JUDGMENT 1. - Dr. Chandra Kiran has invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by way of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to this writ petition may be briefly stated as follows:- The petitioner was promoted to the post of Professor in Gynaecology and Obstetrics on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee under Article 24 (3) of the Rajasthan Medical Services (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, by an order dated June 18, 1969. Before her promotion she was Reader in Gynaecology and Obstetrics. While the petitioner was posted at Udaipur, Dr. Sheela Sharma, Professor and Head of the Department of Gynaecology and Obstetrics at Umaid Hospital Jodhpur was working as Superintendent of the said hospital. Dr. Sheela Sharma was due to retire on May 31, 1980. Hence, on May 19, 1980, the State Government passed an order that Dr. R. N. Singh, non-petitioner No. 3 would held the charge of the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, on the retirement of Dr. Sheela Sharma as he was the only Professor at that time. Thereafter, by an order of the State Government dated June 5, 1980, the petitioner was transferred as Professor and Head of the Department of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur from Udaipur and she joined this post on June 7, 1980. After her transfer the petitioner set up her claim before the State Government that the functions of the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, may be entrusted to her, as there has been a consistent and long standing practice of entrusting functions of the Superintendent of this Hospital to the seniormost person in charge of the Gynaecology and Obstetrics or to the person heading this Department. Non-petitioner No. 3, apprehending that the State Government may pass orders making the petitioner Incharge of the functions of the Superintendent of this Hospital, instituted a suit against her and the State of Rajasthan in the Court of the Munsiff City, Jodhpur, on July 7, 1980, and prayed for a permanent injunction against the State of Rajasthan restraining the latter from removing him and from entrusting the functions of the Superintendent of this Hospital to the petitioner. The non-petitioner No. 3 applied for a temporary injunction also to this effect for maintaining status quo. The non-petitioner No. 3 applied for a temporary injunction also to this effect for maintaining status quo. As the suit had been filed by the non-petitioner No. 3 without giving notice to the State Government under S. 80, C.P.C. an ex parte ad interim order was passed by the Court on July 7, 1980, restraining the petitioner from replacing the non-petitioner No. 3. The petitioner filed a reply to the application for temporary injunction and the application was listed for arguments on July 14, 1980. On July 14, 1980, an additional affidavit was put in by non-petitioner No. 3 and the case was adjourned to July 15, 1980. On July 15, 1980, the ad interim injunction order dated July 7, 1980, was vacated against the petitioner, but it was confirmed against the State Government. Thereafter, aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Jodhpur. The appeal was allowed vide order of the District Judge, Jodhpur, dated Nov. 14, 1980. Thereafter, the State Government passed an order on Nov. 29, 1980, in favour of the petitioner entrusting to her the functions of the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur. On Nov. 29, 1980, non-petitioner No. 3 instituted another suit in the Court of the Munsiff City, Jodhpur, and applied for temporary injunction against the State and the petitioner. This suit also was filed without giving any notice to the State Government under S. 80, C.P.C. However, the non-petitioner No. 3 obtained an ex parte injunction order restraining the petitioner from joining as Superintendent of the said Hospital. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of temporary injunction. The appeal was fixed for hearing on Dec. 4, 1980, with the consent of the parties. In the appeal a ground was taken by the petitioner that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit relating to a service matter and the remedy claimed in the suit can be granted by the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal. On Dec. 4, 1980, non-petitioner No. 3 presented an application before the District Judge, Jodhpur, that as he had already preferred an appeal against the order of the State Government dated Nov. 29, 1980, before the Tribunal and the matter is pending there and as the Tribunal has passed a stay order on Dec. On Dec. 4, 1980, non-petitioner No. 3 presented an application before the District Judge, Jodhpur, that as he had already preferred an appeal against the order of the State Government dated Nov. 29, 1980, before the Tribunal and the matter is pending there and as the Tribunal has passed a stay order on Dec. 3, 1980, his suit as well as his application for temporary injunction had become infructuous. It was also stated in the application that the non petitioner No. 3 had already moved an application in the Court of the Munsiff City, Jodhpur, for withdrawal of his suit, but no order could be passed on his application as the record of the trial Court had been summoned by the District Judge for hearing and decision of the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of temporary injunction. The learned District Judge passed an order that the appeal