenged by he petitioner in this Court in O. P. No. 418 of 1979. Though this Court held that the appeal before the Cooperative Tribunal was incompetent, it declined to interfere under Art.226 of the Constitution and dismissed the original petition on the ground that the Deputy Registrar has no jurisdiction to decide the cases. It appears that the petitioner has filed a writ appeal against that decision and the same is pending in this Court. 3. The petitioner filed two claim petitions as C. P. Nos. 480 of 1976 and 71 of 1978 before the Labour Court, Kozhikode under S.33C(2) of the 10-5-1971 as void and ineffective since the Labour Court refused to approve the dismissal under S.33(2)(b) of the Act. Exts. P4 to P9 relate to these cases. The Labour Court passed the impugned order allowing the claims in part. Claim for the period from 11-1-1971 to 10-5-1971 was rejected on the ground that the petitioner has filed a separate application before the Registrar for the same which is pending and that the petitioner has filed a statement before the Labour Court stating that he will pursue his remedy in the other case. The petitioner's claim for salary till the date he completes 58 years of age was rejected and he was held to be entitled to salary only till the date on which he completed 55 years of age on the basis that his age of superannuation is 55 years and not 58 years. These two findings are challenged by the petitioner. The Labour Court further held that since the legality of the reversion orders are pending decision in the proceedings arising from A.R.C. No. 7/70-71, he petitioner will be entitled to claim salary only in his grade as Inspector for the present, subject to the result of the arbitration cases now pending in writ appeal. The petitioner also challenged this conclusion that he will be entitled only to the salary in the cadre of Inspector subject to the result of the arbitration case. The first respondent (Society) has filed O. P. No. 1117 of 1980 challenging the right of the Labour Court to allow the claim to any extent. 4. The petitioner also challenged this conclusion that he will be entitled only to the salary in the cadre of Inspector subject to the result of the arbitration case. The first respondent (Society) has filed O. P. No. 1117 of 1980 challenging the right of the Labour Court to allow the claim to any extent. 4. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent society contended that the status of the petitioner as workman as defined in the Act, the validity of the dismissal order, his right to arrears of salary, his age of superannuation and whether he is entitled to salary as Manager or as Inspector are all questions in dispute and the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under S.33C(2) of the Act has no jurisdiction to decide these matters. The learned counsel for the petitioner rebutted these contentions and further contended that the dismissal order is void abinitio and does not require any adjudication at the hands of the Industrial Tribunal under S.10 of the Act and that other contentions are not bona fide and cannot stand in the way of the Labour Court exercising its jurisdiction. He further contended that the Labour Court committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding that the age of superannuation is 55 years and that the petitioner is entitled to salary only as Inspector. The learned counsel for the society contended that proceedings before the Labour Court are barred under S.69 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act and this is also rebutted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. In the counter affidavit filed by the society before the Labour Court it was stated that since the petitioner must be deemed to have been functioning as Manager at the time of application for approval and no application under S.33C(2) of the Act is maintainable. On the basis of the evidence of the petitioner as PW 1, and the representative of the society as RW 1, the Labour Court held that the petitioner was not discharging functions which are mainly managerial and therefore he is a workman as defined in the Act. On the basis of the evidence of the petitioner as PW 1, and the representative of the society as RW 1, the Labour Court held that the petitioner was not discharging functions which are mainly managerial and therefore he is a workman as defined in the Act. The Labour Court further held that the conduct of the society in setting aside the first order of dismissal for non compliance with S.33(2)(b) of the Act and the application filed by it seeking approval of the second dismissal order under this provision of law and the proceedings in O. P. No. 3912 of 1976 would show that the petitioner is a workman. The conduct of the society shows that at the crucial time, viz., at the time of dismissal, it took the definite stand that the petitioner is a workman and here fore, he conditions prescribed in S.33(2)(b) of the Act must be fulfilled and that was why the society set aside the earlier dismissal order, passed a fresh order and tendered one month's salary and sought the approval of the Labour Court. When the approval was rejected the society pursued the matter in O. P. No. 3912 of 1976. At no stage in those proceedings the society seek to withdraw the application for approval. Even before this court in O. P. No. 3912 of 1976, the society did not raise a contention that the approval was unnecessary. It is clear that the contention regarding the status of the petitioner was raised before the Labour Court without any bona fides and only with a view to show that there is dispute regarding his status. Any dispute raised without bona fides before the Labour Court in proceedings under S.33C(2) of the Act will not have the effect of shutting out the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. 