JUDGMENT S.J. Hyder, J. - Two questions have been pressed on behalf of the counsel for the appellant in this second appeal. In the first place he has contended that the transferor of the appellant who was a sirdar of share of the land in dispute had deposited 10 times of the annual rent and had made an application for grant of bhumidhari sanad before executing a sale deed of his rights in the land in dispute in favour of the appellant and as such the appellant acquired rights of his transferor when the sanad was ultimately granted in favour of his transferor. He next contended that the respondents were barred by the principle of estoppel from denying the rights of the appellant which he had acquired under the sale deed executed in his favour by his transferor. In order to appreciate the validity of the submissions of the learned counsel it is necessary to state facts of the case. 2. One Habbu Khan had two sons named Munan Khan and Kifayat Khan. Chunnu Khan and Nanhoo Khan plaintiff-respondents were the sons of Munan Khan. Kifayat Khan died leaving behind a son Nathu Khan who is transferor of the defendant-appellant. There is no controversy between the parties with regard to these facts. 3. The suit giving rise to this second appeal was filed by the plaintiff-respondents. They stated that Nathu Khan and the plaintiff-respondents were sirdars of the land in dispute in which the share of Nathu Khan was ?. They further disclosed that Nathu Khan died four months prior to the institution of the suit and the plaintiff-respondents were his sole heirs and sugarcane crop in an area of 9 bighas Kham had been sown by the plaintiff-respondents in a portion of the joint sirdari holding and they were in possession of the same. According to the plaintiff-respondents the defendant-appellant had no right, title or interest in the joint holding but they were threatening to cut away sugarcane crop standing on the land. They claimed a decree for permanent injunction restraining defendant-appellant from interfering with their possession over the land in dispute. They got the plaint amended and stated that after the filing of the suit the defendant-appellant had cut and removed the sugarcane crop which was of the value of Rs. 2,000/-. They prayed that decree for a sum of Rs. They claimed a decree for permanent injunction restraining defendant-appellant from interfering with their possession over the land in dispute. They got the plaint amended and stated that after the filing of the suit the defendant-appellant had cut and removed the sugarcane crop which was of the value of Rs. 2,000/-. They prayed that decree for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- as damages may be passed against the defendant-appellant on account of damages for wrongful misappropriation of the sugarcane crop. 4. Defendant-appellant contested the suit. He stated that his mother was first married to one Yasin Khan and he was born from this union. He further stated that Yasin Khan died and his mother remarried Nathu Khan son of Kifayat Khan and he lived with Nathu Khan as his own son. According to him Nathu Khan had a share in the land in dispute. He further stated that Nathu Khan deposited 10 times of the annual rent for acquisition of bhumidhari rights in the land in dispute on June 9, 1966 and on the same date Nathu Khan executed a sale deed of his right, title and interest as bhumidhar of the land in dispute in favour of the defendant-appellant. It was claimed by him that the sugarcane crop has been raised by him and had been rightly cut and removed by him. It was also averred that an order granting bhumidhari sanad was passed which would relate back to the date on which the 10 times of the rent had been deposited by Nathu Khan. He did not dispute that Nathu Khan died four months prior to the institution of the suit giving rise to this second appeal. 5. The two courts have concurrently found that Nathu Khan had deposited 10 times of the rent of half share in the holding on June 9, 1966. On the same day he also moved an application for grant of bhumidhari sanad and executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant-appellant representing himself to be bhumidhar of half share in the holding. It has been further found that Nathu Khan died on Oct. 18, 1966 and the order granting bhumidhari sanad in his favour was passed on Feb. 13, 1969. Chunnu Khan plaintiff-respondent had moved an application for review of the order dated Feb. 13, 1969 on 25th day of that month. It has been further found that Nathu Khan died on Oct. 18, 1966 and the order granting bhumidhari sanad in his favour was passed on Feb. 13, 1969. Chunnu Khan plaintiff-respondent had moved an application for review of the order dated Feb. 13, 1969 on 25th day of that month. Two days later the order dated February 13, 1969 was recalled by the Tahsildar. The defendant-appellant preferred a revision against the order dated Feb. 27, 1969 and the Additional Commissioner, Rohilkhand division recommended to the Board of Revenue that the said order dated February 27, 1969 was improper and illegal and should be recalled. The findings of the two courts below with regard to these facts have not been called in question before me. 6. In support of the first contention learned counsel strongly relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bansidhar v. Smt. Dhirajadhari, 1971 All LJ 937 : ( AIR 1971 All 526 ). The said case is wholly distinguishable and does not support the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. In that case the order granting bhumidhari sanad had been passed during the lifetime of the tenure-holder who had made an application for grant of such a sanad. The Full Bench observed that the proceedings up to the date of the passing of the order granting sanad were judicial proceedings. Proceedings subsequent to that order culminating in the actual grant of the certificate of sanad were merely ministerial in nature. It was further held that when the order is passed granting sanad in favour of the applicant it relates back to the date of the application. 7. In the case giving rise to this second appeal the position is wholly different. Nathu Khan the original tenure-holder who made an application for grant of the bhumidhari sanad died before an order granting a sanad in his favour had been passed in the judicial proceedings which had commenced on a motion made by him. The fact that Nathu Khan was dead was not brought to the notice of the Court and his heirs were not brought on record. The provisions of law contained in Sections 134 to 137 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act do not contemplate that the order for the grant of bhumidhari sanad can be passed in favour of a dead person. The provisions of law contained in Sections 134 to 137 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act do not contemplate that the order for the grant of bhumidhari sanad can be passed in favour of a dead person. In consequence the order passed on Feb. 13, 1969 granting sanad in favour of Nathu Khan who had died on 18-10-1966 was a nullity and was wholly incapable of conferring the status of bhumidhar on Nathu Khan. It follows as a corollary that Nathu Khan never had any transferable interest which could have passed to the defendant-appellant under the sale deed dated June 9, 1966. Nathu Khan will therefore be deemed to have died as a sirdar and on his death which occurred on Oct. 18, 1966 his interest in the holding devolved on the plaintiff-respondents. The view which I have taken above is supported by a catena of decisions and it is unnecessary to cite them. 8. Coming to the second argument of the learned counsel it may be stated at once that no plea based on the principle of estoppel had been raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant before the two courts below. The question of estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact. The circumstances on the basis of which the said plea could be sustained have not been investigated. The appellant cannot be permitted to raise the plea for the first time in second appeal. It may, however, be mentioned that according to the appellant's own case his mother had remarried Nathu Khan and the appellant lived with the deceased as his own son. It is therefore inconceivable that the appellant did not know that Nathu Khan was only a sirdar of the land in dispute. The second argument urged by the learned counsel in support of this second appeal also fails. 9. No other plea has been raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant in support of this second appeal. 10. The result is that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents there shall be no order as to costs.