NOOR MOHAMMED v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR — 1981 DIGILAW 174 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The prayer in this petition is to quash Ext. P3 notification issued for the acquisition of a property, 0.1012 hectares in extent, in survey No. 79/4 in Nagalassery Amsom Desom belonging to the petitioner's father. The 1st respondent is the District Collector, Palghat; the 2nd respondent the Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer of Ottapalam and the 3rd respondent the Nagalassery Panchayat represented by its Executive Officer. 2. The petitioner is a medical graduate and is at present doing his post-graduate course in surgery in the Medical College, Trivandrum. His wife is a practising doctor The petitioner's father wanted to settle him and his wife in life and therefore decided to construct a nursing home in the land in question. The construction of the nursing home is half way through and a sum of Rs. 40,000 had already been spent for the construction. A well for the use of the nursing home had been dug and its sides were dressed The petitioner's expectation, at the time be filed this petition, was that the construction could be completed within a period of three months. 3. In January, 1981 the petitioner came to understand that the Posts and Telegraphs Department was interested in acquiring the land. Thereupon the petitioner's father submitted a representation Ext. P1 dated 28-1-1981 to the 1st respondent pointing out the need to retain the land for the petitioner and his wife and bringing to the notice of the 1st respondent various other properties suitable for this purpose and stating that the construction of a nursing home had already been started. On 3-3-1981 the 1st respondent wrote back to the petitioner as per Ext. P2 stating that no requisition for the acquisition of the land had been received from the Posts and Telegraphs Department. Therefore he proceeded with the construction of the nursing home. In the meanwhile, the petitioner came across Ext P3 notification under S.3 (1) and S 19 (4) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The purpose recited in Ext. P3 is the construction of a new bus stand and a shopping centre for the 3rd respondent. When the 1st respondent sent Ext. P2 letter there was no whisper about the land being necessary for the purpose of the Panchayat. The purpose recited in Ext. P3 is the construction of a new bus stand and a shopping centre for the 3rd respondent. When the 1st respondent sent Ext. P2 letter there was no whisper about the land being necessary for the purpose of the Panchayat. The petitioner's case in the petition is that the exercise of power under S.19(4) of the Act is totally mala tide and is made to subserve the ends of the President of the 3rd respondent who has considerable political influence over the Government. The attempt of the 3rd respondent to deprive the petitioner of the land is mala fide. The petitioner contends that the emergency put forward in Ext. P1 is a dishonest statement and is a fraud on the power under S.19(4) of the Act. The construction of the bus stand and shopping centre is in no sense a purpose which merits the stringent provisions of S.19. The petitioner is virtually presented with a fait accompli in the combined notification under S.3(1) and S.19(4) of the Act. 4. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2 and sworn to by the Tahsildar, the locus standi of the petitioner to move the court is questioned. It is stated that the various lands pointed out by the petitioner's father in Ext. P1 representation are not suitable for the construction of the bus stand-cum¬shopping centre. In Para.7 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the Ist respondent invoked the urgency provision under S.19(4) of the Act on the basis of requisition of the 3rd respondent. It is denied that political influence was brought to bear upon the 1st respondent for initiating acquisition proceedings. 5. The 3rd respondent in a detailed counter-affidavit has tried to justify the acquisition proceedings. It is stated that the Panchayat resolved as per its resolution dated 27th November, 1976 to acquire about 25 cents in survey No. 79/4 for the purpose of constructing a bus stand which was a long-felt need considering the geographical location of the area. In fact, the Panchayat could not find out a better place than the one in question. The steps in respect of the acquisition could not be finalised earlier for more than one reason, including paucity of funds In 1980 the Government sanctioned a sum of Rs 15,000 for acquisition of a suitable land. In fact, the Panchayat could not find out a better place than the one in question. The steps in respect of the acquisition could not be finalised earlier for more than one reason, including paucity of funds In 1980 the Government sanctioned a sum of Rs 15,000 for acquisition of a suitable land. This amount would lapse within one year and therefore early acquisition of the land was necessary. On 27th February, 1981 the Panchayat met again and passed a resolution requesting that the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act might be invoked with a view to expedite the proceedings for acquisition Pursuant to this resolution the District Panchayat Officer accorded his approval to the site after inspection. A request was made to the Collector thereafter on 2 3 1981 and accordingly on 2 4 1981 the notification in question was issued. The allegations of mala fides, political pressure etc. are denied. 