JUDGMENT MOHTA, J.- This civil revision application under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, ordinarily a Single Bench matter has been referred to a Division Bench for decision by the learned Single Judge (Ginwala, J.) as in his opinion it involves the following question of general importance:- 1. Whether for getting decree for eviction in respect of leased premises governed by the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 ("the House Rent Control Order" for short) it is necessary for a landlord to determine the lease by giving quit notice after securing necessary permission from the Controller? Though the question referred is purely legal, it is necessary to notice the factual matrix as the revision bas to be decided on merits as well. 2. The applicant (original-plaintiff) had let out his block of two rooms in Itwari, Nagpur to the non-applicant (original-defendant) on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. After obtaining requisite permission from the Controller, in terms of Clause 13(3) of the House Rent Control Order, a quit notice as required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued. The notice was first sent at the residential address and as it returned unserved with an endorsement that the non-applicant was not found at the house, another notice was sent at his office address. Both the notices were sent by registered post. Second notice also returned unserved. The applicant then served the notice by affixing its copy on the door of the house of the non-applicant in presence of two witnesses. After expiry of the 'requisite period, a civil suit for eviction and other relief was instituted in the Court of Small Causes. The non-applicant contended that the notice was not validly served and consequently the suit was not maintainable. This contention succeeded and consequently the suit was dismissed. The present revision is directed against the said judgment and decree. 3. Two-fold submissions are made on behalf of the applicant. The first is that no notice was really necessary in view of the fact that permission from the House Rent Controller was obtained. Second is that the notice was validly served. We will examine the first point in some detail as it is decisive of the fate of the case. It is essentially founded on the observations made in the case of V. Dhanpal Chettier v. Yasoda Ammal1. Second is that the notice was validly served. We will examine the first point in some detail as it is decisive of the fate of the case. It is essentially founded on the observations made in the case of V. Dhanpal Chettier v. Yasoda Ammal1. This is a decision dealing with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Question arose as to whether for getting decree for ejectment under the said Act was it first necessary to terminate the tenancy by giving notice under section 106, Transfer of Property Act. Madras High Court came to the conclusion that it was not. Agreeing with this view and referring to various decisions of various High Courts and so also some previous decision of the Supreme Court it is observed :- "Even though there was no basic or fundamental difference in regard to the law of eviction of a tenant in any of the State Statutes, different constructions were culled out in varying manners to arrive at the conclusion in some cases that a notice to quit in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary and in some it was held that it was not necessary. The gravamen of the underlying principles seems to have been overlooked in many cases." After dealing with some of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in general and section 111(h) in particular, the judgment proceeds to add:- "It is this clause which brings into operation the requirement of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Without adverting to the effect and the details of waiver of forfeiture waiver of notice to quit, relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent etc. as provided for in sections 112 to 114-A of the Transfer of Property Act, suffice it to say that under the said Act no ground of eviction of a tenant has to be made out once a contractual tenancy is put to an end by service of a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Until and unless the lease is determined, the lessee is entitled to continue in possession. Once it is determined it becomes open to the lessee to enforce his right of recovery of possession of the property against him. Until and unless the lease is determined, the lessee is entitled to continue in possession. Once it is determined it becomes open to the lessee to enforce his right of recovery of possession of the property against him. In such a situation, it was plain and clear that if the lease of the immoveable property did not stand determined under any of the Clauses (a) to (g) of section 111, a notice to determine it under section 106 was necessary. But when under the various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of the said Acts, then how does .the question of determination of a tenancy by notice arise? If the State Rent Act requires the giving of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of relief such a notice will have to be given." 4. The perusal of this judgment will indicate that all the judgments and provisions considered therein relate to the Bihar Rent Act. Kerala Lease and Rent Control Act, East Punjab Urban Rent Registration Act, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Delhi and Ajmer Nerwada Rent Control Act, M. P. Accommodation Control Act, Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, Saurashtra Rent Control Act and Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. "All these Acts without exception provide for a complete Code for eviction and under their provisions alone a decree or order of eviction can be passed on proof of grounds enumerated in the Acts. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that basic structure of all the aforesaid Rent Control Legislations are the same and the difference in the phraseology used therein leaves no scope for taking different view about requirement of giving a quit notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which was considered an exercise in futility, in view of the position that landlord cannot get decree for eviction and tenant continues to be so even thereafter. It was consequently held that making out a case for eviction under the Act by itself can be the foundation of the decree and not the determination of lease by issuing quit notice under the Transfer of Property Act. It was consequently held that making out a case for eviction under the Act by itself can be the foundation of the decree and not the determination of lease by issuing quit notice under the Transfer of Property Act. After dealing with this aspect, Supreme Court observed ... "In all the States the law should be uniform viz., that either a notice is necessary or it is not. It was high time, therefore, that this larger Bench, was constituted to lay down a uniform law for the governance of the