K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) A Co-operative Society called Vanivilasa Co operative Sugar Factory, Ltd. , hiriyur-respondent No. 3, established and functioning under the provisions of the Karnataka Co operative Societies Act, 1959, (Karnataka Act No. 11 of 1959) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) engaged in the manufacture of sugar, some time in 1979 established a distillery for manufacture of rectified spirit. On 1-3-1980, the board of Directors of the Society, inter alia, decided that the distillery should be given on lease to avoid further losses, in pursuance of which a brief advertisement was issued on 12-3-1980, inviting tenders to lease the distillery. ( 2 ) IN response to the above said advertisement, the petitioner, respondent No. 4 and seven others, with whom we are not now concerned, filed their tenders to operate the distillery at the rates or amounts specified in their respective tenders. In their tenders, the petitioner and respondent no. 4 offered to pay a rent of Rs. 7,02,000 and Rs. 6,20,000 respectively. ( 3 ) BEFORE the tenders were opened on 28-7-1980 at 12 noon, that being the appointed date and time for opening tenders, the Executive Committee of the Society, constituted and functioning under bye law No. 27 of the Bye-laws of the Society, invited the tenders for private negotiations, at which the petitioner offered to pay a rent of Rs. 7,30,000 as against Rs. 7. 02,000 offered in its tender and respondent No. 4 offered to pay a rent of Rs. 7,25,000 as against Rs. 6,20,000 offered in its tender. So far as the other terms and conditions, stipulated by the Executive Committee, there was no difference between the petitioner and respondent No. 4. ( 4 ) ON an examination of the aforesaid offers made by the petitioner and respondent No. 4, the Executive Committee, by its resolution dated 28th July, 1980, decided to accept the highest tender of the petitioner and recommended the same to government for its approval. The resolution passed by the Executive Committee in that behalf reads thus: x x x agreeably with the aforesaid resolution, the Managing Director of the Society (hereinafter referred to as the MD) a lent official from the Co operative Department of Government, addressed letter No. VSF/ dtl/80 81 dated 2-8-1980 to the Director of Sugar and Additional Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Bangalore-respondent no. 2, to move the Government to accord its approval to lease the distillery to the petitioner on a rent of Rs. 7,30,000 per annum fora period of ten years on the terms and conditions stipulated in the draft agreement enclosed to the said letter. ( 5 ) WHILE the proposal made by the MD of the Society was pending before respondent No. 2, respondent No. 4 addressed him a letter, inter alia, stating that it was aggreeable to enhance the rent for the distillery from Rs. 7,25,000 to Rs. 8,00,000 per annum. On an examination of the proposals received by him from the MD and , the revised offer made by respondent No. 4, respondent No. 2 addressed letter No. D. O. No. DSK/74 75 DIST/jnl/74, dated 19-8-1980 to Government, recommending the acceptance of the revised tender offered by the petitioner with a postscript, that reads thus: "i write to enclose a copy of my endorsement the Managing Director of m/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing corporation Pvt. Ltd. , along with his letter, in original". ( 6 ) ON an examination of the proposals made by the Director and other relevant papers, the Minister for Co-operation, by his minute dated 26-1-1981 in MD file No. RDC, 149 COF (Paras 53 to 55) decided that the revised offer of respondent No. 4 for Rs. 8,00,000 should be accepted and the distillery should be leased to it at the enhanced rent of Rs. 8,00,000 per annum, the other conditions being the same. The minute made by the Minister reads thus: "i have gone through the entire file. It has been noticed that a lot of injustice has been done, while considering the tenders of M/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing corporation Private Ltd. , Bangalore. At the time of opening the tenders both the representatives of M/s. Khoday Brewing A distilling Industries Private Ltd. , and m/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , were present. After opening the tenders, the tenders of M/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , was the highest. However, it was not accepted and the management informed these firms that the tenders will be decided after negotiation. At the time of discussions, it is understood that M/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , were not allowed properly to discuss and settle the tender. However, it was not accepted and the management informed these firms that the tenders will be decided after negotiation. At the time of discussions, it is understood that M/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , were not allowed properly to discuss and settle the tender. I came to know that even after a letter addressed to the Director of sugar by registered post, their case was not taken into consideration. It is also noticed that the letter from the Secretary, R. D. C. Department, addressed to the Director of Sugar on 25-9-80 vide page 64 to take into consideration the offer made by M/s. Bangalore trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , for Rs. 8. 00 lakhs p. a. for the first 10 years and Rs. 11. 00 lakhs p. a. for the subsequent 10 years have not at all taken into consideiation by the Director of Sugar. Therefore, it is noticed that the Management have ignored the offer of M/s. Bangalore trading and Financing Corporation pvt. Ltd. , which is not correct. It is also policy of the Government that we should not encourage the monopoly interest. The offer of Rs. 8 lakhs given by M/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing Corporation pvt. Ltd. , Bangalore will bring more funds to the Vanivilasa Co operative Sugar factory, i. e. Rs. 50,000 more than the negotiated rate offered by M/s. Khodays. M/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , have to deposit Rs. 2,50,000 for 10 years with Yanivilas Cooperative Sugar Factory free of interest. The other conditions offered by both the parties are the same. As the offer for Rs. 8 lakhs for first ten years for leasing the Distillery in favour of M/s. Bangalore Trading and Financing corporation Pvt. Ltd. , will bring more funds to the Society, the tender for leasing out the Unit in favour of M/s. Bangalore trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , is hereby approved. Further, action for entering an agreement, with M/s. Bangalore Trading and financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , should be taken up immediately". ( 7 ) IN conformity with the aforesaid minute of the Minister for Co-operation, the Government addressed two letters on 2 2-1981 bearing the same number, to respondent No. 2 conveying its approval to lease the distillery to respondent No. 4. ( 7 ) IN conformity with the aforesaid minute of the Minister for Co-operation, the Government addressed two letters on 2 2-1981 bearing the same number, to respondent No. 2 conveying its approval to lease the distillery to respondent No. 4. The said letters, the validity of which is challenged by the petitioner, read thus: "sub: Leasing out the "distillery unit" of the Vanivilas Cooperative Sugar Factory Ltd. , hiriyur". With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter No. DSK/74 75 / dist/vvcsf/74, dated 2-1-1981 on the subject mentioned above, I am directed to state that after examining the proposal ia detail Government are pleased to order that the Distillery Unit of V. C. S. F. Ltd. , hiriyur should be leased to M/s. Bangalore trading and Finance Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , bangalore, on an annual negotiated rent of Rs. 8 lakhs (Eight lakhs) per annum for the first ten years subject to M/s. Bangalore Trading A Financing Corporation pvt. Ltd. , depositing a sum of Rs. 2,50,000 (Rupees Two lakhs and fifty thousand only) for ten years with the V. C. S. F. free of interest subject to execution of a lease deed executed by the Director of Sugar, on behalf of Messrs. Vanivilas Co operative sugar Factory Limited and M/s. Bangalore trading and Financing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. , the lease of which has been approved by the Government". Sub: Leasing out the "distillery unit" of the Vanivilas Cooperative Sugar Factory Ltd. , hiriyur". In continuation of this Department's letter of even number. dated 2-2-1981 on the subject mentioned above I am directed to state that the lease deed should be executed by the Managing Director of Vanivilas co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. , hiriyur and not by the Director of Sugar as stated in the said letter. The draft deed should be sent to Government for approval before execution. An immediate compliance is requested in the matter". ( 8 ) IN pursuance of the above decision of Government, respondent No. 4 executed a draft deed of lease in favour of the society, which in turn was sent to Government through the Director for its approval. The draft deed should be sent to Government for approval before execution. An immediate compliance is requested in the matter". ( 8 ) IN pursuance of the above decision of Government, respondent No. 4 executed a draft deed of lease in favour of the society, which in turn was sent to Government through the Director for its approval. On examining the draft lease deed, the government suggested certain modifications for which respondent No. 4 also agreed, which was approved by Government on 11 2 1981 and the same was conveyed to the Society on the same day, and on consideration of the same, the Board of directors of the Society on the very same day passed a resolution to implement the orders of Government and authorising its md to execute the lease deed and other papers that are necessary in that behalf in favour of respondent No. 4. The resolution passed by the Board of Directors thereto reads thus : "337e aetj^ ^adb^d ^j3 ttsx> F$ > o3osx> 3 Joeodjjado ^^dihr ss^ 'add edi?^ sandoz^ofo ?ocj4> ti. irt!and 70esoo 11-2-81 and "ids37d drta 11-00 tfobrt xo$ri ajsuoff soso^o 3?o ^zlandd > j7> !3on^ pfr^g^rteb.>3^oi> ^erfjsf^ 28 (2) zoomed a^oo La 057 dof sandari ofojk s3i. tsortstodo 370^ rfj^ and and3j?aorf e3ocsr 33. 537 wrt sjo^d wds?^ ?> ,crf tnsgprs^fs41 ^ssr^da rija^ o ,^kf. 'dorado er^dicfcf Se^- arfort rf^r^j 8 ^s, asi^art^^ eosui djs. ri^ di$s3 Ks2r'/i T^jcrex> e^sdd ^xalji dj^j 20^ ?c3"tf ^jj^ejlojo^. andj^ ssifdaorf eoo> d^ rfo. wof. Ce. ?j. 149 *. ^r- 80 rfo% wor. a. ?j. 149 *. . ^r- so (11) 3d. 2-2-81 ^ oiudoi r. 68 kj^. rt^jjoi. La BSDJ^f ^-^. sirezandi^do. In terms of the draft, approved by government, a lease deed was executed by respondent No. 4 in favour of respondent no. 3 and the same was presented for registration before the concerned Sub-Registrar on 12-2-1981, who has impounded the same on the ground that it is insufficiently stamped. ( 9 ) ON 12 2 1981, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the first and the substantial order of Government and for a mandamus to respondents 1 to 3 to lease the distillery in its favour as per the draft lease deed that had been proposed to be executed. ( 9 ) ON 12 2 1981, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the first and the substantial order of Government and for a mandamus to respondents 1 to 3 to lease the distillery in its favour as per the draft lease deed that had been proposed to be executed. In the same petition, the petitioner also sought for the following interim relief: " (i) Stay the operation of the order of the first respondent dated 22 81 at Annexure 'g'. (ii) Restrain the respondents from granting lease to the 4th respondent ; (iii) Restrain the respondents from doing any act in furtherance of the order of the first respondent dated 2-2-1981 at Annexure 'g'. On 12-2 1981, Bhimiah, J. , issued rulenisi and granted an ex parte ad interim order as prayed for by the petitioner. On a further application made by the petitioner, viz. , I. A. No. III, Jagannatha Shetty, j. , made a further order on 6-3-1981 in these terms : "this is an application for an interim direction against respondents 1 to 3 restraining them from granting lease in favour of respondent 4 and also prohibiting them from doing anything in furtherance of the order impugned in this writ petition. The relief asked for in this application is only in furtherance of the interim order already made by this Court on 12-2-1981. The petitioner apprehends underhand dealings between the Government and the respondents. To make the matter clear it is proper that status quo ante should be maintained. I. A. III is accordingly allowed". On LA. Nos. IV and V made by respondents 3 and 4 for vacating the ex parte ad interim orders, without making an express order on those applications, I heard the main petition itself as agreed to by all the parties. ( 10 ) THE petitioner while alluding to some of the facts noticed earlier, has asserted that the Board of Directors of the society were competent to grant the lease in its favour and the same has been so granted in its favour. As a corollary to the above, the petitioner has urged that government had no power to interfere with the lease granted in its favour and grant tie lease to respondent No, 4 and that by cancelling the same, the