6. The above are the facts of the case. The questions for consideration are: (i) Whether the petitioner has locus standi to present this application? (ii) Whether the invocation of S.19 (4) of the Act was proper in the circumstances of the case? and (iii) Whether the notification Ext. P3 is liable to be quashed for all or any of the grounds mentioned by the petitioner. 7. Though in the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2 the invocation of S.19 (4) of the Act was justified, the learned Government Pleader found it difficult to press that case before me. He only argued that the petitioner bad no locus standi to maintain the petition In reply to the submissions made by the respondents' counsel the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri. P. N. K. Achan stated that at an earlier date when the matter was discussed before another Bench the learned Additional Advocate-General also had submitted that he was not supporting the notification under S 19 (4) of the Act. The 3rd respondent's counsel, however, stuck to his case that the invocation of S.19 (4) was proper and was not bad for any reason. In view of this attitude taken by him it becomes necessary for me to consider this aspect of the case about which detailed arguments were addressed 8. The 3rd respondent's counsel, however, stuck to his case that the invocation of S.19 (4) was proper and was not bad for any reason. In view of this attitude taken by him it becomes necessary for me to consider this aspect of the case about which detailed arguments were addressed 8. From the materials available it is evident that the need for a bus stand and a shopping centre found expression as early as in 1976 in a resolution of the Panchayat. Time passed by and this desire of the Panchayat could not attain fulfilment for various reasons. It is only in the year 1980 that a sum of Rs. 15,000 was sanctioned by the Government which amount was about to be lapsed within one year. This alerted the Panchayat and they swung into action by passing another resolution on 27th February, 1981 requesting the emergency provisions of the Act to be invoked. The District Panchayat Officer thereafter inspected the site, accorded his approval which was followed by the notification under S.3 and 19(4) of the Act. 9. It cannot be denied that the purpose mentioned is a public purpose. The desire to have a bus stand and shopping centre was there even in 1976. What prompted the 3rd respondent-Panchayat to move into action to get the emergency provisions invoked is the fear that the amount sanctioned by the Government would lapse if acquisition proceedings were not immediately taken up; in other words, though the need for a bus stand could brook the delay from 1976 upto 1980 the Panchayat felt that the acquisition had to be urgently made to avoid the danger of the amount getting lapsed Not without justification does the petitioner's learned counsel submit, in the light of this disclosure, that what persuaded the Panchayat to act was not the dire emergency for getting possession of the property but the fear that the amount would lapse, which, according to him, cannot be a circumstance justifying the invocation of S.19(4) of the Act. I see force in this contention. The fact that the amount would get lapsed may be a strong circumstance for the Panchayat to act but that will not satisfy the ingredients of S.19(4). The emergency should be reflected in the need of the acquisition and not in the availability of funds. I see force in this contention. The fact that the amount would get lapsed may be a strong circumstance for the Panchayat to act but that will not satisfy the ingredients of S.19(4). The emergency should be reflected in the need of the acquisition and not in the availability of funds. Perhaps by a proper representation or by an appeal to the Government the Government could be persuaded to reallocate funds for the acquisition. That can rarely be put forward as a ground to invoke the provisions of S.19(4). 5,19(4) denies to a citizen certain valuable rights. Courts have repeatedly discouraged exercise of this power. The exercise of this power denies to the citizen his right to apprise the authorities of the various facts affecting the acquisition, of the availability of similar or better lands in the neighbourhood, of the undesirability of acquiring the land in question and of various other circumstances which might weigh with the authorities in some cases to reconsider their decision. Courts have viewed the emergency mentioned in S.19(4) as one that will not brook a delay of 30 days; for S.5 gives to the party interested in property sought to be acquired only 30 days' time for filing his objections to S.5 notice which notice is dispensed with if S 19 (4) is invoked It will not be proper to tell a citizen that "the money allotted will lapse; therefore I want your property immediately". What he should be told is that "if I do not take your property immediately, the purpose of the acquisition will be in peril and the public will be denied of the property". If this test is to be applied I have no hesitation to hold that the invocation of S.19 (4) in this case was misplaced. I will try to justify this stand with reference to decided cases. 