N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the petitioners in their fresh replies filed to the second show cause notice had specifically urged that to enable them to successfully and effectively cross-examine Mr. Madhu Pandya the main actor of the scene these delinquents should be furnished with the statements ar his which were in the form of his applications to the Chief Minister and the Gujarat Public Service Commission. The Special Secretary who passed the impugned orders had dealt with this question in the course of his impugned orders. He did so specifically because the High Court in its earlier common judgment had directed that it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority passing the final order in the departmental enquiry to give a speaking order dealing with all substantive or substantial contentions of the delinquent concerned. In this connection the Special Secretary states as follows : Shri Vyas (the petitioner of the Special Civil Application No. 167a of 197s raised the contention that he was not supplied copies of the various applications said to have been submitted by Shri Pandya (that is Madhu Pandya) to Government and G. P. S. C. and that this bad hampered cross-examination of Shri Pandya. IT is observed from the record that Shri Vyas was furnished copies of all documents and records which were relevant to the enquiry ant which formed part of the evidence against him. The applications of Shri M. P. Pandya referred to by Shri Vyas have not been relied upon nor did they in any way form part of the charge against Shri Vyas. As such the question of supplying copies of there applications did not arise. ( 2 ) IN the order Annexure H dated 21-3-1978 which is the impugned order in the Special Civil Application No. 1670 of 1978 the very argument is dealt with as follows:the third point raised by Shri Shukla (the petitioner of the Special Civil application No. 1670 of 1978) is that he was not supplied copies of the various applications said to have been sent by Shri Pandya to Government and the G. P. S. C. on different dates in respect of the R. Q. E. IT must be submitted here that those applications have not boon relied or In any way formed part of the charge against Shri Shukla. The question at supplying copies of these applications to the delinquent therefore does not survive. Shri Shukla was supplied with the statements of all the 20 persons asked for by him as they were relevant to the enquiry against him ( 3 ) BEFORE me it was very vehemently contended by Messrs. Anand and Desai the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners in the Special Civil Application No. 1670 and the Special Civil application No. 1671 of 1978 respectively that as Mr. Madhu Pandya was the main witness of the department in the departmental enquiry as he had asserted that he had made the alleged payments to these petitioners against the promise of his being helped to clear the R. Q. Examination and as Mr. Madhu Pandya a public servant who could not at law commit the offence of giving bribe had been almost an approve who was not arraigned in the enquiry his earlier statements if furnished would have enabled these petitioners to effectively cross-examine the said Madhu Pandya and for aught the petitioners know the inconsistent statements of Mr. Madhu Pandya would have proved him a far more unreliable witness than the Department thought him to be. To me it appears that by denying the petitioners the opportunity to effectively and substantially cross-examine the said star witness of the Department in that joint enquiry The petitioners were denied a reasonable opportunity of making good their defence and this vital factor goes to the root of the impugned orders and vitiates them. ( 4 ) THE Division Bench of this High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and myself had an occasion to deal with a question like the one that is arising under this point no. 6. While allowing the Letters Patent Appeal No. 78 of 1978 in the Special Civil Application No. 1652 of 1977 the Division Bench speaking through the Chief Justice respectfully disagreed with S. H. Sheth J. s view which is the view of the Department in this case and the Division Bench in this connection has observed as follows:with great respect to our learned Brother (S. H. Sheth J. as he then was) we are unable to agree with this conclusion. The conclusion was as follows: This contention cannot be upheld because the record shows that Rupla Sadhu was fully cross-examined by the petitioner. The conclusion was as follows: This contention cannot be upheld because the record shows that Rupla Sadhu was fully cross-examined by the petitioner. The statement recorded at the preliminary fact finding inquiry cannot be had as a matter of right. What the accused was asking for was not a copy of the repeat made at the time of the preliminary inquiry but what he was asking for was a copy of the statement of Rupla Sadhu recorded in the course of the preliminary departmental inquiry so that he could effectively cross-examine Rupla Sadhu. Rupla Sadhu was cross-examined before the inquiry officer in the course of the departmental inquiry. It is an obvious and well settled position that an earlier statement made by a particular witness is a very effective instrument at the time of cross-examination and if there are any discrepancies between the earlier statement and the deposition before the inquiry officer the same can be property brought on record in order to discredit the testimony of the particular witness. By nonfurnishing of the copy of the statement of Rupla Sadhu recorded in the course of the preliminary fact finding inquiry the inquiry officer was depriving the petitioner of his right to cross-examine that particular witness effectively and to the point and was depriving him of an opportunity to bring on record contradictions between the earlier statement and the deposition before the enquiry officer. if in fact there were any such contradictions. We have no means of finding out whether there were in fact any contradictions or not but it is undoubtedly true that a copy of the earlier statement would have enabled the delinquent to cross-examine Rupla Sadhu effectively. ( 5 ) WHAT has been