Judgment 1. This is an application for quashing of an order dated 18-2-1979, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vaishali at Hajipur in Trial No. 1524 of 1979. The certified copy of the order has been filed along with this application. From this order, it appears that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence under Sec.188 of the I.P.C. against these two petitioners and has summoned them to take their trial. 2. The opposite party No. 2, Chandrama Roy filed an application in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hajipur, alleging likelihood of the breach of peace at the hands of these petitioners with respect to certain lands in dispute and the learned Magistrate an being satisfied drew up a proceeding under S.144 of the Cr. P.C. against both the parties. The learned Magistrate restrained both the parties from going over the disputed plots. On 22-11-1978, the opposite party No. 2 filed another application in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alleging therein that in spite of the prohibitory order passed by the learned Magistrate, these two petitioners went over the land and started demolishing a ridge and laying bricks by digging ditch over it. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate on being satisfied that these two petitioners violated the prohibitory order passed under S.144 of the Cr. P.C. filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vaishali at Hajipur on 22-11-1979, as aforesaid. The petition of complaint was received in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vaishali On 18-12-1979, and on a perusal thereof, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and summoned these two petitioners to take their trial on the aforesaid charge for violation of the prohibitory order, which is an offence punishable under S.188 of the I.P.C. Now the learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the validity of the impugned order dated 18-12-1979 on the ground that it is hit by S.168 of the Cr. P.C. The contention op the learned counsel is that the offence u/s. 188 of the I.P.C. provides two kinds of punishment. P.C. The contention op the learned counsel is that the offence u/s. 188 of the I.P.C. provides two kinds of punishment. If such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, the offender shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to two hundered rupees, or with both and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, the offender shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. It has been submitted that in this case, the period of limitation as prescribed in Sub-Section (2) of S.468 of the Cr. P.C. shall be maximum to a term of one year. Sec. 468 of the Cr. P.C. puts. limitation on taking cognizance of the offence by a Court in such belated matter. It has been submitted that the case of the petitioners is of the second category. According to S.188 of the I.P.C., the period of limitation shall be maximum to a term of one year from the date of commission of the offence. In the instant case, the offence committed, as alleged by the opposite party No. 2, is dated 22-11-1979 (1978). It has been stated that an application was filed in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate an 22-11-1978, alleging therein that these two petitioners vialated the prohibitory order passed under S.144 of the Cr. P.C. The learned Magistrate on being satisfied with respect to the allegation made against these two petitioners drew up the petition of complaint, which is dated 22-11-1979 (vide Annexure-2), which was received in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 18-12-1979. It was on this petition of complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence against these two petitioners. Computing the period from the date of commission, of the offence, i.e., from 22-11-1978 it appears that the order taking cognizance of the offence gets hit by Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 468 of the Cr. P.C. 3. Mr. It was on this petition of complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence against these two petitioners. Computing the period from the date of commission, of the offence, i.e., from 22-11-1978 it appears that the order taking cognizance of the offence gets hit by Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 468 of the Cr. P.C. 3. Mr. Shyam Sunder Sinha "Shyam" appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 on the other hand has contended that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on getting the complaint petition, issued a notice of show cause to the members of the opposite party asking them why they should not be prosecuted and punished for violation of the prohibitory order passed by the Court. This notice, as it appears from paragraph 6 of the petition, was issued on 3-3-1979 and as such the learned counsel has urged that the period of limitation should be commuted from 3-3-79. In other words, it has been contended that this date will be deemed as the date, on which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate got knowledge of the offence committed. An attempt has been made to argue that in fact the Sub-Divisional Magistrate could not feel satisfied on the earlier application filed before him and he, therefore, thought it proper to issue a notice of show cause and on being satisfied with respect to the allegation of contravention of the prohibitory order, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate thought it proper to file a petition of complaint, which was sent to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and received on 18-12-1979. On the aforesaid basis, it has been urged that the period of limitation should start running from the date, the Sub-divisional Magistrate felt satisfied with respect to the commission of the offence and not actually the date on which the offence was committed. 4. In my opinion, the argument is misconceived. The period of limitation will start from the date the offence is committed. Of course, the limitation may be condoned in certain circumstances under S.473 of the Cr. P.C. It may also be mentioned here that in case the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved, the period of limitation shall commence in such cases from the date such offence comes to the knowledge of such person aggrieved as envisaged under S.469 of the Cr. P.C. It may also be mentioned here that in case the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved, the period of limitation shall commence in such cases from the date such offence comes to the knowledge of such person aggrieved as envisaged under S.469 of the Cr. P.C. So far as this case is concerned, in my opinion, the opposite party cannot take shelter under the ambit of S.469 of the Cr. P.C. Learned counsel for the State has also tried to support the argument advanced by Shri Shyam Sundar Sinha Shyam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party No. 2. It is the case, in which there is a clear averment, which has been filed as Annexure-2 of the application, that the date of offence committed, was 22-11-1978. In the petition of complaint the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not stated anything that he made an enquiry into the allegation or waited for the submission of the show cause before filing the complaint, inasmuch as there is no averment that hp got the knowledge of the offence on any date later than 22-11-1978. Thus, it appears clear that when the offence, which has committed on 22-11-1978, was brought to the knowledge of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the period of limitation will commence on and from the date, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate took this into consideration. It is quite obvious that the order taking cognizance of the offence dated 18-12-1979 gets hit by S.468 of the Cr. P.C., and it becomes barred by limitation. 5. Lastly, the counsel for the petitioners submitted that the averments made in the petition of complaint, in fact, do not constitute an offence under S.188 of the I.P.C. It has been contended that the complainant in the whole of the petition of complaint does not speak that such disobedience, if any, committed by the petitioners causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed or it has not been stated that such disobedience, if any, committed by the petitioners causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray. In other words, it does not fulfil the requirement as laid down under S.188 of the I.P.C. in taking cognizance of the aforesaid charges and as such the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioners for an offence under S.188 of the I.P.C. 6. In the result, this application succeeds and the impugned order, dated 18-12-1979, is hereby quashed.Application allowed