ORDER 1. The petitioner M/s. Benares Electric Light & Power Company Limited, a public limited company, was holder of a licence for the generation, supply and distribution of electrical energy in the city of Benares, now known as Varanasi, and its environments, granted to it under Part II of the Indian Electricity Act 1910 (hereinafter referred to as Act 9 of 1910) by the then Government of United Provinces. The petitioner commenced generating electricity and supplying the same within the Municipal Limits of Varanasi in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid licence. It also started, with effect from November, 1962, purchasing a considerable quantity of electricity in bulk at voltage 11 KV from the U.P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). Two bills used to be submitted to the petitioner by the Board; one in respect of the bulk supply received by it at Sahupuri Sub-Station and the other at Waterworks and Manduadih Sub-station. The Board, in exercise of the power under Section 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as Act 54 of 1948) notified on 28-12-1971 a revised grid tariff to be applicable with effect from 1-1-1972 to sales of electricity by it. This notification was published in Part 1-A of the U.P. Gazette dated 1-1-1972. Bills for the supply of bulk electricity by the Board to the petitioner between January and August 1972 granted a rebate of 5% to the petitioner purporting to be under clause 6 (b) of the aforesaid notification. Two bills dated 3-10-1972 for September 1972 and two bills dated 1-11-1972 for October, 1972, however, did not grant the said rebate of 5%. Not only that the petitioner received two bills dated 30-10-1972 one of which contained a demand for the refund of Rs. 2,61,753.51 P. and the other for the refund of Rupees 1,37,533.19 P. on the ground that rebate of 5% had earlier been wrongly allowed in the bills for the period between January and August, 1972. For the period between September, 1972, and March, 1973, even though the bills did not allow any rebate the petitioner made payments after deducting the rebate calculated at the rate of 5%. 2. For the period between September, 1972, and March, 1973, even though the bills did not allow any rebate the petitioner made payments after deducting the rebate calculated at the rate of 5%. 2. The two bills dated 30-10-1972 aforesaid for refund were returned by the petitioner to the Executive Engineer, Electricity Maintenance Division, Manduadih, Varanasi, on 3-11-1972 and it was pointed out by the petitioner in a covering letter that it was entitled to a rebate of 5% and no reason had been assigned as to why the Board had taken a contrary decision. These two bills were, however, returned back for payment to the petitioner along with a letter dated 29-10-1972 which also contained an enclosure of a D.O. dated 31-10-1972 stating that the 5% rebate was not admissible on the supplies given to the consumer at voltage 11 KV. It was admissible only when the supply was given at voltage more than 11 KV and up to 66 KV. The petitioner, however, vide its letter dated 4-12-1972 reiterated that it was entitled to the rebate of 5% terms of the notification dated 28-12-1971 aforesaid. 3. Subsequently the Board issued a notification dated 10-4-1973 published in Part 1A of U.P. Gazette dated 28-4-1973 whereby, inter alia, clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 was substituted. It would be useful to quote the original and the substituted clause 6 (b) at this place. Original clause 6 (b) read as follows: - "A rebate of 5 and 7.5 per cent will be admissible, if supply is taken at voltages between 11 and 66 KV and above 66 KV respectively." The substituted clause 6 (b) reads as follows:- "A rebate of 5 and 7.5% on the amount calculated at the rate of charge, will be admissible if supply is taken at Voltages above 11 KV and up to 66 KV and above 66 KV respectively." The petitioner started paying the bills after the notification dated 10-4-1973 without deducting any amount as rebate. The dispute between the parties is about the entitlement of the petitioner to a rebate at 5% in respect of supply of electricity by the Board to the petitioner for the period prior to the issue of the notification dated 10-4-1973. The Board ultimately served the petitioner with a notice of demand dated 18-1-1974 for a sum of Rs. The dispute between the parties is about the entitlement of the petitioner to a rebate at 5% in respect of supply of electricity by the Board to the petitioner for the period prior to the issue of the notification dated 10-4-1973. The Board ultimately served the petitioner with a notice of demand dated 18-1-1974 for a sum of Rs. 9,38,910.85 requiring the petitioner to pay this amount within 30 days failing which it was to be recovered as arrears of land revenue under the U.P. Government Electrical Undertaking (Dues Recovery) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act 16 of 1958). The petitioner sent an objection to the aforesaid notice on 22-3-1974. No heed was, however, paid to this objection by the Board and ultimately an Amin came to recover the amount aforesaid on the basis of a recovery certificate issued in this behalf. It is this notice of demand which is sought to be quashed along with the proceedings for recovery of the demand under U.P. Act 16 of 1958. A writ of mandamus is also sought to be issued directing the respondents not to recover the amount mentioned in the aforesaid notice of demand. 4. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the recovery proceedings initiated as they were under U.P. Act No. 16 of 1958 were illegal inasmuch as Section 3 of the said Act required the notice of demand mentioned therein to be served or caused to be served by the "prescribed authority" in respect of dues which were payable to "a Government electrical undertaking". According to counsel for the petitioner the notice of demand in the instant case having been served by the Executive Engineer, Electricity Maintenance Division, P.O.D.L.W. Manduadih, Varanasi, could not be treated as a notice served by the prescribed authority within the meaning of Section 3 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 nor could the Board be treated as "a Government electrical undertaking" within the meaning of the said section. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on the decision of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court dated 11-6-1974 in Matter No. 201 of 1972 (The United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board). Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on the decision of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court dated 11-6-1974 in Matter No. 201 of 1972 (The United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board). Having considered the matter we are of opinion that there is no substance in this submission in view of two gazette notifications which do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court deciding the aforesaid case. 5. On the authority of the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court it has also been urged by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner being a licensee within the meaning of Sec. 2 (h) of Act 9 of 1910 could not be a consumer as defined in Section 2 (a) of U.P. Act 16 of 1958. By Section 9 of the Electricity Laws (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act 1974 (36 of 1974) published in U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated December 19, 1974, the definition of the term "consumer" contained in Section 2 (a) of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 has been amended. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of U.P. Act 36 of 1974 provides that in Section 2, for clause (a) the following clause shall be substituted, and be deemed always to have been substituted, namely :- "(a) 'Consumer' means any person who is supplied with energy by a Government Electrical Undertaking whether for his own consumption or in connection with his business of supplying energy or otherwise." The petitioner would apparently be a consumer under this amended definition. The decision of the Calcutta High Court being based on the unamended definition can now be of no assistance to the petitioner. 6. Coming to the question as to whether the Board could be termed as "a Government electrical undertaking" within the meaning of Section 3 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 it would be seen that the term "government electrical undertaking" has been defined in Section 2 (c) of this Act. 6. Coming to the question as to whether the Board could be termed as "a Government electrical undertaking" within the meaning of Section 3 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 it would be seen that the term "government electrical undertaking" has been defined in Section 2 (c) of this Act. According to this definition the term "government electrical undertaking" inter alia includes an electrical undertaking run or controlled by the State Government or the Board as may be notified in this behalf, It has been pointed out on behalf of the respondents that the electricity which was supplied to the petitioner was by the electrical undertaking known as Mau Steam Power Station System. In this connection it has been brought to our notice by counsel appearing for the Board that the State of U.P. had for purposes of supply of electricity been divided into several systems one of them being Mau Steam Power Station System. Notification No. 1687-H/XXIII-PA-562-6-58 dated August 6, 1960, published in the U.P. Gazette Part I dated August 13, 1960, is a notification issued under Section 2 (c) of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 whereby the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified that among others Mau Steam Power Station System shall be a Government electrical undertaking for purposes of the said Act. In this view of the matter the submission made by counsel for the petitioner that the dues sought to be recovered by the impugned notice of demand were not payable to a Government electrical undertaking and consequently the notice of demand was illegal cannot be accepted. 