JUDGMENT This appeal at the instance of the defendant arises out of a suit for declaration of the joint tenancy right in respect of the suit property and also for a decree passed in Title Suit No. 388 of 1960 of the Court of 5th Munsif, Alipore, is void, illegal, collusive, inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiff and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.2 from executing the decree passed in Title Suit no. 388 of 1960. The premises No. 83/1, Sambhu Nath Pandit Street and 83/2, Sambhu Nath Pandit Street were leased out to the plaintiff's father Sri T. N. Banerjee for a period of 20 years with an option of renewal. It is alleged that T. N. Banerjee constructed valuable structure on it and let out to the defendant persons. During his life time, the said T. N. Banerjee executed a will disposing of his certain properties as per direction in the will and on his death the suit property passed to his legal heir including the plaintiff. The plaintiff very recently came to know that the defendant at the back of her and her co-sharers and without impleading them as party managed to get an ejectment decree in respect of the suit premises describing the present defendant No. 12 as the sole defendant and put that decree into execution in Title Ex. 36 of 1962. 2. The defendant appeared and contested the suit by filing written statement. It is stated there that the period of lease expired during the life time of Sri T. N. Banerjee and he never exercised his option for renewal and the defendant No.12 remained in the suit property as a trespasser and the ejectment decree was passed against the defendant. In the additional written statement filed on 18.2.1970 the defendant denied that T. N. Banerjee exercised his option for renewal which was negatived upto the Hon'ble High Court. The suit was decreed by the Court of first instance. On appeal, however, the suit was dismissed. Hence the present appeal at the instance of the defendant. 3. Mr. Shyama Charan Mitter on behalf of the appellant contended that the lease was entered into by the defendant's predecessor late T. N. Banerjee for 20 years and the said lease expired on 31st December, 1957. Late T. N. Banerjee did not exercise his option for renewal and died in December 1957. 3. Mr. Shyama Charan Mitter on behalf of the appellant contended that the lease was entered into by the defendant's predecessor late T. N. Banerjee for 20 years and the said lease expired on 31st December, 1957. Late T. N. Banerjee did not exercise his option for renewal and died in December 1957. On the basis of this fact, Mr. Mitter on behalf of the appellants contended that after the lease for a term is determined by efflux of time the lessee was a tenant-at-sufferance and such tenancy is not demisable estate and the person who comes in after the tenant-at-sufferance is a mere trespasser and the owner has the right to take possession as against the trespasser and a claim of a trespasser that he has a possessory right against the whole world but not against rightful owner. 4. Mr. Mitter relied upon the cases reported in ILR 8 Madras 424, 46 CWN 366, 1949 FC 124 at 127, AIR 1973 SC 508 , 43 CWN 877, AIR 1970 SC 846 and AIR 1972 SC 2299 in support of his contention. It appears to me that the most important point in this case is whether the tenant T. N. Banerjee exercised his option of renewal. Both the Courts found that no such option of renewal was exercised. Therefore with the end of the term of the lease, Mr. T. N. Banerjee becomes tenant by sufferance. 5. Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee on behalf of the respondent No.1 contended that there is no dispute on the proposition that after the death of the leasee who did not exercise the option of renewal, the lessee in possession is a tenant by sufferance but according to him such tenant by sufferance is no a trespasser and such tenant has possessory right which is heritable and transferable. If such right is heritable and transferable, the tenant cannot be a trespasser. It is argued by Mr. Banerjee that the tenant by sufferance in possession cannot be evicted in due course of law and the landlord cannot take possession from the tenant by sufferance who has a possessory right without a suit. A person in possession, according to Mr. Banerjee, who assumed the character of owner has a perfect title against the whole world but the rightful owner Mr. A person in possession, according to Mr. Banerjee, who assumed the character of owner has a perfect title against the whole world but the rightful owner Mr. Banerjee relied upon the cases in support of his argument in 20 IA 99 at 106, 9 Weekly Reporter 123, 82 CWN 92, AIR 1968 SC 620 and 1165, 51 IA 293 and 1907 AC 63 at 69. 