JUDGMENT - Tulpule R.D. J.-This petition raises a question of procedure which, I am informed, is beingly routinely followed by the Rent Controllers. 2. Respondents in this case filed an application under clause 13 (3) ofthe C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, herein-after referred to as “the Rent Control Order” against petitioner alleging there­ in various grounds under which permission could be granted by the Rent Controller to a landlord to terminate the tenancy of the tenant. Notice of this application in due course was sent, according to the record of the Rent Controller, to petitioner. That notice having been returned to him, as the record says, with an endorsement 'refused', the Rent Controller proceeded ex-parte against petitioner tenant. He passed an order on 22nd October 1980 granting permission to respondents to serve notice to quit upon petitioner. Petitioner, thereupon, was served with a notice to quit terminating his tenancy by respondents, which he received on 18th December 1980. Petitioner says that was the first time he came to learn of the proceedings and of the grounds of permission. Thereupon he filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte order passed on 2nd October 1980. Therein he contended that no notice was received by him and that he had not refused any registered notice sent by Rent Controller to him and that the endorsement of refusal said to have been made by the postal authorities on the envelope was false and incorrect. He, therefore, prayed that the ex-parte order passed by the Rent Controller on 22-10-1980 be set aside and the case be enquired into and decided in accordance with law. I am informed that though no notice of this application for setting aside the ex-parte order was issued, respondents appeared themselves and even suggested to the Rent Controller that the application may be enquired into and if the Rent Controller was satisfied that petitioner had not received the notice and that there was good cause for him to remain absent on the date fixed, the order may be set aside and the matter enquired afresh. 3. 3. Nevertheless, the Rent Controller proceeded to decide this applica­ tion and being of the view that his order could only be appealed against and that he had no power to set aside his own order which had become operative, according to him, and the only remedy open being “to go in appeal if felt aggrieved”, he felt that there was no power in the Rent Controller itself and that nothing was shown to him as to how “this Court can set aside its own order passed on evidence and which is operative*', and, therefore, he rejected the application. It is against that order that the present petition is filed. 4. Mr. Rajkarne appearing for petitioner relied upon, naturally, a deci­ sion of this Court in (Diwalibai v. Jaikumar)1. His Lordship Justice Abhyankar stated therein that the power to enquire into an application and to adjudicate upon a matter carries with it implicitly and necessarily the power to decide, in the absence of parties or a party. He also observed and laid down that once the power to decide and proceed ex-parte is considered to be implicit and is available, it also follows that a power to set aside an ex-parte order is in the' tribunal or authority conferred with that power. It was observed that “If there is a power to dismiss an application for non-appearance of the applicant, it hardly needs any emphasis to point out that there is a co-ordinate power to proceed ex-parte against a party who fails to appear, but this power to dismiss in default or to proceed ex-parte also implies equally a duty to restore an application dismissed for default or to set aside ex-parte order if the defaulting party satisfies the authority that there was good cause for non-appearance.” 5. In spite of this decision and the dictum of law laid down by this Court, it is really surprising that Rent Controllers should have, notwithstand­ing this pronouncement of law, felt that it had no jurisdiction to set aside an ex-parte order or an ex-parte decision given by it, provided it was satisfied that the ex-parte order was not justifiably passed and there was good reason or sufficient cause for the party defaulting not to appear. It is merely a counter-part of the power to proceed ex-parte and in absence, to restore an application dismissed in default or to set aside an order passed ex-parte against a non-appearing or defaulting party. These are merely two sides of the coin. They do not have to be, as pointed out by the learned Judge traced to the inherent powers of the Court or an authority, which in the present case, a Rent Controller not being a 'Court' as contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code, may not be traceable. But that is neither here nor there. Such a power exists and such a power must be assumed where the power to decide and adjudicate and enquire is conferred. Such a power carries with it also such incidental and ancillary powers to effectively adjudi­cate upon the cause between the parties. That involves power to decide in absence of either one or the other, and also to set aside the order passed in the absence of one or the other. 6. In view, therefore, of the law which has been so well settled, the order passed by the Rent Controller cannot be allowed to stand and is, there­ fore, set aside. Petition allowed. Rule made absolute. The Rent Controller is directed to enquire into the merits of the application filed by the petitioner and in case he is satisfied that there was good cause shown by petitioner for his non-appearance on the date fixed, then to set aside his order dated 22-10-1980 and hear the application on merits. There be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.