whole country and not permit the unjustified different trend of decisions to continue." On the basis of the aforesaid observations it was contended that the ratio of the decision applied also to the leases governed by the House Rent Control Order, for whatever has been observed is for the whole country, irrespective of the difference in various legislations. However, it is conceded before us and this is even otherwise apparent from record that neither the provisions of the House Rent Control Order nor any judgment interpreting the same has been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. This by itself would not have made much difference if the basic scheme of the House Rent Control Order as well as various Acts considered by the Supreme Court was similar, if not the same. 5. It seems to us that the House Rent Control Order has an entirely different complexion of its own and, therefore, ratio decidendi will not apply to the leases governed it. Before Dhanpal's case (supra) the necessity of issuing a quit notice in terms of the House Rent Control order was never in doubt in eight districts of Vidarbha in which alone the House Rent Control Order holds the field. The House Rent Control order operates in this area ever since it was part and parcel of the erstwhile province of Central Provinces and Berar. It will be necessary to examine some of the salient features of the House Rent Control Order in order to notice the differences in the basic structure. The House Rent Control order operates in this area ever since it was part and parcel of the erstwhile province of Central Provinces and Berar. It will be necessary to examine some of the salient features of the House Rent Control Order in order to notice the differences in the basic structure. We are chiefly concerned with Clause 13 (1) and (3) which read as under:- "13 (1) No landlord shall, except with the previous written permission of the Controller :- (a) give notice to a tenant determining the lease or determining the lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option; or (b) where the lease is determinable by efflux of the time limited thereby, require the tenant to vacate the house by process of law or otherwise if the tenant is willing to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions. x x x x x (3) If after hearing the parties the Controller is satisfied (i) x x x x x (ii) x x x x x (iii) x x x x x (iv) x x x x x (v) x x x x x (vi) x x x x x (vii) x x x x x (viii) x x x x x (ix) x x x x x he shall grant the landlord permission to give notice to determine the lease as required by sub-clause (1)." A provision for appeal against this decision is made in Clause 21. The Collector of the District is an appellate authority who has also been conferred the power of review. The decision of the Collector is made final. That is to be particularly noticed in the absence of power to the Controller to pass an order or decree for ejectment. All that is provided for inter alia is an embargo on the right of the landlord to issue notice terminating the tenancy without obtaining previous written permission from the Controller on any of the grounds enumerated in Clause (i) to (ix) of Clause 13 (3) of the House Rent Control Order. 6. Now, the general law relating to leases of buildings is contained in the Transfer of Property Act, Rent Control Legislations do not repeal the entire general law. 6. Now, the general law relating to leases of buildings is contained in the Transfer of Property Act, Rent Control Legislations do not repeal the entire general law. The scheme of the House Rent Control order clearly is that the landlord cannot give quit notice without previous written permission from the Controller, who bas exclusive jurisdiction to decide the points under the House Rent Control Order. Depending upon his satisfaction or non-satisfaction, the permission is granted or refused. Only after securing permission in his favour, the landlord can give a quit notice. It is at this stage that the Transfer of Property Act applies. Under the Transfer of Property Act, the landlord is not supposed to disclose reasons for determination of the tenancy. Once the permission is granted, the correctness thereof cannot be challenged excepting as provided under the House Rent Control Order. After serving valid quit notice, a civil suit for eviction has to be filed as the House Rent Control order does not provide for the same. This is a wholly independent and distinct action. Thus, the net result is that the twin provisions of the House Rent Control Order and Transfer of Property Act have to be satisfied by the landlord before filing a suit for eviction which is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of R. P. Ghosh v. Pramilabai Ravindra Puri and others2, had occasion to notice the basic differences between the House Rent Control Order and the Delhi Rent Control Act while testing the applicability of a ratio of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Smt. Phool Rani v. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia3, to the leases governed by the House Rent Control Order. It was held the two provisions are not pari materia and, therefore ratio does not apply. We respectfully concur with this view. 7. Our attention has not been drawn to any other Rent Control Legislation having this peculiar feature of requirement of approaching two different authorities of Courts for getting a decree or order for possession. In the catena of cases referred to by the Supreme Court neither the peculiar provisions of this House Rent Control Order nor any decision interpreting the same finds place. In the catena of cases referred to by the Supreme Court neither the peculiar provisions of this House Rent Control Order nor any decision interpreting the same finds place. We are therefore unable to see any merit in the argument that the ratio applies even to the leases governed by the House Rent Control Order. This argument turns few lines of the judgment out of context and this is impermissible. Indeed, in this very judgment, it is observed that if any State law requires the giving of particular type of notice in order to get particular kind of relief, it will have to be given. If the House Rent Control Order provides only for permission to give quit notice and nothing further, it is wholly inconceivable as to how a decree or order for eviction can be obtained except by determining the lease. Understanding the conclusions arrived by the Supreme Court in relation to the provisions' of the House Rent Control Order and not de hors of it, and agreeing with the learned single Judge's view of which be has made no secret, we are therefore, inclined to hold that the said ruling does not take the House Rent Control Order in its sweep and valid quit notice is necessary for getting decree for eviction in such cases. We may at this stage refer to one of the points raised by the learned counsel for the applicants, based on section 13 (3A) and (3B) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. It was contended that for obtaining decree for eviction under clause 13 (1)(hh), the certificate from a Tribunal constituted by the State Government about condition of the house and other requirements was necessary and, therefore, that Act and the House Rates Control Order are pari materia. This argument has only to be stated to be rejected as ex facie it has no substance. 