6. As I have already said on the question of law as enunciated by Mr. Mitter that the tenant by sufferance as the plaintiff, according to Mr. Banerjee, is a tenant being the daughter of late T. N. Banerjee, the lessee is a tenant by sufferance and the decree passed against the defendant No. 12 is not binding on her. Both the parties cited number of cases on this point. Mr. Mitter referred to ILR 8 Mad. 424 at 426. In the said case it has been held that a person after the expiry of the lease becomes a tenant by sufferance. In the case reported in 46 CWN 466 (Mozam shaikh v. Ananda Prasad) it has been held at page 368 that a tenant by sufferance has no title and could not therefore convey one. The tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. In the case reported in 1949 FC 124 at 127 (Adyanath v. Krishna Prasad) it has been held that the tenant by sufferance has no lawful title and continue the possession for the latches of the landlord. In the case reported in AIR 1973 SC 508 (Badrilal v. Indore Municipality) it has been held that no notice is required in the matter of lease and the lease is determined by efflux of time. In the Commentaries on the Indian Transfer of Property Act, Seventh Edition by H. H. Shephard and K. Brown at page 437 it has been stated by the learned authors that the tenant-at-sufferance has bare possession without right and without privity between himself and the owner, he has no right to any notice to guit; he has no interest which he can transfer to another or which on his death another can take. At the same time he is not a trespasser as would be any person claiming under him by succession or otherwise. At the same time he is not a trespasser as would be any person claiming under him by succession or otherwise. In Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, latest Edition, Vol-1, at page 269 it has been stated that a tenant on sufferance has no demisable estate. In Wharton's Law Lexicon 1977, 14th Edition at 962 while explaining the term 'tenant by sufferance' it has been explained that there exists no privity between the tenant at sufferance (who has but a mere possession, without privity) and the person entitled to the possession, yet such occupancy is not adverse to the title of the person who possesses the right of entry, unless he chooses to consider it so; but an adverse possession will take place on an entry and participation of the profits of the land by a person without the reversioner's consent, after the death of a tenant at sufferance. This estate cannot be the subject of conveyance or transfer. In the case reported in 43 CWN 877 ( Birbhoom C.C. Ltd. v. Chandan Mall) it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that the possession of a wrongdoer is a good title as against the whole world with the exception of the true owner. The same principle was followed in the case reported in AIR 1970 SC 866 and AIR 1972 SC 2299 (M.K. Setty v. M. V.L. Rao). Mr. Banerjee, however, contended that the case reported in 43 CWN 877 (Birbhoom C.C. Ltd. v. Chandan Mall) does not support Mr. Mitter's contention but on the other hand supports, Mr. Banerjee's contention. In my opinion, Mr. Banerjee is not right on this submission. The said appeal arose out of a suit for partition. The properties in suit with the exception of plots Nos. 13 and 14 in village Warup belonged to one Kadir Sarkar who was the common ancestor of the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 4. The plots Nos. 13 and 14 were acquired with the profits of those properties after the death of Kadir. Kadir died in the year 1892 leaving a wife Pearjan, three sons and three daughters born of her and another son named Jaha Bux, born of a predeceased wife. The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that plots Nos. Kadir died in the year 1892 leaving a wife Pearjan, three sons and three daughters born of her and another son named Jaha Bux, born of a predeceased wife. The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that plots Nos. 1 to 12 of village Warup and plot No. 1 of village Shibpur were the properties left by Kadir. With regard to the other plots it was held that the plaintiffs failed to show that they had any interest in them. The trial Court gave the plaintiffs a preliminary decree in respect of these 13 times of property and there was an appeal against this decision. It has been held that 13 items of property were the properties of Kadir. It has also been held that Kadir's possession was merely of a wrong-doer and he had not acquired any title to these properties by adverse possession by continuing for a period of 12 years, he had no interest in the property which could devolve upon his heirs on his death, and although after his death the possession was continued by his three sons, their possession was on their account as independent trespassers and they themselves acquired a good title to the property to the exclusion of the other heirs of Kadir. On this fact the Division Bench of this Court held that the possessory right, even though it has not ripened into ownership by lapse of the statutory period, is a right in immovable property which is heritable and transmissible according to law. It has been further held that the possession of a wrong-doer held for a term less than the period of limitation is a good title against the whole world with the exception of the true owner. In the case before this Court it was not the fight between the true owner and the wrong-doer and the person holding possessory right. On the other hand it is the fight between the brothers and sisters and therefore the property