JUDGMENT - Kotwal V.S. J. - The defendant-petitioner placed an oral order with the respon-dent-plaintiff, Registered Firm dealing in Forward Contracts in various commodities styled as “Hedge Contract”, sometime in the month of May 1971, as also in October 1971 pertaining to turmeric. On the instructions of the defendant two separate Accounts in the names of Shantilal Kantil and Shantilal Manekchand were opened with the plaintiff firm and the agreements were also entered into the same names Some amounts known as 'Margin Amounts' given by the defendant were also entered in the respective accounts. It, however, transpired that there was a reasonable possibility of losses hav-ing been incurred under the transactions under the contract, and therefore, to ward off the said prospective losses, the plaintiff demanded some additional margin amounts from the defendant. This, however, was not complied with and, therefore, as per the Articles of Association and the Byelaws of the Spices and Oil Seeds Exchange Limited, Sangli of which the plaintiff was a member, the transactions which were already entered into in the year 1971 we're proceeded with and completed. This was done by the plaintiff in the capacity of Pucca Adatiya. The speculation, however, having ultimately came to be true, there occurred certain losses in the transactions and the total amount involved in the two accounts alongwith interest was to the tune of Rs. 6262.78. The question about recovery of the said amount having arisen the matter was referred by the plaintiff to the Arbitrator as per the stipulations under the Rules and Regulations of the Association as also as per the Bye-laws. The defendant was duly served with notice and also put in his written statement. At the outset an objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator on the ground that the defendant had not entered into any agreement and the reliance was placed on some of the Bye-laws to come out of the clutches of the arbitration proceedings. Several contentions were also raised on the merits. During the progress of the arbitration proceeding's the defendant did not participate though the notices were sent to him to remain present. Ultimately an award came to be made by the Arbitrator upholding the claim of the plaintiff for Rs. 6262.78. The award, thereafter, was lodged in the Court of Jt. Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Sangli which was registered as Regular Civil Suit No 198 of 1973. Ultimately an award came to be made by the Arbitrator upholding the claim of the plaintiff for Rs. 6262.78. The award, thereafter, was lodged in the Court of Jt. Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Sangli which was registered as Regular Civil Suit No 198 of 1973. This claim was also resisted by the defendant more or less on the same grounds and particularly the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was also brought under question. After both the sides tendered their evidence and the matter was argued db merits, the trial Court held that the award was not vitiated on any count and it was binding on the defendant with the result that the' defendant was made liable to pay the said am*ount to the plaintiff and a decree in consonance with the award came to be recorded on 23–4-1976. The defendant's Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1976 was dismissed by the Assistant Judge endowing all the findings of the trial Court and accordingly the decree of the trial Court was confirmed. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was filed by the defendant challenging the impugned decisions raising practically all the contentions which were raised before the Courts below. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that it was the requirement of the Articles of Association and the Bye-laws that there must in the first instance be contract between a member of an association and a non-member which should be in writing and signed and should contain a term of reference to arbitration. It wascontended that admittedly there was no written contract much less there was an agreement to refer the dispute to Arbitra-tor and, therefore, the award having been, passed without jurisdiction could not be upheld in the civil Court and reliance was placed on the provisions contained in section 16(1) (c) and 30(c) of the Arbitration Act. On behalf of the defendant among other contentions it was stated that there being concurrence amongst the Courts below, jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution could not be invoked. Negativing the submission on the ground that applying even strict yardstick the case squarely answered the principles as regards exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 and having regard to all the aspects of controversy, it was held that interference under Article 227 of the Constitution was wholly justified and was absolutely essential since the decree was extremely vulnerable. Negativing the submission on the ground that applying even strict yardstick the case squarely answered the principles as regards exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 and having regard to all the aspects of controversy, it was held that interference under Article 227 of the Constitution was wholly justified and was absolutely essential since the decree was extremely vulnerable. V.S. Kotwal J [After dealing with the facts of the case and negativing the objection as regards tenability of the petition under Article 227 in paragraphs 1 to 9, the Judgment proceeds:]- 10. I have already indicated at the outset the nature of the controversy. That the