6. Let us now examine the correctness of the stand taken by the society that since there is a dismissal order, the question whether the order is invalid and unenforceable should have been raised as an industrial dispute under S.10 of the Act and this dispute fails outside the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide under S.33C(2) of the Act. The leading case on the point is one reported in Central Bank of India Limited v. P. S. Rajagopalan and others ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ). The leading case on the point is one reported in Central Bank of India Limited v. P. S. Rajagopalan and others ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ). This is a decision rendered by five Judges of the Supreme Court, the judgment being delivered by Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was. The Court adverted to the legislative background of the various provisions and considered S.33 and 33A along with S.33C of the Act and took the view that the object in enacting S.33C is to provide speedy remedy to the individual workman to enforce or execute his existing rights and therefore cases which legitimately fall within its purview should not be excluded and at the same time care must be taken to see that cases which fall under S.10 of the Act are not brought within the scope of S.33C of the Act. In Para.16 of the judgment it is stated as follows: "(16). ......... In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s.(2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise, ........ " (emphasised supplied) Dealing with the argument that Labour Court can exercise jurisdiction only where the claim is admitted, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-s.(2), because he has merely in raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under S.33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be proceeded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-s.(2). ........" (emphasis supplied) In Para.19 of the judgment, the Court took the view that the power under clause C(2) is much wider than that under clause C(1) and the three categories of claims mentioned in clause C(1) also fall under clause C(2) and in that sense clause C(2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding. At the same time the court observed that the claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chap.5A, may also be competent under Clause C(2). Illustrating a case which may not fall under clause C(2), the Court observed as follows: "......If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under S.33C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a. claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre existing contract, cannot be made under S.33C(2)." (emphasis supplied) 7. The decision in U.P. Electric Supply Co. The decision in U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Shukla and others ( AIR 1970 SC 237 ) had to deal with the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide a claim for retrenchment compensation under the parallel provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. It was held that where the right to retrenchment compensation which is the foundation of the claim is itself a matter which is exclusively within the competence of the Industrial Tribunal to be adjudicated upon on a reference, it would be straining the language of S.33C(2) to hold that the question whether there has been retrenchment may be decided by the Labour Court, and that where retrenchment is conceded, and the only matter in dispute is that by virtue of S.25FF no liability to pay compensation has arisen the Labour Court will be competent to decide the question. In R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur and others ( AIR 1972 SC 451 ), the Supreme Court had to deal with jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S.33C(2) to decide a claim for compensation for lay off. The Court held that the Labour Court was competent to go into the question. The court followed the observations in Central Bank of India case. The Court also referred to the observations in U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. case to the effect that when the factum of retrenchment is questioned, it is exclusively within the competence of he Tribunal and held that "these observations cannot be considered binding on us as all the aspects were not placed before the Court then." Dealing with the dispute whether there was lay off or not and whether there was only closure, the Court observed as follows: "As has been said already, the Labour Court must go into the matter and come to a decision as to whether there was really a closure or a lay off. If it took the view that there was a lay off without any closure of the business it would be acting within its jurisdiction if it awarded compensation in terms of the provisions of Chap.5A." (emphasis supplied) In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The Workmen and another ( AIR 1974 SC 1604 ), the Supreme Court after referring to the observations in the Central Bank of India case held that proceedings under S.33C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and that the Labour Court cannot decide the disputed questions of the workman's right to leave and the corresponding liability of the defendant as they are not incidental to the proceeding. Referring to an illustrative claim of a workman, who is under order of dismissal, the court observed as follows: "......The workman who has been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of the employer. It may be that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal that the dismissal was unjustified. But when he comes before the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under S.33C(2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis compute his wages. 