Order.- One Govindarajant now ordered by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dmdigul, to be impleaded as the third accused in C.C. No. 994 of 1979 on his file, has directed this petition under section 482, Criminal Proceduxe Code, for quashing the proceedings as against him in the said case pursuant to the order, dated 7th December, 1979,passed by the learned Magistrate under section 319 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The brief history of the case which led to this petition can be stated thus; Initially the respondent-complainant filed a complaint against the fiist accused, viz., one Venkataraman, for an offence under sections 7 (1) and 16 (1) (a) (i) read with section 2 (ia) , clauses (a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (XXXVII of 1954), as amended upto date (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the allegation that the said Venkataraman was found to be in possession of ten bundles of adulterated tea dust packets, weighing about 2.300 Kilograms, for the purpose of sale, and that he offered the same for sale to the Food Inspector lor the purpose of analysis and sold 690 grams (three bundles) to the Food Inspector for a cash consideration of Rs. 11.40, and that the sample, on analysis, was found to contain about 20 per cent, of extraneous matter other than tea and ash insoluble in H.C.L. was in excess over the maxi mum Imposible limit by 100 per cent. It is seen that the Court, subsequently, by its order in Crl.M.P. No. 2329 of 1979 dated 7th May, 1979, on a memo, filed by the prosecution under section 20-A of the Act, ordered one Ranganathan to be impleaded as the second accused as he is said to have been conducting one Doable Rose Tea Company at Udumalpet and had sold adulterated tea dust packets in bundle form to the first accused Venkataraman at Palni. It is seen that two witnesses viz, the Food Inspector and another, were examined as P. Ws. 1 and 2 and Exhibits P-1 to P-9 were marked on the side of the complainant. Both the accused examined the petitioner herein as D.W. 1 and filed Exhibits D-1 to D-5. It is seen that two witnesses viz, the Food Inspector and another, were examined as P. Ws. 1 and 2 and Exhibits P-1 to P-9 were marked on the side of the complainant. Both the accused examined the petitioner herein as D.W. 1 and filed Exhibits D-1 to D-5. After recording the evidence of D.W- 1 and marking the documents on the side of the defence, the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order directing the petitioner to be impleaded as the third accused along with accused 1 and 2 and further directed that copies of the said order be served on accused 1 and 2, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor before the trial Court and the petitioner herein. It is only at this stage, the petitioner who claims to have not received any copy of the impugned order or any summons from the Court, has filed this petition. 3. Mr. Haji P.K. Jamal Mohamed, appearing on behalf of the petitionee submitted that the proceedings taken against the pstitioner cannot be sustained, for the following reasons: (1) The impugned proceedings in this case have been taken after the conclusion of the trial and therefore the impugned order passed under section 319 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, is one pissed without jurisdiction and hence it cannot be sustained as the said section contemplates that the proceedings could be taken only “in the course of any enquiry in to, or trial of, an offence;” (2) When the Act provides a specific provision viz.,section 29-A , which empowers that Court to implead a manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food on the Court being satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (3) of section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or in section 20 of the Act, the Magistrate ought to have exercised the powers under section 20-A and not under section 319 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. According to him, the special provision viz.,section 20-A of the Act, excludes the operation of section 319(1), Criminal Procedure Code. (3) There is no sufficien evidence in this case, warranting the impleading of the petitioner herein as an accued along with accused 1 and 2. 4. Nowj I shall take up the above submissions’ one by one. According to him, the special provision viz.,section 20-A of the Act, excludes the operation of section 319(1), Criminal Procedure Code. (3) There is no sufficien evidence in this case, warranting the impleading of the petitioner herein as an accued along with accused 1 and 2. 4. Nowj I shall take up the above submissions’ one by one. Before adverting to the Submissions made by the learned Counsel, I would like to mention here that sub- sections (1), (2) and (4) (b), of section 319 of the new Code are new provisions, whilst sub- section (3) of section 319 of the new Code corresponds to sub- Section (1) of section 351 of the old Code, and the present sub- section (4) (a) of section 319 corresponds to sub- section (2) of section 351 of the old Code, but with a difference that the opening words of sub- section (4) have been newly introduced. The condition precedent for the application of section 319 (1) is that the proceedings should be taken against a person for an offence which he appears to have committed “in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence”, provided it appears from the evidence that the person proposed to be impleade has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the other accused. Admittedly, in the present case, the trial had commenced and the witnesses have been, examined on both sides. The crucial question is whether on the examination of D.W.1 the trial had finally come to an end and thus concluded. If the trail had finally concluded, then this section cannot be availed of by the Court to implead the petitioner herein to take trial along with accused 1 and 2. Therefore, we have to see the exact meaning of the words “in the course of the trial.” 5. The meaning of the word “trial” was considered by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ram Nadesh.1 In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated thus: “The word ‘trial’ is not defined in the Go de. ‘Trial’ according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary means the conclusion, by a competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal’ (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Vol. ‘Trial’ according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary means the conclusion, by a competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal’ (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Vol. 4, p. 3092), and according to Wharton's Law Lexicon means’the hearing of a cause, civil or criminal, before a Judge Who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land’ (Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th, Edn., p. 1011) The words ‘tried” and ‘trial’ (appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn the words ‘tried’ and ‘trial’ have been used in the sense of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in these sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they shouId necessarily be limited in their cannotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which scheme and purpose of the provision under consideration.” 6. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Palghat Municipality v S.R. and O. Mills2, has held that the term”during the trial of any offence “occurring in section 20-A of the Act, would mean at any stage after the commencement of the trial and before the conclusion of the trial by convicting or acquitting the accused concerned and not thereafter, 7. The Supreme Court is Delhi Municipality v. Sahoi3, while examining the scope of section 20-A of the Act, has pointed out that; section 20-A of the Act clearly contemplates the contingency where the discretionary jurisdiction under the Act can be exercised only during the trial of any offence, that is to say, the stage at which the Magistrate can exercise has jurisdiction under this Act must be before the trial has concluded and ended in the acquittal or the conviction. 8. 8. It is unnecessary for me to refer to all the decisions cited at the Bar on this point, as it is very clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, that the trial of a case legally lasts till the proceedings come to an end by the conviction or acquittal, as the case may be, of the accused, and till then the proceedings are in the course of the trial. Because the defence witness has been examined and certain documents have been marked on the side of the defence, it cannot be contended that the trial has come to an end and therefore the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to act under section 319 (1) of the Code. If such an interpretation has to be given, as contended by the petitioner's Counsel, then it would defeat the very purpose and object of section 319, Criminal Procedure Code., Admittedly in this case, the case has not ended either in the acquittal or in the conviction of the accused, and therefore I am of the view that there is no merit in the first contention raised by the learned Counsel. 9. Now, I shall pass on to the second contention viz., that in view of the provisions under section 20-A of the Act, while dealing with an offence under the Act, the general law under section 319, Criminal Procedure Code, could not be invoked. The above section was newly added by section 12 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act XLIX of 1964 ,which introduction was made with reference to the report of the Joint Committee on the abovesaid amendment bill, so as to enable the Court to see that a manufacturer, distributor or dealer with respect to an article of food, with reference to which a prosecutior has been launched against the vendor, should not go scot-free. section 20-A, as it stood in 1964, read as follows: “Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) of section 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in section 20 , proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20”. This section, pursuant to the enactment of the New Criminal Procedure Code, was modified by section 17 of the Amendment ActXXXIV of 1976 with effect from 20th March, 1976, by substituting the words “sub- section (3) of section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(11 of 1974)“for the words “sub- section (1) of section 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898 )”. section 319 of the new Code deals with the power of the Court to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of an offence. Sub- section (3) of this section, corresponding to sub- section (1) of section 351 of the old Code, provides that any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence be appears to have committed- section 20-A, as pointed out by a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another v. Laxminarain and another1 is in the nature of an exception to section 351 (1) of the old Code and the manufacturer, distributor or dealer can, under the provision of section 20-A of the Act, be impleaded even though they are not present in Court, and it is, however, clear from the language of section 20-A that this provision can be invoked only during the trial of the vendor and cannot be invoked after the trial of the vendor has concluded either by his discharge or acquittal. A reading of section 20-A of the Act would clearly show that it does not bar the application of section 319, Criminal Procedure Code. A reading of section 20-A of the Act would clearly show that it does not bar the application of section 319, Criminal Procedure Code. There is no nan obstante clause in section 20-A indicating the intention of the Legislature to exclude the operation of the general provision under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Piocedure. 10. The Act is a special enactment, which prescribes no procedure for the trial of offences under the Act and hence, offences committed under the Act have to be tried according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, subject of course, to certain provisions of the Act. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhagwandas v. Dehi Administration2 these special provisions do not take away or derogate from the effect of the ordinary provisions of the law. The Kerala High Court in P.A. Mathew v. Food Inspector,3 has observed that: “there is nothing in either section 319 , Criminal Procedure Code, or section 20-A of the Act, which restricts the power.“of the Court to implead a person as an accused during the course of a trial, if the evidence adduced warrants such an impleading. No doubt, when once the Court decides to implead a person as an accused under section 319 (1) , then the proceedings in respect of such a person shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-heard as contemplated under sub-clause (4) of section 319: Vide Delhi Municipality v. Y.K. Kapoor4 Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxminarain1, for contending that only section 2U-A of the Act has to be invoked and not section 319 ,. Criminal Procedure Code. A close reading of the judgment does not show that section 319 , Criminal Procedure Code, has been held to be a bar in view of section 20-A of the Act. 11. Thus, it is seen that it is, of course: desirable for a Court to invoke sectior 20-A of the Act, if it wants to implead a manufacturer, distributor or dealer during the trial of a case, proceeded against a vendor. The application of section 319, Criminal Procedure Code, is not however, excluded or barred. Therefore, the impugned order is not in any way vitiated on this ground. 12. The application of section 319, Criminal Procedure Code, is not however, excluded or barred. Therefore, the impugned order is not in any way vitiated on this ground. 12. As regards the third contention that the evidence accused does not warrant the impleading of the petitioner as an accused, I do not want to go deep into the merits of the case and express any opinion as to whether there is sufficient evidence or not against the petitioner as such an opinion may be prejudicial to either of the parties. Learned Counsel in support of his contention, relied upon the decision in Desa Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh1 As pointed out in the said decision, if there is no evidence at all worth the name, to connect the petitioner with the commission of the offence, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to implead and proceed against the petitioner. But, in the present case, on a persual of the entire evidence, I am of opini3n that there is prima facie evidence in this case justifying the impugned order of the Magistrate impleading the petitioner herein as an accused. Therefore, the decision relied on by the learned Counsel is of no avail. 13. For all the reasons stated above, I hold that there is no illegality committed by the leaned Magistrate is passing the impugned order, calling for an interference by this Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. Accordingly, this petition will stand dismissed. 14. While dismissing this petition, I, on the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, direct that this case now pending on C.C. No. 994 of 1979 on the file of the Sub-Devisional Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul, be transferred to the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, who, on receipt of the papers, shall expedite the hearing of the case and dispose of the same according to law. R.S. ----- Petition dismissed.