Judgment S.J. Hyder, J. 1. THE second appeal raises an interesting question as to the interpretation of the first proviso to clause (b) of sub section (2) of Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. It would be relevant to mention that the proviso aforesaid has been added to the principal Act by U. P. Act 23 of 1934. 2. THE suit giving rise to this second appeal was instituted by Ratan Singh plaintiff respondent no. 1 on the basis of a mortgage deed dated June 17, 1964. THE relief sought by the plaintiff respondent was that decree for a sum of Rs. 3093.07 p. be awarded in his favour and in case of default of payment of the said amount the mortgage property may be sold at a court auction for the realisation of the said amount. THE plaintiff's claim found favour with the trial Court. It decreed the plaintiff's claim and directed that if the defendant appellant failed to pay the decretal amount within the time stipulated in the decree, the mortgage property shall be auctioned to satisfy the mortgage debt. It further directed that a preliminary decree under Order 34 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be drawn up. THE defendant appellant felt herself aggrieved by the decree of the trial Court. She accordingly preferred an appeal which has also failed. Faced with this situation, the defendant appellant has approached this Court by filing this second appeal. A few facts which are necessary to appreciate the controversies between the parties may be stated. Phul Chand defendant respondent no. 2, was the original owner of the mortgage property. He executed a mortgage deed in respect of the said property in favour of Ratan Singh plaintiff-respondent no. 1. The mortgage debt was to the tune of Rs. 1500/- only. It was stipulated in the mortgage deed that the mortgagor shall pay interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month with six monthly rest. Phul Chand the original mortgagor transferred the equity of redemption in favour of Asharfi Devi, defendant appellant by means of a registered sale deed dated September 24, 1964. Since neither the interest nor the principal of the mortgage debt had been paid, the plaintiff filed the suit giving rise to this second appeal on September 1/2, 1970. 3. Phul Chand the original mortgagor transferred the equity of redemption in favour of Asharfi Devi, defendant appellant by means of a registered sale deed dated September 24, 1964. Since neither the interest nor the principal of the mortgage debt had been paid, the plaintiff filed the suit giving rise to this second appeal on September 1/2, 1970. 3. THE suit was contested by the defendant appellant on a number of grounds. In this second appeal, we are only concerned with the question whether the interest agreed upon between the parties to the mortgage was unconscionable and excessive and was liable to be reduced under Section 3 of the Act, as amended in this State. THE question has been answered against the defendants appellant by the two courts below and has been canvassed once again at the bar. 4. IN order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, the provisions of the Act, in so far as they were relevant, may be briefly surveyed. The preamble of the Act shows that the Act was enacted to give additional powers to the Court to deal with certain cases of usurious loans of money or kind. It is evident from the preamble and the scheme of the Act that it was a remidial measure intended to give benefit to impecunious persons who by force of circumstances, had to borrow money either by executing a mortgage or otherwise. As such it would not be proper for this Court to place a restrictive interpretation on the provisions of the Act. The constructions of its provisions has to be made keeping in view the principle that in the case of remedial measures, the court should lean in favour of advancing the remedy and should take care to suppress the mischief. Section 2 of the Act contains the definition clause. In sub-section (1) of Section 2 interest' has been defined : "Interest" means rate of interest and includes the return to be made over and above what was actually lent whether the same is charged or sought to be recovered specifically by way of interest or otherwise." 5. THE definition of the term 'interest' has been given a very wide meaning and it is the key which has primarily to be employed in unlocking the problem with which this court is confronted. THE definition of the term 'interest' has been given a very wide meaning and it is the key which has primarily to be employed in unlocking the problem with which this court is confronted. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act defines 'loan' to mean a loan whether of money or in kind and includes any transaction which is in the opinion of the Court, in substance a loan. Section 3 of the Act confers on the Court the power to reopen transaction. It lays down that notwithstanding anything in the Usuary Laws Repeal Act, 1855, wherein any suit to which this Act applies, whether heard ex parte or otherwise, the court has reason to believe that the interest agreed between the parties is excessive and the transaction as between them was substantially unfair, it may reopen the transaction, vary the agreement between the parties, set aside wholly or in part any security given or agreement made in respect of any loan. THE above is only a brief enumeration of the very wide powers which have been conferred on the Court to reopen transaction between the parties the moment there is material on record to satisfy the Court that the transaction was of a usurious or unfair nature. This Act constitutes one of the first assaults made on the stronghold of the favourite doctrine of section of the elite, namely, laisez faire. With the advance of society and the spread of the concept of a welfare State the State has to intervene in favour of the weak. In a contract after all, the stronger party has an advantage and it has been gradually realised that bilateral contracts do not possess that amount of sanctity which it was originally thought they had. By incessant State intervention, the so called sanctity of contracts is being gradually eroded. Legislature is coming forward to the succour of the weak. 6. THIS brings us straight to the interpretation of the first proviso to clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act, as amended by U. P. Act 23 of 1934. By incessant State intervention, the so called sanctity of contracts is being gradually eroded. Legislature is coming forward to the succour of the weak. 6. THIS brings us straight to the interpretation of the first proviso to clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act, as amended by U. P. Act 23 of 1934. The proviso reads: "Provided that in the case of loans secured by a first mortgage the court shall deem the interest excessive, if,- (1) the rate exceeds 12 per cent per annum or (2) the amount of interest that might become due at any time exceeds the amount that would become due at that time if the rate were 12 per cent per annum and the interval between rests were six months." Now the question is whether the proviso quoted above places a ceiling on the rate of interest payable on the loan at 12 per cent per annum in cases falling under the first and also under the second paragraph of the said proviso. The two courts below have taken the view that the ceiling is only in respect of the first proviso. According to them, when the interest merges in the principal amount on the expiry of six months, the interest is payable at 12 per cent per annum on such aggregate amount. Learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the correctness of this view. 7. THE definition of interest, referred to above, goes to show that there is a distinction between an amount actually lent and the interest which has accrued thereon. THE proviso referred to above, has to be interpreted keeping in view the said definition. This approach of the problem would indicate that even in a case in which the transaction provides for six monthly rest the interest which may have accrued due during the preceding six months would retain its character of being an interest. Whatever may have been the intention of the parties, there would be no merger between the interest which has accrued due and the amount actually lent. On this interpretation and in my opinion, this is the only interpretation which can be placed on the proviso, referred to above, even under paragraph 2, the interest payable must not exceed 12 per cent on the amount actually lent. On this interpretation and in my opinion, this is the only interpretation which can be placed on the proviso, referred to above, even under paragraph 2, the interest payable must not exceed 12 per cent on the amount actually lent. THE two courts below were therefore, in error in coming to the conclusion that paragraph 2 of the proviso makes it permissible to charge interest on the amount actually lent coupled with the interest which according to the terms of the contract may have merged with the principal mortgage debt. In this view of the matter the decree passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the court of appeal must have modified. To that extent, this appeal must succeed. 8. THE result is that this appeal partly succeeds and is hereby allowed. THE plaintiff's suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1500/- which had been actually lent to the mortgagor together with interest at the rate of 12 per cent on the said amount is decreed and the decree passed by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of appeal is modified to that extent. THE plaintiff respondent shall be entitled to his proportionate costs of the two courts below. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal. THE decree shall be prepared under Order 34 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appeal partly allowed.