lease granted to it, should be upheld by this Court. As a corollary to the above, the petitioner has urged that government had no power to interfere with the lease granted in its favour and grant tie lease to respondent No, 4 and that by cancelling the same, the lease granted to it, should be upheld by this Court. ( 11 ) IN justification of the orders made by the Government and the lease culminating in the deed of lease, respondents 3 and 4 have filed their separate returns. Respondents No. 1 and 2, while producing the records, have justified their action and supported respondents Nos. 3 and 4. ( 12 ) IN its return, respondent No. 3 has arged that it has accepted the offer made by respondent No. 4 on its own merits and the order or the letter written by Government was not a direction but was only an advice tendered to it and there was nothing illegal or improper in accepting that advice. Respondent No. 3 claims that it has not acted under the dictation of respondent No. 1. Lastly, it has urged that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not- maintainable against it and even if there is any breach of contract the only remedy available to the petitioner was to work out its remedies in a Civil Court. ( 13 ) RESPONDENT No. 4 while naturally supporting respondents No. 1 to 3, has averred that title to the property has passed in its favour and it is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and in the circumstances the only remedy for the petitioner was to bring a suit in an appropriate Civil Court. ( 14 ) RESPONDENT No. 5-Commissioner of Excise in Karnataka, has been unnecessarily impleaded and, therefore, his case if any does not require to be noticed. ( 15 ) SRI B. Thilak Hegde, learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended, the act does not empower Government to interfere with the contract to be entered by or with the Society and the order made by government directing the grant of lease to respondent No. 4 is wholly without jurisdiction and illegal. ( 16 ) SRI L. Srinivasa Reddy, learned high Court Government Pleader, appearing for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 5, sri K. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for respondent no. ( 16 ) SRI L. Srinivasa Reddy, learned high Court Government Pleader, appearing for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 5, sri K. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for respondent no. 3 and Sri H. R. Venkataramaniah, learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 urged that Government had the competence to make the orders and interfere with the functioning of the Society. Alternatively, they contended that Government had not really interfered with the rights and powers of the Society but had only tendered advice to the Society, that was sought by it and so construing only and not as a bindidg direction, respondent No. 3 had independently granted the lease to respondent no. 4. Learned Counsel for respondent no. 4 also urged that the writ petition filed annexing a copy of the order obtained surreptitiously should be thrown out with out adjudicating the merits as was done by this Court in B. Nagappa v. University of mysere, (1974) 1 Mys. L. J. 49. As this contention of Sri venkataramanaiah goes to the root of the matter, I propose to examine the same irst. ( 17 ) ALONG with its petition, the petitioner has produced a copy of the letter dated 2-2-1981 written by Government to the Director and the same has been certified as a copy by one of the counsel representing the petitioner. Evidently, the letter was not addressed to the petitioner nor a copy of the same was sent by Government to it and, therefore, the petitioner cannot produce either the original or a copy, if any, written by Government. In para 19 of the petition, the petitioner states that he has been able to obtain an unauthenticated copy of the order produced as Annexure-G. In I. A. No. I filed along with the writ petition for dispensing with the production of a certified copy, the petitioner states that it had applied for a certified copy of the order and the same had not been furnished to it till then and as urgent orders were necessary, the production of a certified copy be dispensed with. Accepting the case of the petitioner in I. A. No. I, the additional Registrar by his order dated 12-2-1981 dispensed with the production of a certified copy for two weeks. ( 18 ) AS it generally happens, even after two weeks a certified copy of the order has not been produced by the petitioner. Accepting the case of the petitioner in I. A. No. I, the additional Registrar by his order dated 12-2-1981 dispensed with the production of a certified copy for two weeks. ( 18 ) AS it generally happens, even after two weeks a certified copy of the order has not been produced by the petitioner. As to how and from whom an unauthenticated copy produced along with the writ petition was obtained has not been explained by the petitioner. At the hearing also, for obvious reasons, counsel for the petitioner did not also state as to how and from whom the petitioner has secured a copy of the order. What can be reasonably inferred in the circumstances is that the petitioner has been able to obtain a popy of the order from some one in the office of the government Secretariat or in the office of respondent No. 2 somewhat surreptitiously but not legally. On these facts, the question is whether this writ petition should be dismissed in limine without examining the merits of the case. ( 19 ) AS to the necessity for the production of a certified copy of the order or the original, if it is served on the party, there can be no dispute at all. In a proceeding for quashing, that requirement is absolutely necessary. But, in many a case, as in the very case, copies are somehow obtained by parties and are produced before this Court, rule nisi is issued and the cases are heard on merits. When this is so, it is unfair to dismiss this petition, without adjudicating the merits. Secondly, when rule nisi has been issued, whoever may be responsible for the mistake, it is more appropriate for this Court to adjudicate on merits rather than throw away the case on a technical ground. Lastly there is no dispute on the government haying made the impugned order. In these circumstances, it would not be proper to throw out the petition without adjudicating the merits. ( 20 ) IN Nagappa's case, Malimath, J. while stressing the necessity of stating from whom and how the petitioner in that case obtained a copy, that was not a public document, but the validity of which had been challenged before the Court, has examined the claim also on merits and found against the petitioner on merits. ( 20 ) IN Nagappa's