16. In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as 'incidental' to the computation." (emphasis supplied) 8. In Fibre Foam (P) Ltd. v. Kannan Nair ( 1979 KLT 30 ) in an application under S.33C(2) it was contended by the employer that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction since applicants were retired on attaining the age of superannuation and question of retrenchment and payment of compensation did not arise. It was held that the question can be decided only by a reference under S.10 and it is not a matter for the Labour Court to decide under S.33C(2). That is a case where "the basis and foundation of the claim is seriously contested and the determination of the basic factor of the case will involve an elaborate process, the question has to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal and not by the Labour Court under S.33C(2) of the Act." 9. That is a case where "the basis and foundation of the claim is seriously contested and the determination of the basic factor of the case will involve an elaborate process, the question has to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal and not by the Labour Court under S.33C(2) of the Act." 9. In Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Jagadish Singh and another ( 1978 (2) LLJ 1 )also the scope of the proceedings under S.33C(2) has been considered with reference to the observations in the Central Bank of India Ltd. case and other case. The Supreme Court had to consider in this decision the effect of contravention of S.33(2)(b) of the Act and sustainably of a claim under S.33C(2) and observed as follows in paragraph (4): "......It is only if an order of dismissal, passed in contravention of S.33(2)(b), is null and void, the aggrieved workman would he entitled to maintain an application under S.33C(2) for determination and payment of the amount of wages, doe to him on the basis that he continues to be in service despite the order of dismissal. It is now well settled, as a result of several decisions of this Court, that a proceeding under S.33C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of executive proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. But the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman and his employer ......................... The application under S.33C(2) would be maintainable only if it can he shown by the workman that the order of dismissal passed against him was void ab initio. . ..." (emphasis supplied) 10. In New India Assurance Co. The application under S.33C(2) would be maintainable only if it can he shown by the workman that the order of dismissal passed against him was void ab initio. . ..." (emphasis supplied) 10. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Balbir Singh Khera ( 1982 (1) LLJ 39 ), Madhya Pradesh High Court held that where the order of termination is challenged as unlawful the workman has to have a recourse to the adjudication at the hands of the Industrial Tribunal and if he succeeds, then apply under S.33C(2) of the Act. That is because, the order of termination cannot be ignored as null and void abinitio. 11. Reliance is also placed on certain other decisions, to which I shall briefly refer. In Bhaskara Menon v. K.S.R.T. Corporation ( 1979 KLT 334 ) the question arose whether Labour Court can go behind an industrial award and in answering the question in the negative, the Court observed as follows: "As in the case of an executing court it is open to the Tribunal to consider the plea that the award is a nullity on the ground that it was made wholly without jurisdiction; but once it is found that the award is not vitiated by any total lack of jurisdiction, it is not open to the Labour Court to entertain and consider objections concerning the legality or correctness of the award." In Divisional Superintendent, South Central Railway, Sholapur and others v. M. K. Kulkarni and another (1982 (1) LLJ 64) Bombay High Court had to consider the question whether in an application under S.33C(2) Labour Court could consider whether the termination of service of the workman at the age of 58 years was justified and whether he must be deemed to be in service till he attained the age of 60 years. The railway authorities had passed an order of retirement on the completion of 58 years. It was held that the correctness or propriety of the order cannot be gone into in an application under S.33C(2) of the Act and the Labour Court could exercise jurisdiction only after the workman gets rid of the order in an appropriate way. 12. The learned counsel for the first respondent - society placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Indo Marine Agencies v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay ( 1979 KLT 845 ). 12. The learned counsel for the first respondent - society placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Indo Marine Agencies v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay ( 1979 KLT 845 ). In that case, the sales tax officer had passed an order of assessment and in due course the revenue recovery officer issued a notice of demand and the same was challenged before the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. It was argued before the High Court that the order imposing tax was a void order and hence the petitioner could resist recovery on the strength of such order. This contention was repelled by this Court, holding that, an order, although void in law, remains for many purposes effective and operative until it is challenged and its invalidity is declared by a competent body or a court. It is not open to a person to ignore the order made against him by competent authority in the purported exercise of his statutory power solely on the ground that the order is null and void and resist all consequences