JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - The Appellant stands convicted u/s 5(2) read with Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) and u/s 420 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called the Code) for having dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated, while functioning as the Sub-Assistant Registrar (Industries) at Jeypore, a sum of Rs. 2,000/- of the Maithili Hand Pounding Co-operative Society (hereinafter called the Society) in the district of Koraput of which Jaya Singh Majhi (since dead), the father of Had Majhi (P.W. 4), was the President, by dishonestly inducing Jaya Singh Majhi to deliver two slips signed by him and the pass book and the seal of the Society falsely representing that the accounts of the Society had to be set right and having drawn an amount of Rs. 2,000/- on 17-9-1970, misappropriating it and obtaining pecuniary advantage for himself, by abusing his position as a public servant and by corrupt and illegal means. On the basis of a written report (Ext. 4) dated 18-9-1972 of the Impactor of Vigilance stationed at Jeypore, the Officer-in-Charge of the Vigilance Police Station at Berhampur drew up the formal first information report (Ext. 5) and the Inspector of Vigilance (P.W. 7), being authorised, took up the investigation in the course of which he examined the witnesses and seized certain documents. Another Inspector of Vigilance (P.W. 8) took over charge of the investigation of this case, received the sanction order (Ext. 10) for the prosecution of the Appellant and ultimately another officer submitted the charge-sheet against the Appellant. 2. The Appellant had pleaded not guilty to the charge. His case can conveniently be stated from his statement recorded u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: I had been to that Society in September 1970. I found that the Society was in moribund condition. To repay the over due loan in consultation with Jaisingh Majhi I intended to release certain amount which was in deposit in Nawarangpur Co-operative Central Bank, Branch Jeypore. As Jayasingh Majhi was busy in tram plantation wink he authorised me in Bank withdrawal slip to withdraw Rs. 2000/-. On 17-9-1970 I withdrew Rs. 2000/- on the strength of that authority. On 19-9-(sic) Sri Jaisingh Majhi received that amount from me. The Society Seals & Pass Book which I had brought from Sri. Majhi were returned to him on the same day. 2000/-. On 17-9-1970 I withdrew Rs. 2000/- on the strength of that authority. On 19-9-(sic) Sri Jaisingh Majhi received that amount from me. The Society Seals & Pass Book which I had brought from Sri. Majhi were returned to him on the same day. I instructed Sri Majhi to repay at least Rs. 1000/- to repay the loan and utilise the other Rs. 1000/- as working capital. Majhi subsequently repaid Rs. 880/- to Khadi Board which I sent officially I had not taken any slip from Majhi other than the Bank withdrawal slip. 3. To bring home the charges to the Appellant, the prosecution had examined eight witnesses. In his defence, the Appellant had examined himself as a witness and had testified that he had returned the amount drawn to Jaya Singh Majhi. On a consideration of the evidence, the learned Special Judge accepted the prosecution case in respect of the three charges, rejected the case of the Appellant and while holding him guilty of the three charges, convicted him u/s 5(2) of the Act and u/s 420 of the Code. For his conviction under the first mentioned section, the Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in detault of payment thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months and for his conviction u/s 420 of the Code, the Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months with a direction that the sentences would in concurrently. 4. Mr. P.K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, has submitted that sanction had not duly been accorded for the prosecution of the Appellant. According to him, none of the charges had been established and the case of the Appellant which was reasonable and probable, ought to have been accepted. Mr. Ajit Rath, the learned Additional Standing Counsel, has, however, submitted that none of the two contentions raised on behalf of the Appellant can prevail. 5. According to him, none of the charges had been established and the case of the Appellant which was reasonable and probable, ought to have been accepted. Mr. Ajit Rath, the learned Additional Standing Counsel, has, however, submitted that none of the two contentions raised on behalf of the Appellant can prevail. 5. Coming to the question of sanction, I notice that this question had been raised at an initial stage and the learned Special Judge, by his order dated the 24th March, 1977, held, for the reasons recorded by him, that the Director of Industries, who had accorded sanction for the prosecution of the Appellant, being the Appellant's appointing and removing authority, was competent to accord sanction and therefore, the sanction order was legal and valid. It would be seen on a perusal of the sanction order (Ext. 8) that the Director of Industries, after fully and carefully considering and examining the materials placed before him with regard to the allegations made against the Appellant and the circumstances of the case and after applying his mind came to the conclusion that the Appellant should be prosecuted and therefore, sanction was accorded u/s 6(1)(c) of the Act. I find no reason to hold that sanction had not duly been accorded for the prosecution of the Appellant. 