would be heard on Dec. 11, 1980. Upon having come to know about the appeal and the stay order passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner appeared before the Tribunal on Dec. 5, 1980 and filed a reply on Dec. 8, 1980, praying for vacation of the stay order on a date earlier than Dec. 12, 1980. The matter, however, came up before the Tribunal on Dec. 10, 1980, on which date a rejoinder was filed by the non-petitioner No. 3 and the appeal was ordered to be put up before the Tribunal on Dec. 12, 1980. On Dec. 12, 1980, the learned counsel for the non petitioner No. 3 sought an adjournment and the case was fixed on Dec. 15, 1980 on which date arguments were heard on the stay application and the case was fixed for passing final orders on the stay application on Dec. 18, 1980. On Dec.18,1980 the order was not pronounced and the petitioner's request for keeping the stay order in abeyance was turned down. Thereafter, several adjournments were given by the Tribunal at the instance of non petitioner No. 3 or otherwise and eventually the matter came up before it on Jan. 27, 1981, on which date arguments were heard on the stay application as well as on the appeal and the case was fixed for delivery of judgment on Feb. 6, 1981. The judgment was pronounced on Feb. 27, 1981, on which date arguments were heard on the stay application as well as on the appeal and the case was fixed for delivery of judgment on Feb. 6, 1981. The judgment was pronounced on Feb. 6, 1981 and the appeal filed by non-petitioner No. 3 was allowed by majority of the members of the Tribunal and the order of the State Government dated Nov. 29, 1980, was quashed. As against this final order of the Tribunal dated Feb. 6, 1981, the petitioner has moved this Court by way of writ petition on the grounds mentioned therein for quashing the decision of the Tribunal and for restraining the non-petitioner No. 3 from working as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur. 3. In support of her contentions in the writ petition, Dr. Chandra Kiran petitioner has put in her affidavit and produced several documents marked Annexures 1 to 9. The writ petition was admitted by this Court on March 6, 1981 and notices were issued to the non-petitioners Nos. 1 to 3. Mr. M. C. Bhoot, Advocate, accepted notice on behalf of non-petitioner No. 3 while notices were served on the other two nonpetitioners Nos. 1 and 2 but nobody has put in appearance on their behalf in response to the notices. The writ petition was then listed for hearing on March 9, 1981 as the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for early hearing and there was no objection from the other side. 4. I have perused the record and heard arguments advanced by Mr. M. R. Calla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M. C. Bhoot, appearing on behalf of the non-petitioner No. 3 at length. It was vehemently contended before me by Mr. M. R. Calla that the tribunal has committed an error apparent on the face of the record in holding that the appeal filed by the non-petitioner No. 3 was maintainable. It was further urged by Mr. Calla that there is no post or office of the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, as such and hence the order passed by the State Government with regard to entrustment of functions of the Superintendent to the petitioner was not appealable and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal filed by the non-petitioner No. 3 and to give the impugned decision marked Annexure 9. According to Mr. According to Mr. M. R. Calla, an appeal before the Tribunal lies only against the order passed in any service-matter or matters affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. As the order of the State Government entrusting functions of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, to the petitioner did not relate to any service-matter or matters affecting non petitioner No. 3, in his personal capacity, no appeal against it could legally be preferred before the Tribunal. 5. Mr. M. C. Bhoot, learned counsel for non-petitioner No. 3, on the other hand, contended that the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, is an office or post although having no emoluments or perquisites, and, therefore, in matter relating to appointment to this office, there must be equality of opportunity for non-petitioner No. 3 who also is working on the post of Professor and Head of the Department of Paediatrics and who is senior to the petitioner in service. Mr. M. C. Bhoot further argued that Article 16 emphasises that the State in appointing or employing persons to an office under it shall give equal opportunity to all citizens and will not make any person ineligible to hold an office or discriminate against him in respect of that office on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or residence. According to his submission, the non-petitioner No. 3 must have been given an equal chance with the petitioner in matters relating to appointment to the office of the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, under the State but the State Government selected the petitioner in preference to nonpetitioner No. 3 to the post of Superintendent in violation of the principle of equality of opportunity, and, so the administrative action of the State Government has resulted in discrimination in the mode of selection which is prohibited under Article 16. Mr. Mr. M. C. Bhoot, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal committed no error apparent on the face of the record in quashing the order of the State Government appointing the petitioner to the post of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, because the Tribunal after hearing the parties and going through the record came to a right conclusion that the principle of equity enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has been violated inasmuch as the non-petitioner No. 3 was dealt with differently and his claim to the post of Superintendent was not even considered by the appointing authority along with the claim of the petitioner. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the above rival contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the parties, in the course of their arguments. The first point that arises for consideration is whether the Tribunal had no authority or jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the appeal, which was preferred before it by the nonpetitioner No. 3, viz., Dr. R. N. Singh. The petitioner had prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari on the ground that the judgment of the Tribunal is without jurisdiction and should be quashed by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The non-petitioner No. 3 in his reply has controverted the claim for certiorari on the aforesaid grounds. The contention of the petitioner in this behalf is that an appeal before the Tribunal lies only against the orders passed by an officer or authority in any service-matter or matters affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity, and, as the order of the Government appointing the petitioner as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, neither related to any service-matter affecting the nonpetitioner No. 3, nor to any matter affecting him in his personal capacity, the Tribunal had no authority to entertain the appeal. The above contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is not acceptable, because "service matter" has been defined in S. 2 (f) of the Act and it means also any one or more than one of the following matters:- 1. seniority, 2. promotion, 3. confirmation, 4. fixation of pay, 5. an order denying or varying pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions to the disadvantage of a Govt, servant, otherwise than as a penalty. seniority, 2. promotion, 3. confirmation, 4. fixation of pay, 5. an order denying or varying pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions to the disadvantage of a Govt, servant, otherwise than as a penalty. In the instant case, the State Government passed an order appointing the petitioner as Superintendent, Umaid hospital, Jodhpur. The non-petitioner No. 3 challenged this order before the Tribunal on the ground that he had a right to be considered for appointment to the office of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, as he is senior to the petitioner. In my opinion, this is a service-matter falling within clause 5 of S. 2 (f) of the Act, because, according to non petitioner No. 3, the order passed by the State Government appointing the petitioner as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, denied or adversely affected his service conditions as his right to be considered for appointment to the so called office of Superintendent, was ignored to his detriment. In determining the question whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and decide this matter, the nature of the claim put forward by non-petitioner No. 3 and not the merits of the claim are to be seen. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal, in my opinion, was not ousted merely because the allegations on which the claim of non petitioner No. 3 was based are shown or found to be incorrect. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal, in my opinion, was not incompetent to adjudicate on this matter, because S. 4 (1) of the Act clearly provides that the Tribunal shall hear an appeal against the order passed by any officer or authority in any service-matter or matters affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision of the Tribunal suffered from a total or inherent lack of jurisdiction and is a nullity is not tenable. It may also be stated in this context that the non-petitioner No. 3 instituted a regular civil suit in the court of the Munsiff City, Jodhpur, challenging the order of the Government dated Nov. 29, 1980, by which the petitioner was appointed as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur. In that suit a temporary injunction was issued against the petitioner. It may also be stated in this context that the non-petitioner No. 3 instituted a regular civil suit in the court of the Munsiff City, Jodhpur, challenging the order of the Government dated Nov. 29, 1980, by which the petitioner was appointed as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur. In that suit a temporary injunction was issued against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of temporary injunction, the petitioner filed a miscellaneous appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, and stated in para 4 of the memo of the appeal as under:- " ;g gS fd vihykUV o jsLiksUMsUV uEcj 3 nksuksa jkT; deZpkjh gS] o ekeyk gktk lsok ls lacaf/kr gS] o ,sls ekeyksa ds fy;s ,d ek= mik; lfoZl fV~C;quy esa vihy djus dk gS o jktLFkku flfoy lfoZlst vihysV fV~C;quy ,DV dh /kkjk 10 ds vuqlkj ,sls ekeys fnokuh U;k;ky;ksa esa ugha py ldrsA bl izdkj tc okn