case, Malimath, J. while stressing the necessity of stating from whom and how the petitioner in that case obtained a copy, that was not a public document, but the validity of which had been challenged before the Court, has examined the claim also on merits and found against the petitioner on merits. When the order made by Malimath, J. , was challenged before a Division Bench in appeal, the appellate Bench considered the matter only on merits. Sri Venkataramaniah is right that the Division Bench has not taken exception to the finding of Malimath, J. on the requirement and necessity to produce a certified copy or to state the source and the person from whom the same was obtained. Firstly, the manner in which the Division bench examined can only be read as suggesting that the Court should decide the case on merits rather on any technicalities. As I apprehend, Malimath, J. in Nagappa's case does not lay down any binding principle. Assuming that Malimath, J. has laid down a principle, even then I am of the opinion that that principle, cannot be properly applied to cases of copies of public documents as in the present case. For these reasons, I cannot uphold the preliminary objection of Sri Venkataramanaiah and I reject the same. ( 21 ) ALONG with the petition, the petitioner has produced the verification affidavit of one K. L. A. Padmanabha Sa as required by the Writ Proceedings Rules framed by this Court. But, very strangely this affidavit is sworn by the deponent on 10 2 1981 though the writ petition filed on 12 2-1981 is dated 11-2-1981. As to how the deponent could have sworn to the contents of the petition before it was ready, if not filed and why the said infirmity was overlooked by the office are beyond my comprehension. But, still this is not a ground on which I should not adjudicate the merits. I, therefore, now proceed to examine the merits of the contentions urged before me. ( 22 ) AS noticed earlier, the Minister for co operation on an examination of the proposals placed before him, made a minute or order directing the grant of distillery lease owned by respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 4 in pursuance of which the two letters were issued by Government. ( 22 ) AS noticed earlier, the Minister for co operation on an examination of the proposals placed before him, made a minute or order directing the grant of distillery lease owned by respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 4 in pursuance of which the two letters were issued by Government. A perusal of the minute made by the Minister and the consequent communications issued by Government to respondent No. 3, cannot but be read as an order that demands, obedience or compliance thereto by that respondent. By any test and standard they can be only be construed as orders and not as gratuitous advice given by an unconcerned person or authority. Whether the source to make the said order can be traced to the Act or to the Executive power of the State, has no relevance in deciding whether the same is an order or not. ( 23 ) THE Executive Committee of the society while recommending for the acceptance of the highest tender offered by the petitioner, directed that the papers be submitttd to Government for its approval. On receipt of the communication made by the MD of the Society, respondent No. 2, examined the same and in turn submitted his proposals to Government. On receipt of the recommendations of the Director, the Government examined the question and made appropriate orders. The Society, the Director and Government all proceeded on the footing that the approval of government was necessary before entering into a lease with one or the other tenderer. ( 24 ) THE fact that all the parties proceeded on the footing that sanction of government was necessary and an order has been made thereto does not really touch on the nature of the order and its efficacy. A fortiori it follows, that it was not a case where respondent No. 3 sought gratuitous advice from some person who is not an authority and that person has tendered some gratuitous advice. In these circumstances, there is no merit in the alternative contention of respondent No. 3 that it had only sought for advice and Government had tendered gratuitous advice in the matter and I, therefore, reject the same. ( 25 ) A society established, incorporated or registered under the Act, a Corporation aggregate, is a juristic person, or a legal entity. As a juristic person the Society can hold and dispose of property, sue and be sued. ( 25 ) A society established, incorporated or registered under the Act, a Corporation aggregate, is a juristic person, or a legal entity. As a juristic person the Society can hold and dispose of property, sue and be sued. Even otherwise, Section 9 of the act declares a Society registered under the act as a body corporate with perpetual succession ; can hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and do all other things that are necessary for the purpose for which it is constituted. ( 26 ) A lease of a distillery or property owned by the society is a disposition of a property and is a case of entering into a contract also. ( 27 ) S. 9 of the Act in clear and unambiguous terms declares the power of a society to enter into contracts. S. 9 or any other provision of the Act, does not confer any power on Government or any other Governmental authority to scrutinise, approve or disapprove, modify or in any way interfere with a contract entered or to be entered into by or with a Society. S. 30b occurring in Chapter IV, Management of co operative Society. , of the Act empowering government to give directions in public interest, does not authorise Government to supervise or interfere with a contract entered or to be entered by a Society. The rules made by Government under the Act or the Bye-laws made by the Society with the approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies do. not also empower government or any Governmental authority to interfere with contracts. The Constitution or any other law also does not empower government to exercise the powers of grant, supervision or control over Cooperative Societies. The executive power of Government, which is co extensive with the power of legislation, cannot also be construed as empowering Government to interfere with contracts made or to be made by or in favour of a Society. ( 28 ) THE authority that is competent to dispose of or make a contract, the manner and method is regulated by the bye laws of the society. The Executive Committes of the Society, constituted under bye law no. 29 is invested by the following bye law to generally supervise the working of the society and its administration. ( 28 ) THE authority that is competent to dispose of or make a contract, the manner and method is regulated by the bye laws of the society. The Executive Committes of the Society, constituted under bye law no. 29 is invested by the following bye law to generally supervise the working of the society and its administration. In matters of disposal of property by lease, award of contracts and others, the Executive Committee is only a recommendatory body and has no power to decide them finally. On the other hand that power is exclusively conferred on the Board of Directors (Vide bye law No. 27 (9) (a ). When a decision is taken by the Board of Directors to least the property, MD or any other authorised officer of the society can only execute the contract as approved by the Board. The bye laws also do not confer any power on government or any Governmental authority to supervise, control, interfere with a lease or contract made or to be made by or in favour of the society. ( 29 ) ON the above analysis, it follows that Government had no jurisdiction and power to interfere with the lease or contract made or to be made by the society and its orders being plainly illegal are liable to be quashed. ( 30 ) SRI Hegde next contended that a co-operative Society is an instrumentality or agency of the State and the Society having accepted the highest tender offered by the petitioner was bound to execute the contract and an appropriate mandamus or direction for enforcement of the same should be issued by this Court. In support of his contention that a Co operative society is an instrument or agency of the state that is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, Sri Hegde strongly relied on the rulings of the Supreme Court in Ramana dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 . and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mufib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487 . ( 31 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents urged that the Society had not accepted the highest tender of the petitioner and the society is not an instrumentality or agency of the State, against which a writ of any nature can be issued by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 31 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents urged that the Society had not accepted the highest tender of the petitioner and the society is not an instrumentality or agency of the State, against which a writ of any nature can be issued by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In spport of their contention, learned counsel strongly relied on the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Ideal Homes Cooperative Building Society Ltd. , v. P. I. Joseph, AIR 1976 Kar. 1 , nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Narayan Rath, AIR 1977 SC 112 . and is Ajmer Singh v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab, AIR 1981 Pandh 107 FB, 2 Kar. L. J. 312. ( 32 ) A society is administered by a committee of management or Board of Directors as they are called in the case of respondent No. 3. Even though the general body of the society is supreme, it cannot obviously administer the day to day affairs of the society and the same can only be administered by the committee of management with the aid, assistance of its own servants and others. ( 33 ) THE Aet and the Rules do not regulate the manner and method of the disposal of property or making a contract by or in favour of the society. The bye laws framed by the society, regulate the day today administration, disposal of the property and the execution of contracts by or in favour of the society. Bye-law No. 29 provides for the constitution of an executive committee consisting not more than six members, the personnel of which is indicated in the same bye-law. Bye-law no. 30 deals with the duties and functions of the executive committee and sub-clause (3) of that bye-law that is relevant reads thus : "to purchase and/or erect buildings, machinery and other equipment and stores required for the working of the society and otherwise dispose of movable and immovable property belonging to the society subject to the approval of the board of Directors". Under the aforesaid provision, the executive committee can purchase and dispost of the immovable and movable property belonging to the society only with tke approval of the Board of Directors. So far as the disposal of property, the executive committee is only a recommendatory body. Under the aforesaid provision, the executive committee can purchase and dispost of the immovable and movable property belonging to the society only with tke approval of the Board of Directors. So far as the disposal of property, the executive committee is only a recommendatory body. By this provision itself, the ultimate power to decide on the disposal of property is conferred on the Board of Directors. Bye- law No. 27 dealing with the powers and duties of the Board of Directors, makes tke position more clear. Under clause 9 (a) of Bye-law No. 27, the Board of Directors, subject to the directions, if any, given by the general body of the society, have to approve, purchase, lease of property and their terms and conditions. ( 34 ) AS seem earlier, the executive committee without a full comprehension of the legal position accepted the highest tender offered by the petitioner and directed the md to send proposals to Government for iti approval. At no other point of time, the Board of Directors has approved the decision of the executive committee or has decided to lease the property to the petitioner. In the absence of approval by the board of Directors, there was no lease much less a valid lease made in favour of the petitioner by the society. On this short ground, the claim of the petitioner for a mandamus to respondents 1 to 3 to execute the deed of lease in terms of the draft lease deed, is wholly misconceived and cannot, therefore, be granted. But, I will also assume that the Board of Directors had approved the decision of the executive committee and examine whether this Court can grant the second relief sought by the petitioner. ( 35 ) WHILE examining the power of government, I have found that Government had no jurisdiction and power to interfere with the disposal of the property by the society and its order is wholly without jurisdiction. The Act and the Rules do not confer any power on respondent no. 2 also to interfere. Even otherwise, his recommendation to Government cannot be read as respondent No. 2 approving the action of the society which also was impermissible to do. In this view, a mandamus sought by the petitioner to respondents 1 and 2 to grant the lease of distillery of respondent No. 3 is wholly misconceived and cannot be granted. 