JUDGMENT 1. - This is a defendant's revision petition against the appellate order of the Addl. District Judge, dated 16.8.1980, whereby the order of the Munsif, Nagaur striking out the defendence of defendant dated 9.5.1979, was upheld. 2. The case has a some what chequered history. The plaintiff Nathmal instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment of the shop in question on 14.7.1973 inter-alia, on the ground of default. The plaintiff claimed arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 604/- and it was averred that the defendant is a tenant w.e.f. 9.4.1970 at the rate of Rs. 40/- p.m. and the tenancy was oral. 3. The defendant Motilal submitted an application under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) on 13.8.1975. In this application, he disputed the amount of the rent due and stated that the rent upto 6.2.1975 has already been paid and rent from 7.2.1975 to 6.8.1975 of six months amounting to Rs. 240/- and interest thereon amounting to Rs. 42/- and a sum more than the total thereof i.e., to the tune of Rs. 300/- are being deposited. It was prayed that the Court may determine the amount of rent due and interest thereon. The defendant also attached a schedule to the application showing the payment of rent on different dated upto 6.2.1975. 4. Written statement was filed by the defendant on 14.1.1976. 5. On 2.9.1975, the plaintiff submitted an application under section 13(6) of the Act as then stood stating that the defendant has not deposited the amount of rent to the tune of Rs. 604/- with interest thereon on the first date of hearing so the defendant's defence may be struck out. On the same date also filed reply to the defendant's applicant under section 13(5), in which it was prayed that the defendant's application be dismissed and his defence be struck out. It is pertinent to make a mention here that the Act was amended by the Rajasthan Amendment Ordinance No. 26/1975, which was replaced by the Amending Act No. 14/1976, w.e.f. 22.9.1975. It is pertinent to make a mention here that the Act was amended by the Rajasthan Amendment Ordinance No. 26/1975, which was replaced by the Amending Act No. 14/1976, w.e.f. 22.9.1975. On 22.10.1975 the defendant submitted an application under section 13-A as amended by the Amending Act No. 14/1976., in which it was prayed that the Court may determine the amount of arrears of rent due, interest thereon and the cost of the suit and a date may be fixed for depositing the same. On 16.12.1975, the plaintiff submitted reply to that application. On 6.1.1976, arguments were heard on the defendant's application for determination of rent and on the plaintiff's application for striking out the defence. According to the defendant, a sum of Rs. 300/- was deposited on the first date of hearing which was due, whereas the plaintiff's version is that a sum Rs. 604/- was due, in view of the fact that there was a dispute between the parties with regard to the payment of rent and the amount of rent due and the dispute pertain to a question of fact so the Court ordered that the question cannot be determined without recording evidence and also that Court deferred the decisions of both the applications till evidence of the parties is recorded on this disputed question of fact. The defendant thereafter examined himself as D.W.1 and produced two witnesses, D.W.2 Ghanshyam and D.W.3 Ahmed Hussain. In rebuttal the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and produced Poonam Chand P.W.2 and Arjun Mal P.W.3. After recording the evidence, the learned Munsif on 4.4.1977 determined the amount of rent to the tune of Rs. 640/- and interest thereon amounting to Rs. 320/-, out of which a sum of Rs. 300/- was already deposited by the defendant. The defendant was directed to deposit the remaining amount Rs. 624/- within 15 days and the defendant was further directed to deposit the amount of rent every month in accordance with law. It appears that the defendant Motilal went in appeal against the order of determination of arrears of rent dated 4.7.1977. His appeal was allowed on 15.7.1977 and the order dated 4.7.1977 was set aside and the case was sent back to the learned Munsif with the direction that both the applications of the defendant be decided in accordance with law. It would appear that the defendant's application under section 13-A was not decided. His appeal was allowed on 15.7.1977 and the order dated 4.7.1977 was set aside and the case was sent back to the learned Munsif with the direction that both the applications of the defendant be decided in accordance with law. It would appear that the defendant's application under section 13-A was not decided. After remand of the case the learned Munsif by his order dated 1.12.1977, decided the defendants application under section 13-A and directed the defendant to deposit rent upto that date amounting to Rs. 604/- with interest thereon at the rate of 6% p.a. and cost of the suit. The payment was to be made within 30 days from the date of the order, while rejecting the defendants' application under section 13(5)(old), the learned Munsif observed that the old provision contained under Sections 13(4) and (5) having ceased to exist, the defendant's application has automatically come to an end. 6. Dissatisfied with the order dated 1.12.1977, an appeal was preferred by the defendant but the same was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge on 23.12.1977, the defendant applied for extension of time for deposit of rent upon 31.1.1978 on which the Court allowed the defendant time to deposit rent upto 31.1.1978. On 31.1.1978, again the defendant submitted an application for extension for one months' time thereupon the Court further allowed the defendant one month's time to deposit the amount of rent within the time extended by the Court. Thereafter the plaintiff moved an application on 29.4.1978 under section 13(5) of the Act as amended by Act No. 14/1976 of striking out the defence of the defendant on the ground that the defendant has failed to deposit the amount of rent. On 11.2.1978 a reply to the application was filed by the defendant. Arguments were heard on the plaintiff's application under Section 3(5) and the learned Munsif allowed the application and struck out the defence of the defendant by his order dated 9.5.1979. On appeal by the defendant the learned Additional District Judge upheld the order of the learned Munsif by his order dated 16.9.1980. 7. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Addl. District Judge, Nagaur, the present revision petition has been filed by the defendant. 8. The revision petition raised an important and a complicated question of law. 9. On appeal by the defendant the learned Additional District Judge upheld the order of the learned Munsif by his order dated 16.9.1980. 7. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Addl. District Judge, Nagaur, the present revision petition has been filed by the defendant. 8. The revision petition raised an important and a complicated question of law. 9. Shri M.L. Chhanani learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner submitted that on failing of the defendant to comply with the order passed on the plaintiff's application under Section 13-A, no application is maintainable by the plaintiff under section 13(5) of the Act. According to him Section 13(5) of the Act is attracted only when the tenant fails to deposit rent under Sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein. Shri Chhangani urged that sub-section (5) of Section 13 necessarily referred to the provisions contained in sub-sections (3) and (4). The Court is required to determine the amount of rent provisionally together with the interest thereon under sub-section (3) and the tenant's required to deposit the amount so determined within 15 days or within such further time not exceeding three months as may be extended by the Court under sub-section (4). Shri Chhangani emphasised that as there is no determination of rent under sub-section (3) so the defendant was not required to deposit the rent under the sub-section (4) and as such, sub-section would not at all come into play and the plaintiffs application under sub-sections (5) of Section 13 is not maintainable. Both the Courts have seriously erred in the law in allowing the plaintiff application and striking out the defence against eviction of the tenant. 10. Shri Chhangani submitted that no provision has been made under section 13-A similar to the provision contained in sub-section (5) of Section 13 and sub-section (5) of Section 13 cannot be read as part of Section 13-A what he means to submit is that when the tenant does not comply with the order of the Court for deposit of arrears of rent, interest and cost, then the defendant's defence cannot be struck out for there is no such provision. He pointed out and maintained that the only course open to the Court was to proceed under section 13(3) and determine the rent provisionally together with the interest thereon and thereafter, to call upon the defendant to make payment thereof within the time as contemplated under sub-section (4). As no such order has been passed in the present case, the constitution in the absence of determination of amount of rent and interest under section 13(3), is misconceived. 11. Mr. N.M. Singhvi learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that Section 13-A is a special provision which applies to all pending cases and the defendant by moving an application under section 13-A availed of this provision when the Court after recording the evidence of parties determined the arrears of rent, interest and cost but the defendant failed to deposit the amount so determined even within the extended time. He submitted that sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 13 should be deemed to have been replaced by Section 13-A and it should further be deemed that the order passed under section 15-A is in the nature of the order passed u/sub-section (3) and the amount is to be deposited under sub-section (4). Thus the plaintiff's application for non-compliance of the order under sub-section (3) according to Mr. Singhvi was maintainable under sub-section (5) or Section 13. Shri Singhvi made references to some case law which if needed, I shall refer at the appropriate place, though I may here state that the cases referred to by Mr. Singhvi have no direct bearing on the question with which I am presently confronted. 12. Singhvi was maintainable under sub-section (5) or Section 13. Shri Singhvi made references to some case law which if needed, I shall refer at the appropriate place, though I may here state that the cases referred to by Mr. Singhvi have no direct bearing on the question with which I am presently confronted. 12. For proper appreciation and adjudication of the controversy, which has arisen in the present revision petition, it is necessary to read the relevant, provisions of Sections 13(4), (5), (6) and (7) as they stood prior to the Amending Act No. 14/1976 : "(4) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clauses (a) of sub-section (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the tenant shall, on the first day of hearing or on or before such date as the court may, on an application made to it, fix in this behalf, or within such time, not exceeding two months, as may be extended by the Court deposit in Court or party to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six percent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of deposit and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. (5) If in any suit referred to in sub-section (4), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court shall determine, having regard to the provisions of this Act, the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant, within fifteen days from the date of such order, in accordance with the provisions of Section (4). (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), on the date or within the time specified therein, the Court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), on the date or within the time specified therein, the Court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. (7) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall be passed by the Court but the Court may allow such costs as it may deem first to the landlord." 