D. C. GHEEWALA, J. ( 1 ) WHILE the question of retention of death penalty on the statute may be debatable one so long as it is retained on the Statue book there might be cases in which the extreme penalty provided under the law might be called for. Sec. 354 (3) of Cr. P. Code provides that when the court is inclined to award the extreme penalty provided under the law special reasons for so doing must be given by the court. While there cannot be any absolute guidelines for determining as to what these special reasons can be we feel that if all or majority of the following circumstances exist in a given case imposition of death penalty might be proper and might fall within the category of special reasons. (1) If the accused has diabolically designed has meticulously planned and has efficiently executed his object of doing away with a human life. (2) If the motive for the crime is sheer greed or lavicious lust and lechery. (3) If a real or supposed wrong of the victim howsoever trivial it may be has weighed with the accused to such an extent that he has made a deliberate preparation spreading over a period of time to do away with the deceased. (4) If the accused under the guise of befriending the victim has lured him to a particular place and has subsequently to realise his object has acted in an unusually cruel of fiendish way while doing away with the victim. (5) When at the time of the commission of the crime the accused has acted with fiendish ferocity and with a spine-chilling and blood-curdling cruelty and where the very act indicates that the accused wanted to inflict the greatest amount of torture on the victim of his wrath and where his conduct indicates that he took saddistic delight in it. (6) Where the conduct of the accused subsequent to the crime does not show any remorse and on the contrary indicates that he is gloating over the successful execution of his design. (6) Where the conduct of the accused subsequent to the crime does not show any remorse and on the contrary indicates that he is gloating over the successful execution of his design. (7) Where the act of the accused is not his first brush against the law and where it is established that he is a hardened criminal whose subsequent release even after a period of long years is likely to let loose a menace over the society and at whose hands innocent lives are likely to be jeopardised. (8) Where from the fatality of circumstances it is revealed that the accused though he passes off under the tag of a human being is devoid of all traces of humanity and where it can be reasonably concluded that he is as much misplaced in a civilized society as wolves would be in a populous territory. (9) Where the crime of the accused is not a sporadic display of violence but where it is established that he has adopted violence as a way of life and in order that the rest of the society might experience a safe peaceful and terror-free existence sniffing out of such a life by a judicial edict becomes the painful duty of the court. ( 2 ) WE therefore feel that if the above circumstances or a large majority of them exist in a given case the imposition of extreme penalty is not only called for but would become the duty of the Court to impose the same. .