plaintiff is a member of the Association is an accepted position. It is an equally accepted position that the petitioner defendant is a non-member. A further important aspect which is accepted by both the sides is that there is a framing of the statutory rules and Articles of Association and also there exist bye-laws which are binding on the parties. In fact, the plaintiff is relying very much on the said bye-laws and the rules and it is further controverted that the Association is competent enough to frame such rules and the bye laws which got statutory position under the former contract Act. This aspect is referred to at this juncture, inasmuch as, it is really the foundation of the entire controversy and is equally the foundation for resolving the same. Two accounts were opened with the plaintiff firm as indicated earlier, and additional margin amounts were demanded which demand was not complied with by the petitioner, with the result that under the bye-laws and the rules, transaction had proceeded further and as was stipulated, there did occur certain losses. On settling accounts, the plaintiff firm discovered that an amount of Rs. 6262.78 P. was due from the petitioner with reference to both the accounts and this included the principal and* the interest thereon. The matter was then referred to the arbitrator and after concluding the arbitration proceedings, an award came to be passed which was lodged in the Civil Court and in consonance therewith, a decree was recorded to the tune of the said entire amount and it was confirmed by the District Court. The matter was then referred to the arbitrator and after concluding the arbitration proceedings, an award came to be passed which was lodged in the Civil Court and in consonance therewith, a decree was recorded to the tune of the said entire amount and it was confirmed by the District Court. Now, the further outstanding feature which is extremely relevant and and germane to this proceeding is that there is no controversy, that there did not exist any written contract, and the plaintiff has admitted that the entire transaction had flown out of an oral agreement. In fact, both the Courts below have proceeded on that basis and it is conceded in this proceeding by Shri Hombalkar, the learned counsel for the respondent. A doubt was raised by the learned counsel that certain documents though not in the shape of agreement may contain the signatures of the petitioner and therefore, record was sent for and after perusal thereof, both the sides have accepted that no document and especially some documents which are styled as Kabalas' bore the signatures of the petitioner. The doubt is completely dispelled. However, then we have a positive statement and assertion in the shape of admission made by the plaintiff himself to the effect that there is no written agreement and no document, neither any 'Kabala' has been ever signed by the defendant. This admission therefore, would close the chapter in so far as that aspect is concerned. The net result of this would be that the entire alleged transaction is based on an oral agreement while no document during the course of the said transaction contained the signature of the defendant. I have already indicated the nature of controversy as raised by Shri Pungalia, the learned counsel for the petitioner. In order to understand the thrust of his submissions, it is necessary to consider some of the relevant rules and regulations as also the bye-laws. Articles 28, 29, 29-A are clubbed together in Chapter 7 under the heading “Arbitration” which pertain to the Rules and Articles of Association. Article 28 in so far as is relevant, relates to a transaction between a member and another member of the Association which is to be settled by resort to arbitration proceedings. Article 29 per-tains to transaction between a member and a non-member and its reproduction therefore, is necessary. “29. Article 28 in so far as is relevant, relates to a transaction between a member and another member of the Association which is to be settled by resort to arbitration proceedings. Article 29 per-tains to transaction between a member and a non-member and its reproduction therefore, is necessary. “29. It shall be compulsory for every non-member who has entered into a contract with any member of the Association, in case, such non-member has agreed in writing to abide by the Rules and Regulations of the Association, to have all claims and disputes arising out of or in course of the performance thereof or out of any breach of such contract, settled by arbitration subject to the bye-laws of the Association from time to time in force.” Article 29-A covers both the earlier Articles namely 28 and 29 and this Article is of equal relevance and importance and it reads as : - “29-A. The provisions for arbitration contained in Articles 28 and 29 shall be deemed to be an express agreement between members and between members and non-members who may have dealings with members, to refer the dispute or differences in respect of any transaction entered into between them (whether such transaction is admitted or not) including the existence of such contracts and/or the question of validity or invalidity of such contracts and for obtaining an award thereon, before the parties to any such transaction can take any other action.” 