13. After amendment by the Amending Act of 14/1976 the provisions of Sections 13(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) relevant provisions of Section 13-A read as under : "(3) In a suit for eviction on ground set forth in clause (a) or sub-section (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the Court shall, on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the Court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in Court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent therein upto the end of two months previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of determination. Provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section, the Court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of filing of the suit. (4) The tenant shall deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under Sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of the such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. (4) The tenant shall deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under Sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of the such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteen of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the Court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the Court under sub-section (3). (5) If tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the Court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearings of the suit. (6) If a tenant deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall be passed by the Court against him : Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under the subs-section, if having obtained such benefit or benefit under Section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again make a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. (7) If any suit referred to in sub-section (3), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant the Court shall decide the dispute finally at the time of decision of the suit and may, at that time pass such orders regarding costs or interest, as having regard to the circumstances of the case, it deems fit. Section 13-A, special provisions relating to pending and other matters (Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or any other law. Section 13-A, special provisions relating to pending and other matters (Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or any other law. (a) No Court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the (Amending Ordinance) pass any decree in favour of landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pay to the landlord, or deposits in Court; within such time such aggregate of the amount of rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the Court under and in accordance with that clause; (b) In every such proceeding, the Court shall on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the (amending Ordinance) notwithstanding any order to the contrary determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at 6% per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety day, as may be fixed by the Court; and on such payment being within the time fixed aforesaid, the proceeding shall be disposed of as if tenant had not committed any default;" 14. It may be stated that there is no provision under Section 13-A analogous to the provision contained in sub-section (6) as it stood prior to the amendment of 1975 and subs-section (5) as it stands today after the Amendment of 1976. A comparative study of the relevant provisions as they stood prior to amendment and after the amendment will make it clear that prior to the amendment, there was no obligation on the part of the defendant to deposit rent on the first date of hearing or within such time as may be extended by the Court under that provision with interest on the amount of arrears of the rent and if there is a dispute with regard to the amount of rent payable and that dispute has been raised by the defendant then the tenant is required to deposit the amount of rent as provided in sub-section (5). Failure of deposit of the amount under sub-section (4) or (5) within the specified time would render the defence against the eviction to be struck out by the Court under sub-section (6). After the amendment under sub-section (3) the Court is required to provisional determine the amount of rent together with 6% interest thereon upto the date of determination and under sub-section (4), the tenant is required to deposit that amount within 15 days or within the time extended by the Court not exceeding three months. There is a further obligation on the part of the defendant to continue to deposit the amount of rent by the 15th of each succeeding month, a provision similar to the old provision contained in sub-section (4) attracts the provision of subs-section (5) wherein the Court is required to order the defence against the eviction to be struck out. 15. Section 13-A is a special provision relating to the pending matters. This Section has been enacted with a view to confer benefit on the defaulting tenants. In this provision if the tenant makes an application within 30 days from the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance under clause (b) of Section 13-A, then the Court is required to determine the amount of arrears of rent upto date and interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum and cost of the suit and the tenant is required to deposit the amount so determined within such time not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by the Court. The provision had a life only for a period of thirty days from the commencement of the Ordinance. 