10. The following authorities show how the courts have considered the scope of S.19 (4) of the Act corresponding to S.17 (4) of the Central Act. In Seshagiri Mailer v. Tahsildar, 1964 KLT. 54, Govindan Nair, J. had this to say regarding the scope, of S.17 (4) of the Act: "Under S.17(4) of the Act, the Government have to form an opinion about the applicability of S.17(1) or 17(2). In Seshagiri Mailer v. Tahsildar, 1964 KLT. 54, Govindan Nair, J. had this to say regarding the scope, of S.17 (4) of the Act: "Under S.17(4) of the Act, the Government have to form an opinion about the applicability of S.17(1) or 17(2). And when they so form an opinion and decide to dispense with the provisions of S.5-A, they must be fully aware that a very valuable right statutorily conferred on a citizen to object to the acquisition proposed is taken away. S.5A gives only 30 days' time to a person affected or interested to file his objections to the proposed acquisition by a notification under S 4(1). It appears to me, therefore, that any urgency that demands a dispensation with S.5-A must necessarily be an urgency which will not brook a delay of 30 days. In other words, the statute itself impliedly speaks about the circumstances under which the dispensation can be made. The conduct of the Government here indicates that they have waited nearly for two months to publish this and at the same time have taken away a valuable right conferred on the citizens. An urgency to suit the convenience of the Government and at the same time depriving the citizen of a very valuable right, is not the one contemplated by the Act. I think the exercise of power in such circumstances is an abuse of the powers conferred by S.17(4), at any rate, a colourful exercise of such power." In Sitaram Maroti Girnale v. The State of Maharashtra and others, AIR. 1963 Bombay 242, also the scope of this exercise of power fell for consideration: "But we may observe that it has become almost a rule for the acquiring authority in such cases to apply the urgency clause and to dispense with the provisions of S.5-A which enable the owner or occupier of the land proposed to be acquired to raise objections before the acquiring authority. x We are not therefore satisfied from our experience about the use of the urgency clause in similar notifications that the acquiring authority applied its mind in deciding whether or not the urgency clause should be made use of and thus deprive the owners and persons interested in land, of a valuable opportunity to raise objections to the proposed acquisition. x We are not therefore satisfied from our experience about the use of the urgency clause in similar notifications that the acquiring authority applied its mind in deciding whether or not the urgency clause should be made use of and thus deprive the owners and persons interested in land, of a valuable opportunity to raise objections to the proposed acquisition. In tact, sometimes if valid objections are raised, the acquiring authority itself is saved from further trouble and it can correct its mistake if pointed out in time. The acquiring authority deprives itself of this opportunity as the facts of this case disclosed by depriving the occupants of their right of raising objections to the proposed acquisitions." In Thirumalaiah v. State of Mysore and another AIR, 1963 Mysore 255, the court observed: "It is, in my opinion, clear that power which may be exercised under sub-sec. (4) of S.17 should be exercised in exceptional cases where it would be reasonable for the Government to dispense with the hearing enjoined by S.5-A. Such would be cases where some great prejudice or inconvenience would be caused by adherence to the requirements of S.5-A compliance with which might defeat the very purpose of the acquisition which has become emergent " In Mammu alias Kunhammad Keyi v. Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Tellicherry, 1965 KLT. 1021, a Division Bench of this court was considering the scope of exercise of powers under S.19 (4) of the Kerala Act: "There is no doubt that the right conferred by S.5 is a very valuable right, ensuring as it does the compliance with an important canon of natural justice. Sub-section (4) of S.19 authorises the abrogation of such an essential and salutary provision and it may be possible to say that the sub-section violates the fundamental right to hold, acquire and dispose of property guaranteed by Art.19(1) (f) of the Constitution, and that it is not salvaged by clause (5) of that article on the basis that it embodies only a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the fundamental right in the interests of the general public. x An order is vitiated by malafides if it is passed by an authority without applying its mind at all, even though there is no evidence of any personal ill-will, corrupt motive or other improper purpose." 