11. A combined reading of these Articles under the said chapter would make it manifestly clear that Articles 28 and 29 read in isolation would make an incomplete picture and to understand their impact and the consequence flowing therefrom, reading of Article 29-A becomes inevitable. This is sought to be emphasised, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has merely read Article 29-A and relied on the same without any reference whatsoever to Article 29. It would thus become apparent that it is compulsory for a non-member who is a party to the agreement with a member of the Association, to have all the disputes settled by arbitration which, however, would be subject to bye-laws in force, and Article 29-A contemplates that this reference to an arbitration under Article 29 would be deemed to be an express agreement between such parties. A legal fiction is, therefore, created in the two provisions, when under Article 29, a non-member is required to agree in writing to abide by the Rules and Regulations, and it isin that respect only that under Article 29-A a deeming clause envisages that such a written agreement would be treated as an express agreement for reference to arbitration. In effect, therefore, an agreement in writing to abide by the rules and bye-laws as contemplated by Article 29 is the basis for the consequence that flows out of the legal fiction under the deeming clause contained in Article 29-A. To put it in negative form, if there does not exist any such writing to abide by the rules and. regulations and the bye-laws, then, an agreement for reference to arbitration shall not be deemed to exist, though in that event, it will not be estopped by a separate mode which would also be by way of an agreement as contemplated by section 2 of the Arbitration Act. 12. As stated, the parties agree and the record substantiates that not only there is no agreement for arbitration-express or implied, not only there is not even a written contract for the main transaction, but, there is no writing whatsoever executed by the petitioner even to inferentially suggest that he has agreed to abide by the rules and the bye-laws. This is practically conceded on behalf of the respondent. Then the consequence must follow that the petitioner had not agreed either expressly or even by implication or under the deeming clause to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. The learned District Judge no doubt referred to Article 29-A but for a limited purpose when he observed that the said provision would show that even a non-member was subject to rules and regulations and as such, all disputes are to be referred to the arbitrator. Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is therefore right in submitting that the learned Assistant Judge has really missed to appreciate the real purport of the said two Articles and an apparent fallacy has been committed since Article 29-A has been read in isolation. This, therefore, is the first hurdle in the way of the respondent plaintiff. 13. Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is therefore right in submitting that the learned Assistant Judge has really missed to appreciate the real purport of the said two Articles and an apparent fallacy has been committed since Article 29-A has been read in isolation. This, therefore, is the first hurdle in the way of the respondent plaintiff. 13. The matter, however, does not rest there, inasmuch as, assuming otherwise, still, the petitioner stands on a better footing which is based on the bye-laws which are accepted by the respondent plaintiff. In that connection, Bye-laws 14, 15 and 184 would assume some relevance and in that vein, it is also worth-noting that there is an appendix to the said bye-laws which is also accepted by the plaintiff and which contains various forms in which the contracts are required to be executed. It is necessary to reproducer verbatim Bye-laws 14 and 15:- “14. Bye-laws as they stand and as they may stand from time to time, shall govern the rights and obligations in relation to all matters arising out of Hedge Contracts between members and between a member and a non-member and the parties concerned shall act accordingly and fulfil the same.” “15. Terms of contracts and forms of contracts of authorised commodities shall be the relevant terms of the contracts and forms of the contract as provided in the Appendix which shall form part of the Byelaws. All contracts made on terms and conditions which are repugnant to the terms and conditions of the contract as provided in the Bye-laws, shall be void and the members entering into such contracts shall be liable for disciplinary action.” Bye-law 184 is also extremely relevant and it reads as under :- “184. All claims, differences and disputes including the dispute about the existence or non-existence of the contract and the arbitration agreement, whether admitted or not (other than the disputes covered by other bye-laws such as clearing bye-laws, survey bye-laws, etc.) arising out of or in relation to (a) all contracts, whether between members or between member and non-member, made subject to the Bye-laws of the Association, or (b) the rights and responsibilities of persons not parties to' such contracts, or (c) relating to the construction or interpretation of any contract or any bye-laws, (including the bye-laws, relating to arbitration) shall be settled by reference to arbitration.'* 14. A combined reading of these bye-laws will clearly indicate the purpose for which those were enacted and how the formalities are to be observed and also the consequence of non-observance. Bye-laws 14 and 15 find place under the head “General Bye-laws regarding contracts and trading”. This would, therefore, indicate that its general applicability to all the transactions under the contracts and trading is covered thereunder. It also makes a clear reference to its applicability to “Hedge Contracts” and it is further specifically mentioned that it shall also cover transactions between a member and a non-member. Thus all the requirements of bye-law 14 are squarely fulfilled. After these formalities are over, then, one has to turn to bye-law 15 which relate to the authorised commodities and in the instant case, the subject matter of the transaction is also an authorised commodity. It prescribes that the terms of such contracts shall be as. provided for in the Appendix and the further prescription is that the said Appendix shall form part of the bye-laws. The last and residuary clause of the said bye-laws, lays down the consequence of non-observance. One of the consequences would be that a disciplinary action can be initiated against a member who is a party to the contract with which we are not concerned, but the second and more important consequence would be that it would entail into the contract becoming void. 15. It is in this context worth-referring to the Appendix as it follows in its chronological order. This Appendix is obviously framed under the Bye-laws and it is styled as “Spices and Oil-seeds Exchange Limited official contract forms for Hedge contracts”. We are mainly concerned with the forms which fall in a schedule containing forms Nos. B-2 to B-5. Its nomenclature is “Official clients contract form for Hedge contracts...... between a member and a non-member.” That these forms are applicable to the instant case is conceded by the counsel on behalf of the respondent plaintiff. B-2 is the basic form of a contract. B-2 to B-5. Its nomenclature is “Official clients contract form for Hedge contracts...... between a member and a non-member.” That these forms are applicable to the instant case is conceded by the counsel on behalf of the respondent plaintiff. B-2 is the basic form of a contract. It contains six terms, 5th being of more relevance is, therefore, quoted hereunder :- “In the event of any dispute of any nature arising out of this contract, the same shall be settled by arbitration in Sangli according to the bye-laws of the Spices and Oil-seeds “Exchange Limited.” The 6th term refers to the execution part of the contract contemplating that it was so entered into by. the said parties. The form also prescribes the requirement of taking the signatures of the concerned parties. This form of contract which is now a part and parcel of the bye-laws being incorporated in the Appendix which itself is framed under the said bye-laws, comes very much in the picture in the context of the said two bye-laws 14 and 15. 16. The combined reading of these three bye-laws on the plane of the forms contained in the Appendix and the necessary terms' about the reference to arbitration, the analysis would entail into certain logical and inescapable deductions. Thus, there would be required a Hedge Contract relating to an authorised commodity which may be between a member and non-member. The parties shall be governed by the bye-laws and their rights and obligations would be subject to those bye-laws. The contract would be in the form as prescribed in the Appendix, the most relevant term of which being term No. 5 contemplating that in the event of any dispute, it shall be settled by arbitration. In the breach of these formalities which have the statutory force, the consequence would be two-fold, envisaging disciplinary action against the member and also entailing the contract being reduced to a void contract. It would further be reinforced on the said analysis that all claims and disputes arising out of such a contract, would be referable to an arbi- trator for settlement. However, a certain qualification is hedged in before applicability of bye-law 184 comes into operation for making a reference to the arbitrator, namely, that the contract itself must be subject to the bye-laws of the Association. However, a certain qualification is hedged in before applicability of bye-law 184 comes into operation for making a reference to the arbitrator, namely, that the contract itself must be subject to the bye-laws of the Association. The necessary consequence of this clause would be that the contract does not answer the requirements of the bye-laws and when there is no situation agreed upon by the parties as contemplated under the bye-laws as also under Articles 29 and 29-A coupled with the absence of term No. 5 as embodied in the form under the Appendix, then, the matter cannot be made referable to the arbitrator. 17. It is in the context of these rules, regulations and the bye-laws that Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel has justifiably submitted that since there is no written agreement, there is equally no written document, equally there being no document signed by the petitioner out of which even inferentially an agreement can be spelt out, and in the absence of any specific agreement or stipulation agreed upon by the petitioner for making the dispute referable to an arbitrator, the reference made to the arbitrator, the proceedings initiated and conducted by the arbitrator and the resultant award recorded;by the arbitrator would obviously be without jurisdiction. There does not appear to be any escape from this conclusion. 