JUDGMENT S.J. Hyder, J. - A notice was issued by the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, to the plaintiff-appellant on June 14, 1966 calling upon him to show cause by June 17, 1966, why the constructions made by him should not be demolished. The plaintiff did not submit any reply to the said notice whereupon the Nagar Mahapalika issued a notice Jo him under Section 327 ( 2) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, hereinafter referred to as "the Adhiyam' ordering the demolition of the constructions made by the plaintiff. Since the demolition could not be carried by the date fixed in that notice, another notice was issued to the plaintiff under Section 327 (2) of the Adhiniyam. On receipt of the notice, the plaintiff filed the suit giving rise to this second appeal. In the suit be claimed the relief of permanent injunction directing the Nagar Mahapalika, its officers and servants and agents to refrain from demolishing the plaintiff's constructions. The suit was dismissed by the trial court by its judgment and decree dated October 31, 1972. The plaintiff thereupon preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the first Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Kanpur by its judgment and decree dated March 4, 1974. Aggrieved the plaintiff has now preferred this second appeal. It will be pertinent to mention that the plaintiff had obtained an ad-interim injunction in support of the plea claimed by him at every stage of these proceedings. In consequence, the constructions made by the plaintiff still stand and the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, has not been able to execute its order passed under Section 327 (2) of the Adhiniyam. 2. Plaintiff's case, in short, was that he was the tenant of a shop on the ground-floor of house No. 15/271 in the Civil Lines in the City of Kanpur on a monthly rent of Rs. 25. He stated that the accommodation in his tenancy including the constructions which were claimed by the Nagar Mahapalika to be unauthorised existed in the same shape and form for 40 years before the institution of the suit. He claimed that the officers of the Nagar Mahapalika were in league with his landlady who was keen to evict the plaintiff and they have got the notice issued in collusion with the landlady. He claimed that the officers of the Nagar Mahapalika were in league with his landlady who was keen to evict the plaintiff and they have got the notice issued in collusion with the landlady. Plaintiff stated in an equivocal terms that he had not made any constructions as alleged in the notices issued by the Nagar Mahapalika under Section 327 of the Adhiniyam and that the said notices were wholly without jurisdiction The notice was also characterised by him as illegal, invalid, arbitrary and wrong. 3. The Nagar Mahapalika contested the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff had constructed a pucca wall, a wooden stall and Bhattis. They also stated that the plaintiff had raised pellers and made a Chabutra on the Nazul land. In their written statement, it was further disclosed that the said constructions had been made without the approval of the appropriate authorities of the Nagar Mahapalika. In the written statement, the notices issued to the plaintiff were stoutly defended and it was stated that the notices were valid and in accordance with law. It was further disclosed that there did not exist any collusion between the landlady on the one hand and the officers and servants of the Nagar Mahapalika on the other. Certain other pleas were also raised by the Nagar Mahapalika to which it is not necessary to refer in this judgment. 4. The trial court framed as many as seven issues on the pleading of the parties. It came to the conclusion that none of the constructions made by the plaintiff existed on the Nazul land. At the same time it was held by the trial court that the constructions had been made by the plaintiff illegally and without any permission from the Nagar Mahapalika. Plaintiff's assertion that the offending constructions were old was negatived. Inconsequence, the trial court non-suited the plaintiff. As already stated, the decree of the trial court has been affirmed in appeal. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant has strongly contended that the two courts below have concurrently found that none of the constructions made by the plaintiff existed on the Nazul land and, as such, the Nagar Mahapalika should have dropped the matter and not have issued a notice to the plaintiff under Section 327 (2) of the Adhiniyam. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant has strongly contended that the two courts below have concurrently found that none of the constructions made by the plaintiff existed on the Nazul land and, as such, the Nagar Mahapalika should have dropped the matter and not have issued a notice to the plaintiff under Section 327 (2) of the Adhiniyam. True it is that the two courts ha\e come to the conclusion that on the own admission of the Inspector of the Nagar Mahapalika, none of the offending constructions existed on the Nazul land. They have, however, proceeded on the footing that the constructions made by the plaintiff had been made without obtaining the sanction of the Nagar Mahapalika as required by Section 317 of the Adhiniyam and, as such, were liable to be demolished. The notice dated June 14, 1966, inter alia states that the plaintiff had made constructions on the open land in front of his house no. 15/271 by making a pucca wall and by executing pillars and a wooden shop. The notice further recites that the plaintiff had made a platform and Bhattis on the drain belonging to the Nagar Mahapalika and that ail the constructions made by the plaintiff were objectionable and were liable to be demolished. It, is therefore, not correct to urge that the Nagar Mahapalika was seeking to demolish the plaintiff's constructions merely on the ground that they had been erected on Nazul property. The first submission of the learned counsel is, therefore, unacceptable and cannot be upheld. 