11. In Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR. x An order is vitiated by malafides if it is passed by an authority without applying its mind at all, even though there is no evidence of any personal ill-will, corrupt motive or other improper purpose." 11. In Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR. 1967 SC. 1081, observed the Supreme Court: "But even though the power of the State Government has been formulated under S.17 (4) of the Act in subjective terms the expression of opinion of the State Government can be challenged as ultra vires in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is malafide." and in Narayan Govind Gavate etc. v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR. 1977 SC. 183 as: "We think that S.17 (4) cannot be read in isolation from S.4(1) and 5A of the Act. The immediate purpose of a notification under S.4 (1) of the Act is to enable those who may have any objections to make to lodge them for purposes of an enquiry under S 5A of the Act. It is true that, although, only 30 days from notification under S.4(1) are given for the filing of these objections under S.5A of the Act, yet sometimes the proceedings under S.5A are unduly prolonged. But, considering the nature of the objections which are capable of being successfully taken under S.5A, it is difficult to see why the summary enquiry should not be concluded quite expeditiously " and in The State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others, AIR. 1980 SC 319 as: "The fourth point about the use of emergency power is well taken. Without referring to supportive case-law, it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a bearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Art.14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under S.17 of the Act. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a bearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Art.14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under S.17 of the Act. Here a slumbering process, pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking, makes a travesty of emergency power." 12. The above authorities lay down the limitations under which alone the powers under S.19 (4) of the Act corresponding to S.17 (4) of the Central Act can be exercised. I thought it necessary to refer to the supportive case-law only to emphasise the need for a scrupulous adherence to the mandate contained in the emergency provision The emergency provision should be invoked only in exceptional and rare cases; in cases where the court would find it difficult to interfere with the subjective satisfaction of the Government or the officer concerned. The indiscriminate invocation of the emergency provision has more often than not retarded acquisition proceedings. Experience has shown that initiation of land acquisition proceedings invoking emergency powers has often defeated the purpose of acquisition and has never advanced it In this case the "long-felt need" starting from 1976 which went into hibernation till 1981 can never be projected as sufficient to invoke the provisions contained in S.19 (4) of the Act. I do not want to go into the allegations of political pressure etc. to characterise the order under S.19 (4) as mala fide. In my view the absence of proper exercise of mind renders the action mala fide. I bold that resort to S.19 (4) in this case is bad 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner spun out a new case purely a question of law during his submissions which case was not covered by the pleadings. The 3rd respondent's learned counsel was justified in his submission that he was taken by surprise by the new case put forward. Even so I would like to refer to the said case for completeness of this judgment and express my opinion on the case put forward. If this judgment had to be rested on this new question alone I would have refrained from a detailed discussion about this aspect of the case Since the disposal of the case does not depend upon this question alone f think it only proper to advert to this aspect of the case also 14. If this judgment had to be rested on this new question alone I would have refrained from a detailed discussion about this aspect of the case Since the disposal of the case does not depend upon this question alone f think it only proper to advert to this aspect of the case also 14. S.65 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 deals with "acquisition of immovable property required by Panchayats" The section clothes the Panchayat with authority for getting acquisition proceedings initiated only for certain functions and not for all. I shall read this section: "Any immovable property which is required by a Panchayat for a public purpose connected with the discharge of the functions imposed on it under this Act, or rules or bye-laws thereunder, or any other law, may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in