6. I would next proceed to examine as to whether the charges against the Appellant had been established. As has been submitted at the BaI, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 6 regarding the receipt of some loans by the Society was not material with regard to any of the charges. The prosecution sought to build its case on the evidence of Had Majhi (P.W. 4), the son of Jaya Singh Majhi who, it was alleged, had been cheated by the Appellant and that of Biswanath Tripathy (P.W. 2) and Jagannath Panigrahi (P.W. 3), both co-villagers of Jaya Singh Majhi. It admits of no doubt from the evidence of P.W. 5, the then Branch Manager of the Koraput Central Co-operative Bank at Jeypore that an amount of Rs. 2,000/- of the Society was withdrawn on 17-9-1970 by the Appellant as per Ext. 3, the endorsement made in the pass book of the Society. According to P.W. 5, this amount had been withdrawn on the basis of the authority of Jaya Singh Majhi and the withdrawal form contained the signatures (Exts. 2,000/- of the Society was withdrawn on 17-9-1970 by the Appellant as per Ext. 3, the endorsement made in the pass book of the Society. According to P.W. 5, this amount had been withdrawn on the basis of the authority of Jaya Singh Majhi and the withdrawal form contained the signatures (Exts. I, III and 1/2) of the depositor and the Appellant had made an endorsement (Ext. 1/4) after receipt of the money. As earlier indicated the Appellant; himself did not dispute the fact of withdrawal of Rs. 2,000/- by him. His case was that as Jaya Singh was busy in transplantation work, he authorised him (Appellant) to withdraw Rs. 2000/- and after withdrawal of this amount on 17-9-1970, he handed over the money to Jaya Singh Majhi on 19-9-1970 along with the seal of the Society and the pass book instructing Jaya Singh Majhi to repay at least Rs. 1000/- towards the loan and to utilise the balance amount as the working capital and his further case was that Jaya Singh Majhi subsequently repaid Rs. 880/- to the Khadi Board which he (Appellant) sent officially. 7. On their own showing, P.Ws. 2 and 3 were not present at the time when Jaya Singh Majhi handed over the pass book and the seal of the Society. According to both these witnesses. Jaya Singh Majhi had 10 the month of Kartik of the year 1970 told them that the Appellant had taken away the pass book and the office seal from him. P.W. 2 had testified that Jaya Singh told him that his signatures on a form and a plain paper with three signatures of his had been taken by the Appellant representing to set right the papers of the Society which were incorrect and the evidence of P.W. 3 was that Jaya Singh told him that the Appellant had taken 2 to 3 signatures of his on a form and his signature on a plain paper. According to both these witnesses, one and a half years thereafter, Jaya Singh had told them that the Appellant had sent back the pass book and the seal and while according to P.W. 2, Jaya Singh told him that the Appellant had withdrawn Rs. 2,000/-, according to P.W. 3, the statement of Jaya Singh was that the Appellant had withdrawn all the amounts from the pass book. Both these witnesses had proved Exts. 2,000/-, according to P.W. 3, the statement of Jaya Singh was that the Appellant had withdrawn all the amounts from the pass book. Both these witnesses had proved Exts. I, III and 1/2, the signatures of Jaya Singh in the form of withdrawal and Ext. 2, the signature of Jaya Singh in another document. P.W. 4 had deposed that his father had told him that he had demanded the pass book from the Appellant, but the Appellant did not return it. In the absence of evidence that P.Ws. 2 and 3 were in any way connected with the affairs of the Society, it was highly unlikely that Jaya Singh Maihi would be informing them from time to time about the Appellant taking the pass book and the seal with signatures on a form and' a plain paper and again one and a half years thereafter about the return of the pass book and the seal and the withdrawal of the amount. As deposed to by P.W. 3, Jaya Singh did not tell him that he had reported about the act of the Appellant to anyone nor did he (P.W. 3) advise Jaya Singh to report a bout it to the Police authorities. P.W. 3 had admitted that before the Vigilance authorities examined him two to three years prior to his deposition (recorded on the 13th July, 1977), he had not told anyone about this. P.W. 2 had also admitted that after hearing the complaint of Jaya Singh against the Appellant, he had told none about it and until his examination by the Vigilance authorities, he had not disclosed about it to anyone. There was no evidence that at any point of time, they had asked the Appellant about it. It is important to note that referring to the statement of Jaya Singh Majhi, P.W. 2 had stated in his examination-in-chief thus: ...One and half years thereafter he told me that the S.A.R. had sent back the Pass Book and the seal, after withdrawing Rs. 2000/- from the Pass Book. He told me that he received that Rs. 2000/-.... This statement of P.W. 2 would indicate an admission on the part of Jaya Singh that he had received that amount of Rs. 2,000/-. On a careful consideration of their evidence, it would be seen that the evidence of P.Ws. 2000/- from the Pass Book. He told me that he received that Rs. 2000/-.... This statement of P.W. 2 would indicate an admission on the part of Jaya Singh that he had received that amount of Rs. 2,000/-. On a careful consideration of their evidence, it would be seen that the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 with regard to some statements said to have been made by Jaya Singh pointing to the guilt of the Appellant would not deserve credence and was not to be accepted merely because it had not been shown as to how and why these witnesses would come forward to depose against the Appellant. After all, disinterestedness by itself does not stamp the evidence of a witness with truth. 8. Hari Majhi (P.W. 4), son of Jaya Singh Majhi, had deposed thus: In 1970 Kartika at about 10 A.M. one day the accused came to our because, and called my father to the Society, and wanted to take the Pass Bock and seal of the Society telling that there was something wrong in the records and would send back those after setting the records right. He also took three signatures of my father on a form and one signature on a plain paper. My father also sold paddy and gave him Rs. 12/- towards his bus fare, as desired by the accused. One and a half years thereafter my father got back the Pass Book and the seal. On receipt of those, my father told that the accused had withdrawn Rs. 2000/- from the Pass Book. My father did not receive back the amount from the accused. I can identify the signature of my father. Exts. 1, 1/1, 1/2 and 2 are his signatures. In 1972, my father sent a petition to Bhubaneswar regarding this amount. There was no evidence that Jaya Singh Majhi was illiterate person. He was the President of the Society and it was highly unlikely that he would not know the Implication of putting signatures on a form or on a blank piece of paper. He was not likely to quietly accept the suggestion of the Appellant and give his signatures on blank papers on a plea of the Appellant that there was something wrong in the records and that he would set right the records. He was not likely to quietly accept the suggestion of the Appellant and give his signatures on blank papers on a plea of the Appellant that there was something wrong in the records and that he would set right the records. It is not understood as to how the pass book of the Society would be necessary for getting the records straight and if any such suggestion had been made by the Appellant, in the normal and natural course of events, Jaya Singh Majhi would have asked the Appellant as to why for such a purpose, he would require the pass book of the Society and in addition, his signatures on a form and on a plain paper. It would be seen from the evidence of P.W. 4 that his father gave Rs. 12/- to the Appellant towards bus fare and this 'would lend assurance to the case of the Appellant that as Jaya Singh was busy in transplantation, he authorised the Appellant in the withdrawal slip to draw Rs. 2000/- on the strength of that authority on his behalf for which Jaya Singh paid Rs. 12/- to the Appellant as bus fare. It seems to me to be highly improbable that Jaya Singh after handing over the pass book and the seal of the Society and giving his signatures on a form and another on a plain paper, would not even enquire from the Appellant thereafter as to what he did with these documents and would keep silent for one and a halt years thereafter when he allegedly got back the pass book and the seal and came to know that the Appellant had withdrawn Rs. 2000/- from the pass book If Jaya Singh had, in fact, been deceived by the false persuasion of the Appellant and had handed over the documents, he would certainly not keep quiet and after making enquiry from the Appellant, he would report against him. Such conduct on the part of Jaya Singh Majhi would tell its own tale and further probabilise the case of the Appellant. As late as in 1972, as deposed to by P.W. 4, his father sent a petition to Bhubaneswar regarding the incident. Only the signature (Ext. Such conduct on the part of Jaya Singh Majhi would tell its own tale and further probabilise the case of the Appellant. As late as in 1972, as deposed to by P.W. 4, his father sent a petition to Bhubaneswar regarding the incident. Only the signature (Ext. 2) of Jaya Singh had been proved in a document, but the learned Special Judge took into consideration the entire document which was said to be a report made by Jaya Singh against the Appellant. A document not admitted in evidence was not to be relied on. Even assuming that a report had been made by Jaya Singh in 1972, there was nothing to show that Java Singh, in spite of the suspicious activities of the Appellant had taken action about it and there appears to be some force in the contention of the defence that after Jaya Singh was noticed to deposit Rs. 2000/-, he might have made a false report against the Appellant. P.W. 4 had admitted that he had made no complaint to the effect that the Appellant had taken away the signature of his father on a piece of plain paper. It is important to note that this witness (P.W. 4) had not stated to the Investigating Officer that the Appellant took signatures of his father on a form and a blank paper and that took, in his presence. As admitted by him, he had told none about the Appellant taking the pass book from his father until he was examined by the Investigating Officer. 