flowing from it. It is not correct to say that an order which is void is void in the sense that it has no affect at all. An order may be void abinitio, but remains in effect and continues to operate until its invalidity is declared by the Court. This decision will not apply to the facts of the present case. The decision had to deal with the effect of an order passed by a statutory authority under a statute. The court took the view that he assessee cannot ignore the order and resist recovery and it was his duty to have challenged the order in appropriate way. The present case deals not with an order passed by a statutory authority under a statute, but with a dismissal order passed by an employer. The petitioner is also not seeking to resist the consequences flowing from the order. It is the Labour Court which is requested to treat the order as void. Therefore, the above principle cannot apply to the facts of the present case. 13. The petitioner is also not seeking to resist the consequences flowing from the order. It is the Labour Court which is requested to treat the order as void. Therefore, the above principle cannot apply to the facts of the present case. 13. The position of law in this behalf can be summarised as follows: S.33C contains legislative recognition of the right of individual workmen to a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights, without having to seek recourse to the time consuming process under S.10 of the Act or without having recourse to depend on their trade union to espouse their cause. Sub clause (2) is of wider amplitude than sub clause (1). Sub clause (1) gives right to a workman to make an application to the Government for recovery of money due to him from an employer in a settlement or award or under the provisions of Chap.5A or 5B of the Act. The Government on being satisfied that money is so due, has to issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall recover the same under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. Sub clause (2) any workman entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money; if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which the benefit should be computed, the question has to be decided by the Labour Court. The Labour Court may appoint a commissioner to submit a report and the commissioner can take evidence also. The decision of the Court has to be sent to the Government and any amount found due has to be recovered as provided in sub clause (1). The provision contemplates an enquiry into the existence of the right, such an enquiry is only incidental to the main determination which has to be made by the Labour Court. The proceeding is in the nature of execution proceedings in which the Labour Court decides the amount due or makes the computation. However, under the guise of taking such a decision, Labour Court cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal which is entitled to adjudicate matters covered by S.10(1)(c) and to C decide rights of workman or the existence of liability on the part of the employer. However, under the guise of taking such a decision, Labour Court cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal which is entitled to adjudicate matters covered by S.10(1)(c) and to C decide rights of workman or the existence of liability on the part of the employer. At the same time, a mere assertion by the employer that the applicant has no right or status or that the employer has no liability will not oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to take a decision. Labour Court can go into the question of right or status though it may not be able to go into the validity of an order passed by the employer regarding the termination of service or dismissal, discharge, etc. A blank or mala fide denial on the part of the employer of the status or the right of the applicant cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court; but where the basis and the foundation of the claim is seriously and genuinely disputed and the decision on that factor will involve an elaborate process, it has to be decided by an industrial tribunal on a reference and not by the Labour Court under S.33C(2) of the Act. If the decision involves an interpretation of an award, settlement or order or a rule, that will be well within the province of the Labour Court to do. 14. If a workman is dismissed by an employer, he may challenge the legality of the dismissal order before the appropriate forum. Unless the correctness and propriety of the order is declared by a competent authority, he cannot claim wages under S.33C(2) of the Act. It will not be open for him straight away to apply thereunder. As long as the dismissal order stands, it cannot be said that he has an existing right to wages. The Labour Court may not be able to adjudicate on the correctness or propriety of the dismissal order. In such an eventuality, the dispute is not merely a dispute regarding the amount of money due or the amount at which a benefit is to be computed. The dispute relates to the validity of the dismissal order and that can be decided only by an industrial tribunal. The position is different in the case of a dismissal order, which is void and ineffective. The dispute relates to the validity of the dismissal order and that can be decided only by an industrial tribunal. The position is different in the case of a dismissal order, which is void and ineffective. In such a case, the Labour Court is not called upon to decide on the validity or propriety of a dismissal order. The existence of an order is admitted. What is alleged by the workman is that it is void and ineffective, that is to say it does not exist in the eye of law and that he continues to be workman. In such a case the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S.33C(2) is not ousted. A void order can certainly be ignored by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has undoubted jurisdiction to decide if the dismissal order which exists in fact is void and ineffective. If it is held to be not void or is effective, the Labour Court cannot decide the propriety or correctness and seek to get over it. If, on the other hand, it is found to be a void order, jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not ousted. 