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1981 DIGILAW 18 (PAT)

Raghunandan Rai v. Punjab National Bank

1981-01-20

NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, SHIVANUGRAH NARAIN

body1981
JUDGMENT : Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. 1. These writ applications have been filed on behalf of two petitioners who were employees of the Punjab National Bank, which is one of the nationalised Banks under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Banking Acquisition Act) Departmental proceedings were initiated against these petitioners and ultimately they have been dismissed from the service of the Bank. Appeals filed on their behalf before the Appellate Authority have also been dismissed. According to the petitioners, there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice in conducting the enquiry which has caused prejudice to them, as such the ORDER :of dismissal which is based on the enquiry report aforesaid is no dismissal in eye of law. According to them, the enquiring officer has not considered several documents produced on behalf of the petitioners and there has been non consideration of the defence of the petitioners which hats resulted in great injustice to them. A further grievance has been made on behalf of the petitioners that even the statutory appellate authority constituted under the Punjab National Bank Officer (Employees' Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Regulations) has not considered the grievances of the petitioners which has resulted in failure of justice. As common questions of law and facts are involved in these two writ applications and the charges are also more or less similar in nature both the writ applications were heard together with the consent of the parties and are being disposed of by a common JUDGMENT :. 2. I shall first indicate briefly the facts of the case in C.W.J.C. no. 2992 of 1979 filed on behalf of Bindeshwari Prasad Srivastava. According to the petitioner of that writ application, he entered in the service of the said Bank at Kanpur Branch on 6.1.1947 and worked in various capacities till June, 1972 when he was promoted to the post of Officer Incharge of the Maharajganj Branch of the Bank. In July, 1973, he was again promoted to the post of Branch Manager, in the month of July, 1974 a Branch at Motihari was started and the petitioner was appointed as the first Branch Manager and started functioning as such with effect from 29.7.1974. One of the objects of the Bank was to advance loans for agricultural purposes. In July, 1973, he was again promoted to the post of Branch Manager, in the month of July, 1974 a Branch at Motihari was started and the petitioner was appointed as the first Branch Manager and started functioning as such with effect from 29.7.1974. One of the objects of the Bank was to advance loans for agricultural purposes. At that very time, Shri Raghunandan Rai (R.N. Rai) who is the petitioner in the other writ application C.W.J.C. No. 2361 of 1979 was posted as Assistant Agricultural Officer at the said Motihari Branch of the Bank to look after the agricultural advances. According to the petitioner Sri Srivastava it was the duty of said Sri Rai to check all securities in respect of the advances of agricultural loans. Loans were advanced for purchase of pumps to different applicants. The Bank was to make payments to the suppliers of the pumps after installation, and verification of the security was duly done by the Bank. 3. Some time in early part of 1976, some complaints were received by the Bank that although the records of the Bank show that, pumps had been supplied to some of the cultivators, factually no such pumps had been supplied. After some preliminary enquiry, departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner Sri Srivastava in respect of his alleged dereliction of duty in not properly verifying the installation and security before payments had been made to the suppliers of such pumps. On 2.7.1976, petitioner Sri Srivastava was put under suspension. A copy of the ORDER :of suspension is Annexure-1 to the writ application. On 28.7.1978 a copy of the charges framed against him was served on him. A copy of the charges is Annexure:-2 to the writ application. On 4-8.78, the petitioner Sri Srivastava submitted his show cause, a copy whereof is Annexure-3. It is said that an enquiring officer was appointed by the Personnel Committee to inquire into the charges against the aforesaid persons and the inquiry commenced. An inquiry report dated 23-1-1979 was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority, who passed on ORDER :of dismissal against the said petitioner by its ORDER :dated 19-3-1979, a copy whereof is Annexure--4 to the writ application. An appeal in accordance with the aforesaid Regulations was preferred before the Appellate Authority on 24-4-1979 (memo of appeal is Annexure-5) The Appellate Authority, however, by his ORDER :dated 5-7-1979 dismissed the said appeal. An appeal in accordance with the aforesaid Regulations was preferred before the Appellate Authority on 24-4-1979 (memo of appeal is Annexure-5) The Appellate Authority, however, by his ORDER :dated 5-7-1979 dismissed the said appeal. A copy of the ORDER :of dismissal is Annexure--6 to the writ application. Thereafter, a review petition was filed which was also dismissed. 