P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) ). By an order made on 26/08/1981 by the first respondent (District Magistrate Junagadh) the petitioner was detained under sub-sec. (2) read with sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 of the National Security Act 1980 with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds of detention were supplied to the Petitioner on 29/08/1981 The State Govt. approved the order of detention under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 3 of the National Security Act 1980 on 5/09/1981 The present petition was instituted on 14/09/1981 Rule was ordered to issue on the petition on 16/09/1981 The petition reached hearing before this Court yesterday and it is being disposed of by this judgment. ( 2 ) THE second infirmity in the order of detention is that in respect of the incident of 1969-70 referred to in ground No. 1 the petitioner was prosecuted and acquitted and that the said factor does not appear to have been considered by the detaining authority and that even if it is believed that the said fact entered into account the detaining authority has failed to explain as to why the said circumstance was disregarded and the said incident was still relied upon in arriving at the requisite satisfaction. A bare perusal of ground No. 1 gives no indication whatsoever whether the fact that the petitioner was prosecuted and acquitted in regard to the said incident was present to the mind of the detaining authority. If at all the said ground if it is read without anything more leaves an impression on the mind that the said fact possibly was overlooked by the detaining authority. In the affidavit-in-reply however the detaining authority has averred that the fact that the petitioner was tried and acquitted in respect of the said incident had been taken into consideration while passing the detention order. This is no more than a bare assertion. No material in support of the assertion has been produced before the Court. Viewed in the context of the averments made in ground No. 1 we are hesitant to accept the bare assertion. This is no more than a bare assertion. No material in support of the assertion has been produced before the Court. Viewed in the context of the averments made in ground No. 1 we are hesitant to accept the bare assertion. Even assuming however that the fact that the petitioner was tried and acquitted in respect of the said incident was present to the mind of the detaining authority and that it entered into account it would not be sufficient merely to assert that the said fact was taken into consideration while passing the detention order. Something more than a mere assertion to that effect is necessary to be placed on record when the power of detention is challenged on the ground of non-application of mind or mala fides in the context of such a situation. True it is that in a series of cases it has been held that the mere fact that the detenu was discharged in a criminal case relating to certain incidents does not mean that no valid order of detention could be passed against him in connection with those very incidents. (See Sahib Singh Dugal and Others v. The Union of India A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 340 Mohd. Salim Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal and Another A. I. R. 1972 Supreme Court 1670 Mohd Subrati alias Mohd. Karim v. State of West Bengal A. I. R. 1973 Supreme Court 207 and Israil Sk. v. The District Magistrate West Dinajpur and Others A. I. R. 1975 Supreme Court 168 Even proceeding on the footing that the principle would be applicable even in the context of a situation where the detenu has been regularly tried and acquitted it would still be necessary for the detaining authority to explain as to why and under what circumstances the detention order was passed against the detenu in connection with those very incidents in order to effectively meet a challenge based on the ground of non-application of mind or mala fides. This is so because extreme cases can be visualised where a Court has held a criminal case to be false and still a detaining authority with that judicial pronouncement before him may claim to be satisfied (though unreasonably) about prosp- ective prejudicial activities based on what a court has found to be baseless. This is so because extreme cases can be visualised where a Court has held a criminal case to be false and still a detaining authority with that judicial pronouncement before him may claim to be satisfied (though unreasonably) about prosp- ective prejudicial activities based on what a court has found to be baseless. It would be an abuse of detention powers and virtual nullification of the judicial process to permit that to be done (see Golam Hussain v. Police Commissioner Calcutta A. I. R 1974 SC 1336 ). The detaining authority might be well within its bounds however in relying upon those very incidents if it shows for example that it was not possible to obtain a conviction because the prosecuting agency was unable to get evidence or sufficient evidence on account of the fear of the detenu or that the evidence connecting the detenu with the incidents was such as was not legally admissible in a regular criminal trial or that the acquittal was on a technical ground or that there was some such or similar reason for relying upon those very incidents inspite of the acquittal. In the instant case we find that the detaining authority except making a bald assertion that the circumstance with regard to the prosecution and acquittal of the petitioner was taken into consideration has said no more. We are not satisfied that there was proper application of mind by the detaining authority to the said circumstance which undoubtedly is relevant. The order of detention is liable to be struck down even on this ground. Rule made absolute. .