16. Admittedly the defendant in this case had availed this provision and moved an application on 22.10.1975. The defendant had already moved an application under Section 13(5)(old) on 13.8.1975. Thus, there were two applications of the defendant, one under Section 13(5)(old) and other under section 13-A. I may refer here a decision cited by Mr. Singhvi, wherein a similar question arose as to whether application under Section 13(5)(old) can continue alongwith the defendant-tenant's applicationunder section 13-A. 17. The decision is in M/s Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Goyal, 1979(1) Rent Control Reporter 44. In that case the defendant filed an application under Section 13(5). Singhvi, wherein a similar question arose as to whether application under Section 13(5)(old) can continue alongwith the defendant-tenant's applicationunder section 13-A. 17. The decision is in M/s Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Goyal, 1979(1) Rent Control Reporter 44. In that case the defendant filed an application under Section 13(5). On 7th August 1975 prior to be Amending Act of 1976 and after the Amending Act, he submitted another application under Section 13-A(b) on 26th October, 1975. It was contended in that case by the learned counsel for the defendant that the application under Section 13(5) should not have been rejected by the learned District Judge and the provisions of Section 13(5) was more beneficial as under the provision the tenant was not required to pay cost and it was urged that both the provisions i.e., Section 13-A of the Amending Act and Section 13(4) and (5) of the Act before the Amendment can exist together and the tenant is entitled to take advantage of either of the two provisions. 18. This contention of learned counsel for the defendant was repelled and it was observed that Section 13-A being with non obstante clause, thus this revision over-rides the other provisions of the Act. The provision under Section 13-A will supersede the provisions contained in subs-sections (4) and (5) and it was also observed in that case that after the Amending Act, the tenant can only resort to the provisions of Section 13-A in a pending suit and the learned District Judge was right in rejecting the defendant's application under Section 13(5)(old) of the Act. 19. In the present case as well the defendant's application under Section 13(5) has been rejected by the learned Munsif by the observation that application has automatically come to an end and the learned Munsif proceeded to pass an order on the defendant's application under section 13-A, though in M/s Carona Sahu Company's case an application under Section 13-A was not disposed of so the case was sent back for orders on that applications. The case of M/s Carona Sahu Company does not throw light on the questions that when the tenant fails to comply with the order passed on his application under Section 13-A, his defence against the eviction is able to be struck off. It is with this question with which I an faced in the present revision petition. The case of M/s Carona Sahu Company does not throw light on the questions that when the tenant fails to comply with the order passed on his application under Section 13-A, his defence against the eviction is able to be struck off. It is with this question with which I an faced in the present revision petition. The question arises whether the provision contained in sub-section (5) as it stands today, can be read in the provision of Section 13-A. Straight off, it can be said that literally subs-section (5) of Section 13 cannot be attracted to the case when tenant does not deposit or pay the amount of rent, interest and cost as determined and ordered under Section 13-A. If the contention as advanced by Shri Singhvi is upheld, it would mean that the Court is re-writing the statutes, which in my opinion is beyond the powers and jurisdiction of the Court. Even when it is a case of cause omission, such lacuna, gap, deficiency or defeat in the statute cannot be supplied by the Court. 20. The following observations of Denning L.J. came up for severe criticism at the hands of the House of Lords and they were plainly disapproved. "When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task offering the intention of Parliament...... and then he must supplement the written words so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the Legislature. A Judge should ask the question himself how, if the makers of the Act and themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." In a subsequent case he restated the same thing in a new from : "We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than opening it upto destruction analysis" Lord Simonds said. "It appears to me" to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation." Lord Morton (with whom Lord Goddard entirely agreed) observed "These heroics are out of place."Lord Tucker pointed out. "Your Lordships would be acting in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity if the view put forward by Denning, L.J., were to prevail."Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had also an occasion to consider the dictum of law.In M/s. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1285, it was observed as under:- "Lord Denning might have exhorted the Judges not to be timorous souls but to be bold spirits, ready to allow a new cause of action if justice so requires. These are lofty ideals which one should steadfastly pursue. But before embarking on this mission, it is necessary for the Court to understand clearly its limitations. The powers of the Courts to legislate is strictly limited. Judges ought to remember that their office is jusdicere and not jus dare, to interpret law, and not to make law or give law." 21. Thus in the light of the principle and cannon of interpretation as stated above, sub-section (5) of Section 13 cannot be read as part of Section 13-A and it cannot be said that the order which has been passed under section 13-A may be treated as an order under sub-section (4). 