6. It was next urged in support of the appeal that no specific provisions of the enactment or the bye-law which have been violated by the plaintiff have been disclosed in the notice under Section 327 (2). All necessary facts on the basis of which objection was taken on behalf of the Nagar Mahapalika to the constructions erected by the plaintiff have been stated in the notice. There is obiing in the provisions of Section 317 of the Adhiniyam or any other law which requires, and makes it obligatory on the Nagar Mahapalika to mention in the notice the provision of law which is alleged to have been violated. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission urged in support of this appeal. 7. There is obiing in the provisions of Section 317 of the Adhiniyam or any other law which requires, and makes it obligatory on the Nagar Mahapalika to mention in the notice the provision of law which is alleged to have been violated. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission urged in support of this appeal. 7. It has been contended that Chapter XIII of the Adhiniyam was suspended with effect from 13-12-1966 by U. P. Act No. 29 of 1966. Now Chapter XIII is comprised of Sections 315 to 340 and bears the heading "Building Regulations". A parallel legislation which regulated building constructions was enforced in the State of Uttar Pradesh which was known as U. P. Regulation of Building Operations Act, 1958". The Act of 1958 as its preamble shows was enacted to provide building regulations in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It was considered necessary to enact the legislation to put a check on the tendency of haphasard building construction which was going on the townships of the State. In the year 1966, the legislature stepped in and amended the Act of 1958 and also the Adhiniyam. The work of regulating buildings was taken over from the Nagar Mahapalika and was entrusted to the Controlling Authority under the Act of 1958. In consequence sub-section (2) was added to Section 3 of the Act of 1958. In order to appropriate the argument of the learned counsel. It is necessary to read the sub section : - "The operation of Chapter XIII of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1958.................... shall in respect of a regulated area remain suspended for the period during which the declaration relating to it under sub-section (1) remains in force, and the provisions of Section 6 of the U. P. General Clause Act, 1904 shall apply in relation to such suspension as if the suspension amounted to repeal of the said enactments by this Act. 8. It is not controversy between the parties that the city of Kanpur was regulated area under the provisions of the Act of 1958. It. therefore, necessarily follows that on the coming into force of U. P. Act 39 of 1966, Chapter XIII of the Adhiniyam, which included Sections 317 and 327 was suspended with effect from 31st of December, 1966. 9. It is. It. therefore, necessarily follows that on the coming into force of U. P. Act 39 of 1966, Chapter XIII of the Adhiniyam, which included Sections 317 and 327 was suspended with effect from 31st of December, 1966. 9. It is. however, to be noticed that all the notices, the validity of which had been challenged in the instant suit, were issued by the Nagar Mahapalika much before the commencement of Act 39 of 1966. In spite of the fact that Chapter XIII of the Achiniyam had been suspended, by a fiction of law, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was nevertheless applied by the legislature. The result of this was that in spite of the suspension of Chapter XIII of the Adhini-yam, any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment continue and all legal proceedings and investigations could be continued as if there had been no repeal of the prior enactment. In the instant case, instead of the word `repeal', used in Section 6 of the General Clause Act, the word `suspension' has to be read in section and the result would be in spite of the change in the phraseology. 10. It was next on behalf of the appellant that the power to issue a notice under Section 337 was conferred by the legislature on the Mukhya Nagar Adhikrri and since the notice in the instant case had been issued by the Kshettriya Adhikari, the notice was without jurisdiction and could not be given effect to. In this connection, it would be relevant to point out that in the year 1966, all the Nagar Mahapalikas in the State stood superseded and the Governor had, in the first instance, issued Ordinance 2 of 1966 to carry on the work of the Nagar Mahapalika. Under Section 2 of the Ordinance the function of the Nagar Mahapalika, Nagar Pranukh, Up- Nagar Pramukh, Executive Committee, and other statutory committees and the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari were vested in the Administrator appointed for each of the Nagar Mahapalikas. The Administrators have been further authorised to delegate all or any duties to any officer of the Nagar Mahapalika named in the order of delegations. In the instant case, the Nagar Mahapalika filed before the court of appeal a copy of the order dated 1st of February, 1966 delegating the powers under Section 327 to the Ksehttriya Adhikaries. The Administrators have been further authorised to delegate all or any duties to any officer of the Nagar Mahapalika named in the order of delegations. In the instant case, the Nagar Mahapalika filed before the court of appeal a copy of the order dated 1st of February, 1966 delegating