9. The aforesaid facts and circumstances would substantiate the theory of the defence that the Appellant had withdrawn the amount of Rs. 2000/- on the basis of the authority given by Jaya Singh on behalf of the latter and had handed over this amount to Jaya Singh. This case was not to be thrown out merely because he had not obtained a receipt for Rs. 2000/- from Jaya Singh Majhi when he returned the amount. After all the amount had been withdrawn by him on behalf of Jaya Singh Majhi. 10. It is now well-settled that an accused person is not to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if on a review of the evidence his case appears to be a reasonable and probable one. In the case of Shri Rabindra Kumar Dey Vs. 10. It is now well-settled that an accused person is not to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if on a review of the evidence his case appears to be a reasonable and probable one. In the case of Shri Rabindra Kumar Dey Vs. State of Orissa u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) and Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, which a similar plea had been raised by the Appellant, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: Having regard to the stand taken by the parties the matter lies within a very narrow compass. So far as the entrustment of Rs. l0,000/- is concerned that is undoubtedly admitted by the Appellant, and the only explanation given by him is that he had returned the money to the Nazir after his return from the village Balichandlapur and he had also directed the Nazir not to deposit the money in the treasury. If once the explanation of the accused is disbelieved, or proved to be absolutely false, then it is quite natural that he must be presumed to have retained the money with himself for a period of six months. Although the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused, yet where the entrustment is proved or admitted it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove the actual mode or manner of misappropriation and in such a case the prosecution would have to rely largely on the truth or the falsity of the explanation given by the accused. In Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai and Another Vs. The State of Bombay, at p.324 : A.L.R. 1960 S.C. 889 at p. 891 this Court observed as follows: The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof entrustment of prorerty and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead' to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or her which he had dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made. xx xx xx In our opinion three cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence are well-settled namely: (1) that the onus lies affirmatively on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and it cannot derive any benefit horn weakness or falsity of the evidence version while proving its case; (2) that in a criminal trial the accused must be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty; and (3) that the onus of the prosecution never shifts. It is true that u/s 105 of the Evidence Act the onus of proving exceptions mentioned in the Indian Penal Code lies on the accused, but this section does not at all indicate the nature and standard of proof required. The Evidence Act does not contemplate that the accused should prove his case with the same strictness and rigour as the prosecution is required to prove a criminal charge. In fact, from the cardinal principles referred to above, it follows that, it is sufficient if the accused is able to prove his case by the standard of preponderance of probabihties as envisaged by Section 5 of the Evidence Act as a result of which he suceeds not because he proves his case to the hilt but because probability of the version given by him throws doubt on the prosecution case and, therefore, the prosecution cannot be said to have established the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the mode of proof by standard of benefit of doubt is not applicable to the accused, where he is called upon to prove his case or to prove the exceptions of the Indian Penal Code on which he seeks to rely. It is sufficiently for the defence to give a version which competes in probability with the prosecution version, for that would be sufficient to throw suspicion on the prosecution case entailing its rejection by the Court. It is sufficiently for the defence to give a version which competes in probability with the prosecution version, for that would be sufficient to throw suspicion on the prosecution case entailing its rejection by the Court. This aspect of the matter is no longer res integra but is concluded by several authorities of this Court. In Harbhajan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, at p. 241 : AIR 1966 S.C. 97 at p. 101 this Court observed as follows: But the question which