2 also to interfere. Even otherwise, his recommendation to Government cannot be read as respondent No. 2 approving the action of the society which also was impermissible to do. In this view, a mandamus sought by the petitioner to respondents 1 and 2 to grant the lease of distillery of respondent No. 3 is wholly misconceived and cannot be granted. ( 36 ) WHETHER a Co operative society constituted under the Act is a State or an authority or a person against whom a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution can be issued by this Court is no longer res integra so far as this Court is concerned. In more than one case, this Court has consistently taken the view that a Co-operative society constituted under the Act is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Ideal Homes Co-operative Society's (4) case a Division Bench of this Court consisting of D. M. Chandrashekhar, J. (as he then was) and Venkataswami, J. while reviewing all the earlier rulings, in unmistakable terms has held that a writ petition wider Art. 226 does not lie against a Cooperative Society. So far, the Supreme court in any ruling that has been brought to my notice has ruled to the contrary. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in nayagarah Co-operative Central Bank's (5) case while disapproving the contrary view taken by the High Court of Orissa, has left open that question and has not so far decided the same. In these circumstances, on the earlier rulings of this Court that are binding on me, it is not open for me to hold that a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a co-operative Society. ( 37 ) WHEN confronted with the above rulings Sri Hegde, contended that tht rulings of this Court are no longer good law in the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ramana dayaram Shetty (2) and Ajay Hasia's (3) cases and, they are not binding on me. ( 38 ) IN Ramana Dayaram Shetty's and Ajay hasia's cases the question did not directly arise for determination and, therefore, the supreme Court has not expressed any view on that question and that being to, the rulings of this Court are still binding on me. ( 38 ) IN Ramana Dayaram Shetty's and Ajay hasia's cases the question did not directly arise for determination and, therefore, the supreme Court has not expressed any view on that question and that being to, the rulings of this Court are still binding on me. But, I will also assume that the question is not res integra so far as this Court is concerned and examine whether on tht principles enunciated in Ramana Dayaram shetty's and Ajay Hasie's cases and other cases relied on by Sri Hegde, a Co-operative Society is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 39 ) IN order to know what is a cooperative society, it is not necessary to notice the origin, development and the present state of the co-operative movement in the world, our Country and the State of karnataka. Mr. Calvert In his treatise "law and Practice of Co-operation" defines Co operative Society" as a form of organisation wherein the persons voluntarily associate together as human beings on a basis of equality, for the promotion of economic interests of themselves. Dr. C. B. Mamoria and Dr. R. D. Saksena in their book 'co operation in Foreign Lands' (III edition) while tracing the origin of the cooperative society have summarised the principles of co operation in these words. "co operative principles are those practices which are essential to the achievement of the co-operative enterprise or movement. The principles of co operation are normally traced to Rochdale pioneers who established their equitable society in 1844, though their origin goes back to Robert Owen and Dr. William kind of Brighton and to some of the utopian Socialists. The co-operative principles, though revolutionary in character, were never stridently announced from the pulpit or the platform and though the deep philosophical import, they were not enunciated in any weighty tone of a learned philosopher. They were simply the rules of business recorded in the proceedings of a small consumer society of a handful of weavers who came together for providing common mutual services. But, herein lies the secret of the profound combination of rision and realism in the principle of co-operation when seen together as a totality. They were simply the rules of business recorded in the proceedings of a small consumer society of a handful of weavers who came together for providing common mutual services. But, herein lies the secret of the profound combination of rision and realism in the principle of co-operation when seen together as a totality. More than a century has elapsed since the principles were first enunciated ; through the years they have been examined and commented upon, refurnished and reburnished, but their original statement remains almost unaltered in all the essential aspects". An International Commission appointed by the International Co operative Alliance in 1964 under the Chairmanship of D. G. Karve of India with Mr. A. Bonner (of england), Mr. Havard A. Cavden (of USA), prof. D. R. Henzler (of Germany) and prof. IIstanov (of USSR) as its members have set out the following as the essential principles and ideas of a co-operative movement or a co operative society as hereunder ; " (i) Open and voluntary Membership, (ii) Democratic Administration, (iii) Self- help and Mutual help, (iv) Principles of service, (v) Distribution of Surplus, (vi) Political and Religious neutrality (vii) Proper weighment and supply of unadulterated goods ; (viii) Principle of education, and (ix) Co-operation among co-operatives". According to J. J. Woreley 'a Co-operative Philosophy of Society' must rest on free universal association democratically governed, conditioned by equity and personal liberty. From the above, it follows that a co operative society is purely a voluntary association though its incorporation, registration and all other matters are regulated by the Act. An examination of the various provisions of the Act show that the basic principle under lying a cooperative society is not destroyed and the same is not converted into a Government company or a Government organisation as in the case of a Government company or various other authorities or organisations that are formed and are in the increase in our Country. ( 40 ) A co-operative society under the act, can be incorporated or registered under the Act for the promotion of the economic interests of general welfare of the members or of the public in accordance with co operative principles. A Society registered under the Act is a body corporate with perpetual succession and seal. The Act regulates the incorporation, working, winding up and various other activities. A