22. On analysis the provisions of Sections 13(3) and (4) and Section 13-A, it will be clear that under Section 13(3), the determination of rent is only provisional. I need not go into the question as to whether under Section 13-A, time barred rent can be determined or not but so far as Section 13(3) is concerned, there is a proviso to Section 13(3) that time-barred rent shall not be taken into account. Under Section 13-A the expression used is arrears. Apart from that there is another point of distinction between the two provisions i.e., with regard to cost. Under Section 13-A costs are also required to be determined which are to be paid by the defendant-tenant but it is not so under Section 13(3). Under Section 13-A the expression used is arrears. Apart from that there is another point of distinction between the two provisions i.e., with regard to cost. Under Section 13-A costs are also required to be determined which are to be paid by the defendant-tenant but it is not so under Section 13(3). Sub-section (5) of Section 13, thus, only deals with the situation when the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to under Sub-section (4) and it does not deal with the situation where the tenant fails to deposit the arrears of rent, interest and cost as determined under section 13-A. In my opinion sub-section (5) of Section 13 cannot be attracted when the tenant makes default in payment or deposit of arrears of rent, interest and cost under section 13-A. 23. However, I am unable to agree with the submission made by Shri Chhangani that the Court could have only proceeded to determine the amount of rent provisionally under sub-section (3) of Section 13 so that the tenant could deposit the amount of rent and interest under sub-section (4). In this connection, it may be stated that the tenant elected a remedy under Section 13-A which conferred a special benefit on him as on compliance of the order passed under Section 13-A, the suit for eviction on the ground of default has to be disposed of as if no default has been committed. It cannot be conceived that the question of determination of arrears of rent may be intended by the Legislature to determined twice, in one case finally and in the order case provisionally. The argument of Shri Chhangani would mean that despite the final determination of the amount of arrears of rent after recording evidence of the parties the Court must again determine the amount of rent provisionally under Section 13(3). Such a position is beyond comprehension. It is significant that in the present case the application under section 13-A has been disposed of after recording the evidence of both the parties as the question involved was a question of fact. Such a position is beyond comprehension. It is significant that in the present case the application under section 13-A has been disposed of after recording the evidence of both the parties as the question involved was a question of fact. Having so determined on the basis of evidence, it is inconceivable that recourse may be had to sub-section (3) of Section 13 and the Court may be called upon to determine the amount of rent again and that too only provisionally, thereby give a go by to the final determination of the arrears of rent under Section 13-A. 24. & 25. In a situation like the present in my opinion the provision of Section 13(3) and (4) and the provisions of Section 13-A should be harmoniously construed in the manner that when the tenant makes an application under Section 13-A for availing of a special benefit under the special provision and an order has been after recording evidence of the parties, then so far so the question of arrears of rent is concerned, that stands finally determined between the parties in that connection. When an application under section 13-A has been decided the tenant has failed to deposit the arrears of rent, interest and cost, then there is no question of striking out the defence. The issue between the parties with regard to the ground of default will be determined and if the ground under section 13(1)(e) is established, the landlord would be entitled to a decree for eviction.26. As has been stated above, Section 13-A being a special provision, it will over-ride the other general provisions of the Act and sub-sections (3) and (4) may be considered to be general provisions in relation to the provisions of Section 13-A sub-section (3) of course can be attracted to a case when the stage of the case referred to therein is still there.27. I need not deal with the situation when the provision of Section 13-A is not resorted to by the defendant and the Court proceeds to determine the rent provisionally under section 13(3). As stated above, the provisions of Section 13-A can be availed only within 30 days of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance and not thereafter. I need not deal with the situation when the provision of Section 13-A is not resorted to by the defendant and the Court proceeds to determine the rent provisionally under section 13(3). As stated above, the provisions of Section 13-A can be availed only within 30 days of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance and not thereafter. If this provision is once availed and if the tenant acts in accordance with the order passed by the Court then the ground of default, will not remain as the suit shall be disposed of as if no default has been committed and there is no liability or obligation to deposit monthly rent thereafter as is provided under sub-section (4). In case the tenant fails to deposit the arrears of rent, then the suit shall proceed regard being had to the findings arrived at by the Court while determining the arrears of rent and if it is found that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months, then the landlords would be entitled to a decree for eviction.28. In the light of the foregoing discussions, this revision petition deserves to be allowed in view of the fact that the plaintiff's application under Section 13(5) was not maintainable.29. According the revision petition is allowed. The order of the Courts below dated 16.9.1979, are set aside, and the plaintiffs application under section 13(5) is dismissed. The case shall now go back to the trial Court for being decided in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above.Petition allowed. *******