JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - The petitioner I. N. Saxena was employed by respondent No. 2 M/s. Gastetner Duplicators (Private) Ltd. as a mechanic at Lucknow. He was later on transferred to Kanpur when the office of the company was closed at Lucknow. Subsequently, the office of the Company was reopened in May, 1957 and the petitioner was brought back to Lucknow from Kanpur. On 31-3-1970 the petitioner was ordered to be transferred to Ahamdabad Branch of the Company and he was directed to take charge of his duties on 1-5-1970. The petitioner then made a representation on 15-4-1970 against the order of transfer. That representation was rejected by the company on 22-4-1970 and he was directed to join his duties at Ahmadabad Branch on 1-5-1970. It seems that on 28-4-1970 the petitioner made another representation requesting the company to allow him 21 days time to enable him to join at Ahmadabad. This request was conceded and he was directed to join at Ahmadabad on 19-5-1970. But he could not do so as he fell ill on 18-5-1970. He applied for two days leave on 18-5-1970 which was granted. Then he sought the extension of his sickness leave supported by medical certificate up to June, 1970. That was allowed. But in the meantime on 3-6-1970 the company asked the petitioner to get himself medically examined at the expense of the Company by a doctor selected by the Company. The petitioner protested company as to why the medical certificate submitted by him was unacceptable. The Branch Manager at Lucknow then personally went to the house of the petitioner along with Dr. A. Prakash to have the petitioner medically examined but the latter refused to submit himself to medical examination by that doctor. The company then asked the petitioner by letter dated 11-6-1970 that he should either join at Ahamdabad by 22-6-1970 or intimate within 48 hours his willingness to get himself medically examined by the doctor selected by the Company and failure to do so would render him liable for disciplinary action. On 17-6-1970 the petitioner again applied for extension of his medical leave and he also wrote to the company that the medical certificate submitted by him should be accepted. On 17-6-1970 the petitioner again applied for extension of his medical leave and he also wrote to the company that the medical certificate submitted by him should be accepted. The company informed the petitioner that it had a right to get the medical examination done by a doctor of its choice, but as a special case the medical certificate submitted by him was accepted and he was granted leave on medical ground. He was, however, told that the order transferring him to Ahamdabad remained operative and he should join at Ahamdabad on 17-7-1970. The petitioner replied that the order of transfer should be cancelled. The Company did not accede to that request and insisted that the petitioner should join at Ahamdabad on 31-7-1970. The petitioner again wrote a letter on 28-7-1970 intimating that either the company should say that his medical certificate was incorrect or show him the rule under which it can compel him to be examined by a doctor of the Company. The Company replied on 19-8-1970 by letter asking the petitioner to indicate the date on which he would join his duties at Ahmadabad Branch. It was also pointed out to the petitioner that if he failed to do so, the company would have no other option but to presume that he had become unfit to perform his duties on ground of continued ill-health and the company would take action accordingly. The petitioner immediately sent his reply dated 31-8-1970 refuting the suggestion that he was unfit to perform his duties on account of continued ill-health. He had applied for leave up to 8-9-1970 which was granted to him. Then he again applied for extension for six weeks from 9-9-1970 no order on this application was passed and the petitioner was discharged from service on 29-9-1970. 2. The petitioner then raised an Industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication to Labour Court under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner as also respondent No. 2 filed under their written statements before the Labour Court and adduced evidence in support of their respective contentions. The petitioner had contended, inter alia, before the Labour Court that the order of transfer was mala fide, the order of discharge was also mala fide and that he was not liable to be discharged under S. 19(1) of the U. P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam 1962. The petitioner had contended, inter alia, before the Labour Court that the order of transfer was mala fide, the order of discharge was also mala fide and that he was not liable to be discharged under S. 19(1) of the U. P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam 1962. The Labour Court found no merits in the plea of the petitioner that the order of transfer as also the order of discharge were mala fide. It also held that the illness of the petitioner for 135 days could very well be regarded as continued ill-health. It further found that in the said period of 135 days the petitioner was unable to perform his duties and he was unable to do so on account of continued ill-health. Therefore, section 19 (1) (b) of the Act was clearly applicable and his services could be terminated. The order terminating the employment of the petitioner was, therefore, held to be justified and legal by the Labour Court and it was held that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. The petitioner has impugned the said award of the Labour Court dated 7-6-1974 by this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition has been opposed by respondent No. 2 which has filed its counter-affidavit and a rejoinder affidavit in reply thereto has also been filed by the petitioner. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the facts of the case, the provisions of S. 19 (1) of the aforesaid Act were not at all attracted and the petitioner could not, therefore, be discharged from service. The submission was that the Labour Court did not consider as to what was the nature of sickness of the petitioner and as to whether his continued ill health had rendered him unfit for the job for which he was employed. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submitted that the Labour Court has found as a fact that the petitioner had remained ill for a long period of 135 days and this illness was regarded as continued ill health. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submitted that the Labour Court has found as a fact that the petitioner had remained ill for a long period of 135 days and this illness was regarded as continued ill health. It was also pointed by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the Labour Court has further found as a fact that during the said period of 135 days, I. N. Saxena was incapable to perform his duties and as he was unable to do so on account of continued ill health, therefore, S. 19 (1) of the Act was clearly applicable. Further contention of respondent No. 2 was that the said findings recorded by the Labour Court are findings of fact; hence they cannot be interfered with. They have become conclusive. These findings of fact are neither perverse nor are such which can be said to be based on no evidence nor are these findings such which no reasonable person can arrive at nor are these findings illegal or were recorded by a Court having no jurisdiction to do so. Hence while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this court cannot interfere with those findings of fact. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied on Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, ( AIR 1960 SC 1168 ) wherein it was held that a finding based on no evidence is an error of law apparent on the record but errors in appreciation of documentary evidence or errors in drawing inference can be corrected only by a Court sitting as a court of appeal and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. The submission was that as this Court is not sitting in appeal over the award made by the Labour Court, the findings aforesaid cannot be disturbed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution because they are based on evidence and this court cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of the evidence. 4. Before we set out to examine the rival contentions it would be appropriate here to mention in brief the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution while dealing with a petition where the petitioner prays for a writ in the nature of certiorari. The scope is by now well laid down in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. The scope is by now well laid down in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. Instead of quoting all those decisions it would be appropriate to refer to a decision of a Full Bench of this court in Ghazanfar Rashid v. Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate Examination, U. P. (1979 All L J 676) : ( AIR 1979 All 209 ), wherein the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction in a writ for certiorari was examined. The Full Bench in that case observed (at p. 211 of AIR) :- "Under Article 226, the High Court has jurisdiction to quash the decision or orders of subordinate tribunals and statutory authorities entrusted with the quasi-judicial functions, if they act without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice or if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide, yet it is limited as it exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the subordinate courts and it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction." 5. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque, ( AIR 1955 SC 233 ), it was laid down as follows (at p. 243) :- "The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right and when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari." These principles were affirmed by the Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division, ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ), Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, ( AIR 1960 SC 1168 ), U. R. Bhatt v. Union of India, ( AIR 1962 SC 1344 ), State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ), Syed Yaqub v. K. S. Radha Krishna, ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ), State of Madras v. G. Sundaram, ( AIR 1965 SC 1103 ) and State of Andhra Pradesh v. C. Venkatarao, ( AIR 1975 SC 2151 ) : (1975 Lab I C 1585). Thus it is well settled that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Tribunal or quasi judicial authorities. If the decision is arrived at bona fide after complying with principles of natural justice, the High Court cannot substitute its own findings because it would not sit in appeal over the decision of the subordinate tribunal or authority and would not interfere with the findings on the reappraisal of the evidence even if those findings were erroneous. At the same time if the order is based on no evidence or if the findings are arbitrary and capricious or are such that no reasonable person will arrive at those findings, the order can be quashed. So long as the authority functions within the spirit and letter of the law, the High Cour has no concern with the manner in which the power was exercised by the subordinate tribunal or authority. Hence errors appreciation of evidence and affidavits and errors in drawing inference or omission to draw inference would not be examined. But the Court may quash an order on the ground of errors of law apparent on the face of the record. If the court of fact has, in substance, based its findings on no evidence or the findings are perverse or it erroneously ignores a vital plea or material evidence which affects the result a manifest error of law leading to a failure of justice can be said to have been established. In other words, the error in the decision must be manifest error apparent on the face of the record, for example when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, the error in the decision must be manifest error apparent on the face of the record, for example when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. Such a patent error can be corrected by a writ of certiorari but mere wrong decision cannot be corrected. In Sheikh Rahmat Ilahi v. Mohammad Hayat Khan, (AIR 1943 P C 208) it was clearly laid down that there is no difference in principle between a failure to appreciate and determine the real question of fact to be tried and a failure to appreciate and determine a question of fact which vitally affected the issue stated in the case. In either case, the failure is a failure in the duty imposed by law upon the Court and the question whether there has been such a failure must be a question of law. The Labour Court has in paragraph 13 of its award held : "When his services were terminated, he had remained unfit for 135 days to perform his duties on account of his ill health and I am unable to agree with the submission of the workmen's representative that illness for 135 days, at a stretch did not attract S. 19 (1) (b) of the Act. Clause (b) is silent as to the duration of the illness which can be regarded as `continued illness' but we have the fact that under the Act a Workman is entitled to sickness leave as of right only for 15 days in a year and therefore, in my opinion, illness for 135 days can very well be regarded as `continued ill health.' In this period I. N. Saxena was unable to perform his duties and as he was unable to do so on account of continued ill health, therefore, S. 19 (1) (b) of the Act was clearly applicable and the services of Sri I. N. Saxena could be terminated. I. N. Saxena was served with a notice of discharge and the ground for discharge was clearly mentioned therein and one month's notice pay was also sent to him by money order." 