M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is defendant's second appeal against the divergent findings of the courts below. Parties in this appeal will be referred to hereinafter by the ranks and position assigned to them in the trial Court. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF Muniyappa alias Doddannaiah filed O. S. No. 304 of 1960 in the then Court of the Subordinate Judge, bangalore, seeking to enforce specific performance by defendant-1 (the present appellant in this Court ). This specific performance prayed for was related to certain immoveable properties and one village house set out in the plaint schedule. They were 10 items in number, situated in two villages of anekal Taluk. It is necessary at this stage itself to state that except item nos. 3 and 9 of the suit schedule properties, all other items are less than one acre in ex lent. The agreement in respect of these properties was executed on 24-4-57 by defendant-1 in favour of plaintiff. According to the plaint averments, summarised, defendant-1 did not have title to the suit schedule properties. She being a widow, not being able to cultivate the lands herself she wanted to dispose of the same to the plaintiff subject however to her perfecting title which had been disputed by third parties. It was in that circumstance that monies were advanced by the plaintiff from time to time and finally when the agreement of sale deed was executed on the aforementioned date showing a total consideration of Rs. 6,000 had been paid as advance against the sale of the properties. Remaining Rs. 2000 was to be paid at the time of the execution of the sale deed. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that the first defendant had filed O. S. No. 156 of 1957 in the court of the II Munsiff, Bangalore, praying for declaration of her title to the suit schedule properties against one Muniswamappa and another and in that case she was successful in obtaining the decree for declaration and possession. In that behalf she filed Ex. No. 313 of 1960 seeking possession of the suit schedule properties which had already come to his possession at the time of the agreement of sale which was executed in the year 1957. Plaintiff resisted the delivery of possession to defendant-1 in the execution petition taken out by her. In that behalf she filed Ex. No. 313 of 1960 seeking possession of the suit schedule properties which had already come to his possession at the time of the agreement of sale which was executed in the year 1957. Plaintiff resisted the delivery of possession to defendant-1 in the execution petition taken out by her. Soon after, he issued a legal notice to defendant-1 to convey the suit schedule properties in accordance with the agreement of 1957. On her failure to do so, he presented the plaint for specific performance as earlier mentioned. ( 3 ) THE suit claim was resisted by defendant-1, on the ground that she did not execute any agreement of sale whatsoever and she denied almost every assertion made by the plaintiff including denial of the said agreement of sale. On such pleadings the trial court framed as many as 7 issues which are as follows: - (1) Whether the plaintiff proves the execution of the alleged agreement ? (2) Whether the alleged payment of Rs. 6000 is true ? (3) Whether plaintiff was put in possession of suit premises in pursuance of the agreement? (4) Whether the 1st respondent failed to perform her part of the contract by executing the sale deed in plaintiff's favour? (5) Whether the sale, if any, by defendants 1 and 2 of items 9 and 10 is not true, valid and binding on plaintiff? (6) Whether the suit for specific performance is premature? (7) Whether D-2 is bona fide purchaser for value without notice of item 8 of plaint schedule properties?in the first instance issues were framed in the Court of the learned subordinate Judge, Bangalore. Consequent upon the promulgation of civil Courts Act, 1964 the suit was transferred to the Court of the Addl. 11 Munsiff, Bangalore which really is the trial Court in the instant case. The suit was renumbered as O. S. No. 408 of 1964 on the file of the Addl. II Munsiff, Bangalore and proceeded with. ( 4 ) PLAINTIFF examined as many as five witnesses including himself and got marked several documents in support of his case, while defendant-1 examined herself and two other witnesses in support of her case. The suit was renumbered as O. S. No. 408 of 1964 on the file of the Addl. II Munsiff, Bangalore and proceeded with. ( 4 ) PLAINTIFF examined as many as five witnesses including himself and got marked several documents in support of his case, while defendant-1 examined herself and two other witnesses in support of her case. ( 5 ) AFTER appreciating the evidence on record, the learned Munsiff gave his findings on the issues which are summarised as follows:- That the plaintiff had failed to prove the execution of the agreement of sale of 1957; that he had not proved payment of Rs,. 6000 and that he was not in possession of the suit schedule properties under the agreement of sale. In the result, it became academic for him to pronounce on other issues except for recording a finding that the suit was not premature. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, plaintiff preferred an appeal in R. A. No. 58 of 1966 in the Court of the Civil Judge, bangalore Dist. Bangalore. That appeal came to be allowed and the judgment and the decree of the trial court reversed. Defendant-1 came up before this Court in S. A. No. 1262 of 1969 questioning the correctness of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. That appeal came to be allowed by this Court on the ground that the judgment and decree. of the lower appellate Court was erroneous inasmuch as the learned judge had not recorded his reasons for dis-agreeing with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, the matter was remitted to the lower appellate Court for fresh disposal in accordance with the observations made in the aforementioned second appeal. Thereafter the lower appellate Court disposed of the appeal once again, setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court directing specific performance of the agreement of 1957 in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, really this is a second round which defendant-1 is having in this Court. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel Sri Mohammed farooq appearing for the appellant, has strenuously urged three questions of law, which according to him, would be sufficient to set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. Therefore, really this is a second round which defendant-1 is having in this Court. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel Sri Mohammed farooq appearing for the appellant, has strenuously urged three questions of law, which according to him, would be sufficient to set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. The first ground urged in support of the appeal is that the learned Civil judge did not correctly appreciate the evidence in coming to the conclusion that Ext. P-1, the agreement of sale was indeed executed by defendant-1. In other words, the learned counsel has elaborated in the course of his arguments, that the trial Court had rightly rejected the evidence of the Finger Print Expert relying upon the oral evidence in the case and had come to the conclusion that Ex. P1, the suit agreement of sale, did not bear the thumb impression of defendant-1, and that the lower appellate court erred in disturbing that finding accepting the evidence of the Finger print Expert which itself was self-contradictory and which definitely was a clear error of law. The learned counsel relied upon trie decision of the high Court of judicature, Madras in the case of Edara Venkata Rao v. Edara Venkayya (1 ). In that decision the Madras High Court took the view that while the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of C. P. C. , should not go into questions of facts decided by the lower appellate Court, when such finding of facts depended on higher degree of proof, that would be a question of law and not a mere question of fact. I do not know how that decision is of assistance to the case of the appellant-defendant. None can have quarrel with the proposition of that law. The learned counsel has not succeeded in his endeavour to apply the principle enunciated in that decision to the facts of this case. It is seen from para-43 of the lower appellate Court's judgment that it has discussed the evidence of P. W. 1 (Finger Print expert ). It has come to the conclusion that the expert evidence clearly indicated the irresistible conclusion that defendant's thumb impressions were to be found in Ext. P. 1. No doubt, it is true that it is stated in the evidence of P. W. 1 as under:"for fixing identity, 12 points are sufficient. It has come to the conclusion that the expert evidence clearly indicated the irresistible conclusion that defendant's thumb impressions were to be found in Ext. P. 1. No doubt, it is true that it is stated in the evidence of P. W. 1 as under:"for fixing identity, 12 points are sufficient. If they agree on all the 12 points, then I say that they are identical. After making 12 identical points I have not marked further identical points. "the learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that earlier P. W. 1 had stated that 4 ridges characteristics were similar. From that it is asserted that there are only 4 points having similarity. That would not be correct understanding of the deposition of p. W. 1. After having stated that 4 ridges characterstics are similar he proceeds to depose that he marked 12 points. However, the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that defendant-1 had signed the agreement of sale was not solely based on the Finger Print Expert's evidence i. e. P. W. 1. But I find from the first sentence of para-43 of the judgment of the lower appellate court that the direct evidence is also supported by the expert evidence. Accordingly, the learned appellate judge accepted the evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4 who spoke about the execution of Ext. P-1, which he has chosen to believe as against the version put forward by defendant-1. In otherwords the expert evidence has been only to affirm the evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4. Therefore, the lower appellate court being the final Court of facts, i should not lightly disturb that finding by reappreciating the evidence once again while exercising jurisdiction under S. 100 CPC. The Madras case relied upon by the learned Counsel for appellant has no application to the facts of the case; because the question of degree of proof does not come into the picture at all. It is a question of how the oral and documentary evidence on record has been re-appreciated by the lower appellate Court as against reasons given by the trial Court rejecting the same. The lower appellate Court has given cogent reasons, as directed by this Court in its earlier order. I therefore, do not see any merit in the first contention. It is a question of how the oral and documentary evidence on record has been re-appreciated by the lower appellate Court as against reasons given by the trial Court rejecting the same. The lower appellate Court has given cogent reasons, as directed by this Court in its earlier order. I therefore, do not see any merit in the first contention. ( 8 ) THE next contention which has been raised orally and later by making an application for amendment of the grounds in the memorandum of appeals is that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court was in spite of the express prohibition contained in the Karnataka prevention of Fragmentation and consolidation of Holdings Act, 1966. The Act defines "fragmentatation" to be something which is less than standard area which is defined under S. 2 (g) of the Act, which reads as follows:"'fragmentation' means a holding of land of less extent than the appropriate standard area determined under Sec. 3. "s. 3 of the Act deals with determination of standard area, which reads as follows: -"3. Determination of Standard Area.- for the purpose of this Act, standard area means the area specified in column (3) of the Schedule to this act. "the lands are classified into 7 classes which has been reduced to 4 classes by subsequent amendment. The four classes of lands under the said Act, have different areas specified for standard area. It suffices to notice that in class 'd' the last class of land, standard area, is specified to be a little over 2 acres. It is not the case of defendant-2, that she is required to convey a portion of a larger area which results in fragmentation below the standard area. As already pointed out while narrating the facts of the case, all items of the suit schedule properties except items Nos. 3 and 9 are less than an acre and are themselves fragments to which alone the defendant has title if Ext. P-1 is to be upheld. What she is required to convey is not a portion of larger area resulting in fragmentation but, the fragments themselves. I, therefore, do not see any of the provisions prohibiting alienation contained in the said Act, that are attracted to the facts of the case. P-1 is to be upheld. What she is required to convey is not a portion of larger area resulting in fragmentation but, the fragments themselves. I, therefore, do not see any of the provisions prohibiting alienation contained in the said Act, that are attracted to the facts of the case. ( 9 ) LASTLY, the learned counsel urged that the trial Court had given an adverse finding on issue No. 6 adverse to defendant-1 inasmuch as it had held that the suit was premature. I do not know how, by that finding, the defendant was aggrieved as the suit itself came to be dismissed by the trial court. In any event no appeal was filed by the defendant against that finding nor had she raised that question in cross-objections before the lower appellate Court. ( 10 ) IN the result, there is no merit in the Second Appeal and the same is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court. There will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .