N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN order to appreciate this contention the legal aspect of the problem deserves to be noted. Under sec. 14 of the Contract Act a consent is said to be not free if it is caused by coercion undue influence etc. and it has been provided there that consent can be said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence of such coercion undue influence etc. In my view the word cause is highly connotative. Even if there he undue influence or coercion but if it does not appear that it was instrumental in making the promisor to do the act in question the existence of coercion etc. would be of no avail. The word cause is not a term of art but it is a term of science. Nothing can be said to be the cause of a particular effect unless it is the proximate and immediate cause of that effect. When a particular effect is said to be caused by a particular factor it must be clearly and cogently established that the effect is the direct outcome of that particular cause. If the alleged cause is remote and not proximate is distant and not immediate such a cause cannot be said to be the cause in legal parlance. What I have observed above is made clear by the words quoted from sec. 14 above. I would reiterate that the consent can be said to be so caused only if it could be shown that but for those factors of the alleged causes the effect would not have ensued. In my view this is too well-entrenched a proposition of law to be elaborated any further. It is also to be noted that a factor that would cause a particular effect with a particular man may not be able to achieve that result in the case of another man. In other words the causal relationship can be said to be established only if it is proved that in the facts and circumstances of a particular case the said factors had weighed with the promisor and that but for those factors the said promisor would not have acted in the manner he is found to have acted. In other words the causal relationship can be said to be established only if it is proved that in the facts and circumstances of a particular case the said factors had weighed with the promisor and that but for those factors the said promisor would not have acted in the manner he is found to have acted. Thus the totality of circumstances is required to be viewed before a decision one way or the other is reached in this regard. I propose to examine the evidence on record in this light. [the rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] appeal dismissed. .