Society registered under the Act is a body corporate with perpetual succession and seal. The Act regulates the incorporation, working, winding up and various other activities. Even the State Government can be a member of a society and in large co operative societies like respondent No. 3 it is invariably a member (vide S. 16 of the Act ). A society can be established with limited or unlimited liability of its members. ( 41 ) A co-operative society which is a body corporate or a 'corporation aggregate" with perpetual succession and seal has a distinct legal personality from the personality of the members that constituted it. A 'corporation aggregate' is defined in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition) at para 1204 as hereunder: "meaning of Corporation aggregate. A corporation aggregate has been defined as a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities in common and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it. either at the time of its creation or at any subsequent period of its existence". "continuity" and "distinct entity" of a corporation are described in the same volume as hereunder; "continuity. An essential element in the legal conception of a Corporation is that its identity is continuous, that is, that the original member or members and his or their successors are one. Accordingly, once a liability or obligation has become binding on a corporation, whether sole or aggregate, it will bind the successors even though they are not expressly named. " "corporation a distinct entitv. The nature of a corporation may be shown by contrasting it. as a legal conception with the individuals or mass of individuals in which it resides. In law the individual Corporators, or members, of which it is composed are something wholly different from the corporation itself;. for a corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual. The nature of a corporation may be shown by contrasting it. as a legal conception with the individuals or mass of individuals in which it resides. In law the individual Corporators, or members, of which it is composed are something wholly different from the corporation itself;. for a corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual. If a man trusts a corporation, he trusts that legal person, and must look to its assets for payment, he can only call upon individual members to contribute if the Act or charter creating the corporation has so provided. The liability of an individual member is not increased by the fact that he is the sole person beneficially interested in the property of the corporation and that the other members have become members merely for the purpose of enabling the Corporation to ber come incorporated and possess but a nominal interest in its property, or hold their interest in trust for him. Notice to an individual who happens to be a member of a corporation aggregate but has no authority to receive notices is not equivalent to notice to the corporate body; and where an action is maintainable by and in the name of a corporation, it cannot be maintained by individual members of the corporation. After the dissolution of a corporation the members, in their natural capacities can neither recover debts which are due to the late corporation nor be charged with debts contracted by it. " ( 42 ) ON the application of the above principles even if Government is a member as a share holder, a co-operative society does not become a Government department, officer, company, corporation or an organisation, for which reason it would not fall within the meaning of the term 'state' occurring in Article 12 of the Constitution. ( 43 ) APPLYING every one of the princiciples enunciated by the Supreme court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty's and Ajay Hasia's cases, it is not possible to hold that a co-operative society is an instrumentality or an agency of the state. The laws made to regulate the incorporation, working and winding up of co-operative societies, cannot and will not transform a co-operative society into an instrumentality or agency of the State. The laws made to regulate the incorporation, working and winding up of co-operative societies, cannot and will not transform a co-operative society into an instrumentality or agency of the State. An officer lent by Government to discharge the functions of a Managing Director or any other post in a society, does not and cannot transform a co-operative society into an instrumentality or agency of the State. ( 44 ) SRI Hegde urged that a writ can issue against a natural or a juristic person, notwithstanding that that person does not fall within the term 'state' or an instrumentality or an agency of the State. In support of his contention Sri Hegde strongly relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in rohtas Industries Ltd v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union, AIR 1976 SC 425 . ( 45 ) IN Rohtas Industries Ltd's case, the supreme Court was examining whether a voluntary arbitrator appointed by agreement of parties under Section 10a of Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 was amenable to the jurisdiction of the high Court under Article 226 of the constitution. In that context the court speaking through Krishna Iyer, j. , observed thus; "the expansive and extraordinary pov/er of the High Courts under article 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person-even a private individual and be available for any (other) purpose, even, one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Art. 226 in 1963 inserting Art. 226 (1a) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the express reference to 'the residence of such person. ' But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a china shop. This Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is jus ice and a patent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has by and large been the people's sentinel on the quivive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. The mentor of law is jus ice and a patent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has by and large been the people's sentinel on the quivive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. We hold that the award here is not beyond the legal reach of Articlt 226 although this power must be kept in severely judicious leash. " the scope and ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution has been expounded by the Supreme Court in large number of cases and it is unnecessary to notice all of them. But, according to all of them, a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can be issued against the State, any authority of the State or an officer of the State, an