18. Shri Hombalkar, the learned counsel for the respondent tried td get over this incovenient situation by advancing a submission that really speaking, the petitioner would be covered by a different set of bye-laws i. e. bye-laws in “Bye-laws regarding non-members”. After going through the relevant bye-laws in this category, it is very difficult to uphold the contention raised by Shri Hombalkar. It does appear as rightly submitted by Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel for the petitioner, from the scheme of the said bye-laws that those would come into operation prescribing certain special provisions in respect of a contract entered into by a non-member only after the basic requirement of fulfilment of Bye laws 14 and 15 is satisfied. This submission on the reading of those bye-laws is well-justified. 19. This submission on the reading of those bye-laws is well-justified. 19. It is in that context that the title to the bye-laws 14 and 15 which is general and sort of serving as a patent bye-law even relating to a contract between a member and a non-member, assumes importance when it reads as “General bye-laws regarding Contracts and Trading” and it covers specifically even the case of a contract between a member and a non-member. There is thus no substance in the contention raised by Shri Hombalkar. The learned counsel for the respondent though tried to submit that an appeal is provided for under bye-law 217 which would lie to the Board within 10 days from the notice of making and signing the award. The contention is that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the validity and legality of the award, then a legal remedy was available to him in the shape of appeal and he having not thus availed of the said remedy, the doors under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should not be readily open for such a litigant. This submission contains a basic fallacy. It is clear from the record that the petitioner is not only challenging the legality and validity of the award but his challenge is deeper when it touches the very jurisdiction of the arbitrator to hear such a reference, much less, to make an award. Therefore, the matter of jurisdiction which is fundamental is far away from the legality of the award recorded by an arbitrator* who initially had a jurisdiction to entertain the matter. In that view of the matter, therefore, the said submission also does not deserve to be upheld, and it would be improper to hold that the petitioner should be deprived from prosecuting this remedy in this proceeding. It is also in that context worth-noting another allied feature. According to Shri Hombalkar, the learned counsel for the respondent, there are obvious limitations on the powers of the Court which would not be sitting in appeal over the award passed by the arbitrator. The learned counsel has relied on the provision of section 16 which vests the Court with the power to remit the award in case of three contingencies. The learned counsel submits that the present case would fall under none. The learned counsel has relied on the provision of section 16 which vests the Court with the power to remit the award in case of three contingencies. The learned counsel submits that the present case would fall under none. The Said fallacy which unfortunately is the under-current of these submissions is thus rebutted, inasmuch as, there is no challenge as such merely to the legality or validity of the award. It is one thing to say that an arbitrator who had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference and has proceeded with it and passed an award, the legality of which could be challenged under certain provisions with obvious limitations. However, it is entirely different thing when the challenge is to the very root of the matter divesting the arbitrator of any jurisdiction that was sought to be given under the Act. In that context, Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly relied on the provisions of section 30 (c) of the Act which contemplate that an award can be set aside if it is otherwise invalid. This is a sort of residuary clause and would cover several contingencies, the most dominant of which would be the one as contemplated by the case at hand, namely, that there was never an agreement-express or implied-between the parties to refer the matter to the arbitrator and the basic aspect being against the bye-laws, a reference to the arbitrator itself could not be said to be a valid one, with the result that the arbitrator himself would not be vested with the competence and jurisdiction to entertain the same, much less, to pass an award, with the ultimate resultant consequence that the award can be justifia-bly styled as “otherwise invalid”. If that be so, then, the petitioner would be thoroughly entitled to knock the doors of a Court by invoking jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the invalidity of the award is manifestly clear and glaring which spells out an error apparent on the face of the record. 20. If that be so, then, the petitioner would be thoroughly entitled to knock the doors of a Court by invoking jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the invalidity of the award is manifestly clear and glaring which spells out an error apparent on the face of the record. 20. Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel .for the petitioner also relied on the provisions of section 2 of the Arbitration Act in support of hiscontention that a concept of arbitration agreement under the Act would require a written agreement to submit present or future disputes to arbitration, and since admittedly, there is no such written agreement, there cannot be any reference. This submission also cannot be said to be unjustified, though it need not detain us as the petitioner is bound to succeed on the other premise as indicated earlier. 