force for the time being and on payment of the compensation awarded under the said Act, in respect of such property and of any other charges incurred in acquiring it, the said property shall vest in the Panchayat: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prevent any Panchayat from acquiring immovable property either through private purchase or by free surrender." The petitioner's counsel laid great emphasis on the words "for a public purpose connected with the discharge of the functions imposed on it under this Act, or rules or bye-laws thereunder, or any other law". According to him, the Panchayat can move for the acquisition of immovable property under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act only if the Panchayat has an obligation under the Act or the rules to discharge the public purpose for which the acquisition is proposed. In other words, it is only for the discharge of functions imposed under the Act that S 65 enables the Panchayat to initiate acquisition proceedings and not in any other case. Now let us examine whether the purpose in question is one such. In other words, it is only for the discharge of functions imposed under the Act that S 65 enables the Panchayat to initiate acquisition proceedings and not in any other case. Now let us examine whether the purpose in question is one such. S.57(1) reads as follows: "Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder it shall be the duty of a Panchayat within the limits of its funds, to make reasonable provision for carrying out the requirements of the Panchayat area in respect of the following matters namely: items (a) to (m)" This section therefore places an obligation on the Panchayat, by using the word "shall', to make reasonable provision for the requirements of the Panchayat within the limit of its funds for the various purposes detailed in clauses (a) to (m). Now we read S.57 (2): "Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder a Panchayat may also, within the limit of its fund and wherever possible with Government aid, make reasonable provision for carrying out the requirements of the Panchayat area in respect of the following matters, namely: clauses (i) to (vii)" Contrast the two sections. While in S.57 (1) the word used is 'shall' in S.57 (2) the word used is 'may' meaning thereby that discretion is vested with the Panchayat to make reasonable provision for carrying out the requirements of Panchayats in respect of the matters enumerated in items (i) to (vii). While in one case the Panchayat has the statutory obligation to carry out and discharge its functions, in the other case it is given freedom within permissible limits to carry out the requirements of the Panchayat. S.57(2)(vi)(c) and (i) read as follows: "(c) the construction and maintenance of buildings for warehouses, stores, shops, purchasing centres etc. (i) the opening of and maintenance of public markets, slaughter houses, bus-stands, cart-stands, landing places, baiting places and ferries and also the licensing of such places opened and maintained by private individuals and institutions." The public purpose fur which the present acquisition is proposed comes within these two items which are functions the discharge of which is not statutorily imposed on the Panchayat. 15. I find considerable force in this submission. The use of the word 'imposed' in S.65 of the Panchayats Act cannot be overlooked. 15. I find considerable force in this submission. The use of the word 'imposed' in S.65 of the Panchayats Act cannot be overlooked. The literal meaning of the expression 'discharge of the functions imposed on it under the Act' is that the Panchayat has a statutory duty to discharge its functions. S.65 juxtaposed with S.57 (1) and 57(2) makes the object of the section clear. While in S.57(1) the expression used is only "within the limits of its funds" in S57(2) the expression used is "within the limit of its fund and wherever possible with Government aid" which again means that the purpose mentioned in S.57(1) has to be discharged with its own funds without waiting for Government aid while S.57(2) enumerates purposes which can wait so that the Panchayat could not only use its funds but use Government aid when the aid comes. A close scrutiny of sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.57 and its contents affords guidance for appreciating the contention whether the purpose in this case is one for which the Panchayat could initiate the acquisition proceedings. The Panchayat got sanction of funds from the Government either by request or otherwise. This also fortifies the view that the purpose for which the acquisition proceedings are taken in this case comes within S.57(2). I agree with the contention of the petitioner's counsel that the purpose in this case is not one the discharge of which is imposed on the Panchayat by the Act. I am using this argument only for the purpose of reinforcing my conclusion that the invocation of the emergency powers under S.19(4) of the Act was uncalled for and unjustified. I may not be taken to decide that for purposes mentioned in S.57(2) the