often arises and has been frequently considered by judicial decisions is whether the nature and extent of the onus of proof placed on an accused person who claims the benefit of an Exception is exactly the same as the nature and extent of the onus placed on the prosecution in a criminal case; and there is consensus of judicial opinion in favour of the view that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That, no doubt is the test prescribed while deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused, but that is not a test which can be applied to an accused person who seeks to prove substantially his claim that his case falls under an Exception. Where an accused person is called upon to prove that his case falls under an Exception law treats the onus as discharged if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability. As soon as the preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus. It must be remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at all stages of the case, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The same view was taken in a later case in State of U.P. Vs. Ram Swarup and Another, at pp. It must be remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at all stages of the case, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The same view was taken in a later case in State of U.P. Vs. Ram Swarup and Another, at pp. 416-17 : AIR 1974 S.C. 1570 at p.1576, where this Court observed as follows: That is to sayan accused may fail to establish affirmatively the existence of circumstances which would being the case within a general exception and yet the facts and circumstances proved by him while discharging the burden u/s 105 of the Evidence Act may be enough to cast a reascnable doubt on the case of the prcsecution, in which event he would be entitled to an acquitta 1. The burden which rests on the accused to prove the exception is not of the same rigour as the burden of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. It is enough for the accused to show, as in civil case. That the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. Judged in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it would be clear from the evidence adduced from both the sides in this case and in particular the evidence of the Appellant as D.W. 1, that the case of the Appellant was reasonably true and was acceptable by the standard of preponderance of probabilities. 11. It could not thus be said that the Appellant had committed the offence of misappropriation punishable u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the Act or that he had obtained pecuniary advantage for himself by corrupt and illegal means punishable, u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Act. 12. In view of the findings recorded by this Court, it must be held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of cheating punishable u/s 420 of the Code. 12. In view of the findings recorded by this Court, it must be held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of cheating punishable u/s 420 of the Code. 'Cheating' has been defined in Section 415 of the Code which reads: Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mmd, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'. Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. In the instant case, the charge against the Appellant was that he had dishonestly induced Jaya Singh Majhi to deliver two slips signed by him and the pass book and seal of the Society to him which he (Appellant) converted as a valuable security for his own use. This case of the prosecution has not been accepted by me for the reasons aforesaid and it has been found that the withdrawal of the money by the Appellant was on behalf of Jaya Singh Majhi. In Older to hold a person guilty of cheating. It must be held that his intention was dishonest and there must be established mens rea. The Appellant had not dishonestly induced Jaya Singh Majhi to deliver the two slips signed by him and the pass book and the seal of the Society, nor had he converted any of the documents as a valuable security for his own use. The Appellant had withdrawn the amount of Rs. 2,000/- on the basis of the authority given by Jaya Singh Majhi on his behalf and to his knowledge and had returned this amount to Jaya Singh Majhi. In view of these facts and circumstances, the order of conviction passed against the Appellant u/s 420 of the Code is misconceived. 13. The Appellant had withdrawn the amount of Rs. 2,000/- on the basis of the authority given by Jaya Singh Majhi on his behalf and to his knowledge and had returned this amount to Jaya Singh Majhi. In view of these facts and circumstances, the order of conviction passed against the Appellant u/s 420 of the Code is misconceived. 13. The learned Special Judge failed to take into consideration the inherent improbabilities in the case of the prosecution and the infirmities in the evidence adduced from its side and recorded an order of conviction with respect to the three charges which cannot be allowed to stand. 14. In the result, the appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The order of conviction and sentences passed against the Appellant in respect of all the charges is set aside. Final Result : Allowed