15. We are concerned in this case with a dismissal order for which approval was sought under S.33(2)(b) and approval was refused by the competent labour court. What is the effect of the dismissal order of the labour court refusing to approve it. In The Straw Board Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Govind ( AIR 1962 SC 1500 ) the Supreme Court had to consider the case of dismissal order for which approval was refused by the Labour Court on the ground that the application for approval was submitted only after the order of dismissal was passed. The Supreme Court held that the view taken by the Labour Court was not justified and it is sufficient if as part and parcel of the same transaction, the application is filed and no prior approval is necessary. In the course of the discussion, in Para.8, the Court observed as follows: "It is, however, urged on behalf of the respondent that if the employer dismissed or discharges a workman and then applies for approval of the action taken and the Tribunal refuses to approve of the action, the workman would be left with no remedy as there is no provision for reinstatement in S.33(2). There, however, shall no difficulty on this score, if the Tribunal does not approve the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. In such a case no specific provision as to reinstatement is necessary and by the very fact of the Tribunal not approving the action of the employer, the dismissal or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would be continued in service as if there was never any dismissal or discharge by the employer. In that sense the order of discharge or dismissal I passed by the employer does not become final or conclusive until it is approved by the Tribunal under S.33(2)." (emphasis supplied) This reasoning has been followed by this Court in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co., Ltd. Munnar v. Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam and others (AIR 1963 Kerala 44). In Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. S. N. Modak ( AIR 1966 SC 380 ) the employer applied for approval of the order of discharge under S.33(2)(b) pending certain industrial disputes. Pending the application, all the industrial disputes were adjudicated. It was contended before the Tribunal that it has become function officio and has no jurisdiction to dispose of the application on merits, in view of the fact that industrial disputes were no longer pending. The Tribunal repelled this contention and on merits refused to accord approval. Dealing with the effect of an order granting or refusing approval, the Supreme Court observed as follows in Para.5: "It is also conceded that if approval is granted it takes effect from the date of the order passed by the employer for which approval was sought. If approval is not granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by the employer is wholly invalid and inoperative and the employee can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment of the employer notwithstanding the order passed by him dismissing or discharging him. If approval is not granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by the employer is wholly invalid and inoperative and the employee can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment of the employer notwithstanding the order passed by him dismissing or discharging him. In other words, an approval by the prescribed authority makes the order of discharge or dismissal effective; in the absence of approval such an order is invalid and inoperative in law." It was argued before the Supreme Court that even if the application is disposed of on merits, the employer can pass another order of dismissal and need not seek the approval because the industrial disputes were already over, and therefore, proceeding with the approval application would be futile. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court in the following manner: "This argument in our opinion is misconceived. It cannot be denied that with the final determination of the main dispute between the parties, the employer's right to terminate the service of the respondent according to the terms of the service revives and the bar imposed on the exercise of such power is lifted. But, it cannot be overlooked that for the period between the date on which the appellant passed its order in question against the respondent, and the date when the ban was lifted by the final determination of the main dispute, the order cannot be said to be valid unless it receives the approval of the Tribunal. In other words, the order being incomplete and inchoate until the approval is obtained cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the employer and employee between the appellant and the respondent; and so even if the main industrial dispute is finally decided, the question as to the validity, of the order would still have to be tried and if the approval is not accorded by the Tribunal the employer would be bound to treat the respondent as its employee and pay his full wages for the period eventhough the appellant may subsequently proceed to terminate the respondent's service." (emphasis supplied) 16. In Punjab Beverages Private Limited case pending industrial dispute, a workman was dismissed and approval was sought under S.33(2)(b) and later on the application was withdrawn. Thereafter the workman