JUDGMENT 1. - This revision is preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 18-9-1980 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, 2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this revision are these : Petitioner made an application on behalf of the whole Jatiya community of village Asop under sec. 145 Cr. P.C. It is alleged that the land khasra No. 2127 measuring 5.5. bighas is situated in the vicinity of village Asop. The land was gifted by the former Jagirdar of village Mop to Jatiya community for the purpose of their leather industry and also issued pita. Since then members of the Jatiya community are using it. The petitioner is the mukhiya' of the Jatiya community. At the time of the settlement, this land could not be entered into the name of the Jatiya community and was wrongly entered as a pastural land. The non-petitioners are also the members of the Jatiya community but they got various portions of the land allotted in their favour by Tehsildar Bilara. On 10-2-1980, the non-petitioners threatened the petitioner that they would construct residential houses on this land and deny the Jatiya community the use of the same. An application under section 146 Cr. P.C. was also moved by the petitioner for the attachment of the land in dispute. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate by his order dated 19-3-1980 confirmed his earlier order of attachment and made an order that the land in question shall remain in possession of the receiver and the parties were directed to get their rights decided by a competent civil court. The non-petitioner preferred a revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur against the order dated 19-3-1980, which was accepted and the attachment order dated 19-3-1980 was set aside along with the preliminary order dated 13-2-80 and the earlier order of attachment dated 14.2.1980. While making these orders, it was observed by the learned Sessions Judge that since the dispute related to a property which was in the joint possession of the parties, the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C. did not lie and in that view he cancelled the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C. and also passed the consequential orders as stated above. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has now approached this court by way of revision. 3. P.C. did not lie and in that view he cancelled the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C. and also passed the consequential orders as stated above. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has now approached this court by way of revision. 3. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was not open to the learned Sessions Judge to quash the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C. in the absence of a finding arrived at on the evidence in the case that it was a dispute relating to a property in joint possession. On the other hand it is argued by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners that such a finding was not necessary because it was specifically alleged by the petitioner in his application under section 145 Cr. P.C. that the land was in joint possession of the members of the Jatiya community including the petitioner and the non-petitioners. in this view only two findings could be arrived at in the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C. (1) That the property was in the joint possession of the members of the Jatiya community and (2) that the property was in the exclusive and separate possession of the non-petitioners. 4. Any of these two findings would entail the quashing of the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C. I have considered the rival contentions care fully. It was thus observed in Ota and ors. v. Jai Singh and ors., 1976 Criminal Law Reporter page 336 : "I have carefully perused the record and heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. It has been laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Nahar Singh v. The State that where a court after inquiry reaches the conclusions that parties before it are in joint possession of the subject of dispute, the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P.C. should be dropped as no final order under sub-sec. (6) of Section 145 or u/s.145 or u/s. 146 (1) of the old Cr. P.C. should be dropped as no final order under sub-sec. (6) of Section 145 or u/s.145 or u/s. 146 (1) of the old Cr. P.C, can be passed in favour of any party, because when both the parties are in joint possession there is no exclusive possession of other party and it cannot also be said that the Magistrate is unable to find out as to which of the parties is in possession of the property in dispute at the relevant time In the instant case no inquiry into the actual possession over the subject of dispute was conducted, it was not possible for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Unless such an inquiry was conducted. it was not possible for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to come to a conclusion that the parties were in joint possession of the land in dispute at the relevant time. Apart from this, it appears prima facie from the report of the Station House Officer and the report of Jai Singh son of Moti Singh. one of the members of party No. A that exclusive possession over the disputed land was claimed by party Number A while Party Number B claimed to be in joint possession along with the former. It was, therefore, no less a question of disputed actual possession than the one where each party puts forward a claim of exclusive possession over the entire area. In this view of the matter also the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate could not drop the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. at the initial stage without making an inquiry into the actual possession. Hence, the reference cannot be accepted on the ground that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate ought to have dropped the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. as the parties before were in joint possession of the subject of dispute. However, I may observe that if upon an inquiry into the matter the Sub Divisional Magistrate comes to a conclusion that the parties before him are in joint possession of the disputed land, the proper course for him will be to drop the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. of course while dropping proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. he