the powers under Section 327 to the Ksehttriya Adhikaries. The learned counsel urged that the delegation of powers made by order dated 1st of February, 1966 lapsed with the repeal of the Ordinance and it could not be construed to continue and to have effect even after by U. P. Act No. 4 of 1966. This argument has to be rejected for the simple reason that the repealing clause of Act 4 of 1966. specifically lay down that not with standing the repeal of the Ordinance, any thing done or any action taken under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the Act as if the Act had commenced on the 25tb day of January, 1966. The non-obstante clause, referred to above, specifically lays down that although an action may have been taken under the Ordinance, the same was by a fiction of law, deemed to have been taken under the provisions of Act 4 of 1966. I, therefore cannot accept the submission, that the delegation of power by the Administration of the Nagar Mahapalika on the Kshettriya Adhikari came to an end with the repeal of U. P. Ordinance 2 of 1966. 11. Learned counsel also submitted that the copy of the order dated 1st of February, 1966 delegating the power a of the Kshettriya Adhikari should not have been allowed to be filed at the appellate stage. The power to admit additional evidence is subject to the limitations imposed by Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. and is largely discretionary. I would be reluctant to interfere with the discretion exercised by the first court of appeal. 1, however, would not base any finding on this matter on this ground. In the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff before the trial court, all that be had stated is that the notices impugned in the suit were illegal, invalid, arbitrary wrongful and without jurisdiction. 1, however, would not base any finding on this matter on this ground. In the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff before the trial court, all that be had stated is that the notices impugned in the suit were illegal, invalid, arbitrary wrongful and without jurisdiction. The facts on the basis of which the notices issued by the Kshett-ritya Adhikari had been characterise 1 in this manner by the plaintiff had not been disclosed in the statement of claim. It is settled law that a pleading should contain a consed statement of facts and should not contain either the law or the evidence on which a party to a suit relies in support of his assertion, Now the question whether the notice were illegal, invalid, arbitrary or without jurisdiction were all matters of law and hid nothing to do with the facts. No doubt the language employed by the plaintiff in his statement of claim was strong but the words employed in drafting the plaint would not be sufficient to inform the defendant of the facts which he was required to meet. At the trial stage, therefore, the Nagar Mahapalika had no notice that the notices issued under the signatures of the Kshettriya Adhikari would at a subsequent stage of the proceedings be challenged on the ground that no power had been delegated to him by the Administrator in that behalf. 12. It was for the first time in paragraph 5 of the memorandum of appeal that the plaintiff specifically stated that the notices issued to him under Section 327 of the Adhiniyam were invalid on the ground that they had not been issued by the appropriate authority and that no power to issue such notices had been delegated by the Administrator to the Kshettriya Adhikari. On coming to know of this ground of appeal, the defendant-respondent filed a copy of the order of the Administrator of the Nagar Mahapalika dated 1-2-1966. The said document was brought on record on September 28, 1973. The argument in the appeal was heard on 10th October, 1973 and the judgment was delivered later on. From the sequence of events state above it is evident that the order of the Administrator dated 1-2-1966 was allowed to be filed by the plaintiff-appellant without any objection. He even accepted the cost and did not adduce any evidence. The argument in the appeal was heard on 10th October, 1973 and the judgment was delivered later on. From the sequence of events state above it is evident that the order of the Administrator dated 1-2-1966 was allowed to be filed by the plaintiff-appellant without any objection. He even accepted the cost and did not adduce any evidence. No grievance of the fact that the document should not have been admitted was made out before the first court of appeal. In my opinion, it is too late in the day for the plaintiff-appellant to challenge the validity of the order admitting additional evidence at the appellate stage. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant next urged that the construction made by the appellant did nor fall within the mischief of Section 317 of the Adhiniyam. It may be stated that so such ground was taken up by the plaintiff in his statement 6f claim. All that he had stated in the plaint was that the offending constructions were in existence for the last 40 years. Apart from that, 8ec 317 makes it obligatory on every person not to make any addition to a building without obtaining permission. The word `Building' has been given a very wide meaning in sub section (6) of Section 2 of the Adhiniyam. It include almost every structure except a tent, or such other temporary structure. The constructions made by plaintiff cannot be said to be of such a portable nature as a tent. The submission based on Section 317 of the Adhiniyam is not in the first place sustainable as it is not grounded on the pleadings. Even otherwise, I cannot upheld the said contentions on merits. 14. The result is that find no force in this second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The stay order shall stand vacated.