4. So far as the case of the petitioner Sri R.N. Rai (Petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2361 of 1979) is concerned, he joined as a clerk in the said Bank on 20-7-1973. Later, he was confirmed in that post. On 12-11-1974, he was promoted as Assistant Agricultural Officer in Grade E on probation. On 2-12-1974 he joined the said post at Regional Office, Patna, but later posted at Motihari where he joined on 10-12-1974 as Assistant Agricultural Officer. It is his case that he had joined there without much experience and he used to perform his duties as directed by the Branch Manager of that Bank Shri B.P. Srivastava, the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 2992 of 1979. He has also stated that the Bank had to advance loans for agricultural purposes including for purchase of pumps. It has been stated, in detail as to how the application for such loan used to be processed in the office of the Bank. He has asserted that the Branch Manager Sri Srivastava aforesaid directed him to fill up the different columns in the ledger in respect of the advance sanctioned by the said Branch Manager, and on his direction, he had filled up the ledger account in respect of different borrowers. He has asserted that he was verbally asked by Sri Srivastava to visit the shop of M/s. Gupta and Company, Motihari, dealer in pumping sets and boring materials, which was located in the ground floor of the same building in which the Bank had its office, and to verify whether boring materials which were to be treated as security were of good quality. On the ORDER :of the Branch Manager Sri Srivastava, this petitioner claims to have sighed the ledger saying, "Security verified." 5. Counter affidavits and other supplementary affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondent Bank. On the ORDER :of the Branch Manager Sri Srivastava, this petitioner claims to have sighed the ledger saying, "Security verified." 5. Counter affidavits and other supplementary affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondent Bank. According to the respondent Bank, after preliminary inquiry it transpired that the two petitioners in collusion with each other had committed fraud and misappropriated the amounts which were shown to have been advanced to different agriculturists for purchase and installation of pumps, which in fact, were never purchased or installed at the sites. According to the respondent, this was done by violating the rules of the Bank regarding advances for agricultural purposes. Thereafter, charges were framed against these petitioners in accordance with the requirement of the Rules and Regulations and an inquiry was held by a duly appointed inquiring officer who submitted his report holding the petitioners guilty of the charges leveled against them. That Inquiry report was considered by the disciplinary authority also who agreeing with the findings passed an ORDER :of dismissal against the petitioners. Their appeals were also dismissed because they were without merit. 6. The Bank is a statutory authority which is governed by the statutory rules in matters of departmental proceedings and dismissal was not challenged by the respondents. Virtually it is an admitted position that the said Bank would be deemed to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It also can not be disputed that the respondent-Bank being a statutory authority, has to hold a departmental proceeding in accordance with the aforesaid Regulations which have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 of the Banking Acquisition Act aforesaid. The said Regulation, defines, appellate authority, disciplinary authority, officer employees, etc. and I shall refer to those definitions at the appropriate places, Regulation 4 gives the details of minor and major penalties; Regulation 5 enables the disciplinary authority to institute disciplinary proceedings, and to impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4. Regulation 6 prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalties. Regulation 7 details the power of the disciplinary authority and as to how action is to be taken on the inquiry report. Regulation 10 is a provision in respect of common proceedings. Regulation 17 is a provision in respect of appeals to be filed before the appellate authority. Regulation 18 is the power of review. Regulation 7 details the power of the disciplinary authority and as to how action is to be taken on the inquiry report. Regulation 10 is a provision in respect of common proceedings. Regulation 17 is a provision in respect of appeals to be filed before the appellate authority. Regulation 18 is the power of review. The Schedule of that Regulation shows that on the relevant date the Chief Personnel Officer was the disciplinary authority in respect of officers in Grade-E, D and C whereas Personnel committee was the disciplinary authority in respect of officers in Grades B and A. It is not in dispute that Sri Srivastava was an Officer in Grade B and Sri Rai was an officer in Grade E. 7. The case of Sri Rai was heard first. As such I propose to consider the questions involved in the writ application filed by him (C.W.J.C. No. 2361 of 1979). It was first urged that the petitioner was holding the post of a clerk only on substantive basis and had been promoted as an Assistant Agricultural Officer on probation, as such, in eye of law he will not be deemed to be a Grade E officer so as to be governed by the Regulation aforesaid. In this connection, it was pointed out that if the departmental proceeding had been initiated against him treating him to be a clerk, then he would have been governed by Rules, framed by the Bank which are more favorable to the petitioner than the Regulation aforesaid, and, as such a prejudice has been caused to him by treating him as an officer for the purpose of disciplinary proceeding. 