filed an application under S.33C(2) of the Act for payment of wages. In Punjab Beverages Private Limited case pending industrial dispute, a workman was dismissed and approval was sought under S.33(2)(b) and later on the application was withdrawn. Thereafter the workman filed an application under S.33C(2) of the Act for payment of wages. It was contended that the workman continued to be in service on account of the withdrawal of the approval petition. It was held that the withdrawal of the approval petition has the same effect as the management failing to file an approval petition and that was only a contravention of S.33(2)(b) and such contravention did not have the effect of rendering the order of dismissal void or inoperative, though the workman would have a right to raise an industrial dispute challenging the dismissal order S.10(1)(c) or to file a complaint under S.33A of the Act. On this basis it was further held that an application under S.33C(2) was not maintainable. In dealing with the question involved in the case, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the difference between the contravention of S.33(2)(b) by not applying for approval or withdrawing the approval petition and a case where the approval is sought and the same is either granted or refused. In Para.6 and 7 of the judgment, it has been observed as follows: "If the permission or approval is refused by the Tribunal, the employer will be precluded from discharging or punishing the workman by way of dismissal and the action of discharge or dismissal already taken would be void. But, the reverse is not true, for, even if the permission or approval is granted that would not validate the action of discharge or punishment by way of dismissal taken by the employer. Permission or approval would merely remove the ban so as to enable the employer to make an order of discharge or dismissal and thus avoid incurring the penalty under S.31(1), but the validity of the order of discharge or dismissal would still be liable to be tested in a reference at the instance of the workman under S.10........... 7. This is the position which arises when the employer makes an application for permission or approval under S.33 and such permission or approval is granted or refused ................." 17. The position can, therefore, be summarised thus. 7. This is the position which arises when the employer makes an application for permission or approval under S.33 and such permission or approval is granted or refused ................." 17. The position can, therefore, be summarised thus. A dismissal order passed by the employer pending an industrial dispute is subject to approval by the Labour Court under S.33(2)(b) of the Act. The employer has to make an application to the Tribunal for grant of approval. The dismissal order is incomplete or inchoate and will not take effect till it is approved. Once it is approved, it becomes final or effective or complete and till its validity is negatived by competent Tribunal on a reference of an industrial dispute, the workman cannot claim wages under S.33C(2) of the Act. If the approval is refused under S.33(2)(b), the order which is only incomplete, inchoate and ineffective falls to the ground. It does not become complete, final or effective. It is void and inoperative in law. It cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the employer and employee between the parties. The employee would be deemed to be never to have been dismissed and he would continue in service as if there was no dismissal order. No specific order of reinstatement is necessary. The employer is bound to treat the workman as his employee and to pay his wages for the relevant period. That being so, the Labour Court acting under S.33C(2) of the Act has jurisdiction to determine the amount of wages or compute the money value of the benefit due to the employee under such circumstances. The present case deals with the dismissal order for which approval was refused. Being a void and ineffective order, even without an order of reinstatement, the petitioner is entitled to be treated as continuing in service of the first respondent and is entitled to claim wages under S.33C(2) of the Act. There is no error of law committed by the Labour Court in this behalf. 18. On the dispute regarding the correct age of superannuation, whether it is 55 or 58, the Labour Court has held that it is 55 years. According to the bylaws of the first respondent the age of retirement is 58 years. There is no error of law committed by the Labour Court in this behalf. 18. On the dispute regarding the correct age of superannuation, whether it is 55 or 58, the Labour Court has held that it is 55 years. According to the bylaws of the first respondent the age of retirement is 58 years. However, R.183(2) of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules laid down that no employee shall be eligible to continue in service of the society after he attains the age of 55 years. The learned counsel for the petitioner place reliance on R.200 to contend that the benefit under the bylaws is saved. Relevant portion of the 200 reads thus: "200. Savings: - Nothing in these Rules or any rules made thereunder shall operate to debar from enjoyment of any person or employees of any right or privilege of emoluments to which he is entitled by the term of any contract or agreement or conditions of service subsisting between such person and a cooperative society on the date on which these rules shall come into force. .........." The Rules came into force on 21-5-1969. Under the original rules the age of retirement was fixed as 55 years. This was changed as 58 with effect from 15-10-1975. The petitioner attained the age of 55 years on 18-2-1974. Thus the amended rule will not help him. Under the old rule, he had to retire on completion of 55 years. R.200 protects only "right or privilege of emoluments" under the bye laws. The benefit of a higher age of superannuation is not saved under R.200. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the expression "privilege of emoluments" is wrong and the correct expression is "privilege or emoluments." If that be so, the right or privilege mentioned in the rule is not restricted to emoluments and could take in other rights and privileges also. Various publications of the Rules give conflicting versions. Some publications refer to "privilege of emoluments," while some other publications refer to "privilege emoluments." The rules have been published in the official gazette and the gazette copy mentions "privilege of emoluments." The court can go only by the version given in the official gazette and not in any private publications. Certain emoluments may be drawn as of right and certain others may be drawn by way of privilege. Certain emoluments may be drawn as of right and certain others may be drawn by way of privilege. What is saved is only the right or privilege of emoluments and nothing else. Therefore, the correct age of superannuation in this case is 55 years and not 58 years. The Labour Court has arrived at the correct conclusion, though on a slightly different reasoning. Though the reasoning arrived at by the Labour Court may be defective, it cannot be said that the conclusion is vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the record. 20. For wages for the period between 1-1-1971 to 1-5-1971 the petitioner has filed a case before the Registrar of cooperative societies. Before the Labour Court he filed a statement to the effect that he will pursue his remedy before the Registrar. Therefore, the Labour Court did not pass any order for this period. At this stage, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the Labour Court should have passed an order for the wages for this period also as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 21. The petitioner claimed wages due in the cadre of Manager. The Labour Court allowed his wages in the cadre of Inspector. It has to be remembered that there are two reversion orders reverting the petitioner from the post of Manager to the post of Inspector and against those orders he filed two arbitration cases, which have been dismissed, but the dismissal is now challenged in writ appeal before this court and the writ appeal is said to be pending. The Labour Court observed that wages will be calculated subject to the result of the arbitration cases. The petitioner would contend that whatever be the fate of the arbitration cases, he will be entitled to wages as Manager since the reversion orders had been stayed. I do not think, it is necessary for me to decide this dispute at this stage. After the final determination of the arbitration cases, it will be open to the petitioner to approach the Labour Court with a fresh claim in this behalf. 22. The last contention which has to be considered arises under S.69 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 (for short the 'Societies Act'). After the final determination of the arbitration cases, it will be open to the petitioner to approach the Labour Court with a fresh claim in this behalf. 22. The last contention which has to be considered arises under S.69 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 (for short the 'Societies Act'). According to the learned counsel for the first respondent, the present dispute is a dispute which has to be referred to the Registrar for arbitration and therefore cannot be decided by the Labour Court under the Act. S.2(i) of the Societies Act defines "dispute" as "any matter touching the business, constitution, establishments or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not." Relevant portion of S.69 clause (1) reads thus: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises -- ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ such dispute, shall be referred to the Registrar for decision, and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute." 23. I have been referred to certain decisions in this connection and I shall briefly refer to the same. In Malabar Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. Kozhikode, v. State of Kerala ( 1963 KLT 705 ) a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether reference to the Industrial Tribunal of a dispute regarding wage rate, allowances, promotion, etc. was barred by S.51 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932. The question was answered in the negative by the Bench and the distinction between the two jurisdictions has been very well brought out by M. S. Menon, C.J. (as he then was) in his own inimitable way thus: "Cooperative societies are creatures of Statutes, controlled by (heir constitution and concerned with their contracts. Industrial disputes stem, not from the subtle refinements of contractual obligations, but from the rougher jurisprudence of social justice and readjustment. Industrial disputes stem, not from the subtle refinements of contractual obligations, but from the rougher jurisprudence of social justice and readjustment. The uplands of the Industrial Tribunals are out of bounds to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies." In Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. and Others v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others ( AIR 1970 SC 245 ), the Supreme Court had to consider the effect of the arbitration provision in S.61 of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964. The dispute in that case related to the alteration of conditions of service and the same was held to be not touching the business of the society. 