K. J. SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Art. 226 of the constitution raises a short question of law, viz. whether on the true construction of Rule 6 of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules 1971 (called shortly as 'the Rules'), as applied to the undisputed facts in this case, the 1st respondent who is the owner of a touring talkies can be said to be in lawful possession of the site. ( 2 ) BEFORE I turn to the facts, for immediate reference, I now straightaway set out Rule 6:"6. Records relating to ownership or possession to site, building or equipment to be produced.-If the applicant for licence is the owner of the site, building or equipment he shall produce before the licensing authority necessary records relating to his ownership and possession. If he is not the owner, he shall produce to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, documentary evidence in proof of his lawful possession of the site, building or equipment. "we are concerned in this case only with the second part of the rule. The petitioner is undisputedly the owner of the site and the 1st respondent claims to be a tenant in lawful possession of the site. ( 3 ) THE touring cinema of the 1st respondent goes by the name of "padma Touring Talkies". It is located at Sy. No. 278/7 at Shravana belagola town. On January 4, 1979 he obtained the site under a lease from the owner for 11 months on a rental of Rs. 150 per month. After the expiry of the lease he has been continuing in possession by paying rent to the son of the owner till May, 1980. He now claims to be a tenant-holding over and demands renewal of the licence from the District Magistrate on the ground that he is in lawful possession of the site. ( 4 ) THE original lease and the licence expired in November, 1979. However, the licence was renewed upto May, 23, 1980 obviously not with the consent of the owner. When renewal was sought for further period, the owner objected contending that she had leased the site only for a temporary period of eleven months and the 1st respondent has no right to continue in the premises thereafter. She also contended that she required the site for her own use. When renewal was sought for further period, the owner objected contending that she had leased the site only for a temporary period of eleven months and the 1st respondent has no right to continue in the premises thereafter. She also contended that she required the site for her own use. The 1st respondent, however, pleaded before the District Magistrate that he has been in lawful possession of the site since the owner has not terminated the lease by giving a sufficient notice. He also said that the owner has accepted the rent upto May, 1980 which entitles him to continue in possession as a tenant holding-over under S. 116 of the transfer of Property Act. He also in the meantime filed a suit for injunction against the owner and obtained a temporary injunction restraining her from interfering with his possession. The District Magistrate after considering those rival contentions, held that the 1st respondent's possession of of the site in question was lawful and he was entitled to the renewal of the licence subject to his fulfilling the other requirements under law. The validity of that order is challenged in this petition. ( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding further, it may be noted that after the expiry of the written lease, the owner did not personally accept the rent from the 1st respondent and the case is not governed by the Karnataka Rent control Act which entitles the 1st respondent to claim statutory protection from eviction. ( 6 ) THE primary question that arises for decision is whether the 1st respondent could be said to be in "lawful possession" of the site, within the scope and meaning of the second limb of Rule 6. The question raised does not call for a detailed study in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in M. C. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam, AIR 1974 SC 104 at 110, Para 15. In that case, the concept of an identical expression under the madras Cinema (Regulation) Rules, 1957 was examined and it was observed:"the word 'lawful', therefore naturally assumes significance in the second part while it was not even necessary in the first part. In that case, the concept of an identical expression under the madras Cinema (Regulation) Rules, 1957 was examined and it was observed:"the word 'lawful', therefore naturally assumes significance in the second part while it was not even necessary in the first part. The fact that after expiry of the lease the tenant will be able to continue in possession of the property by resisting a suit for eviction, does not establish a case in law to answer the requirement of lawful possession of the property within the meaning of Rule 13. Lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. This court in lallu Yeshwanth Singh's case (1968) 2 SCR 203 = AIR 1968 SC 620 supra, had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession. "it may be seen that it was emphasised that lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant and that relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. It was also made clear that lawful possession is not litigious possession and it must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property. It was further held that juridical possession is protected by law against lawful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession. In the instant case, the 1st respondent claims to be in lawful possession of the site on two grounds: First, he relies on the temporary injunction granted by the civil court against the owner restraining her from interfering with his possession. In the instant case, the 1st respondent claims to be in lawful possession of the site on two grounds: First, he relies on the temporary injunction granted by the civil court against the owner restraining her from interfering with his possession. It was urged that the temporary injunction in his favour would clothe him with the righf to remain in possession lawfully without any interference from the owner. The contention though attractive at the first sight, is obviously not bound. The temporary injunction only protects him from unlawful interference by the owner, but is not conclusive, much less indicative of the fact that he is a tenant-holding- over or a person in lawful possession of the site. It only shows that his right to remain in possession is itself under litigation. The litigious possession as the Supreme Court has observed, stands excluded from the concept of "lawful possession" in the context of the second part of Rule 6. The second ground upon which the 1st respondent's possession was sought to be justified and protected, was the acceptance of rents by the owner's son after the period of the written lease. It was inter alia contended that the 1st respondent has become a 'tenant holding over' entitled to the benefits of S. 116 of the Transfer of property Act. ( 7 ) SINCE the 1st respondent claims to be a tenant holding-over, it may be necessary to refer to the requirements and incidents of such a tenancy. Woodfall in the book "landlord and tenant", Woodfall-Landlord and Tenant 27th Edn. P. 271. summarises:"where a tenant for a term of years holds over after the expiration of his lease, he becomes a tenant on sufferance; but when he pays, or expressly agrees to pay, any subsequent rent, at the previous yearly rate, a new tenancy from year to year may thereby be created upon the same terms and conditions as those contained in the expired lease, so far as the same are applicable to and not inconsistent with a yearly tenancy. This, however, is a matter of evidence rather than of law, the question being what may fairly be inferred as the intention of the parties. "it is therefore clear that a person remaining in possession after the expiry of the term of a lease is just a tenant on sufferance with no rights whatsoever. This, however, is a matter of evidence rather than of law, the question being what may fairly be inferred as the intention of the parties. "it is therefore clear that a person remaining in possession after the expiry of the term of a lease is just a tenant on sufferance with no rights whatsoever. There is a clear-cut distinction between a, tenant remaining in possession after the expiration of a lease with the consent of the landlord and a tenant remaining in possession without such consent. That has been vividly stated by the Supreme Court in Bhawanji v. Himatlal, AIR 1972 SC 819 at 821, Para 9 as follows:"if a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant at will or holding over In English Law and the latter a tenant at sufferance. " ( 8 ) HAVING stated the law on the subject, I turn to apply the facts to the present case as found by the district Magistrate. After summarising the evidence, he has stated thus: "the owner has assented to the tenant's continuing in possession and the tenancy has to be presumed to have been renewed under S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Then there follows his further observation:"it is, of couse to be made clear that all this is subject to the finding of a competent civil court, which has been approached by applicant in this case and which has granted a temporary injunction in his favour. "the above conclusion was reached by the District Magistrate on the basis of the rent receipts produced by the 1st respondent. Those receipts were issued by Paraswanath - the son of the petitioner - acknowledging the receipt of rents for a few months after the expiration of the original lease. On this material, the District Magistrate concluded that the owner has assented to the tenant continuing in possession and the tenancy has to be presumed to have been renewed. But there is no evidence that Paraswanath was authorised to receive the rents for and on behalf of the petitioner. On this material, the District Magistrate concluded that the owner has assented to the tenant continuing in possession and the tenancy has to be presumed to have been renewed. But there is no evidence that Paraswanath was authorised to receive the rents for and on behalf of the petitioner. There is also no evidence that during the term of the written lease, Paraswanath was alone receiving the rents throughout. It is necessary to point out that mere acceptance of rent by or on behalf of the landlord will not create a tenant- holding-over. In addition to the receipt of rents, there should be evidence to establish the assent of the landlord express or implied, to continue the tenancy. Therefore the payment of rents for about four months by the 1st respondent after the expiration of the lease, assuming it to be true, without anything more cannot establish the petitioner's assent to continue the tenancy. There is no material on record to establish such an assent of the petitioner. ( 9 ) WHERE the owner disputes the lawful possession of the site, building or equipment with the tenant, the onus is heavy upon the tenant to prove his lawful possession. The evidence in such a case to be produced by the tenant must be in conformity with the statutory requirement of the second part of Rule 6 which provides that he shall produce to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, documentary evidence in proof of his lawful possession of the site etc. , The documentary evidence should alone be the foundation for the satisfaction of the District magistrate and not surmises on the conduct of the parties. It is also necessary to point out that the district Magistrate cannot tentatively decide the dispute and grant licence subject to the decision of the civil court as he has done in the present case. ( 10 ) IN the absence of any other material on record to lend support t3 the claim of the 1st respondent as to his legal possession of the site in question, the District Magistrate, in my opinion, was not right in renewing the licence. ( 11 ) IN the result, the rule is made absolute and the impugned order is quashed. Respondent-1 shall pay costs to the petitioner. Advocate's fee rs. 100. --- *** --- .