Lo;eso gh pyus dkfcy ugha gS] rks fdlh izdkj dh vLFkk;h ;k vUrfje fu"ks/kkKk dk iz'u gh iSnk ugha gksrk gSA " From the above para of the memo of the appeal, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was challenged by the petitioner herself on the ground that the matter related to service and the Tribunal alone was to adjudicate upon it in an appeal before it. The non-petitioner No. 3, thereupon, preferred an appeal before the Tribunal and, later on, withdrew the suit from the civil Court. In view of these facts, the petitioner cannot be permitted to plead inconsistently before this Court that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the appeal filed before it by non-petitioner No. 3 when she herself had pleaded before the District Judge that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by which her appointment as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, was challenged by non petitioner No. 3. It is a matter of principle that a party cannot be allowed to take inconsistent position in courts to the disadvantage of this opponent. The petitioner had taken up a particular position before the District Judge, Jodhpur, at one stage of this litigation and it is now not open to her to resile from that position. Reference in this connection be made to Udrej Singh v. Ram Bahai Singh, AIR 1946 All 436 and Hakim Syed Shah Khurshed Ali v. Commr. The petitioner had taken up a particular position before the District Judge, Jodhpur, at one stage of this litigation and it is now not open to her to resile from that position. Reference in this connection be made to Udrej Singh v. Ram Bahai Singh, AIR 1946 All 436 and Hakim Syed Shah Khurshed Ali v. Commr. of Tirhut Division, AIR 1955 Pat 198 , in which a similar view is taken. 7. Mr. M. R. Calla, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the conduct of the nature referred to above imputed to the petitioner cannot estop her from raising the question of jurisdiction before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as there was total absence or lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Tribunal to hear and decide the appeal filed before it by non-petitioner No. 3 against the order of the State Government appointing the petitioner as Superintendent, Umaid, Hospital, Jodhpur. In support of his above contention, Mr. M. R. Calla placed reliance on Raghunandanlal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 Raj 184 , Dholpur Co-operative Transport and Multipurposes Union Ltd. v. The Appellate Authority, AIR 1953 Raj 193 , Barkatali v. Custodian General, AIR 1954 Raj 214 , Badridas v. Appellate Tribunal, S. T. Authority, AIR 1960 Raj 105 , Uda v. Jogdish Narain, 1963 Raj L W 284 and Chhaila v. Board of Revenue Raj., AIR 1975 Raj 157 . The above contention has no force, because it is not a case where lack of jurisdiction is patent. I have already held above that the order passed by the State Government appointing the petitioner as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, fell within clause (v) of S. 2 (f) of the Act, as it afforded a grievance to the non-petitioner No. 3 that his right to be considered for appointment as Superintendent was denied and such a denial adversely affected his service conditions. It is no doubt true that no waiver or consent can confer jurisdiction on any authority, if there is total absence or lack of inherent jurisdiction and in such a case objection can be raised in the writ petition against the decision of the authority even though the party raising the objection had adopted a contradictory stand at some stage of the litigation before any other authority or Court. The reason is that there can be no estoppel against statute and the proper decision on the question of jurisdiction cannot be affected by an inconsistent stand taken by any party at some earlier stage of litigation. But it is equally true that there may be cases where the conduct of the petitioner may be such as to disentitle him or her to a discretionary relief. So far as the instant case is concerned, I do not find any substantial ground for holding that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal filed before it by non petitioner No. 3. 8. The next important question that arises for determination in this writ petition is whether the impugned order passed by the State Government with regard to entrustment of the functions of the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital to the petitioner has resulted in any discrimination against Dr. R. N. Singh non-petitioner No. 3 and has contravened in any manner the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Mr. M. C. Bhoot, learned counsel for non-petitioner No. 3, invited my attention to the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution and contended on their strength that the non-petitioner No. 3 has an equal chance with the petitioner in matters relating to appointment to the office of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, under the State. He argued at length with regard to the word `office' used in Article 16 and referred me to various meanings of this word given in the dictionaries and in the following authorities: Gazula Dasratha Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 564 , Sinha Ramanuja v. Ranga Ramanuja, AIR 1961 SC 1720 , Mahommed Shujat Ali v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1631 : (1974 Lab I C 1103) , E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 : (1974 Lab I C 427) , Government, Branch Press v. D. B. Belliappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 : (1979 Lab IC 146), Bishan Das v. Durga Prasad, 1971 Raj LW 470 , Mamat Ram Bayan v. Bapu Ram Atai Bura Bhakat (1888) ILR 15 Cal 159 , Ramalingachi Reddi v. Elayyaperuma AIR 1937 Mad 403 , Mangobinda v. Sachidananda Swami, AIR 1953 Orissa 151 , General Manager S. Rly. v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36 , A. C. Mitra v. State, AIR 1970 Orissa 19, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority, (1979) 3 SCC 489 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) , Kasturi Lal v. State of J. & K., AIR 1980 SC 1992 , S. S. Dua v. State of J. & K. 1973 Lab IC 1300 (J & K) , Ishvarlal v. Principal Govt. Arts & Science College 1975 Lab I C 1700 (Goa) and Dr. M. C. Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Special Appeal No. 588 of 1972, decided on September 12, 1975. According to his submission, there is an office of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, because it embraces the elements of special duty, position of trust or ministration conferred by exercise of Governmental authority for a public purpose and, therefore, discrimination in the matter of appointment to this office by executive action can be made subject-matter of judicial determination. 9. Mr. M. R. Calla, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the provisions of Article 16 are not attracted to this case, because the Art. relates to offices which are filled by employment or appointment by the State. Mr. Calla further urged that there is no appointment at all to any office under the State in this particular case and so the beneficent provisions of Articles 14 and 16 will not apply. According to his submission, the word `office' has been construed by courts in different senses and different meanings have been assigned to this word having regard to the language and object of a particular enactment. In a nutshell, Mr. Calla's contention before me is that the so-called office of the Superintendent, Umaid Hospital is not an office within the meaning of the `office' used in Article 16 of the Constitution, as no such office or post has been created by the State by any enactment, rule or notification but it is an adjunction of certain duties of the nature of Administrator or Manager of the Hospital to the post of Professor of Gynaecology and Paediatrics which the petitioner holds without any emoluments attached thereto.In support of his above contention, reliance was placed by Mr. M. R. Calla on R. K. Varma v. Delhi E. S. Undertaking, 1976 Lab IC 974 (Delhi) and Kanta Khaturia v. Manak Chand, AIR 1970 SC 694 and Dr. M. R. Calla on R. K. Varma v. Delhi E. S. Undertaking, 1976 Lab IC 974 (Delhi) and Kanta Khaturia v. Manak Chand, AIR 1970 SC 694 and Dr. Satya Deo Bhardwaj v. State of Rajasthan (Writ Petn. No. 3651 of 1979) decided on 28th March, 1979. 10. I have gone through all the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the parties and carefully considered the rival contentions mentioned above. It may be observed at the outset that no post of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, as such has been created by the State Government by any order or notification. What has been done by the Government is that the petitioner, who is holding the post of Professor, Gynaecology and Obstetrics has been given certain powers in the discharge of her duties and designated as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur. There is no dispute that Dr. R. N. Singh, non-petitioner No. 3, is a senior Professor of Paediatrics in the same hospital. His claim is that he being a senior Professor should have been assigned this work of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, and the order of the Government appointing the petitioner to the post of Superintendent clearly violated the provisions of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution in not considering him eligible for appointment to that post. In my opinion, the claim of Dr. R.N. Singh, non-petitioner No. 3, is not well-founded firstly, because there is no inter se seniority between him and the petitioner. The petitioner is a Professor in the Department of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, while Dr. R. N. Singh, non petitioner No. 3 also is a Professor in another Department of Paediatrics in the same Hospital. There is no order or notification of the Government that Dr. R.N. Singh, of Paediatrics shall rank senior to the petitioner, who is Professor of Gynaecology and Obstetrics. In the absence of fixation of inter se seniority between the Professors of different Departments of the same Hospital, it is not open for non petitioner No. 3 to contend that he being a Professor senior to the petitioner should have been assigned the work of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital. Jodhpur. Apart from this, it happens in Government Reported in ILR (1979) 29 Raj. Jodhpur. Apart from this, it happens in Government Reported in ILR (1979) 29 Raj. 755 service that persons occupying junior posts are made heads of Department while holders of senior posts are not so declared, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. Gopaul v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1864 . The observations relevant to the point under consideration are quoted below (at p. 1867):- "We cannot accept the submission that the mere fact