Panchayat is disabled from requesting for initiation of acquisition proceedings. For such purposes acquisition proceedings can be initiated; but in the context of the express limits contained in S.57(2) it has to be held that for such a purpose emergency provisions cannot be invoked. In other words, purposes mentioned in S.57(2) will not justify a request for invoking S.19(4) of the Act 16. The 3rd respondent's counsel placed considerable stress on the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this court in O. P. No 714 of 1980 (1981 KLN. SN. page3) which considered the scope of S.19(4) of the Act. In other words, purposes mentioned in S.57(2) will not justify a request for invoking S.19(4) of the Act 16. The 3rd respondent's counsel placed considerable stress on the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this court in O. P. No 714 of 1980 (1981 KLN. SN. page3) which considered the scope of S.19(4) of the Act. Stress was laid on the observation of this court on the absence of attack against the proceedings of the District Collector deciding to invoke the provisions under S.19(4) Before considering the scope of the principle decided in that judgment, it will be useful to refer to its facts. S.3 notification in that case was issued on 7th September, 1978 and it was published in the gazette on 10-10-1978 The declaration under S.6 of the Act was later published in the Gazette dated 4-5-1979. The writ petition before the court was filed only on 4th March, 1980. Eradi, C. J. speaking for the Bench declined to interfere in the case accepting the plea that the petition was hopelessly belated. The petitioner's case that the notification escaped his notice was not accepted by the court. In reinforcement of the said conclusion the learned Chief Justice observed that in the circumstances of that case the petitioners should be deemed to have known earlier the proceedings of the District Collector dated 6-9-1978 justifying the invocation of the provision in S.19(4) of the Act for the reasons recorded by the District Collector in the said order and the absence of challenge by the petitioner against the validity of the said order was held to be a circumstance adverse to the petitioner in dismissing the petition. The contention raised here is that in the absence of a separate attack on the order of the Collector, this petition also should go. 17. The principle laid down in that case applies to the facts of that case. The same cannot be said in regard to the case on hand. Here, the petitioner has moved this court with expedition. The Collector's proceedings as seen from Ext. P3 are dated 23-3-1981. This petition was filed on 8-4-1981. The proceedings of the Collector deciding to invoke S.19(4) of the Act could have been known to the petitioner only when he saw the S 3 notification. The thrust of the attack in this petition is against invocation of the emergency powers. The Collector's proceedings as seen from Ext. P3 are dated 23-3-1981. This petition was filed on 8-4-1981. The proceedings of the Collector deciding to invoke S.19(4) of the Act could have been known to the petitioner only when he saw the S 3 notification. The thrust of the attack in this petition is against invocation of the emergency powers. When the petitioner seeks to quash Ext. P3 he seeks to quash the notification and the proceedings of the Collector invoking S.19(4). Therefore the decision in the case cited is not serviceable to this case. 18. It is necessary to refer to another submission made by the petitioner's counsel According to him, the satisfaction in this case is entered not by the Collector who is the competent authority to do it but is done by the 3rd respondent or in any case by the 2nd respondent, the Tahsildar. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2 occur the following sentences: "The first respondent invoked the urgency provision under S.19(4) of the KLR. Act 1961, on the basis of the requisition of the 3rd respondent and the resolution No. 1/81 dated 27-2-1981 of Nagalasseri Panchayat and an the basis of the proposals submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer as the parties were not prepared to give possession of the land in advance on negotiation. The Land acquisition proceedings are taken for a public purpose as envisaged under the K.L.A. Act 1961 and there is no dishonest intention in doing so, on the basis of the requisition and resolution of the Panchayat The repeated contentions of the petitioner regarding invoking urgency provision of the K.L.A. Act are superfluous and baseless since it was resorted to, in good faith and under the circumstances mentioned above. xxxx The first and second respondents were satisfied that there is real necessity to acquire the land in question and that the lands are urgently needed for the construction of the bus stand cum shopping centre." I have before me the files of the Government placed in my hands by the Government Pleader. I see the proceedings of the District Collector-02.16319/81 dated 23-3-1981. It reads: "The Executive Officer, Nagalasseri Panchayat, Koottanad has sent up proposal for the acquisition