7. In regard to the question as to whether the notice of demand given by the Executive Engineer referred to above could or could not be treated as a notice by the "prescribed authority" within the meaning of Section 3 aforesaid reference may be made to Notification No. 4873-HW/XXIII-PA-562-H-58 dated August 14, 1963, published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette Part I dated August 31, 1963. This notification was issued under sub-section (b) of Section 2 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 which sub-section defines the term "prescribed authority" includes any person authorised as such by the State Government by notification in the official gazette to perform the functions of a prescribed authority under the said Act for such area as may be specified in the notification. By the said notification the Governor of Uttar Pradesh authorised the Executive Engineer, Hydel Division, Varanasi, as prescribed authority for Mau Power Station System. Subsequently a circular was issued on September 29. 1970. by the U.P. State Electricity Board whereby Hydel Division Varanasi, was renamed as Electricity Maintenance Division, Varanasi. The notice of demand under Section 3 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 in the instant case as seen above having been given by the Executive Engineer, Electricity Maintenance Division, Varanasi, was apparently a notice by the "prescribed authority" contemplated by Section 3 of the Act aforesaid. The said notice cannot, therefore, be held to be illegal on any of the grounds mentioned above. 8. It was then urged that the demand made under the impugned notice was arbitrary in regard to items Nos. 17, 18 and 19 of the annexure attached to the notice of demand and even though an objection was raised by the petitioner in this behalf the Board did not care to clarify the correct position. In our opinion the notice of demand cannot be quashed on this ground either. The Executive Engineer, Electricity Maintenance Division, Varanasi, wrote a letter dated 26-2-1973 to the petitioner which reads:- "I am to return herewith the above-noted bills with the remark that the amount of the bill is correct as it has been prepared on the basis of date of receipt of cheque in the office. If you do not agree with the date shown in the bill the record on which you want revision of bills may kindly be furnished so that the date may be verified and bill corrected." In place of complying with the said letter the petitioner wrote back on 1-3-1973 as follows:- "With reference to your letter No. 4238/EMDV/Rev. dated 26-2-1973 we have already mentioned the correct date of payment in pencil in your bills under reference. Kindly depute your staff for necessary verification of the dates of receipts of cheques from our records. The bills are returned herewith." In our opinion the petitioner was not justified in not assisting the Board in this behalf as required by letter dated 26-2-1973 aforesaid and in taking the stand which it did in its reply dated 1-3-1973. Kindly depute your staff for necessary verification of the dates of receipts of cheques from our records. The bills are returned herewith." In our opinion the petitioner was not justified in not assisting the Board in this behalf as required by letter dated 26-2-1973 aforesaid and in taking the stand which it did in its reply dated 1-3-1973. We are not in a position, in the absence of any cogent reason given in this behalf for the stand taken by the petitioner in not deputing anyone to make necessary verification, to go into the question as to whether the demand in respect of these items was correct or not in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 4 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 entitles the petitioner after depositing the amount demanded by a notice under Section 3 to institute a suit for the refund of the dues or part thereof so deposited. Since we are not in a position to go into this question under Article 226 of the Constitution we wish to make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the submission made by counsel for the petitioner in regard to the correctness of the amount of these three items and it will be open to the petitioner to raise this point in a suit contemplated by Section 4 aforesaid where the question raised can more appropriately be gone into. 9. It was then urged that U.P. Act 16 of 1958 was ultra vires inasmuch as it permitted the Board at its unguided discretion to institute a suit for recovery of its dues against one consumer whereas to proceed under U.P. Act 16 of 1958 against another. Reliance was placed on Article 14 of the Constitution. We find it difficult to accept this submission for two reasons. Firstly, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Director of Industries, U.P. v. Deep Chand ( AIR 1980 SC 801 ) its earlier decision in Northern India Caterers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1967 SC 1581 ) (which did support the petitioner's contention) stood overruled by Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay ( AIR 1974 SC 2009 ). In Deep Chand's case Section 3 of U.P. Public Money (Recovery of Dues) Act (25 of 1965) which provided for speedier remedy for recovery of Government dues as arrears of land revenue was held to be not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Secondly, in view of Section 3 (b) of the Uttar Pradesh Recovery of Taxes and other Public Moneys (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 (Act 15 of 1970) read with Section 5 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 the remedy of a suit is barred and it cannot now be said that two remedies for recovery of its dues are available to the Board. Section 3 (b) of U.P. Act 15 of 1970 inter alia provides that no suit shall lie or be deemed, at any time after January 25, 1950, ever to have lain in the civil court for the recovery of dues of any nature whatsoever other than dues referred to therein where any Uttar Pradesh enactment, whether passed before or after the commencement of the Constitution, provides for the recovery thereof as arrears of (land) revenue. In this connection it would be seen that S. 5 of U.P. Act 16 of 1958 provides for recovery of dues payable to the Board by a consumer of electricity as arrears of (land) revenue. 