Judgment :- 1. A building situated at Market Road, Ernakulam and in the occupation of the respondent-tenant, belongs to two sisters, the petitioners herein. The petitioners moved the Rent Control Court for evicting the tenant under S.11 (3) and S.11 (4) (iii) of Act 2/65. In support of the first ground, it was alleged that the 1st petitioner was carrying on a business in the name and style of "Cochin Pharma Distributors" at Church Landing Road and that the building in the tenant's occupation was required for that business. The allegation in support of the 2nd ground was that the tenant had obtained other premises within the same-city to carry on two separate hotel businesses, one near Jos Junction and another near Pallimukku Junction. S.11 (3) permits eviction of the tenant if the landlord "bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him". And S.11 (4) (iii) allows eviction if the tenant acquires possession of a building in the same city, reasonably sufficient for bis requirements. 2. The Rent Control petition and the tenant's objections thereto had apparently proceeded on the footing that "Cochin Pharma" was a proprietary business of the 1st petitioner. As a matter of fact, the business belonged to a firm with four partners, and the first petitioner was only one among them. This circumstance was brought out during the cross-examination of pw. 1 with the result that the point formulated for decision by the Rent Control Court was in these terms: "Whether eviction can be ordered on the ground that the 1st petitioner bona fide needs the petition schedule building for providing accommodation for the business run by her in partnership". The court found that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide, and ordered eviction. It did not however specifically deal with the question whether S.11 (3) could be availed of by a co-owner, engaged in partnership with others, to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground that the building in his occupation was required for the use of the partnership business. The appellate authority confirmed the above order, also without considering the 'partnership aspect' of the case. Differing from the Rent Control Court, that authority also accepted the case of the petitioners under S 11(4) (iii) and ordered eviction on that additional ground. 3. The appellate authority confirmed the above order, also without considering the 'partnership aspect' of the case. Differing from the Rent Control Court, that authority also accepted the case of the petitioners under S 11(4) (iii) and ordered eviction on that additional ground. 3. When the matter was taken up in revision under S.20, the District Court took a different view on the scope of S.11 (3), and said: "In the instant case possession is sought for not for the occupation of the first petitioner - 1st respondent or the 2nd petitioner - 2nd respondent or for any member of their family dependant on them. It is sought for on behalf of a registered partnership in which the 1st respondent happened to be one of the partners only. The application schedule building does not belong to the firm, as spoken to by pw. 1. Therefore the respondents are not entitled to eviction on the ground of bona fide need for own occupation coming within the S.11 (3) of the Act." As regards the ground based on S.11 (4) (iii) also, the court differed from the appellate authority's conclusion. The Rent Control Petition was accordingly dismissed. 4. In the present proceedings under S.115 CPC., the petitioners challenge the correctness of the view taken by the District Court on the scope of S 11 (3). The point relating to S 11 (4) (iii) was urged in CRP. No. 3208/80, but that was dismissed at the admission stage In view of my order dated 14-7-81 in CMP. No. 12129/81, the petitioners are confining their case in the present proceedings to S.11(3) only, and I am dealing with that alone. 5. The controversy is about the scope of the expression "his own occupation" in S.11 (3). Counsel for the petitioners contends that 'own occupation' cannot be equated to 'exclusive occupation' or 'sole occupation', and that where a landlord is a member of a partnership, his need to occupy the building along with the other partners for the partnership business will still be a need for own occupation. The tenant's contention, on the other hand, is that "own occupation" in the context has to be contrasted with occupation by members of the family separately dealt with by the sub-section itself, and that consequently, occupation by the landlord and some strangers will not amount to "his own occupation". 6. The tenant's contention, on the other hand, is that "own occupation" in the context has to be contrasted with occupation by members of the family separately dealt with by the sub-section itself, and that consequently, occupation by the landlord and some strangers will not amount to "his own occupation". 6. Before dealing with the decision cited, I shall try to test the rival propositions' with some illustrations. Suppose the landlord is an aged bachelor and he proposes to move into the building with two brothers, who may not be members of his family, or with two friends who are willing to attend on him. Can the eviction petition be thrown out on the ground that what is contemplated is not "his own occupation", but occupation of himself and some strangers? I think not, because the strangers are coming in only to fulfil the need of the landlord for his own occupation Again, suppose the landlord is a company which is not a "public institution" under S. H (7), and it wants the tenant to vacate so that the building can be made available to one of its officers entitled, under the terms of appointment, to be provided with residence The officer is not the landlord himself, nor a member of his (its) family. Can it be said that because S.11 (3) speaks of "own occupation", the company cannot seek eviction at all? In my opinion, the occupation by the officer in such a case will be 'own occupation" by the company itself, because legal possession will be with the company and the officer will be a licensee Take again the case of a landlord who is engaged in partnership business with his wife as the only other partner. If the business is in need of more space and if a tenant is occupying a bigger building belonging to the landlord, can his eviction petition be resisted