that the post of Accommodation Controller, to which the appellant has been transferred, has not been designated as the post of a Head of the Department necessarily involves any reduction in rank. In fact, it is well-known that in Government service there may be senior posts, the holders of which are not declared as Heads of Department, while persons holding comparatively junior posts may be declared as such. The rank in Government service does not depend on the mere circumstances that the Government servant, in the discharge of his duties, is given certain powers " Hence, to my mind the Government committed no error in passing the order that the work of Superintendent be assigned to the Professor of Gynaecology and Obstetrics in Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, i.e. the petitioner. It will not be out of place to mention that no question of promotion to any post did arise when the work of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, was assigned to the petitioner, because this work does not carry any special pay or any emoluments or pecuniary advantage with it. The petitioner is merely asked to do extra work in addition to the duties attached to her post or office of Professor in Gynaecology and Obstetrics. When no promotion is involved in appointment to the so called post of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, Article 16 of the Constitution of India is not attracted merely because non petitioner No. 3 thinks that the so-called post is more important than the post which he is holding at present. When no promotion is involved in appointment to the so called post of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, Article 16 of the Constitution of India is not attracted merely because non petitioner No. 3 thinks that the so-called post is more important than the post which he is holding at present. Reference in this connection may be made to an authority of the Delhi High Court, R. K. Verma v. Delhi E. S. Undertaking (1976 Lab IC 974) (supra), wherein Hon'ble Prakash Narain J. (as he then was) observed as follows (at p. 977):- "It has been urged that although there is no promotion involved in appointment to the post of Private Secretary all the same the very nature of the post makes it a very important one and so, persons like petitioners also should have been considered. I fail to understand the logic behind this contention. If, admittedly, no promotion is involved and it is only a question of posting a person on a particular post, then merely because the petitioners think that the post of Private Secretary to the General Manager is more important than the posts that they are holding at present cannot persuade the Court to pronounce in their favour and hold that Article 16 would be attracted. To give an illustration one may take the case of transfers. Can it be said about an employee transferred from one station to another or from one post to another that Article 16 is attracted if such transfer does not involve any promotion or demotion?" In this view of the matter, the contention of Dr. R. N. Singh, non-petitioner No. 3 that he being similarly situated was discriminated in the matter of employment or appointment to the post of Superintendent cannot be upheld. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Satya Deo Bhardwaj v. State of Rajasthan (ILR (1979) 29 Raj 755) referred-to above. In that case it was contended before the Division Bench of this Court that there is post or office of the Head of Department of Bio-Chemistry in S.M.S. Medical College, Jaipur, and the petitioner, who held such post or office, could not be transferred to S. N. medical College, Jodhpur, where there is no independent post of Head of Department of Bio-Chemistry. This contention was repelled by the Division Bench of this Court by making the following observations:- "A perusal of the Rules and the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951, which are applicable to this case, would clearly show that the only post which the petitioner holds is that post of Professor of Biochemistry in the cadre of the Service, that no post of the Head of the Department of Biochemistry at S. M. S. Medical College, Jaipur, is borne on the cadre of the service, that no such post has ever been created by the Government and that, therefore, there was no question of the petitioner having ever held the post of the Head of the Department of Biochemistry S. M. S. Medical College, Jaipur. A reference to rule 6 and the Schedule appended to the Rules would reveal that the Service consists of three cadres, viz., (i) Selection posts of Professors and Additional Professors, (ii) Senior posts of Readers and (iii) Junior Posts of Lecturers and Senior Demonstrators, spread over the Clinical Wing and non-clinical wing. None of these cadres and none of the posts in any of the cadres includes the so-called "office or post" of the Head of the Department of Biochemistry S.M.S. Medical College, Jaipur". The reasons given by the D.B. of this Court for not holding the Head of the Department of Biochemistry to be an office or post are equally applicable to the Superintendents of Hospitals, because no pay or definite rate of pay or any emolument or pecuniary advantage is attached to the so-called post or office of Superintendent, Umaid Hospital and it is neither included in any cadre post of the Service nor the Government by any Act, Rule, Notification or order has created this so called post or office. Hence, the Tribunal committed an error apparent on the face of the record in holding that the Government while assigning the work of the Superintendent wrongly ignored the claim of Dr. R. N. Singh for appointment to this so called post of Superintendent and, in this manner, the impugned order of the Government, is hit by the mischief of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution.. 