10. We may also point out at this place that since Articles 19 (1)(f) and 31 have been deleted by Sections 2 and 6 of the Constitution (Forty Forth Amendment) Act, 1978, the petitioner cannot now invoke those two articles to its aid. 11. Since now it is no longer open to the Board to institute a suit as pointed out above and the only course open to the Board was to proceed under U.P. Act 16 of 1958 the ancillary submission that the Prescribed Authority acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner in issuing the recovery certificate against the petitioner cannot also be accepted. 12. Coming to the legality of the claim of the Board that the petitioner was not entitled to any rebate under clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that on a plain reading of the said clause the petitioner was entitled to a rebate of 5%. 12. Coming to the legality of the claim of the Board that the petitioner was not entitled to any rebate under clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that on a plain reading of the said clause the petitioner was entitled to a rebate of 5%. It was pointed out that the issue of the subsequent notification dated 10-4-1973 by the Board itself indicated that even the Board was of the view that clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 did entitle the petitioner to a rebate of 5%. It was also urged that the notification dated 10-4-1973 could not be given retrospective effect and indeed even on its language which substituted clause 6 (b) aforesaid by a new clause the said notification dated 10-4-1973 was not retrospective. In regard to the rule of interpretation counsel for both the parties with reference to text books on the subject such as by Craies and Maxwell as also certain decided cases urged that clause 6(b) aforesaid had to be read in its context. Since the principle of interpretation of statutes that in case of ambiguity context has importance is well settled we do not find it necessary to give any detailed reference of the citations. In the view which we are inclined to take in regard to the interpretation of clause 6 (b) aforesaid we feel that it is not necessary to go into the question whether the subsequent notification dated 10-4-1973 was or could have been made retrospective. In our opinion if clause 6 (b) was correctly interpreted it conveyed the same sense which it conveys after its being substituted by the subsequent notification dated 10-4-1973. To us it appears that what was, so to speak, implicit in clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 has been made explicit by the notification dated 10-4-1973. The original and the substituted clause 6 (b) have already been quoted above. As has already been noticed the petitioner was being supplied electricity in bulk of voltage 11 KV. The question which falls for our consideration is whether rebate was admissible under clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 if supply was made at voltage above 11 KV as urged by counsel for the Board or was also admissible if supply was made even at 11 KV as urged by counsel for the petitioner. The question which falls for our consideration is whether rebate was admissible under clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 if supply was made at voltage above 11 KV as urged by counsel for the Board or was also admissible if supply was made even at 11 KV as urged by counsel for the petitioner. 13. Clause 2 of the notification dated 28-12-1971 gives the character of service as follows :- "Alternating character, 3 phase, 3 wire, 50 cycles, 11 KV or 6.6 KV or 3.3 KV depending upon the availability of voltage of supply. D.C. supply will be at 440 volts." Clause 4 thereof gives the rates of Fixed charge as well as Running charge for Alternating Current supply as also for Direct Current supply. Clause 6 (a) provides for extra charge whereas clause (b) provides for rebate. Clause (b) having already been quoted clause (a) may also be referred to which reads :- "(a) the supply may be given at 400 Volts at the discretion of the Board in which case an extra charge of 7.5 per cent on the amount calculated at the rate of charge will be leviable." Parties are agreed on the point that 1 KV represents 1000 Volts. They are also agreed on the principle of determining costs of supply of electricity namely, the higher the voltage of supply, the lesser the cost and the lesser the voltage of supply the higher the cost. Section 46 of Act 54 of 1948 deals with Grid Tariff and notification dated 28-12-1971 as seen above was issued under this section. Sub-section (4) of Section 46 provides for