on the ground that the need is not for his own occupation, but for the occupation of himself and his wife as partners? If the answer is in the negative, does it make any difference if the partner is not the wife, but another? If the answer is in the negative, does it make any difference if the partner is not the wife, but another? Tenants also can form partnership; and where a building is let out to a tenant for commercial purposes, and where be takes in his wife (or a stranger) as partner, can the landlord successfully seek eviction under S.11 (4) (i) on the ground that the tenant has transferred "his right under the lease" to a firm consisting of himself and another, or under S 11(4)(v), on the ground that the tenant himself has not been occupying the building for six months? If a building is let out to a firm consisting of A, Band C, and if the three partners subsequently take in D as a fourth partner for the same business, is there any substantial change in the nature of the occupation? Illustrations like these may not conclude the question of interpretation raised, but they at least indicate that "occupation" for the purposes of sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.11 need not necessarily in all cases be exclusive occupation, sole occupation or even personal occupation. 7. Turning to the authorities cited, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Clift v. Taylor (1948(2) A.E.R. 113) seems to be relevant. Taylor, landlord of a building, had let out a portion thereof to Mrs. Clift for use as a teashop. Taylor himself was partner in a firm of estate agents and the firm was carrying on the business in the remainder of the building, as a tenant of Taylor. When the question of renewal of the lease in favour of Mrs. Clift arose in 1947, Taylor contended that the tea-shop portion of the building was also required for his partnership business. S 5(3; of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927 provided that renewal "shall not be deemed to be reasonable" if the landlord required the premises "for occupation by himself". Clift arose in 1947, Taylor contended that the tea-shop portion of the building was also required for his partnership business. S 5(3; of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927 provided that renewal "shall not be deemed to be reasonable" if the landlord required the premises "for occupation by himself". The question therefore arose whether occupation by the firm of estate agents would be occupation by the landlord himself, and the Court said: "Under sub-s. (3)(b) the landlord proved two of his four conditions of exemption, namely, (i) that he "required the premises for his own occupation," and (ii) under para, (iv), that "the grant of such a lease of the premises would not be consistent with good estate management." The facts proved by him as regards exemption (i) are these. The existing arrangement with his partners as to the firm's occupation of the building (excluding the tea-shop) was that the firm as a whole had a tenancy from him as landlord and he assumed that a similar arrangement would be made in regard to the premises previously let for a tea-shop. On this, counsel for the tenant contended that such a lease would not constitute "occupation by the landlord" within the meaning of condition (i) to be proved by the landlord. The answer of counsel for the landlord was that it was open to the landlord to give a mere licence to the firm to use the new premises, which would dispose of that objection. We agree, but we go further. On the reasonable interpretation of the Act it would be ridiculous to suppose that Parliament had intended to complicate the simple business conception of occupation by the landlord by pursuing the irrelevant further inquiry whether he had a partner or partners or whether he let the premises in question to the firm or gave them a licence, but even if so artificial and technical a construction of the Act as that urged by counsel for the tenant was proper, counsel for the landlord pointed out that, on the basis of the position now obtaining both in equity and at law, as explained with authorities in CHESHIRE'S MODERN REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., pp. 550, 554,, land or any interest in land owned by a partner-snip and in its possession is occupied by all the partners and by each of them, because they are tenants in common. 550, 554,, land or any interest in land owned by a partner-snip and in its possession is occupied by all the partners and by each of them, because they are tenants in common. In addition, counsel for the landlord argued that, had Parliament intended to limit the word "occupation" to the sole occupation of the landlord and to exclude occupation by him as a partner, it could have inserted the word "solely," as was done in the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1878, S.13(1) " S. 11(3) of Act 2/65 applies to buildings let out for commercial purposes also; and is it possible to think that the legislature wanted a further enquiry, in the context of "own occupation", as to whether the landlord was going to occupy the building as an individual or in his capacity as a partner? Is it too much to suppose that the landlord would be occupying the building himself, permitting the other partners to occupy it as licensees during the currency of the partnership and for its purpose? 8. Mr. C.S Narayanan for the tenant would however contend that the Supreme Court has taken a different view of the matter in D.N. Sanghavi v. A.T. Das (AIR. 1974 SC. 1026). The case arose under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act S.12(1)(e) of the Act provided for eviction of a tenant occupying a residential building if the landlord bona fide required it "for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family". S.12(1)(f) dealt with non-residential buildings, and provided that the landlord could evict the tenant if he required it bona fide "for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters". S.39 dealing with allotment of buildings provided that the Collector could allow the landlord to occupy a building if "he needs the accommodation for his own occupation". The landlord instituted a suit for ejectment on the footing that he wanted the premises for the purpose of "continuing his business" under S.12(1)(f). He and his brothers were engaged in some business, but it was not clear whether he was the managing partner, or an active partner, or whether he was only a sleeping partner. The landlord instituted a suit for ejectment on the footing that he wanted the premises for the purpose of "continuing his business" under S.12(1)(f). He and his brothers were engaged in some business, but it was not clear whether he was the managing partner, or an active partner, or whether he was only a sleeping partner. The proposal was to continue the business in the building occupied by the tenant, but again it was not clear whether he was going to occupy it himself along with his brothers, or whether the brothers would be setting up a separate business of theirs. He did not say or adduce any other evidence to show that "he would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his partners on obtaining possession" from the tenant. On these facts, two questions arose for their Lordships' decision: (i) What is the scope of the words "his business" in S.12 (1) (f) and (ii) whether in the circumstances of the case the business for which the plaintiff required the accommodation could be said to be "his business'? The court examined all the relevant provisions of the Act to come to the conclusion that the legislature was more strict with respect to the eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation than from a residential accommodation Having due regard to this general scheme, and the limited nature of the class of people for whose occupation alone S 12 (1) (f) could be invoked, the court held that "his business" should not receive a wide construction so as to bring in other classes, and that a landlord seeking eviction under S 12 (1) (f) must show that the business is substantially his, and that the "accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business". On the facts of the case, there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff was actually associated with the business which was being carried on, and which was proposed to be shifted: it was possible that he was only a sleeping partner, and the occupation would be by the other partners either for the partnership business or even for a separate business. In this view, the second question was also answered against the plaintiff by holding that he was unable to show the existence of or the proposal to continue a business which could be considered as "his business" under S.12(1) (f). 9. Far from holding that a partner could not seek eviction of a tenant for continuing his partnership business in the premises, the decision indicates that a landlord could do so if he is not a sleeping partner in the business, even under the Madhya Pradesh Act That was how the decision was understood by Poti J. (as he then was) in Govinda Pai v. Sarvothama Rao (1981 KLT. 330) and I am in respectful agreement with that view. No doubt there is an observation in paragraph (2) of the Supreme Court's judgment that in the context of S 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Act. the principles of partnership law could have only restricted application But S.11(3) of our enactment makes no distinction between residential and non-residential accommodation, or between eviction for residential and business purposes. The term "his business" in the context in which it is used in the Madhya Pradesh Act finds no place in Kerala Act 2/65. I may add that Clift v. Taylor (1948 (2) A. E R.113) was noticed by the Supreme Court in Sanghavi's case with the observation that Taylor was actually in management of the firm's estate agency business and that his occupation along with the other partners would in effect be "own occupation." 10. In Shentilal v. Chimenlal (AIR 1976 SC. 2358) the Supreme Court doubted whether occupation by a firm of which the landlord is a partner would amount to "occupation by himself" under S.13 (1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The question was not decided, and the case was disposed of on the assumption that it would. I am unable to agree with counsel that this impliedly overrules the view taken in Sanghavi (AIR. 1974 SC. 1026). 11. It is then urged that if two views are possible on the scope of S.11 (3), the one in favour of the tenant should be adopted, keeking in view the purpose of the enactment. I am unable to agree with counsel that this impliedly overrules the view taken in Sanghavi (AIR. 1974 SC. 1026). 11. It is then urged that if two views are possible on the scope of S.11 (3), the one in favour of the tenant should be adopted, keeking in view the purpose of the enactment. To hold that a partnership is different from the landlord who is only one of its members may be helpful for the tenant in cases like the present arising under S.11 (3), but as explained earlier, it may not be so helpful in cases where the tenant forms a partnership and is faced with the question of eviction under S.11 (4) (i). The law reports contain many decisions where courts have refused to evict tenants on the ground of sub-letting or transfer of possession where they had admittedly formed partnerships after the letting In my opinion the proper approach would be not to generalise and lay down theories in the abstract, but to tackle the facts of each case and see how they operate. If the question arises under S.11 (3), the attempt should be to find out whether the partnership set up by the landlord is one where he could really occupy the premises himself; and if it arises under S.11 (4) (i), the attempt again should be to find out whether the tenant's partnership is one where he effectively continues to occupy the premises notwithstanding the formation of the partnership. That is the approach made by the Supreme Court in Sanghavi's case, and by this Court in Govinda Pai's case. In construing a given arrangement, the general purpose of Rent Control legislation can be kept in view and subterfuges, if resorted to, could be exposed. The mistake made by the District Court in the present case lies in assuming that occupation by a firm will always be different from occupation by a landlord who is a member thereof It thought that eviction was "sought for on behalf of a registered partnership", overlooking the circumstances that the landlords had applied for eviction on their own behalf, though the intention was that the building when it fell vacant could be occupied by one of them for the business she was carrying on along with other partners. 