Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition the challenge is directed against Exts. P4 and P6. Ext. P4 is order No. G 4-67076/ 76-3 dated 29-10-1976 passed by the 2nd respondent, the Inspector General of Police, Kerala State; and Ext. P6 is G. O. R. T. No 348/78/Home, Home 'H' Department dated 21-2-1978 passed by the Ist respondent, the State of Kerala 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of this writ petition, in the light of the contentions passed before me, are not in dispute. On a charge levelled against the petitioner who was. during the material time, a Head Constable, an order imposing a penalty of stoppage of increment for two years was passed by the 3rd respondent, District Superintendent of Police Quilon, within whose jurisdiction he was functioning. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, to whom the concerned file was submitted, came to the conclusion that the punishment awarded, considering the gravity of the offence alleged, was too lenient, and, therefore, forwarded the file to the 2nd respondent, the Inspector General of Police By Ext P4 order the punishment given by the 3rd respondent was enhanced to one of reduction in rank by the 2nd respondent. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed an appeal before the 1st respondent. By Ext. P6 order the first respondent confirmed Ext. P4 order; hence the writ petition. 3. Though various contentions are seen to have been raised, Shri C. S. Rajan, the counsel for the petitioner, pressed only a legal point before me during the course of his submissions. According to him Ext. P4 order passed by the 2nd respondent is without jurisdiction; and as such Ext. P4 and Ext. P6 are liable to be quashed. 4. Under R.16 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules-1958, the authority to impose the punishment of reduction to a lower rank so far as the Head Constable is concerned is the Superintendent of Police of the District, and in appeal the Deputy Inspector General of Police concerned, as could be seen from Annexure showing the lowest authority which may impose penalty, appended to the Rules. The submission made by Shri Rajan is that the Superintendent of Police (the 3rd respondent) having already got the inquiry conducted, and having exercised his jurisdiction, the only other authority which could exercise jurisdiction over the same subject-matter was the Deputy Inspector General of Police in appeal. In this case the Deputy Inspector General of Police did not alter the punishment awarded; on the other hand, what he did was to make a recommendation for awarding enhanced punishment and to forward the file to the 2nd respondent, the Inspector General of Police. It is the 2nd respondent who passed Ext. P4 order enhancing the punishment to that of reduction to the lower rank. 5. The Government Pleader appearing for the respondents sought to support Exts. P4 and P6 orders contending that under the proviso to R.16 it is open to the higher authority to pass an order of punishment which the lower authority was competent to make. For the sake of convenience I will extract below these provisions. "16. Authorities to impose penalties and to receive appeals:- The members of the Service on whom the penalties mentioned in R.15 may be imposed, the lowest authorities competent to impose such penalties, and the appellate authorities empowered to receive appeals shall be as shown in the Annexure appended to these rules: Provided that (a) where in any case a competent authority has imposed or declined to impose a penalty under these rules, a lower authority shall have no jurisdiction to proceed in respect of the same case; (b) the fact that a lower authority has imposed or declined to impose a penalty in any case shall not debar a higher authority from exercising his jurisdiction in respect of the same case; (c) the order of a higher authority imposing or declining to impose in any case a penalty shall supersede any order passed by a lower authority in respect of the same case." Evidently the reliance placed by the Government Pleader is on proviso (b) to R.16. His submission is that the Inspector General of Police being an authority higher in rank than that of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who did not interfere with the punishment awarded by the Superintendent of Police, he was competent to award the punishment of reduction to a lower rank as was done by him by Ext. P4 order. 6. His submission is that the Inspector General of Police being an authority higher in rank than that of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who did not interfere with the punishment awarded by the Superintendent of Police, he was competent to award the punishment of reduction to a lower rank as was done by him by Ext. P4 order. 6. It has already been noticed that by virtue of the main clause of R.16 the authorities competent to order penalty of reduction to a lower rank so far as the Head Constable is concerned is the Superintendent of Police of the District or the Appellate Authority, the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Admittedly the Inspector General of Police is not either the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority so far as the petitioner was concerned. Then the question is whether proviso (b) to the rule would enable the Inspector General of Police who, certainly, is an authority higher in rank than that of the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, to impose the penalty. The wording of the proviso is: shall not debar a higher authority from exercising his Jurisdiction in respect of the same case." This would mean that if a higher authority is having the jurisdiction to do so, the fact that a lower authority had imposed or declined to impose penalty could not debar that authority from exercising his jurisdiction. The jurisdiction has to be traced to some provisions in the rules. In the annexure appended to the rules the Inspector General of Police is not shown to be an authority empowered to inflict the punishment of reduction to a lower rank so far as a Head Constable is concerned. The emphasis being to the exercise of his jurisdiction; if there is no jurisdiction vested in him to inflict a particular punishment so far as that person is concerned, even proviso (b) to the rule would not clothe him with authority to inflict that punishment. It would have made all the difference, had it been a case of the Inspector General having chosen to call for the file and to deal with the matter himself according to law invoking R.8 of the Rules at the stage of enquiry. That also is not the case here. 7. It would have made all the difference, had it been a case of the Inspector General having chosen to call for the file and to deal with the matter himself according to law invoking R.8 of the Rules at the stage of enquiry. That also is not the case here. 7. The Government Pleader then sought to support Ext P6 order relying on R.36-A and 36-B of the rules. No doubt, under those rules wide powers are given to the Government to review an order already passed or to call for the records at any stage of the proceeding and deal with it by themselves as they think fit having regard to the circumstances of the case. In this case the Government did not act suo motu. The appeal filed by the petitioner is seen to have been disposed of by Ext. P6 on the merits of the case without adverting to the question as to whether the Inspector General of Police had jurisdiction to impose the punishment aggrieved by which the petitioner had filed the appeal. The Government Pleader submitted that the jurisdictional question was not raised before the Government by the petitioner. Even then, it being a question of jurisdiction, in spite of the petitioner not having raised it before the Government, the Government should have considered that point. That not having been done, Ext. P6 order also is liable to be quashed. For the foregoing reasons Exts. P4 and P6 are quashed. In the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their respective costs.