may proceed under Section 107 Cr. P.C. of course while dropping proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. he may proceed under Section 107 Cr. P.C. if there is an apprehension of breach of the peace between the parties and if he considers it necessary to initiate such proceedings for prevention of breach of the peace." Where the petitioner comes forward with a case of exclusive possession and the non-petitioners are claiming a joint possession, proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C. cannot be dropped merely on the allegation of the non-petitioners. If that were so, every petition under section 145 Cr. P.C. would be defeated by the non-petitioners merely by asserting that the property was of joint possession. However, such is not the case before me. Here the petitioner has come forward with a case of joint possession and the non-petitioners are claiming their exclusive and separate possession. Even if the case of the petitioner were to be accepted. in my opinion no order could be passed in his favour. This is evident from the observations made in Nahar Singh v. The State, AIR 1951 Rajasthan page 156 : "The question suggests two possibilities : (1) Whether the order should be under Section 145, Cr. P.C. and if so what, or (2) Whether the order should be under Section 146, Cr. P.C. It is not necessary for us to quote authorities so far as the first part of the question is concerned for all the High Courts are agreed that where a court comes to the conclusion that the parties before it are in joint possession of the property in dispute on the date of the order no order under Section 145 in favour of any party declaring him to be entitled to possession until evicted in due course of law and forbidding all disturbances of such possession until such eviction, can be passed dismissing the Lase under sec. 145 or the Magistrate should proceed under sec. 146 Sub-sec. (1), Cr. P.C. That Sub-sec. 145 or the Magistrate should proceed under sec. 146 Sub-sec. (1), Cr. P.C. That Sub-sec. reads as follows : If the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was then in such possession, or is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach it until a competent Court hos determined the rights of the parties thereto, or the person entitled to possession thereof." Under that Sub-sec., a Magistrate can attach the property in either of two cases (1) when he finds that none of the parties before him is in such possession or (2) when he is unable to decide which of the parties before him is in possession of the subject-matter of dispute. But we must make it clear that if, while finding that none of the parties was in possession of the property, the Magistrate also comes to a conclusion that a third person who is no party to the proceeding is in actual possession, he should not disturb the possession of that third person by attaching the property. The question, however, still remains whether in a case where the Magistrate is of the opinion that both the parties before him are in joint possession of the property, it can be said that he has decided that none of the parties was in such possession or is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was in possession. It is clear that where the Magistrate holds that both parties are in joint possession, it is not a case where he can be said to have decided that none of the were in possession. Is it then a case in which it can be said that he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was in possession. The answer to our mind is obviously in the negative. Where the Magistrate holds that both parties are in possession, it cannot. in our opinion, be said that he was unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession. There is only one case which we have been able to find which takes a different view namely Chiranjilal v. Mahadeo Prasad, AIR 1932 All. 683 . Where the Magistrate holds that both parties are in possession, it cannot. in our opinion, be said that he was unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession. There is only one case which we have been able to find which takes a different view namely Chiranjilal v. Mahadeo Prasad, AIR 1932 All. 683 . In that case Bennet J. held that if there were two joint owners in possession jointly it was a case where the Magistrate could not decide which of them was in exclusive possession. He, therefore, went on to held that in such a case sec. 146 would apply. With all respects, we are unable to agree with this view. Therefore our answer to question 2 (a) is that where a Magistrate finds after enquiry that the parties were in joint actual possession o f the property in dispute, he should drop the proceedings under sec. 145 Cr. P.C. Our answer to question 2 (b) is that in such a case, the Magistrate cannot proceed to pass an order under sec. 146, Cr. P.C." 5. Realising this aspect of the case learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that this plea was not raised before the learned Sessions Judge and, therefore, could be availed by the non-petitioners in this revision. I am unable to agree with this contention. The learned Sessions Judge has specifically referred to this aspect of the case. It may be that it is not the case of the non-petitioners that they are in joint possession of this property along with the other members of the community and their case is that they were in exclusive and separate possession of the portions of this land. However, no useful finding favourable to the petitioner can possibly be arrived at even after a detailed enquiry because the Magistrate can only find (1) that the land is in joint possession of the members of the Jatiya community including the petitioner and the non-petitioners or (2) that the land is in exclusive and separate possession of the non-petitioners. No third finding can be arrived at because a finding has to be arrived at only on the pleas put forward by the parties. No third finding can be arrived at because a finding has to be arrived at only on the pleas put forward by the parties. In view of the plain admission and allegation of the petitioners that the land was in joint possession of the members of the Jatiya community, I am of the opinion that no enquiry was necessary and no proceedings under sec. 145 Cr. P.C, lay on the allegations disclosed in the application u/s. 145 Cr. P.C. made by the petitioner. In this view, I find no infirmity in the impugned order. 6. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******