24. In Kalloor Vadukkumuri Service Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Asst. Registrar, Mukundapuram and others ( 1973 KLT 523 ) a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether a dispute regarding the dismissal of an employee of a society and the question of reinstatement could come under S.2(i) and S.69 of the Societies Act. The court took the view that the real question is not whether the dispute is one touching the business of the society or its management or establishment, but whether it is a dispute within the competence of the Registrar to decide and observed as follows: "The powers of the Labour Court, the second respondent, functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are unaffected by the powers of the Registrar under S.69 of the Act. A dispute that was resolved by the second respondent by passing Ext. P5 award could not have been dealt with by the Registrar. He was not competent to deal with that question. He cannot grant relief of reinstatement which has been granted by the second respondent. We also hold that this dispute which has been resolved by Ext. P5 award is not falling within the term dispute as defined in S.2(i) of the Act and not one falling within the competence and jurisdiction of the Registrar functioning under S.69 thereof." 25. In Sankaran v. Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Kozhikode ( 1975 KLT 861 ), the Court had to consider a similar question. The court relying on the decision mentioned above, observed as follows: "If the civil court cannot grant relief to the petitioner, then, the first respondent also cannot. The alternative provided in S.69 of the Act is only an alternative to the normal process of the ordinary courts. The court relying on the decision mentioned above, observed as follows: "If the civil court cannot grant relief to the petitioner, then, the first respondent also cannot. The alternative provided in S.69 of the Act is only an alternative to the normal process of the ordinary courts. The disputes contemplated in S.69 of the Act are disputes of a nature which could have been decided by civil court but for that provision. The power that could be exercised by an Industrial or Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be exercised by the Registrar." 26. It is possible to argue that a dispute regarding the dismissal of an employee of a society is a dispute touching the establishment of the society as referred to in S.2(i) of the Societies Act. But, then, S.2(i) also states that the dispute must be "capable of being the subject of litigation." What is barred under S.69(1) of the Societies Act is the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit or other proceeding in respect of disputes coming under that section. The matter in dispute in he present case is whether the dismissal order is void and inoperative and if so, whether the workman is entitled to claim wages. If the order is void and ineffective, no specific order of reinstatement is necessary, but when the authority holds that the dismissal order is void it involves reinstatement. Ordinarily, a civil court has no power to direct reinstatement or to specifically enforce a contract of service. There is no case for the society that this is an exceptional case which could be brought under the jurisdiction of the civil court. Therefore, a dispute regarding the dismissal of an employee of the society cannot be treated as a 'dispute' which is capable of being the subject of litigation in an ordinary court of law. S.69 provides only an alternative to the normal process of an ordinary court. If an ordinary court cannot adjudicate on this dispute, it must follow that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies also cannot adjudicate on it. The dispute regarding dismissal from service squarely falls within ambit of industrial jurisdiction. Industrial court, unlike an ordinary civil court, has power to order reinstatement and to pass consequential orders. This extra ordinary power has been granted to industrial courts since they are institutions of social justice. The dispute regarding dismissal from service squarely falls within ambit of industrial jurisdiction. Industrial court, unlike an ordinary civil court, has power to order reinstatement and to pass consequential orders. This extra ordinary power has been granted to industrial courts since they are institutions of social justice. Such powers are normally lacking in ordinary civil courts and wholly lacking in the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The contention based on S.69 of the Societies Act must, therefore, fail. 27. It is significant to note that the society did not raise the question of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Labour Court before the Labour Court itself. This plea is taken for the first time before this Court in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. It is not as if the alleged lack of jurisdiction is patent. At best, it is only latent. The court exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution is entitled to know what the Labour Court has to say on the question of jurisdiction. The Labour Court was not given an opportunity to decide that it has no jurisdiction, before this court is called upon to give its decision. The remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution is discretionary. The party who has taken a chance of a decision and was not diligent to urge the lack of jurisdiction of the Labour Court, before the Labour Court, will meet with the refusal by this court to exercise jurisdiction in his favour. The society has not offered any explanation for not raising the question of jurisdiction before the Labour Court. For this reason also, this Court will refuse to interfere, even if, there is a genuine question of lack of jurisdiction. In the result, the two original petition are dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.