JUDGMENT - Deshpande D.B. J.:-The only question for my consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiff's suit is within the limitation and it arises in the following manner. 2. This is an appeal by the original •plaintiff, defendant No. 2 who died during the pendency of this appeal and against whom the appeal has abated, is the real father of the plaintiff. The suit property undisputedly belonged to the plaintiff, and the defendant No. 2 who was the natural guardian of the plaintiff, sold the disputed land to defendant No. 1 on 23rd March 1962 by a registered sale-deed for Rs. 1,500. Disputed land comprised of only 4 acres out of the total area of 10.25 acres of S. No. 25 situated at village Nilwanli Palampat. The plaintiff alleged that for this sale-deed defendant No. 2 had not obtained permission from the District Judge as required by the Hindu/Minority and Guardianship Act and hence according to him this sale-deed is void. The plaintiff alleged further that his father had no authority to sell the land to defendant No. 1. He alleged also that there was no reason for defendant No. 2 to sell the land and that there was also no legal necessity for this sale. For all these reasons, the plaintiff alleged that the sale-deed was not binding upon him and accordingly the defendant No. 1 was in unlawful possession. The suit was filed on 1st July, 1968 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Jr. Division at Pusad. On 5–7-1971, the Pusad Court found that the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Pusad Court and so the Pusad Court returned the plaint to the plain-tiff for presentation to the proper Court and on the same day the suit was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Yeotmal. The plaintiff further alleged that he was born on 30th June, 1947 and he completed his 21 years of age on 30th June, 1968 and so the present suit which was filed on 1–7-1968, as the Court was closed on 30th June, 1968, was within limitation. 3. Defendant No. 1 resisted the plaintiff's claim. He contended that he was a tenant of defendant No. 2 right from 58 to 59 and that is why defendant No. 2 sold 4 acres of land to him for 1,500 rupees. 3. Defendant No. 1 resisted the plaintiff's claim. He contended that he was a tenant of defendant No. 2 right from 58 to 59 and that is why defendant No. 2 sold 4 acres of land to him for 1,500 rupees. He contended that the sale-deed was binding upon the plaintiff, inasmuch as the sale-deed was executed by natural guardian-the father as the Karta of the family. Similarly, he pleaded bar of limitation to the plaintiff's suit. He denied that the plaintiff was born on 30th June, 1947 and according to him the plaintiff was born on 16th May, 1947. In the alternative he set up a defence, of tenancy and contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to obtain possession of the suit land from him. 4. Original defendant No. 2 has proceeded ex parte. 5. After considering the entire evidence before him the learned trial Judge held that the suit property was of the ownership of the plaintiff in as much as it fell to the share of the plaintiff in partition between the plaintiff and his father and other family members. He held that the sale-deed executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 was binding upon defendant No. 1. He held also that the suit was barred by limitation and consequently he dismissed the plaintiff's suit and directed defendant No. 2 to pay, the costs of this suit of defendant No. 1, Feeling aggrieved by this decision the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 6. Shri V. M. Kulkarni appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant urged that the sale-deed executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 is void and is not required to be set aside and as such the provisions of Article 60 of the Indian Limitation Act would not apply. According to him the Article that would be applicable is Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act. It is not disputed and it cannot be disputed that if it is held that Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act applies this suit is well within limitation and hence the real question is what is the Article of the Indian Limitation Act that is applicable to the suit in question? According to Shri Kulkarni although father is the natural guardian of son, the position has changed since the coming into force of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. According to Shri Kulkarni although father is the natural guardian of son, the position has changed since the coming into force of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. It is clear from section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor can do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefits of a minor but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. Sub-section 2 of section 8 of the said Act provides that natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor. Hence, there is a statutory bar against natural guardian in respect of sales and the sale has to be with the previous permission of the Court. But the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 8 are of vital importance in this case. This sub-section runs as follows: “Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.” Hence, it is laid down in the statute itself that any such sale by natural guardian is only voidable at the instance of minor and is not void. Once this position is assumed I shall point out presently that the Article that is applicable is Article 60 of the Indian Limitation Act and not Article 65. There are three decisions of this Court on this point. The first is a Full Bench decision in (Fakirappa Limanna Patil v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu Dharme-kar)1. Therein the Full Bench has clearly observed as follows: “A Hindu minor on his attaining majority cannot sue to recover possession of property transferred by his mother acting as his natural guardian during his minority without suing to set aside the transfer within the period of limitation provided by Article 44 of the Limitation Act.” In that ruling although the transfer was by mother as natural guardian the Full Bench held that the suit was barred by limitation inasmuch as it was not filed within three years by the concerned person after the son attained majority in 1895. Then there is a decision of a single Judge of this Court in (Malkarjun Annarao Gambhire v. Sarubai Shivyogi)2 Therein this Court observed as follows: “Where the alienation is made by a natural guardian or a guardian appointed by the Court, it must be avoided by the minor within three years of his attaining majority.” And similarly, there is another Division Bench ruling of this Court in Tatya Mohyji Dhomse v. Rubha Dadaji Dhomse3. Therein on page 46 the Division Bench has observed as follows: “The alienation by a natural guardian can be said to have some basis in legal authority and therefore the alienation may be binding upon the minor, if it is for necessity or voidable at the option of the minor if it is not for necessity.” 6. A. It is, therefore, clear that these decisions of this Court clearly held that alienation must be set aside by the minor within three years after his attaining majority and hence Article 65 of the present Limitation Act would not apply, and the only Article that is applicable is Article 60 of the present Limitation Act. 7. Now, admittedly the present suit was filed in the Court at Pusad on 1st July 1968. Even if it is assumed for a moment that the plaintiff was born on 30th June, 1947 the suit ought to have been filed on 30th June, 1968, but instead it is filed on 1–7-1968 and I have presently pointed out that subsequently this plaint was returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court as the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Pusad Court. The learned trial Judge has rightly pointed out in paragraph 22 of his judgment relying upon a decision of this Court in (Karim Ismail v. Abdul Rahiman)4 that the benefit of section 4 can be claimed only if the suit is filed in the proper Court on the day on which the Court opens. Hence, it is apparent that the plaintiff ought to have filed this suit in the Court of Yeotmal on 1st July 1968 and having failed to do so he cannot claim benefit of section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act. 8. Hence, it is apparent that the plaintiff ought to have filed this suit in the Court of Yeotmal on 1st July 1968 and having failed to do so he cannot claim benefit of section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act. 8. Contention was raised before the trial Court regarding the benefit of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, but in paragraphs 23 and 24 of his judgment the learned trial Judge has pointed out that even that benefit is not available to the plaintiff and for this purpose also he has relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court as stated in paragraph 23 of his judgment. Similarly, he has relied upon two other decisions one of Nagpur High Court and the other of Allahabad High Court and I do not see any reason to discard that reasoning of the trial Court in this respect. This is on the assumption that the plaintiff is born on 30th June, 1947. 9. This then takes me to the date on which the plaintiff was actually born. It is apparent from the judgment of the learned trial Judge that he has considered this aspect in detail in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and has pointed out that it is not possible to hold that the plaintiff was born on 30th June, 1947. According to the learned Judge, there is every reason to believe that the plaintiff was born on 16th May, 1947 at Pimpalgaon Raja in Buldhana District and not at Shembalpimpri in Yeotmal District. For this purpose the learned trial Judge relied upon an extract of Kotwal Registry produced at Ex. 34/1 by defendant No. 1. Therein an entry is made on 16th May, 1947 [Premchand (plaintiff) is born in 16th May 1947 to the father Madanlal Kanhaiyalal Marwadi Oswal.]. Admittedly name Premchand relates to the present plaintiff. Admittedly Madanlal is not the father of the plaintiff but is the uncle of the plaintiff and hence the learned Judge has pointed out and in my opinion rightly that possibly information was given to the village officer by Madanlal and that is why such an entry came to be made. As against this the plaintiff wanted to rely upon the extracts of the school register to show that his date of birth was 30th June, 1947. As against this the plaintiff wanted to rely upon the extracts of the school register to show that his date of birth was 30th June, 1947. The learned Judge has rightly pointed out that this entry was made in the school register on the basis of the information given by the plaintiff's father long after the plaintiff's birth that is after about 5 or 6 years after the plaintiff's birth i.e. at the time of admission of the plaintiff to the school, and the entry in the Kotwali register is made shortly after the birth of the boy and hence the learned Judge preferred to rely upon the entry in Kotwali register to hold that the date of birth was 16th May, 1947. 10. The plaintiff admitted that horoscopes are prepared in their community and even then he stated that his horoscope was not prepared. I am also not prepared to accept this statement. It is significant to note that defendant No. 2 who was the father of the plaintiff was impleaded as the defendant in this suit and even then he did not file a written statement. The trial Court has pointed out that defendant No. 2 was present in the Court when the evidence was being recorded but even then defendant No. 2 did not step in the witness box to vouchsafe about the date of birth of his son- the present plaintiff. All these facts have certainly weighed with the learned Judge in discarding the plaintiff's version that the date of his birth was 30th June, 1947 and in my opinion the learned Judge was right in holding that the date of birth was 16th May, 1947. It is also significant to note that no person from Pimpalgaon Raja is examined to state that the plaintiff was born at Pimpalgaon Raja. No extract from the village register of Pimpalgaon Raja is produced to show that the plaintiff was born in that particular village and a particular date as stated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff tried to prove his case by examining his uncle Tejmal but it is admitted by Tejmal that he was not present in the village at the time when the plaintiff was born and hence his evidence has no value whatsoever. The plaintiff tried to prove his case by examining his uncle Tejmal but it is admitted by Tejmal that he was not present in the village at the time when the plaintiff was born and hence his evidence has no value whatsoever. The learned Judge has further pointed out that defendant No. 1 has examined two witnesses who stated that the plaintiff was born at Shambalpuri and that the necessary information about his birth was given to the village Kotwali in their presence The learned Judge has further pointed out that these two witnesses were servants and mason of defendant No. 2 and hence considering the entire evidence on record, I am satisfied that the trial Court rightly held that the date of birth was 16th May, 1947 and hence the suit was obviously barred by limitation even assuming that the date of birth was 30th June, 1947, I have presently pointed out that the suit is barred by limitation even then. Thus, there is no merit in this appeal and the appeal is dismissed with costs of respondent No. 1. Appeal dismissed. ----