11. Mr. M. C. Bhoot, learned counsel for Dr. R. N. Singh, further contended that the Tribunal rightly took into consideration an important fact that the petitioner, who is junior to Dr. 11. Mr. M. C. Bhoot, learned counsel for Dr. R. N. Singh, further contended that the Tribunal rightly took into consideration an important fact that the petitioner, who is junior to Dr. R. N. Singh, while working as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur, shall write his annual performance appraisal reports and, in this manner, shall rank senior to him and, therefore, the Government committed an error in appointing the petitioner to the post of Superintendent whose primary function is to control the administration of the Hospital. The above contention has no force. From a bare perusal of the confidential letter No. P. 143/MC. Gr. I dated nil from the Secretary to the Government, Medical and Public Health Department, Gr. I. Jaipur, marked Annexure 17, it is obvious that the Superintendents of Hospitals will send their appraisal in a narrative form of all unit heads to the Principals who while writing out their appraisals will keep in view the appraisal assessment sent by the Superintendents but these will not remain attached to A.P.A. Rs. From this document marked Annexure 17, it does appear that the Superintendent shall send his or her appraisal in a narrative form of all Professors to the Principal, because Principals alone are competent to write and remit the annual performance appraisement reports of heads of Departments and all Professors to the Department of Personnel, and the Secretary, Public Health Department is competent to review them. The Superintendents of the Hospitals, are competent only to send their annual appraisement in a narrative form of all unit heads alone and not of Professors. The contention of Mr. M. C. Bhoot is that the Professor also is a unit head and unless an exception is made in his case, the Superintendent of the Hospital will send his or her appraisement in a narrative form of the Professor also. The above contention has no force, because in the same document marked Annexure 17, it is written in clear and express terms at item No. 2 that the reporting officer in respect of the Head of the Department and in respect of all Professors is the Principal. It is further mentioned at item No. 4 that for unit heads other than Professors the reporting officer will be the Head of the Department. It is further mentioned at item No. 4 that for unit heads other than Professors the reporting officer will be the Head of the Department. Hence, the Tribunal went wrong in holding that the petitioner being Superintendent, Umaid Hospital will send her appraisement in a narrative form of Dr. R. N. Singh, non-petitioner No. 3, who is a Professor and unit head also. Consequently, I am of the view that even if the petitioner is required to send her appraisement in a narrative form of Professor R, N. Singh, non-petitioner No. 3 to the Principal, she does not become senior to the latter, because no inter se seniority between Professor of Gynaecology and Professor of Paediatrics has been fixed by the State Government. Mr. M. C. Bhoot further contended that although there are no rules framed by the Government for making appointment to the post of Superintendent, yet the practice has been to appoint the senior most Doctor as the Superintendent of the Hospital and, therefore, the Government should have considered the case of non-petitioner No. 3 for appointment to that post, because non petitioner No. 3 is indisputably senior to the petitioner. The above contention also is devoid of substance, because in the past when Dr. Zozeph retired in Sept. 1975, Mrs. Dr. Sheela Sharma was assigned the work of Superintendent being Professor and Head of the Department of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, although her length of service as Professor was shorter than the non petitioner No. 3 and the non-petitioner No. 3 was working on the post of Professor since May 20, 1975, whereas Dr. Sheela Sharma had been appointed to the post of Professor, Gynaecology and Obstetrics subsequently. 12. As the Tribunal committed an error apparent on the face of the record in holding in its impugned judgment marked Annexure 9 that by appointing the petitioner as Superintendent, the State Government has enhanced her status and thereby adversely affected the right of the non petitioner No. 3's seniority and varied his service conditions to his detriment in violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16, the writ petition filed by Dr. Chandra Kiran is accepted and the impugned decision of the Tribunal marked Annexure 9 is set aside and the non-petitioner No. 3 is restrained from working as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur. Chandra Kiran is accepted and the impugned decision of the Tribunal marked Annexure 9 is set aside and the non-petitioner No. 3 is restrained from working as Superintendent, Umaid Hospital, Jodhpur. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******