21. Reliance was placed by Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ratio in the case of (Firm Narain Das v. Bhagwan Das)1, wherein it has been observed that when the transaction flows out of an oral agreement, a member or non-member of an association under which they bind themselves to abide by the rules and the bvelaws, including the submission of dispute to arbitrator, even then, it could not be said to be an arbitration agreement as there is no written agreement to refer the dispute to arbitrator as defined i« section 2 of the said Act. It is further observed therein that when an award is given by the arbitrators without any valid reference and the subordinate Court, on an erroneous view of the law, endorses the same and passes a decree on its basis, then really it assumes jurisdiction which did not vest in it and, therefore, it would be proper for the High Court to interfere through it was a revision when inherent powers of the said Court were sought to be invoked. 22. Reliance was also placed on the ratio in (Waverly Jute Mills v. Raymon and Co).2, wherein it has been observed that a dispute as to the validity of a contract could be the subject-matter of an agreement of arbitration, but, it would be effective and operative only when it is separate from the contract which is being impugned, and if it is a term of the very contract whose validity is questioned, then, it has no existence. In the said judgment, it is further observed that an agreement for arbitration is the very foundation on which the jurisdiction of the arbitrators rests, and where that is not in existence at the time when they eater upon their duties, the proceedings must be held to be wholly without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court also in the said ratio negatived the contention that if a party participates in arbitration proceedings then it may be presumed by the said conduct that there was agreement to the reference, and in that context, it was observed that defect of lack of jurisdiction is not cured by the appearance of the parties in those proceedings even if it is without protest because consent can- not confer jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, laid down a qualification and a contingency under which if the arhitration proceeding comes into existence and is not mentioned, the parties can arrive at an agreement subsequently to abide by such an award which would provide as a fresh agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration. However, a caution has been levelled in that behalf as : “But, it will make all the difference in the result whether the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement as defined in section 2 (a) of the Arbitration Act or have merely taken steps in the conduct of proceed-ings assumed or believed to be valid. In the former case, the award will be valid; in the latter, a nullity.” These observations will squarely answer the point raised by Shri Hombalkar, the learned counsel that the petitioner was served and has actually filed his written statement in the arbitration proceedings. This can hardly be the substitute for an arbitration agreement. This ratio, therefore, fully supports the contention of Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel for the patitioner, more so, if during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, there was no agreement as such. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the ratio in (Megna Mills v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd).3 Therein, the parties had agreed to an omnibus term that all the terms and conditions of the said Exchange standard contract would be applicable to the said contract. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the ratio in (Megna Mills v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd).3 Therein, the parties had agreed to an omnibus term that all the terms and conditions of the said Exchange standard contract would be applicable to the said contract. It was then submitted that by reason of this incorporation of the said term, the parties have practically agreed to abide by all the terms that, are included in the aforesaid contract which would also include the term regarding arbitration. In spite of that the Supreme Court refused to uphold the contention atleast in so-far as one of the conditions referring to the clear working days which were required to be specified and since it was not specifically agreed upon or entered into in any document, the specious-recital in some of the letters indicating agreement of all the forma! terms, would not be held to be a sufficient compliance. Shri Pungaliya, the learned counsel has rightly relied on the ratio of this decision. 24. Shri Hombalkar, the learned counsel sought to place, reliance on the ratio in Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U. P.4. This ratio, however, enunciates that the mere absence of the signatures of the complainant party and even omission to fill in the schedule by itself may not amount to non-compliance of the for malities and the clause of reference to arbitration would remain unaffected. However, the said ratio goes thus far and not further, inasmuch as, in the said case, there was a clear written agreement to that effect, the only deficiency being that there was non-observance of formality of obtaining the signatures, and the additional factor was that there was adequate material to, substantiate that the parties are actually agreed upon the arbitration clause. There can hardly be any dispute about the general principles laid down therein, though, the said ratio hardly affords any assistance in the facts of the instant case. (Rest of the judgment is not material for the report.) Rule made absolute. -----