of extent of 25 cents of land in R.S. No. 79/4 of Nagalasseri Village in Ottapalam Taluk for the construction of a bus stand cum shopping centre at Koottanad. I see the proceedings of the District Collector-02.16319/81 dated 23-3-1981. It reads: "The Executive Officer, Nagalasseri Panchayat, Koottanad has sent up proposal for the acquisition of extent of 25 cents of land in R.S. No. 79/4 of Nagalasseri Village in Ottapalam Taluk for the construction of a bus stand cum shopping centre at Koottanad. The requisitioning Department requires the land urgently and the owners of the land are not willing to band over the land in advance by peaceful negotiation. The Tahsildar, Ottapalam has requested to invoke urgency provisions u/s 19 (1) & (4) of the K. L. A. Act for the speedy execution of the work. The District Collector, Palghat therefore directs that necessary provision u/s 19(1) & (4) of the KLA. Act (Act 21 of 1962) shall be applied to this case " I do not think it necessary to state anything more than observing that the proceedings betray an absence of application of mind by the Collector for invoking S.19(4) of the Act. The expression "The District Collector, Palghat, therefore directs " makes this position unmistakably clear that the Collector acted because the Panchayat requested. S.19(4) opens with the words "in the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the Government or the District Collector". The opinion should be that of the Government or the District Collector and the proceedings of the Government or the District Collector should reflect the application of their mind for the need for invocation of S.19(4). It is perhaps realising these difficulties that both the Additional Advocate-General earlier and the Government Pleader before me submitted that they could not support the case under S.19(4). I hold that the respondents have not made out a case for invocation of S.19(4) of the Act. 19. The only point that survives for consideration is whether the petitioner has locus standi to maintain this petition The contention raised is that the petitioner has no right in the property. There is no document by which his father, the rea! owner, transferred his right in the property to the petitioner. Only a person who has persona! right in the property can sustain the petition. This aspect of the case was stuck to both by respondents 1 and 2 and respondent 3. The petitioner's father has filed an affidavit before this court on 17-6-1981 stating that he was away in Kuwait when Ext. P3 was published. Only a person who has persona! right in the property can sustain the petition. This aspect of the case was stuck to both by respondents 1 and 2 and respondent 3. The petitioner's father has filed an affidavit before this court on 17-6-1981 stating that he was away in Kuwait when Ext. P3 was published. He states that he has given complete authority to his son to construct a nursing home and that his son is in legal possession of the property. In Ext. P1 dated 28-1-1981 the petitioner's father informed the District Collector about bis need of the property in question for the construction of a nursing home for his son and his wife and pointed out alternative sites if acquisition was necessary for the purpose of Posts and Telegraphs Department which was in need then. The Collector by Ext P2 informed the petitioner's father that there was no proposal by Posts and Telegraphs Department to acquire this land. From these materials it is clear that the petitioner's father in time informed the District Collector of the identical need of the property which the petitioner now puts forward. The petitioner's father has approved the step taken by the petitioner in moving the petition. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the petitioner is a person not interested or a person not aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings. The Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, AIR 1976 SC. 578, classified persons applying tor a writ of certiorari into three groups: person aggrieved, stranger and busybody or meddlesome interloper. It cannot be said that the petitioner is either a stranger, a busybody or an interloper. The petitioner is vitally interested in the property and be is indisputably aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings. The acquisition proceedings, if pushed through, work to his detriment. The confines of the locus jurisprudence have consider-ably expanded in the recent past and it would be idle to contend on the facts of this case that the petitioner has no locus to move this court. I do not, for this reason, think it necessary to refer to the judgments cited at the bar in support of and against the plea of the locus. I do not, for this reason, think it necessary to refer to the judgments cited at the bar in support of and against the plea of the locus. On the facts of this case I am more than satisfied that the petitioner is an aggrieved person and is well within his rights in moving this court for the reliefs he prayed for. 20. In the result, I quash Ext. P3 and allow this petition. I direct the parties to bear their costs.