'Officer, employee' has been defined under Regulation no 3, (j) the relevant portion whereof is as follows:-- means a person who holds a supervisory, administrative or managerial post in the bank or any other person who has been appointed and is functioning as an officer of the bank, by whatever designations called. From a bare reference to the definition of an 'Officer employee' aforesaid it will appear that it includes any person who holds a supervisory administrative or managerial post, in the Bank, or who has been functioning as an officer of the Bank. From a bare reference to the definition of an 'Officer employee' aforesaid it will appear that it includes any person who holds a supervisory administrative or managerial post, in the Bank, or who has been functioning as an officer of the Bank. It is true that this petitioner was never appointed as an Officer of the Bank on substantive basis because he was just on probation, but it cannot be disputed that during the relevant period he was holding a supervisory administrative post or in any case he was functioning as an officer of the Bank, designated as Assistant Agricultural Officer. It may be mentioned that the ORDER :promoting the petitioner on probation to the post of Assistant Agricultural Officer itself mentions that he will be governed by the aforesaid Regulations. In such a situation, it is difficult to accept that the petitioner will not be deemed to be an officer of the Bank as to be governed by the Regulations aforesaid. 8. It was then submitted that even if it is assumed that the petitioner is an officer of the Bank, still there has been non compliance of Regulation 6 of the said Regulations. It was alleged that neither the charges had been drawn by the disciplinary authority nor the inquiring officer was appointed by the authority contemplated by the Regulations. I have already pointed out that the Schedule of that Regulations describes Chief Personnel Officer as the disciplinary authority for officers in Grade E. Here, in the instant case, the personnel committee, which is a higher body, had taken a decision to initiate the departmental proceeding and to appoint the inquiring officer. The reason which was given on behalf of the Bank for this is that Sri Srivastava who is the petitioner in the other writ, was an officer in Grade B and for him disciplinary authority was the personnel committee. In this connection the proceeding of the personnel committee has been produced, and a copy whereof has been annexed to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Bank. It has been further pointed out that the then Chief personnel Officer, who is the disciplinary authority so far as the petitioner Sri Rai is concerned, was also a member of that personnel committee and he was present when decision to initiate departmental proceeding had been taken, and, as such, he was a party to that decision. It has been further pointed out that the then Chief personnel Officer, who is the disciplinary authority so far as the petitioner Sri Rai is concerned, was also a member of that personnel committee and he was present when decision to initiate departmental proceeding had been taken, and, as such, he was a party to that decision. In my view, this grievance on behalf of the petitioner Sri Rai, is only technical and without any merit. It is not in dispute that the personnel committee is a higher body and even the Chief Personnel Officer is one of the members of that committee. The charges which had been leveled against the two petitioners were interlinked in many respects, as such, it was only proper that the personnel committee should have applied its mind before taking a decision for initiation of the proceedings against these petitioners. On behalf of the Bank an affidavit has also been filed containing the decision of the personnel committee, dated 8.9.1978 appointing the inquiring officer. Regulation 6(2) says that whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or mis-behavior against an officer employee, it may itself inquire into or appoint any other public servant to inquire into the truth thereof. Regulation 6(3) prescribes that whenever it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the disciplinary authority, shall frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations made against the officer employee and copies there of shall be communicated in writing to such officer, who shall be required to submit his written statement of defence. In view of the materials produced, I am satisfied that the personnel committee could have framed charges as disciplinary authority against the petitioners and could have appointed an inquiring officer, and as such, there is no violation of Regulation 6(2) or Regulation 6(3), referred to above so as to vitiate the inquiry and subsequent actions taken thereupon. 9. It was also urged that common proceedings against the two petitioners in absence of a specific ORDER :as contemplated by Regulation 10 has vitiated the inquiry. 9. It was also urged that common proceedings against the two petitioners in absence of a specific ORDER :as contemplated by Regulation 10 has vitiated the inquiry. Regulation 10 says that when two or more officer--employees are concerned in a case, the authority competent to impose a major punishment on all such officer-employees may make an ORDER :directing that the disciplinary proceedings against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding. On behalf of the Bank, it was asserted that both cases were inquired independently, but at the same time. In support of this contention our attention was drawn on behalf of the Bank, to the inquiry report which says that both the cases were heard simultaneously because the exhibits and witnessed in the two cases, were common and even the documents produced on behalf of proceeded were common for both the cases. It was further urged on behalf of the Bank that when the personnel committee, which was a disciplinary authority, for Grade B Officers, decided to initiate proceeding against both the petitioner's in respect of the charges which were connected with each other, it will be deemed that there was an ORDER :for common proceeding in terms of Regulation 10. In my view, there is substance in this contention that when the personnel committee decided to issue charges against both the petitioners and appointed an inquiring officer to inquire into those charges against them, it will be deemed, that the personnel committee directed for common proceeding against the petitioners as contemplated by Regulation 10. In this view of the matter, it cannot be held that the proceeding against the petitioners or anyone of them has been vitiated. 10. On behalf of the petitioner Sri Rai it was then urged that the inquiring officer held him guilty on the following accounts;-- (i) He processed some loan papers which were sanctioned at a time when he did not join the Bank, and thus prepared ante dated documents. (ii) He had recommended loan in favour of persons without ascertaining their existence meaning thereby that some of them were dead. (iii) He endorsed security verification on the loan ledger without actually going to the field, which formed the basis for making payment. (ii) He had recommended loan in favour of persons without ascertaining their existence meaning thereby that some of them were dead. (iii) He endorsed security verification on the loan ledger without actually going to the field, which formed the basis for making payment. According to the petitioner, Sri Rai, the has been found guilty of the three charges, out of which two charges were never framed or communicated to him, i.e. in respect of (i) ante dating the documents of the Bank and (ii) recommending loan in favour of dead persons, and, as such, great prejudice has been caused to him, which has resulted in failure of justice. According to him, this aspect was not notified even by the disciplinary authority who considered the inquiry report for purpose of awarding punishment. The petitioner could not point out this fact to the authority because the inquiry report and the ORDER :of dismissal were communicated together to the petitioner. It was also urged that even the appellate authority has overlooked this aspect of the matter. 11. It is an admitted position that no definite charge in respect of ante dating the documents of the Bank or recommending loans, to the dead persons had been framed against this petitioner. The requirement of Regulation 6(3) is that the disciplinary authority shall "frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations against the officer employee and the articles of charge, together with a statement of allegations on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the officer employee." While defending the inquiry report and the ORDER :of dismissal on behalf, of the Bank our attention was drawn to the copy of the charge, the relevant portion whereof is as follows;-- You while functioning as Asstt. Agriculture Officer, Motihari during the period 9-12-1974 to 30-4-76 made false endorsement of verification in the loan ledger regarding the installation of pumping sets and boring and prepared ante dated loan documents facilitating the payment of the cost of the pump sets and, as such, failed to perform your duties. After that a list giving the names, of the applicants, for loan is mentioned. There is no definite statement as to whose applications this petitioner had ante-dated and in what respect. So far as recommending the applications of dead persons is concerned, there is no whisper in the articles of charges. After that a list giving the names, of the applicants, for loan is mentioned. There is no definite statement as to whose applications this petitioner had ante-dated and in what respect. So far as recommending the applications of dead persons is concerned, there is no whisper in the articles of charges. As such, there should not be any difficulty in holding that the definite charge was communicated to the petitioner was only in respect of wrong verifications in the ledger in respect of the applications for loan, and so far as the other two heads of charges for which he has been held guilty are concerned, no details were communicated to him. To that extent there has been a violation of the requirement of Regulation 6(3) quoted above. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court on several occasions that before a proceeded is asked to show cause, he must be told what are the charges which have been leveled against him. It should be definite and specific so that he can submit his explanation and examine witnesses, if he considers necessary in respect thereof. Mere vague reference respect of some ante dated loan in documents will not be considered to be compliance of the requirements of statutory provisions apart from the principles of natural justice. As such I am inclined to hold that the inquiring officer or the disciplinary authority was not justified in considering the question of dismissal on the ground that the petitioner had been held guilty of three charges. They should have considered that question only taking into account the finding of the inquiring officer that the petitioner had signed the verification certificate regarding the security and installation of the pumps in question. 12. In view of my findings above that the inquiring officer could have inquired into only one charge against this petitioner, i.e. signing the verification form in the ledger saying that he had verified the security, now the question which arises is as to whether the ORDER :of dismissal has been vitiated because it is based on three charges. In other words, according to the petitioner, the disciplinary authority has passed the ORDER :of dismissal under a wrong impression that the petitioner was guilty of three charges which had been inquired into by the inquiring officer. In other words, according to the petitioner, the disciplinary authority has passed the ORDER :of dismissal under a wrong impression that the petitioner was guilty of three charges which had been inquired into by the inquiring officer. On behalf of the Bank it was urged that even if the findings on two of the questions, are ignored, the ORDER :of dismissal can be sustained. It is true that even if one of the several charges against the proceedee is established which is of grave nature then any major punishment, including the ORDER :of dismissal, can be passed against him by the disciplinary authority, but, at the same time, it need not be impressed that cumulative effect of different charges has an effect on the disciplinary authority while considering the question of punishment. In such a situation, any of the authorities, either the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, had to apply its mind to this aspect of the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the ORDER :passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority which are very brief, and, according to the petitioner, cryptic in nature. The ORDER :of the disciplinary authority which has been communicated to the petitioner is as follows:- The disciplinary authority having regard to the Report dated 23-1-79 of the enquiry authority in respect of charges against you, as contained in the charge sheet served, had come to the conclusion that you were guilty of the charges as you failed to perform your duties faithfully and honestly to promote interest of the bank, while you were posted as Asstt. Agriculture Officer, at B.O. Motihari. The disciplinary authority has imposed the penalty of dismissal upon you. I further, the disciplinary authority has decided that for the suspension period, you will not be entitled to any wages other than what you have already been paid as subsistence allowance. The punishment is hereby communicated to you. A copy of the Enquiry Report is enclosed for your information. In spite of our repeated directions, the Bank has not produced the original ORDER :passed by the disciplinary authority. As such, from the ORDER :which is annexed (Annexure--3) it appears that the disciplinary authority has simply agreed with the findings of the inquiring officer and has passed the punishment aforesaid. In spite of our repeated directions, the Bank has not produced the original ORDER :passed by the disciplinary authority. As such, from the ORDER :which is annexed (Annexure--3) it appears that the disciplinary authority has simply agreed with the findings of the inquiring officer and has passed the punishment aforesaid. In view of the decision of the Supreme, Court in the case of (1) Tara Chand Khatri V. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 567) when the disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the inquiring officer it need not give detailed reasons. As such, generally an ORDER :of dismissal, cannot be questioned merely because it does not give detailed reasons for agreement, with the inquiry report. But in the instant case, as I have held that two of the charges which were said to have been proved against the petitioner could not have formed the basis for his dismissal. Then a legitimate grievance can be made on behalf of the petitioner that the disciplinary authority or at least the appellate authority should have applied its mind after ignoring those two findings in respect of ante dating of documents and recommending applications for loans in respect of dead persons. It was urged that even the appellate authority has passed a very brief ORDER :without taking into consideration this aspect of the matter. 13. The ORDER :which has been passed by the appellate authority (Annexure-4) is as follows:- I have gone through the appeal preferred by Shri R.N. Rai against the decision of the Disciplinary Authority imposing penalty of dismissal on him and that for the suspension period he will not be entitled to any wages other than what has been paid as subsistence allowance. After going through the findings of the enquiry officer and the evidence produced before him, I am of the view that the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority is justified in the circumstances of the case. I agree with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and see no reasons to differ with the decision of the disciplinary authority. In my view, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is rejected. I agree with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and see no reasons to differ with the decision of the disciplinary authority. In my view, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is rejected. It need not be impressed that whenever a statutory right of appeal is provided, the appellate authority is to perform a quasi judicial function and has to consider the different grievances made by the person who has been held guilty of the charges. Of course, an appellate authority, is not required to give a JUDGMENT : as it is expected from an ordinary court of law, but at the same time it should appear that it has applied its judicial mind. This aspect becomes more important in cases where the person concerned demonstrates that out of the three charges, two are either nonexistent or could not have formed the basis for the punishment. In such cases the appellate authority is expected to apply its mind to the question as to whether the punishment awarded to the person concerned can be sustained even on the basis of one of the charges which was duly communicated to him. From the ORDER :of the appellate authority, which has been quoted in its entirety above, it appears that it did not notice that fact. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the Bank has drawn our attentions the case of (2) State of Orissa and others V. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (A.I.R. 1963 SC 779) as well as (3) Railway Board, New Delhi and another V. Niranjan Singh (A.I.R. 1969 SC 966) in support of his contention that if the ORDER :of removal is based on two charges and it one of the charges is found to be unsustainable still an ORDER :of removal can be lawfully passed on the charge which has been established. If either the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority had considered this question and held that the petitioner can be dismissed from the service of the Bank, even on the single charge, matter would have been different. But as I have mentioned above, neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority has discussed any thing about the charge or the punishment awarded. They have simply said that they were agreeing with the findings of the inquiring officer. But as I have mentioned above, neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority has discussed any thing about the charge or the punishment awarded. They have simply said that they were agreeing with the findings of the inquiring officer. In such a situation, I am of the view that either the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should have recorded its view on that question. As such, I allow the writ application of the petitioner Sri H.N. Bai in C.W.J.C. No. 2361 of 1979 and quash the ORDER :of the appellate authority as contained in Annexure 4 and direct that the appellate authority shall consider the grievance which has been made on behalf of the petitioner in his memo of appeal regarding non framing of charges in respect of the two findings on misconducts. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner pointed out non consideration of certain documents and materials on the record by the inquiring officer, on the third charge as well. It will be open to the petitioner to file a written argument to supplement the memo of appeal within a month from today before the appellate authority which shall consider the same along with the appeal. 15. So far as the petitioner Sri Srivastava of C.W.J.C. No. 2992 of 1979 is concerned, the main grievance which has been made is that the inquiring officer has not considered the documents produced on behalf of the said petitioner in support of his defence. It was also urged that in the charge there was reference of about loan applications which are said to have been processed by this petitioner. According to the petitioner, 5 out of them had been processed by the other petitioner Sri Rai and this petitioner had nothing to do with them. He had to pass ORDER :s on the basis of the recommendations made by said Sri Rai. An attempt was made to attack the inquiry report for non-consideration of relevant materials and it was urged that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority has considered those matters which are relevant and germane. It was further submitted that utilisation certificates had been given in respect of some of the loan applications which had not been properly considered by the inquiring officer and the petitioner, has mentioned them in his memo of appeal. It was further submitted that utilisation certificates had been given in respect of some of the loan applications which had not been properly considered by the inquiring officer and the petitioner, has mentioned them in his memo of appeal. The ORDER :which has been passed by the appellate authority, so far as this petitioner is concerned, is more or less in the same language in which the appeal of Sri Rai has been disposed of, and it is as follows:- I have gone through the appeal preferred by Sri B.P. Srivastava against the decision of the Dy. General Manager. The disciplinary authority imposing the penalty of dismissal upon him and that for the suspension period, he will not be entitled to any wages other than what he has already been paid as subsistence allowance, as he was found guilty of the charges against him that he misused his official position and indulged in malpractices while sanctioning agricultural advances at B.O. Motihari. After going through findings of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence produced before him, I am of the view that the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority is justified in the circumstances of the case. I agree with the findings of the disciplinary authority and see no reason to differ with the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. In my view, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is rejected. 16. As I have set aside the appellate ORDER :passed on the appeal of Sri Rai and as the case against both the petitioners are inter-connected, it is desirable that this petitioner should, also get another opportunity to present his case before the appellate authority. Accordingly, the writ application of this petitioner is also allowed. It will be open to this petitioner as well to file a written argument within one month from today which shall be in due course placed before the appellate authority. 17. I must make it clear that I never propose to lay down any rule in respect of the form in which a statutory appeal under the regulations should, be disposed of. It will all depend upon the facts of each case. The appellate authority is a quasi judicial authority. Although it is not expected to write a JUDGMENT : like a court of law, but it must appear that it has applied its judicial mind. It will all depend upon the facts of each case. The appellate authority is a quasi judicial authority. Although it is not expected to write a JUDGMENT : like a court of law, but it must appear that it has applied its judicial mind. I further make it clear that setting aside of the appellate ORDER :does not mean quashing of the ORDER :of dismissal or reinstatement of the petitioners. It only gives them a right to get their appeals re-heard by the competent authority. In the result, both the writ applications are allowed and the ORDER :s of the appellate authority, Annexure 4 in C.W.J.C. No. 2361 of 1979 and Annexure 6 in C.W.J.C. No. 2992 of 1979, are set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no ORDER :as to costs. Shivanugrah Narain, J. I agree, but I wish to add a few words of mine. As the entire case is going back far reconsideration by the appellate authority, I do not wish to say anything about the merit of the charges. I, however, only wish to draw the attention of the appellate authority to the precise charges drawn up against the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2361 of 1979. As my learned brother has pointed out that the findings in respect of three matters were recorded in respect of this petitioner by the inquiring officer and as regards the third matter, namely, his recommending loans in favour of persons without ascertaining their existence, there was no charge framed at all. The second charge of preparing ante dated loan documents was framed, but as the statements of imputations in support of this charge were not at all supplied, the petitioner could not reasonably be expected to reply to this charge. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the other charge framed was of false endorsement of verification, i.e. knowingly making an endorsement which was false and the appellate authority held the charge to be proved on the finding which amounts to a finding of more dereliction of duty and that there was no material establishing that in making the endorsement in the ledger the petitioner intended to make a statement that he had physically verified the installation of the pumps at the site and therefore, that charge also cannot be held to be established. This matter also will be considered by the appellate authority.