framing of fixed charges. Clause 4 of the notification dated 28-12-1971 as pointed out above contains these charges. If clauses 2, 4 and 6 of this notification are read together it is apparent that what they provide for is that if supply of electricity is made at voltage between 11000 Volts and 3300 Volts the charges to be paid for the same would be the fixed charges contained in clause 4. If supply is made at voltage above 11000 Volts rebate according to clause 6 (b) will be given. In other words the provision about extra charge or rebate will not apply if supply is made at voltage between 11000 Volts and 3300 Volts. Clause 6 does not contain a provision for penalty or incentive. If supply is made at voltage above 11000 Volts rebate according to clause 6 (b) will be given. In other words the provision about extra charge or rebate will not apply if supply is made at voltage between 11000 Volts and 3300 Volts. Clause 6 does not contain a provision for penalty or incentive. It does not say that if the fixed charges contained in clause 4 are not paid by the date mentioned in the bill extra charge in the shape of penalty will have to be paid nor does it say that if the fixed charges are paid on or before a particular date rebate by way of incentive will be given. Really speaking clause 6 (b) operates in a field different than the field in which clause 4 operates. Clause 4 provides for charges if supply is made at Voltage from 3300 Volts up to 11000 Volts whereas clause 6 (b) provides for charges if supply is made at voltage about 11000 Volts. What clause 6 (b) does is that in place of giving an unending table of charges for supply made at voltage above 11000 Volts, for which no provision has been made in clause 4, it prescribes the guideline on the basis of which these charges are to be fixed or determined. If clause 6 (b) is construed in this manner the word "between" used therein cannot be interpreted to include supply at 11000 Voltage. Since supply of electricity to the petitioner was made at 11000 Voltage the charges to be paid by it were to be those as contained in clause 4 of the aforesaid notification and sub-clause (b) of clause 6 was not applicable to it and the petitioner was not entitled to pay the charges which were to be determined under this sub-clause in respect of supply at Voltage above 11000 Volts. This is precisely what has been said in clear words in this sub-clause as substituted by the notification dated 10-4-1973 and it is in this view of the matter that we are of opinion that the notification dated 10-4-1973 has only made explicit what was otherwise implicit in clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971. The contention of the petitioner that it was entitled to a rebate under clause 6 (b) on the charges fixed under clause 4 cannot, therefore, be accepted. 14. The contention of the petitioner that it was entitled to a rebate under clause 6 (b) on the charges fixed under clause 4 cannot, therefore, be accepted. 14. Lastly it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that in view of its conduct in allowing a rebate at 5% in the bills for the period between January and August, 1972, the Board was estopped from taking a contrary stand till the issue of the subsequent notification dated 10-4-1973 which had the effect of fixing a Grid Tariff different than that which was fixed under the notification dated 28-12-1971 inasmuch as acting on the representation of the Board the petitioner changed its position in regard to fixation of charges to be realised by it from its own consumers in such a manner that if the Board was allowed to resile from its earlier stand it would work much to the detriment of the petitioner. This plea of estoppel is based on the facts stated in paragraph 33 of the writ petition which reads as follows :- "That under Clause 'I' of Schedule VI of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 the petitioner Company has to so adjust its charges for the sale of electricity so as not to exceed the amount of reasonable return. Since from January, 1972 to March 1973. the petitioner Company was entitled to 5% rebate, which was admittedly permitted by the Board from January, 1972 to August, 1972, the petitioner Company granted the benefit of the same to its consumers and did not enhance the rates in order to cover up the amount. The demand by the Board now retrospectively is illegal and unjust". 15. For the Board on the other hand it has been urged by its counsel that the averments made in paragraph 33 of the writ petition were insufficient to invoke the plea of estoppel. It was pointed out that in view of para. The demand by the Board now retrospectively is illegal and unjust". 15. For the Board on the other hand it has been urged by its counsel that the averments made in paragraph 33 of the writ petition were insufficient to invoke the plea of estoppel. It was pointed out that in view of para. I of the Sixth Schedule to Act 54 of 1948 the petitioner was not entitled to have profit more than reasonable return and there is no averment in paragraph 33 of the writ petition that on the coming into force of the new charges on 1-1-1972 in pursuance of the notification dated 28-12-1971 the petitioner had raised the charges payable by its consumers earlier and on the representation made by the Board in the bills submitted by it that a rebate of 5% was admissible the petitioner reduced those rates, nor has it been said that if the rebate is not allowed the profit of the petitioner will fall below the reasonable return. It was also urged that if on a correct interpretation of clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 no rebate was admissible there could be no estoppel against statute and if some officer of the Board still granted a rebate the Board will not be bound by the act of that officer. 