observed by the Division Bench in the judgment of the Letters Patent Appeal No. 78 of 1978 squarely applies to the case on hand also. The Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with a situation of the type in the case of the State of Punjab v. Bharat Ram reported in AIR 1974 SC 2335 . In paragraph 7 of the above judgment it is found as follows:the meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against charges on which inquiry is held. In paragraph 7 of the above judgment it is found as follows:the meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against charges on which inquiry is held. The Government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the Government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Government Servant. Unless the statements are given to the Government servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. ( 6 ) IT is no doubt true that in the Supreme Courts judgment the statements are those Which must be the statements of the preliminary enquiry stage. ( 7 ) MR. C. K. Tackwani the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State invited my pointed attention to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Chandra Tandon v. The Union of India reported in AIR 1974 SC 1589 . In that case it is held as follows:it is very necessary for an authority which orders an enquiry to be satisfied that there are prima facie grounds for holding a disciplinary enquiry and therefore before he makes up his mind he will either himself investigate or direct his subordinates to investigate in the matter and it is only after he receives the result of these investigations that he can decide as to whether disciplinary action is called for or not. Therefore these documents of the nature of interdepartmental communications between officers preliminary to the holding of enquiry have really no importance unless the Enquiry Officer wants to rely on them for his conclusions. In that case it would only be right that copies of the same should be given to the delinquent. THUS where neither the inquiry officer nor the punishing authority relied on the report made against the delinquent servant for arriving at his conclusions the servant cannot make a grievance of the denial of reasonable opportunity on ground of nonsupply of copies of these reports. THUS where neither the inquiry officer nor the punishing authority relied on the report made against the delinquent servant for arriving at his conclusions the servant cannot make a grievance of the denial of reasonable opportunity on ground of nonsupply of copies of these reports. ( 8 ) HE also called to his aid another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India reported in AIR 1964 SC 1854 . In paragraph 12 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has observed that a preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out and it is very necessary that the two (that is the preliminary enquiry and the regular enquiry) should not be confused. It is further observed that so far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question of its being governed by Art. 311 (2) for that enquiry is really for the satisfaction of Government to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should be taken under the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary Government servant or a servant holding higher rank temporarily to which he has no right. ( 9 ) IN my view neither of the two authorities can render any assistance to the Government. In the latter of the two citations the ratio is whether the delinquent has a right of audience at the stage of the preliminary enquiry and the said plea was negated. The former of the two citations does not deal with the case of a previous statement which is called fox by the delinquent in order to enable him to effectively cross- examine one of the witnesses on whose possible evidence department expects to make the charges good. It can never be denied that at any rate the principle of fair play is the sine qua non of quasi judicial enquiries. Unless all facilities that can reasonably be extended to a delinquent at the hands of the Department his having been given the benefit of fair play cannot be said to have been ensured. It can never be denied that at any rate the principle of fair play is the sine qua non of quasi judicial enquiries. Unless all facilities that can reasonably be extended to a delinquent at the hands of the Department his having been given the benefit of fair play cannot be said to have been ensured. For example if the delinquent in the course of the departmental enquiry requests the Enquiry Officer to bring some documents from his own office to be produced at the enquiry the Enquiry Officer cannot decline the request on the specious plea that the Depart- ment on its own does not want to rely on them. Secondly if a delinquent requests the Enquiry Officer to issue a letter of request to an outsider to appear at the enquiry as a witness for the defence the Enquiry Officer cannot decline to do so on the specious plea that he in his capacity as an Enquiry Officer has no power to coerce the witness to come. The Enquiry Officer in such a situation is bound to call for the record from his own office and at any rate issue a letter of request to an outsider to appear at the enquiry. If this is done and if the outsider does not come forth to give evidence at the enquiry the Enquiry Officer cannot be charged with not having acted fairly because he can very well say that all that was in his power to assist the delinquent to make good his defence was done by him. It is to be recalled here that the Government did not say that Mr. Madhu Pandyas earlier statements were not there. Our experience of law Courts shows that more often than not such overenthusiastic departmental witnesses overact their part and expose themselves to the charge of being strongly partisan witnesses. It is in this sense of the term that I uphold the last of the six points canvassed on behalf of these petitioners and this finding goes to the root of the impugned orders and the petitions will be required to be allowed on this ground by quashing not only the impugned orders but also the second show cause notices themselves. .