may be partitioned between the parties unless ouster claims. The matter was sent back to the Court of appeal below. But we are concerned in this case which is not a fight between the possessory right of the wrong-doers but against the true owner. The matter was sent back to the Court of appeal below. But we are concerned in this case which is not a fight between the possessory right of the wrong-doers but against the true owner. In the case reported in 43 CWN 877 (Birbhoom CC Ltd. v. Chandan Mall) it is clear when it said that the possession of a wrong-doer is a good title against the whole world with the exception of the true owner. In this case we arc construed with the true owner of the property which the plaintiff has claimed a right. Admittedly both the parties agreed with the right of tenancy by sufferance. As I have already held in reference to the judgment hereinbefore stated that the tenancy by sufferance is not demisable estate or transferable by conveyance or heritable as such. The case reported in 46 CWN 366 (Mozam Shaikh v. Ananda Prasad) on which reliance was placed by Mr. Mitter, in my opinion, supports him. In the said case the Division Bench of this Court held at page 368 that the tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. I therefore cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has determined without the consent of the person entitled. In the present case admittedly the lease was created, the lease was ended and option for renewal was not exercised by T. N. Banerjee before his death in December, 1952. 7. Mr. Banerjee contended that the plaintiff was not made party in the earlier suit and therefore the decree is not binding on her. The care reported in 20 I.A. 99 at 106 (Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse) on which Mr. Banerjee relied is a case between the two parties one having possessorv right, that is, the plaintiff for 6 years and the other had no title at all. The care reported in 20 I.A. 99 at 106 (Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse) on which Mr. Banerjee relied is a case between the two parties one having possessorv right, that is, the plaintiff for 6 years and the other had no title at all. Which considering the effect of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the Judicial Committee held that "an action seems to us to be absolutely inappropriate in cases in which the person has no title whatsoever, because we cannot give a declaration of something that is untrue; we cannot declare that this person, the plaintiff, has a title, when, as a matter of fact, it is shown he has none". In the present case the plaintiff admittedly is the daughter of T. N. Banerjee, who after the lease expired, became the tenant by sufferance and as I have already held that the tenant by sufferance cannot convey to his successor or transfer the same. This case, in my opinion, does not at all support Mr. Banerjee's contention. Mr. Banerjee relied upon the case reported in 51 IA 293 at 299 (Midnapur Zamindary Company v. Naresh Narayna Roy) for the proposition that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. This principle was recognised by the Supreme Court. About this proposition there cannot be any second opinion. On the basis of the decision of the case reported in 55 IA 344 (Karnani Industrial Bank v. Satya Narayan Shah) Mr. Banerjee contended that after the expiry of the lease the ex-landlord filed a suit against the ex-tenant. Such tenants are all statutory tenants. In my opinion they are not as Late T. N. Banerjee was a tenant by sufferance. T. N. Banerjee, became tenant by sufferance and after the death of T. N. Banerjee none of his sons and daughters could inherit the tenancy by sufferance as such tenancy is neither heirtable nor transferable. In my opinion, therefore, the learned appellate Court was wrong in allowing the appeal. The plaintiff's suit should have been dismissed as was done by the learned Munsif and the decree obtained by, the defendant-appellant in the Title Suit No. 388/60 of the Court of 5th Munsif, Alipore is a valid and legally executable decree against the defendant No. 12. In my opinion, therefore, the learned appellate Court was wrong in allowing the appeal. The plaintiff's suit should have been dismissed as was done by the learned Munsif and the decree obtained by, the defendant-appellant in the Title Suit No. 388/60 of the Court of 5th Munsif, Alipore is a valid and legally executable decree against the defendant No. 12. It may be mentioned here that T. N. Banerjee died in December, 1957 leaving a will. In the said will the property in question was not mentioned at all. In the said will it has been stated that every other property, if there be any, will be inherited by defendant No. 12. Assuming for a moment, the tenancy at sufferance is heritable as it is not, still the defendant. No. 12 on the basis of the probate is entitled to the residuary of the property and therefore on the different ground altogether the decree is also binding on him and the plaintiff had no interest in the property under the will. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. Trial court's decree affirmed.