16. Having considered the respective submissions made by counsel for the parties on this point we are of opinion that the Board is estopped from recovering any amount from the petitioner deducted by it as rebate for the period between 1-1-1972 and 9-12-1972. Before giving our reasons for being unable to accept the submission made by counsel for the Board on this point we may state the basis for taking the view that the estoppel operated in respect of the recovery for the period between 1-1-1972 and 9-12-1972 only and not for the period between 10-12-1972 and 9-4-1973. So far as the period after 9-4-1973 is concerned even the petitioner is not claiming any rebate in view of the notification dated 10-4-1973. So far as the period between January and August, 1972, is concerned the bills which were submitted by the Board to the petitioner allowed a rebate at the rate of 5%, The bills for the month of September, 1972, which did not allow any rebate were dated 3-10-1972 as seen above. So far as the period between January and August, 1972, is concerned the bills which were submitted by the Board to the petitioner allowed a rebate at the rate of 5%, The bills for the month of September, 1972, which did not allow any rebate were dated 3-10-1972 as seen above. Giving a margin of about three days for service, these bills can be taken to have been served on the petitioner on or before 6-10-1972. The third Proviso to para. I of the Sixth Schedule to Act 54 of 1948 provides that the licensee shall not enhance the charges for the supply of electricity until after the expiry of notice in writing of not less than sixty clear days of his intention to so enhance the charges given by him to the State Government and to the Board. In view of this Proviso even if on the receipt on 6-10-1972 of the bills dated 3-10-1972 aforesaid the petitioner wanted to enhance the charges fixed by it for its consumers it could not do so without giving the notice contemplated by this Proviso. If such a notice was given by the petitioner even on 6-10-1972 namely the date on which the bills dated 3-10-1972 were served on it, giving a margin of three days again for service the notice could not be served on the State Government and the Board prior to 9-10-1972. Sixty clear days from 9-10-1972 would have expired on 9-12-1972. This gives the basis for the fixation of the period by us between 1-1-1972 and 9-12-1972. If even on the receipt of the bills dated 3-10-1972 on 6-10-1972 the petitioner did not enhance the charges payable by its consumers by giving the notice as contemplated by the aforesaid proviso it is itself to blame and cannot claim the benefit of estoppel for the period between 10-12-1972 and 9-4-1973. 17. Now we proceed to give our reasons for being unable to accept the submission made by counsel for the Board on the plea about estoppel. On a perusal of paragraph 33 of the writ petition it appears to us that the necessary ingredients of estoppel are contained therein. In the first part of this paragraph reference has been made to adjustment of charges in a manner so as not to exceed the amount of reasonable return. On a perusal of paragraph 33 of the writ petition it appears to us that the necessary ingredients of estoppel are contained therein. In the first part of this paragraph reference has been made to adjustment of charges in a manner so as not to exceed the amount of reasonable return. And when in the latter part of this paragraph the petitioner says that on the Board's granting a rebate of 5% it in its turn granted the benefit of the same to its consumers and did not enhance the rates in order to cover up the amount, it clearly asserts that on the representation made by the Board that the petitioner was entitled to a rebate of 5% it changed its position and adjusted the charges in such a manner so as not to exceed the reasonable return. The last sentence of this paragraph read in this context asserts that the demand made by the Board was to the detriment of the petitioner. In Union of India v. Anglo Afgan Agencies ( AIR 1968 SC 718 ) the plea that executive necessity releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises was repelled and it was held :- "We are unable to accede to the contention that the executive necessity releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment." In M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ) it was held "Though the origin of the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be found in Hughes v. Metropolitan Rly. Co., (1877) 2 AC 439 and Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North Western Rly. Co, (1888) 40 Ch D 268 authorities of old standing decided about a century ago by the House of Lords, it was only recently in 1947 that it was rediscovered by Mr. Justice Denning, as he then was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1956) 1 All ER 256. This doctrine has been variously called 'promissory estoppel', 'equitable estoppel', 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel'. Justice Denning, as he then was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1956) 1 All ER 256. This doctrine has been variously called 'promissory estoppel', 'equitable estoppel', 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel'. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named 'promissory estoppel' it is, as we shall presently point out, neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel." "The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore, seems to be that where one party has by his words or conducts made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not." "The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not, therefore, be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts should be given only a limited application by way of defence." "But on what principle, one may ask, is the distinction to be sustained between promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel in the matter of enforcement by action. If proprietary estoppel can furnish a cause of action, why should promissory estoppel not? There is no qualitative difference between the two. If proprietary estoppel can furnish a cause of action, why should promissory estoppel not? There is no qualitative difference between the two. Both are the offsprings of equity and if equity is flexible enough to permit proprietary estoppel to be used as a cause of action, there is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity." "When we turn to the Indian law on the subject it is heartening to find that in India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognised as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived." "The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned, the former is equally bound as the latter." 18. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned, the former is equally bound as the latter." 18. In our opinion on the principles enunciated in the aforesaid two decisions by the Supreme Court the petitioner is entitled to plead promissory estoppel in support of its challenge to the impugned notice of demand in respect of the amount of rebate for the period between 1-1-1972 and 9-12-1972. We are further of the opinion that the Board has failed to bring its case within the exception contained in the latter part of paragraph 24 of the report in the case of M.P. Sugar Mills (1979 (All LJ 368) (SC)(supra) and it cannot be said that on the facts of the instant case equity requires that the doctrine of promissory estoppel should yield to it. 19. The representation made by the Board relied on by the petitioner was in regard to the meaning of a clause of a notification issued by the Board itself and the principle that there can be no estoppel against statute cannot be invoked on the facts of the instant case. 20. In support of the submission that the Board was not bound by the interpretation put upon clause 6 (b) of the notification dated 28-12-1971 by one of its employees reliance was placed by counsel for the Board upon principle No. 3 laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 39 of the report in the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1980 SC 1285 ) which reads;- "(3) When the officer of the Government acts outside the scope of his authority, the plea of promissory estoppel is not available. The doctrine of ultra vires will come into operation and the Government cannot be held bound by the unauthorised acts of its officers." 21. In our opinion when the concerned officer of the Board prepared the bills for the period between January and August, 1972, and indicated therein that the petitioner was entitled to a rebate in view of the grid tariff notified by the Board in its notification dated 28-12-1971 it cannot be said that the said officer acted "outside the scope of his authority". The officer had been authorised by the Board to prepare the bills according to the said notification and he was acting with authority. If he made an incorrect interpretation of clause 6 (b) of the notification it would at best amount to doing a wrong act in the discharge of the duty assigned to him but will not fall within the category of an act done "outside the scope of his authority". Suppose the bills were prepared by an officer who had not been authorised to do so his act of preparing the bills would be "outside the scope of his authority" but it is not the case of Board that the relevant bills showing that the petitioner was entitled to a rebate of 5% had been prepared by any such officer. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion the writ petition succeeds in part and is allowed to this extent that the U.P. State Electricity Board, respondent No. 3, is directed not to enforce its demand in respect of the amount of rebate for the period between 1-1-1972 and 9-12-1972 against the petitioner and the impugned notice of demand dated 18-1-1974 is quashed to that extent. The writ petition for the remaining reliefs is dismissed. In view of their divided success the parties will bear their own costs.