8. This takes us to the point of validity of service of notice. The first notice was issued by registered post at the residential address which tallies with the registered address of the non-applicant. It was a notice through a lawyer sometime on 28-3-1974. From the endorsement on the envelope (Exh. P-21), it appears that the postman had been continuously going for service riot only at the residence but also at the District Treasury Officewhere the non-applicant was serving. It was a notice through a lawyer sometime on 28-3-1974. From the endorsement on the envelope (Exh. P-21), it appears that the postman had been continuously going for service riot only at the residence but also at the District Treasury Officewhere the non-applicant was serving. This exercise was done for a period of nearly 15 days and on 13-4-1974 it was returned back to the lawyer through whom it was issued. Another notice dated 15-5-1974 by registered post was issued at the office address. This notice was also attempted to be served at the residential address. It appears that at last on 30-5-1974 the postman returned the notice with an endorsement that the occupants of the house reported that the addressee was not in the house. The various endorsements of the visits of the postman at that places are apparent from Exh. P-21 the envelope. It was under these circumstances that the applicant was compelled to affix the notice to a main door of the residence of the non-applicant, a conspicuous part of the property. This was done on 14-6-1974 in presence of two witnesses one of whom has been examined along with the applicant. We have been taken through the entire evidence and we see no reason to discard the testimony of the applicant as well as the independent witness (P. W. 2) Hemchand regarding service of the notice, especially when the various endorsements on the two registered envelopes also support their version that the defendant was deliberately making it impracticable to serve the notice. The applicant seems to be an illiterate person. It is obvious that the relations between the parties were not cordial. Non-applicant's deposition is in only three lines. In the cross-examination he made a statement that his address as on the envelope was not correct but in the second breath he had to admit that his registered address was correct. Bare perusal of the address of the envelope will reveal that it exactly tallies with the registered address. No grievance was made in the evidence of the non-applicant that the notice was not attempted to be served on his family members. The trial Court, however, came to the conclusion that there was no evidence about the plaintiff having ascertained whether the wife and children of the defendant were present in the house when the postman took the registered notice there. The trial Court, however, came to the conclusion that there was no evidence about the plaintiff having ascertained whether the wife and children of the defendant were present in the house when the postman took the registered notice there. According to the trial Court as there was no evidence of effort to serve the notice on the wife or other inmates of the house, it could not be said that the tender or delivery was not practicable and consequently, the affixing of the notice to a conspicuous part was not valid. In this connection, reliance on the decision in the case of Surajmal v. Shamdasani4 was placed. We have perused the Calcutta decision and we are satisfied that the ratio of the said decision does not at all apply to the facts of the present case. It is unfortunate that the landlord has failed to get a decree for possession on such hypertechnical points. Now mode of service is to be found in section 106, part II which reads as under :- "Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to conspicuous part of the property. " It is only to meet the contingency of a person who is required to be served with a notice trying to evade it that provision has been made for serving by affixing the notice to the conspicuous part of the property. This is the last contemplated made of service, the other two being (1) service by post and (2) by delivery to the addressee or to one of his family or servants at his residence. Now, in the present case, two notices were issued by post at the proper addresses. The landlord waited for service for months together. The postman also visited the two places many times. Thus, all attempts of exhausting the first mode are amply proved. It is apparent that under the circumstances, the second mode of services was also impracticable. Now, in the present case, two notices were issued by post at the proper addresses. The landlord waited for service for months together. The postman also visited the two places many times. Thus, all attempts of exhausting the first mode are amply proved. It is apparent that under the circumstances, the second mode of services was also impracticable. From the endorsement of the postman it is clear that there was somebody in the house who was driving the postman to the office, saying that the addressee was not in the house. The postman naturally could not go inside and he made the report after several fruitless attempts of service. If in this back· ground the landlord thought that the second mode was also impracticable we see no fault in his thinking and in resorting to third mode of service. Under the circumstances, finding of the trial Court on this aspect was clearly bad in law specially when no grievance was made by the defendant saying that the notice was not attempted to be served on his family member or servant at the residence. Considering the whole back ground we are clearly of the opinion that the service of notice has to be held to be good. The dismissal of the suit on this ground therefore has to be set aside. 9. About the arrears of rent for June 1974, it appears that the amount bas been paid during the pendency of the suit and no grievance on that account really now subsists. The damages are claimed only for a day as immediately thereafter the suit has been filed. Under these circumstances, we agree with the learned counsel when they argue that it is not necessary to record a finding about the quantum of damages which in the view we are taking of the matter will have to be determined in an enquiry for mesne profits under Order 20, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. In the result, the revision is allowed. Decree of dismissal is set aside and in its place, it is hereby decreed that:- (i) The defendant shall forthwith deliver vacant possession of the suit property and pay costs throughout. (2) Enquiry into mesne profits under Order 20, rule 12, Civil Procedure Code from the date of the suit till possession shall be made. Revision application allowed.