12. 12. It is then contended that the partnership deed has not been produced and that there is no material to show that the partnership arrangement set up is genuine It may be a subterfuge or a camouflage, and the burden of proof is on the landlords, submits counsel for the tenant I am not impressed by this contention The tenant knew, at least by the time pw. 1 was examined before the Rent Control Court, that "Cochin Pharma" was a partnership business. No suggestion was made to pw. 1 that the 1st petitioner was only a sleeping partner or that the whole arrangement was a device to evict the tenant. No whisper was made at any stage during the trial, and apparently at the hearing also, about such a doubt. The Rent Control Court's order proceeded on the assumption that the first petitioner was in management of the firm's business and that it was she who was going to occupy the building when the tenant walked out Still, no ground was raised in the appeal memorandum to suggest that this was not the true position. On the other hand, the ground taken was that there was no evidence to establish that the 2nd petitioner and the other partners of the firm had agreed to the arrangement. The appellate authority also proceeded on the same footing; and it does not appear from the District Court's order that the genuineness of the partnership, the role of the 1st petitioner in the firm's business and the nature of the proposed occupation were ever in dispute before that Court also. It cannot be said that the tenant was denied an opportunity to put forward his case on this aspect of the matter and adduce evidence thereon. Under the circumstances, I am not persuaded to think that this Court (the fourth Court) should now direct another investigation into facts supposed to be relevant. 13. An attempt is then made to draw a distinction between an owner trying to get possession of a building for his partnership business, and one of the co-owners making a similar attempt for a partnership business in which he or she alone is a partner. Though Mr Rama Shenoi for the landlords would say that no such distinction was attempted before the three court's below, I am prepared to examine it as a question of law. Though Mr Rama Shenoi for the landlords would say that no such distinction was attempted before the three court's below, I am prepared to examine it as a question of law. In Shantaram v. Shyam Sundar (1972 RCJ 741) a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that where one out of a number of persons constituting the body of the landlords bona fide requires the building for his own use and occupation, that would amount to a requirement of all the landlords. Their Lordships quoted with approval the following passage from an earlier decision of Naik J:- "It may also well be that the joint landlords may be brothers, some of whom live outside the town concerned because of business or service requirements and may thus not require the tenanted premises for their personal occupation. If the interpretation contended for by the learned counsel for the appellants were to be adopted, some of these brothers who live in the town concerned and genuinely require and tenanted premises for their use or occupation will not be able to get them vacated because all the brothers, at one and the same did not so require them. In my opinion, there appears no justification to so construe the provisions of the Act as to deny to some of the joint landlords the use and occupation of the premises of which they are joint owners when the fact of their genuine requirement is fully established." And in Damodaran Chetti v Rukmaniamma, (1967) II An.W.R. 200, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held: "One of the joint owners or co-owners (of a building) can ask for eviction of a tenant who has been let in by both the owners (wife and husband) notwithstanding that the other co-owner (husband) or co-owners are not willing to join the plaintiff or the petitioner in asking for eviction and on the other hand, do not want the tenant to be evicted, provided such a co-owner or co-owners are made parties to the suit or petition. If this is not the law. cases can be envisaged where one of the co-owners in collusion with the tenant can effect complete dispossession of the other co-owner by merely getting the tenant to acknowledge his sole possession and title. If this is not the law. cases can be envisaged where one of the co-owners in collusion with the tenant can effect complete dispossession of the other co-owner by merely getting the tenant to acknowledge his sole possession and title. When a co-owner is entitled to possession of immovable property in entirety along with the other co-owners it is not permissible for one of the co-owners, subsequently in league with the tenant to permit him to be in possession of the whole of the premises on behalf of himself alone which in effect will oust the other co-owners of the possession of the property to which he is of right entitled " The law regarding joint ownership or co-ownership being what it is, and in the absence of any indication in Act 2/65 that the general law is being superseded, I think the first petitioner alone will be entitled to the relief sought for in this case. Incidentally, the decision in Damodaran Chetti also meets the tenant's grievance that the attitude of the second petitioner remained a mystery all throughout. 14. The last point urged is that this Court cannot interfere under S.115 CPC. even if the District Court has misunderstood and misapplied the law. The scope of S.115 is no doubt limited and even errors of law, unless they relate to jurisdiction, cannot be corrected. But the concept of "jurisdiction", even for the purposes of certiorari, is not so narrow as it was before the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensations Tribunal (1969) 2 A.C. 147. At any rate, I am of the view that misconstruction of S.11(3) of Act 2/65 by the District Court in exercise of its powers under S 20 thereof is a detect in jurisdiction which could be corrected in the present proceedings I therefore set aside the order of the District Court to the extent it relates to the landlords' case under S.11(3), and direct that the Rent Control Court's decision on the point, upheld by the appellate authority, shall stand restored. No costs.