instrumentality or agency of the state and cannot be issued against any and every private person or juristic person except in cases of writ of habeas corpus and a writ of quo warranto. In my view the above observations cannot be read as empowering this Court to issue a writ against any and every person or a juristic person. I, therefore, reject this contention of Sri Hegde. ( 46 ) SRI Hegde finally urged that a writ of mandamus can be issued even to the society or atleast to its Managing director to compel either of them to execute the contract in terms of the decision of the executive committee. In support of his contention Sri Hegde strongly relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in Praga Tools corporation v. C. B. Imanual, AIR 1969 SC 1306 and the observations made in Sekrappa v. Belgaum Division Regulated Market Employees Welfare and Credit Co-operative Society, (1979) 1 Kar. L. J. 299 (para 7 ). ( 47 ) IN Praga Tools Corporation's and sekrappa's cases what, has been held is that a writ of mandamus can be issued to an authority or person to compel the performance of a statutory duty. In Sekrappa's case I have found that the duty to convene a meeting on the Secretary was a statutory duty under the Act. But, that is not the position here and, therefore, the principle in Praga Tools Corporation's and Sekarappa's cases has no application. In Sekrappa's case I have found that the duty to convene a meeting on the Secretary was a statutory duty under the Act. But, that is not the position here and, therefore, the principle in Praga Tools Corporation's and Sekarappa's cases has no application. ( 48 ) IN Ajmer Singh v. The Registrar, co-operative Societies (6) a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, has held that a co-operative society registered under a similar Act, is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the high Court under Article 226 of the constitution. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in Ajmer singh's case. ( 49 ) TO sum up, a co-operative society does not fall within the meaning of the term 'state' find is not an instrumentality or agency of the State against which a writ, direction or order can be issued by a High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 50 ) ON the above conclusion, it follows that this Court cannot annul the contract, if any, entered in favour of respondent No. 4 and in substitution of the same, direct respondent No. 3 to execute the contract in favour of the petitioner, assuming that that is a valid contract in its favour. Hence, the second prayer of the petitioner cannot be granted and I, reject the same. ( 51 ) EARLIER I have found that there is no valid contract in favour of the petitioner, But, I will also assume that there is a valid contract in favour of the Petitioner and that a writ under art. 226 of the Constitution can also issue against a co-operative society and examine whether this Court should issue a writ to respondent No. 3 having regard to all the facts and circumstances and the law bearing on the point. ( 52 ) IN the first place the contract is not a statutory contract governed by any statutory provision but is only a contract governed by the ordinary law of contract. An ordinary contractual obligation cannot be enforced in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution (vide The bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh (10 ). Secondly, the petitioner has not even alleged, much less shown any legal right in his favour and a legal duty to be performed by respondent no. An ordinary contractual obligation cannot be enforced in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution (vide The bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh (10 ). Secondly, the petitioner has not even alleged, much less shown any legal right in his favour and a legal duty to be performed by respondent no. 3 or its functionary and its violation justifying this Court's interference under Article 226 of the Constitution (vide the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. , AIR 1977 SC 2149 lastly, it is clear that the petitioner and respondent No. 4, shrewd businessmen, offer higher amounts of lease only on knowing the lease amount offered by his rival and in that game, the offer made by respondent No. 4 is more beneficial to the society and, therefore, this Court will ntn be justified in acting to the detriment of the society. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that this is not case in which the petitioner is legally and justly entitled for a mandamus to respondent No. 3. ( 53 ) AN examination of the events noticed by me in some detail disclose the hush hush and not too edifying manner in which the whole matter has been concluded by the society and government. A co-operative society cannot be compared to an ordinary individual. A society owes to itself and its share holders and the general public to transact its affairs in such a way that the fa'milar and age old principle that "ceasar's wife must be above suspicion" is observed in all its affairs. If the matter could be interfered with by this Court under Art, 226 of the Constitution, having regard to, (1) the unintellgent, vague and brief advertisement calling for tenders, (2) that all the terms and conditions had not been set out well in advance. (3) that the whole matter at the level of society and Government has been finalised in secrecy, and (4) that the petitioner and respondent No. 4 as shrewd businessmen were determined to outwit the other to the detriment of the society and that the grant of lease to respondent No. 4 was the result of the order made by Government, I would have directed respondent no. 3 to dispose of the lease of its distillery afresh with further appropriate directions in the manner of disposal which necessarily means that I would not have accepted either the earlier offer made by the petitioner or the later offer made by respondent No. 4, found favour with Government and also accepted by the society. Bu't, alas, i cannot do that for the reasons earlier stated, except quashing the orders of government without concerning myself with the consequences that would flow from the same. Whether and what action should be taken in the lighit of these expressions or sentiments but not directions, is a matter for the society itself to decide. ( 54 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I hold that the letter No. RDC. 149 COF 80 dated 2. 2. 81 and its continuation letter of even number and date are alone liable to be quashed and, I, therefore, quash them. Rule issued is made absolute to this extent only and is discharged in all other respects. ( 55 ) IN the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .