JUDGMENT - Padhye R.S., J.-The Assistant Electrical Inspector filed a complaint alleging breach of Rule 44A of the Indian Electricity Rules punishable under rule 141 of the said Rules which was registered as Criminal Case No. 219 of 1978. In Criminal Application No. 218 of 1978 a complaint was filed for breach of Rule 64(2)(a)(e) and (f) of the Indian Electricity Rules punish­able under rule 141. It was alleged that a non-fatal accident occurred to one Manohar B. Desai on the installation belonging to M/s Calico Chemicals, plastics and Fibres Division at about 7 p.m. on 4-7-1977 while the said Manohar, a Machine-operator was engaged in doing re-threading of PVC film of the un-winding unit of the printing machine at about 6.30 p. m. along with a helper. Rule 44A of the Indian Electricity Rules provides for an intimation of accident and for making reports to the relevant authorities within 24 hours and 3 hours respectively. The breach of rule 44A. is punish­able under rule 141 with a fine which may extend to Rs. 300, and in case of a continuing breach with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 50 every day. In Criminal Case No. 219, the breach consisted of not giving necessary intimation and not making the necessary report according to Rule 44A, immediately after the accident on 4-7-1977. The offence thus was complete immediately on failure to give the relevant information and report. In the other case it was alleged that the non-fatal accident occurred on 11-4-1977 at 7.45 a. m. Rule 64(2)(a), (e) and (f) provides for making certain provision when the energy at high or extra high voltage is supplied, converted, trans­formed or used. An omission to comply with these provisions resulted in the causation of an accident and this omission was punishable under rule 141. It was alleged that the petitioners had failed to observe the provi­sions of rule 64(2)(a)(e) and (f) on 4-7-1977 and were guilty of an offence punishable under rule 141. The complaint in respect of the offence in Cri-minal Case No. 219 as also in other case No. 218 came to be filed on 11-3-1978 while the limitation for filing both these complaints was only 6 months under the provisions of section 468(2)(a) of the Criminal Proce­dure Code. The complaint in respect of the offence in Cri-minal Case No. 219 as also in other case No. 218 came to be filed on 11-3-1978 while the limitation for filing both these complaints was only 6 months under the provisions of section 468(2)(a) of the Criminal Proce­dure Code. Both these complaints, therefore, were obviously barred by time and in both these cases objections were raised that the cases be dismissed as barred by limitation. The parties were heard after the objections were raised and the Metropolitan Magistrate by an order passed on 25-11-1980 held that the filing of the complaint was obviously barred but further found that the delay was liable to be condoned in the interest of justice. In the order in Case No. 218 the further finding was that in the present case, delay had not been properly explained by the complainant, while in the other case it was observed that it was no doubt true that the delay was not properly explained by complainant. Even after holding that the delay was not properly explain­ed by the complainant, the Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated 25-11-1980 recorded finding that the delay was liable to be condoned in the interest of justice. The orders were challenged in the High Court under sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Padhye R.S., J.:- After stating the facts in paras 1 to 6 the judgment proceeds 7. After finding that the delay was not properly explained by the complainant, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has proceeded to condone the delay by the impugned orders on the basis of the decision of this Court in the (State of Maharashtra v. P. D. Pujari)1, after observing that in view of the observations in the judgment of this case, the provisions contained in sec­tions 468 and 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code “will have to be liberally construed”. Relying upon a passage from the judgment in the case of the State of Maharashtra v. P.D. Pujari, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate further observed that the delay was liable to be condoned in the interest of justice and for the reason that no injustice would be caused to the accused. It appears to me that the liberal construction of provisions does not mean that the right vested in a party can be ignored. It appears to me that the liberal construction of provisions does not mean that the right vested in a party can be ignored. P. D. Pujari's case (supra) was mainly concerned with the provisions of section 469 of the Criminal Proce­dure Code providing for commencement of the period of limitation on the date of an offence or on the date of knowledge of commission of an offence when the commission of the offence is not known or on the date of the know­ledge of identity of the offender when the identity of the offender is not known earlier. In the present case, the question of applicability of the latter 2 partsof section 469 does not arise and what is material is only the date of offence.It is, therefore, clear that the said decision is in no way applicable to the facts of the present case. I have already observed that even adverting to the general observations made by Pratap J. in para 11 of the said judgment relat­ing to fair and reasonable construction of the provisions of section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is not possible to construe these provisions in such a way as to depriveanaccused personof aright which has accused in his favour under section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code and which can be denied to him only on an order for extension of period of limitation passed by the Court concerned acting judicially under section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code, not when an objection is taken but at the time of the issuance of the process itself. The High Courts of Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have taken a similar view (see (Prakash Chandra v. Kaushal Kishore)2, (Krishna v. State of M. P.)3 and (Madhya Pradesh and Bharat Hybrid Seeds and Agro Enterprises v. State)4. The consistent view is that the delay could not be condoned under the provisions of section 473 of the” Criminal Procedure Code as a matter of course and after the cognizance of the offence is taken. The consistent view is that the delay could not be condoned under the provisions of section 473 of the” Criminal Procedure Code as a matter of course and after the cognizance of the offence is taken. The act of taking cognizance of the offence itself becomes an Act without jurisdiction unless the Court concerned examines the question of limitation under section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code either upon a request by the party or on its own accord and, as far as possible, after hear­ing the opposite party, and decides judicially to grant extension of limitation in that particular case. (Rest of the Judgment not material for the Report.) Orders quashed and complaints dismissed as barred by limitation.