6. A copy of the notice of discharge dated 22-9-1970 is Annexure 5 to the Writ Petition. It says that the petitioner was discharged from service with immediate effect and that a sum of Rs. A copy of the notice of discharge dated 22-9-1970 is Annexure 5 to the Writ Petition. It says that the petitioner was discharged from service with immediate effect and that a sum of Rs. 530.13 was being remitted to him by way of his wages for 30 days in lieu of notice as requested under Proviso to S. 19 (1) of the U. P. D. Aur V. A. Adhiniyam 1962. The said notice further enumerates the grounds on which the order of discharge was passed. The said grounds were as under: "1) You have been away from duties on ground of ill health and the period of absence is far in excess of sick leave allowable under section 10 of the U. P. D. Aur V. A. Adhiniyam, 1962. 2) From your repeated application of sick leave it appears that you have become unfit to perform your duties on the ground of continued ill health". So the petitioner was discharged from service on the ground of continued ill health and that his period of absence was far in excess of sick leave allowable to him under Section 10 of the said Act. The action was obviously taken under S. 19 (1) (b) of the Act which reads as follows :- "19(1) No employee other than an employee for a specified period or in a leave vacancy shall be discharged from service by his employer except on the ground that (a) ...... (b) he is unfit to perform his duties on the ground of physical infirmity or continued ill health, and he has been served with a notice in writing containing the grounds for discharge. The notice shall be for a period of not less than thirty day's or such longer period as may be required under the terms of employment: Provided that the notice of discharge may be of shorter period if the same is accompanied with payment of wages to the employee for the number of days the notice is short of the required period." Cl. (b) of S. 19(1) of the Act enables an employer to terminate the employment of his employee on the ground that the employee is unfit to perform his duties on the ground of physical infirmity or on the ground of continued ill health. (b) of S. 19(1) of the Act enables an employer to terminate the employment of his employee on the ground that the employee is unfit to perform his duties on the ground of physical infirmity or on the ground of continued ill health. So, before discharging the employee from service the employer has to be satisfied that because of continued ill health the employee is unfit to perform the duties. In other words satisfaction has to be reached that the employee has remained in continued ill health and because of that continued ill health he has become unfit to perform the duties for which he has been employed. The unfitness to perform the duties is thus related to continued ill health. If a person maintained ill health and because of that he has become unfit to perform his duties he can be asked to leave the job. To put it differently, the ill health must be of such a nature that the person is not in a position to do the job for which he was employed. Even under the Act an employee can be granted sickness leave. It is difficult to conceive of a human being who may not at all fall ill during the tenure of his service. Almost in all services, therefore, there do exist rules to the effect that an employee would be entitled to grant of sickness leave for a particular period on full pay. There may also be rules where an employee can be granted sickness leave on payment of half pay and thereafter if the sickness continues he may be granted leave without pay but at the same time without losing his job. So also under S. 10 of the aforesaid Act an employee who is governed by that Act may be granted sickness leave for 15 days. That sickness leave can be, granted to him on payment of full wages. In the case in hand, the Company did grant sickness leave to the petitioner, firstly, for two days, later on that leave was allowed to be extended from time to time. In this way the petitioner remained on sickness leave for 135 days. The question is whether the petitioner's service could be discharged on the ground that he remained ill continuously for 135 days. In this way the petitioner remained on sickness leave for 135 days. The question is whether the petitioner's service could be discharged on the ground that he remained ill continuously for 135 days. For this purpose it has to be found out whether the continued ill health of the petitioner for 135 days had recorded him unable to perform his duties as a mechanic. Unless a finding is recorded on this issue, the order terminating the employment of the petitioner could not be justified under S. 19 (1) (b) of the Act. We have to see, therefore, as to whether the Labour Court has recorded a finding that the continued sickness of the petitioner for 135 days had made him unable to perform his duties for which he was employed. The finding is undoubtedly, to the effect that the petitioner had continued to keep ill health for 135 days but from this fact alone the Labour Court immediately came to the conclusion that he was `unable' to do the job for which he was employed. The vital issue before the Labour Court was whether the illness of 135 days had made the petitioner `Unfit' to perform his duties. The Labour Court did not direct its mind to this aspect of the matter. A very vital issue was thus left undecided. That being so, the conclusion of the Labour Court to the effect that because the petitioner was ill for 135 days he had become unable to perform his duties, is a finding which deserves to be interfered with. 7. The Labour Court had to see whether the continued ill health of the petitioner for 135 days had made him `unfit' to perform his duties because under S. 19 (1) (b) of the Act an employee can be discharged from service if he is unfit to perform his duties on the ground of continued ill health. It is one thing to say that a person is `unfit' to perform his duties and it is quite different thing to say that he is `unable' to perform his duties because of his illness. When an employee falls ill and hence goes on leave, he is definitely `unable' to perform his duties during the period of his illness but this would certainly not mean that because of his illness he has also become unfit to perform his duties. When an employee falls ill and hence goes on leave, he is definitely `unable' to perform his duties during the period of his illness but this would certainly not mean that because of his illness he has also become unfit to perform his duties. His continued ill health may or may not render him, in course of time, `unfit' to perform the duty. It is quite possible that on recovery from illness the employee may resume his job and may perform his duty as efficiently as he was doing prior to his illness. It is also possible in a particular case that the nature of the prolonged illness was such which ultimately rendered the employee unfit to perform his duty. So in each case where resort was taken to discharge an employee from service on the ground of his having become unfit to perform his duties because of his continued ill health, the Court has to record a finding whether the continued ill health of the employee was such which had made him unfit to perform his duty. 8. In Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, ( AIR 1978 SC 311 ): (1978 Lab I C 179) a clause in a contract provided that the employer could determine the employment at any time in the event of the employee becoming from any cause incapacitated by a longer period than two calendar months from properly discharging his duties. The employee was sick and he was granted leave for a long time. After the expiry of leave his services were terminated by invoking the said clause. The Supreme Court held that the termination was illegal. It was laid down (at p. 180 of Lab IC) "When an employee is on leave he is not called upon to discharge any duties and therefore the question of the capacity to discharge duties does not fall for consideration. The clause in question comes into play only when an employee who has to discharge his duties fails to do so and the employer makes a judgment of the situation and comes to the conclusion that it is on account of an incapacity which will last longer than two months that the failure to discharge his duties has arisen". The clause in question comes into play only when an employee who has to discharge his duties fails to do so and the employer makes a judgment of the situation and comes to the conclusion that it is on account of an incapacity which will last longer than two months that the failure to discharge his duties has arisen". Under S. 19 (1) (b) of the aforesaid Act also if a person had continued to remain on leave of sickness and the employer asked the employee to resume the duty either at the place where he was or at the place where he is ordered to be transferred and it is found that on account of prolonged illness he has become unfit to perform the duty, the employer may invoke the provisions of S. 19 (1) (b) of the Act for discharging him from employment. The principal question, therefore, to be seen was whether the continued illness for 135 days had rendered the petitioner unfit for performing his duties. A perusal of the award would show that the Labour Court has not recorded a finding on this issue. Rather it has said : "In my opinion, illness for 135 days can very well be regarded as "continued ill health". In this period I. N. Saxena was unable to perform his duties and as he was unable to do so on account of continued ill health therefore, S. 19 (1) (b) of the Act was clearly applicable and the services of Sri I. N. Saxena could be terminated" (Emphasis supplied). The Labour Court has merely recorded a finding that during the period of illness of 135 days I. N. Saxena was unable to perform his duties. It has not recorded a finding that because of his illness for 135 days, I. N. Saxena had become unfit to perform his duties. The question as to whether a person has become unfit to perform his duties would arise when the employee resumes the duty after the expiry of the sickness leave and the employer comes to the conclusion that continued ill health has made the employee unfit for performing his duties. Obviously, the Labour Court has failed to appreciate and determine a question of fact which vitally affected the issue involved. Obviously, the Labour Court has failed to appreciate and determine a question of fact which vitally affected the issue involved. In the circumstances, the award of the Labour Court cannot be sustained and the matter has to go back to the Labour Court for reconsideration in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made here in above. 9. It seems that the order of discharge was impugned before the Labour Court on the ground of mala fides as well. The Labour Court has, on scrutiny of the evidence adduced before it, found that the said order of discharge was not mala fide. This finding is a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence and is not liable to be interfered with in this petition. We, therefore make it clear that the question as to whether the order of discharge was mala fide is not now open to be reagitated before the Labour Court. 10. For the reasons in the foregoing, the petition is allowed, the award of the Labour Court dated 7-6-1974 is quashed and the Labour Court is directed to decide the matter in dispute referred to it afresh on merits in accordance with law as also in the light of the observations made here in above. Costs on parties. 11. Immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment in the above mentioned writ petition, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 prayed that a certificate may be granted for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We have based our judgment on the various decisions of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council as also a Full Bench decision of this Court. In our view, this case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court because the principles involved stand concluded by the decisions of the Supreme Court. 12. The certificate prayed for is, therefore fused and the prayer is rejected.