JUDGMENT : P.K. Mohanti, J. - The second appeal is by Defendant No. 1 against the concurrent decisions of the Courts below decreeing the Plaintiffs' suit for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property on adjudication that the usufructuary mortgage stood discharged u/s 17 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act, 1939. 2. The Plaintiffs are the sons of the original mortgagor and Defendants 1 and 2 are the sons of the original mortgagee. The Plaintiffs case was that on 3-4-1923 their father mortgaged the property usufructuarily with the father of Defendants 1 and 2. The mortgagee died about ten years before the suit without delivering possession of the mortgaged property and Defendants 1 and 2 being in possession of the same did not also deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs filed an application u/s 17(2) of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act on 19-2-1966 which was registered as Revenue Case No. 31/7-1 of 1966 in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur and on 14-9-1969 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed orders declaring the mortgage to have stood discharged and directing Defendants 1 and 2 to deliver possession of the mortgaged property in favour of the Plaintiffs. Since the Defendants 1 and 2 did not comply with the order, the Plaintiffs filed a petition on 6-11-1969 for execution of the order. But the Sub-Divisional Magistrate by his order dated 30-1-1970 held that he had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter u/s 17(2) of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act. The Plaintiffs accordingly alleged that the period from 19-2-1966 to 30-1-1970 should be excluded u/s 14 of the Indian Limitation Act while computing the period of limitation for the suit. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 admitted that the suit property was usufructurily mortgaged with their father. But they disputed the allegation that the mortgage security stood discharged u/s 17 of the Act. They also admitted that the Plaintiffs had filed an application u/s 17(2) of the Act before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur, but contended that the period spent in prosecuting the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate should not be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act. Their further contention was that the Plaintiffs executed a sale deed on a plain paper on 18-1-1932 in respect of the suit property on a consideration of Rs. 250/- and that since then they were in possession of the same by virtue of the sale. Their further contention was that the Plaintiffs executed a sale deed on a plain paper on 18-1-1932 in respect of the suit property on a consideration of Rs. 250/- and that since then they were in possession of the same by virtue of the sale. They alternatively pleaded that they had acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession. 4. Both the Courts below came to the concurrent findings that the sale deed dated 18-1-1932 (Ext. A) is a false and fabricated document; that the mortgage security stood discharged u/s 17 of the Act on the expiry of 15 years from the date of the mortgage; that Defendants 1 and 2 continued in possession of the mortgaged property on behalf of the mortgagor and the nature of their possession was permissive and not adverse and that the Plaintiffs having prosecuted the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur in good faith they were entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. 5. The sole contention in the second appeal is that the suit is barred by limitation and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. 6. The suit mortgage was executed on 3-4-1923. The Orissa Money-Lenders Act of 1939 came into force in the district of Sambalpur with effect from 15-4-1940. Section 17(1) of the Act as it stood on 15-4-1940 reads as follows: 17. Discharge of usufructuary mortgage: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or anything having the force of law or in any contract, a usufructuary mortgage, which is executed after the commencement of the Act, shall, unless discharged previously, be deemed to stand discharged after the expiration of fifteen years from the date of the mortgage and the mortgagee shall deliver up to the mortgagor all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property and shall, if so required, retransfer the property to the mortgagor at his cost free from the mortgage and from all encumbrances created by him or those claiming under him and shall also put the mortgagor in possession of the property. Section 17 of the Act was amended by Orissa Act 18 of 1947 which came into force in the district of Sambalpur on 1-8-1947. Section 17 of the Act was amended by Orissa Act 18 of 1947 which came into force in the district of Sambalpur on 1-8-1947. For the words "a usufructuary mortgage which was executed after the commencement of this Act" the words "a usufructuary mortgage which is executed either before or after commencement of the Act" were substituted. By Orissa Regulation No. 5 of 1949, Sub-sections (2) and (3) were added to Section 17 on 31-12-1949. Those two Sub-sections read as follows: (2) When the mortgagor is a member of a backward tribe as described in Part VI of the Thirteenth Schedule to the Government of India (Provincial Legislative Assemblies) Order, 1936, the Special Assistant Agent, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other officer specially empowered in this behalf by the District Magistrate, the Deputy Commissioner or the Agent to the State Government as the case may be, may, either on application by anyone interested or on his own motion, if he is satisfied on a summary enquiry that the mortgage shall be deemed to stand discharged under Sub-section (1), decree ejectment against any person in possession of the property claiming under the mortgage and may restore it to the mortgagor or his heirs: Provided that if the Special Assistant Agent, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other officer so empowered, is satisfied that the mortgagor or his heirs are not traceable, he may settle such property with another member of the said backward tribe on such terms as he may think fit. (3) Any person aggrieved by a decree or an order passed under Sub-section (2) may prefer an appeal within thirty days from the date of the decree or order to the District Magistrate, the Deputy Commissioner or the Agent to the State Government, as the case may be, and his decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be challenged in any other Court of law. 7. On 9-2-1966, the Plaintiffs filed a petition u/s 17(2) of the Act before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur which was registered as Revenue Case No. 31/7-1 of 1966. On 15-4-1966, the Defendants on 18-1-1932 and as such they had acquired title to the suit property by virtue of the sale (vide Ext. 4). 7. On 9-2-1966, the Plaintiffs filed a petition u/s 17(2) of the Act before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur which was registered as Revenue Case No. 31/7-1 of 1966. On 15-4-1966, the Defendants on 18-1-1932 and as such they had acquired title to the suit property by virtue of the sale (vide Ext. 4). On 14-8-1969, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed orders u/s 17(2) of the Act declaring that the mortgage security stood discharged and directing delivery of possession in favour of the Plaintiffs (vide Ext. 3). On 6-11-1969, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for delivery of possession by way of execution of the order dated 14-8-1969 (vide Ext. 1). On 30-1-1970, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed orders to the effect- that Section 17(2) of the Act as amended by the Orissa Regulation No. 5 of 1949 was not applicable to the district of Sambalpur and consequently his decision dated 14-8-1969 was without jurisdiction. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed the suit on 19-6-1972 for delivery of possession of the suit property or in the alternative for redemption of the mortgage. 8. The fact that the mortgage stood discharged on the expiry of fifteen years from the date of the mortgage by virtue of Section 17 of the Act is beyond dispute. Admittedly the mortgagee has been continuing in possession of the property. The question is what is the nature of his possession. In a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jayagopal Mundra Vs. Gulab Chand Agarwalla and Others it was held that on the discharge of the mortgage by operation of law u/s 17 of the Act possession of the property by the mortgagee is on behalf of the mortgagor and not in derogation of his right, title and interest and the nature of his possession is permissive and not hostile until by any express act the mortgagee exercises his hostile animus. On the discharge of the mortgage the mortgagor will only sue for possession and not file a suit for redemption as the mortgage has been discharged but the mortgagee continues in possession on behalf of the mortgagor as before. Relying on the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision, the Courts below rightly held that on the discharge of the mortgage by operation of law, possession of Defendants 1 and 2 was only permissive and not adverse. Relying on the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision, the Courts below rightly held that on the discharge of the mortgage by operation of law, possession of Defendants 1 and 2 was only permissive and not adverse. As the possession of the Defendants 1 and 2 is permissive the suit for recovery of possession is not barred by any period of limitation. Defendants 1 and 2 can succeed only if they can prove adverse possession for over twelve years. As indicated earlier, the Defendants 1 and 2 for the first time declared their hostile animus on 15-4-1966 when in their objection dated 15-4-1966 filed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur they claimed to have acquired title to the suit land by virtue of a sale. The suit was filed on 19-6-1972 before expiry of the period of twelve years. Consequently their plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession cannot be sustained. 9. The Plaintiffs have put forward an alternative case that they are entitled to the protection u/s 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. The mortgage stood discharged on 15-4-1940 by operation of law. Article 148 of the old Limitation Act provided a period of sixty years for a suit against a mortgagee to redeem or to recover possession. The period of sixty years was reduced to thirty years by Article 61(a) of the new Limitation Act. Section 30(1) of the new Limitation Act provides that any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the old Limitation Act may be instituted within a period of seven years after commencement of the new Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the old Act whichever period expires earlier. So, ordinarily the suit should have been filed on 1-1-1971, but it was filed on 19-6-1972. The Plaintiffs' contention is that they are entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by exclusion of the period from 19-2-1966 to 31-1-1970 during which they were prosecuting the proceeding u/s 17(2) of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur. Both the Courts below concurrently held that the Plaintiffs prosecuted the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur in good faith and with due diligence. 10. Both the Courts below concurrently held that the Plaintiffs prosecuted the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur in good faith and with due diligence. 10. The three essential requisites for the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are (1) identity of cause of action, (2) good faith of the Plaintiffs and (3) the absence of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature in the Court which entertained the prior litigation. The Appellant does not dispute either the identity of the cause of action or the absence of jurisdiction of the Court with reference to the prior litigation. But what is disputed is that there was no good faith on the part of the Plaintiffs. Admittedly the Plaintiffs are illiterate aboriginals. They acted under the advice of senior lawyers in prosecuting the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Defendants 1 and 2 had also engaged a lawyer who did not point out the defect of jurisdiction. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate entertained the proceedings and after hearing the parties passed an order on 14-9-1969 declaring that the mortgage had been discharged and directing delivery of possession in favour of the Plaintiffs. But when an application for execution of the order was filed he came to hold that the proceeding was without jurisdiction. Thus, it appears that the parties, their lawyers and the Court were under the impression that the proceeding u/s 17(2) of the Act was maintainable. 11. The lawyers who appeared for the Plaintiffs before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate have been examined in the suit as P.Ws. 1 and 2. On a careful scrutiny of their evidence it cannot be said that there was negligence of their part. Their conduct was certainly not mala fide. It has not been shown that they had the reputation of being careless or dishonest. They appear to have wrongly advised the Plaintiffs on a general impression. The fact that they did not consult any law book is not a sufficient ground for holding that they were negligent or that they did not act in good faith. Nothing has been brought to my notice on which I may be persuaded to differ from the findings of the Courts below that the Plaintiffs acted in good faith and with due diligence in prosecuting the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur. They are, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. Nothing has been brought to my notice on which I may be persuaded to differ from the findings of the Courts below that the Plaintiffs acted in good faith and with due diligence in prosecuting the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambalpur. They are, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. I am fortified in this view by a decision in the case of Subhanand Chaudhary Vs. Bindeshwari Thakur and Others wherein it was held as follows: There is no general doctrine which saves litigants from the results of wrong advice of their lawyer, still a mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may in the circumstances of a particular case, amount to good faith within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If a senior lawyer relying on his general impression of law, which he does not think or even suspect to be wrong, even without consulting any law book on the point, bona fide gives a wrong legal advice, he cannot necessarily be said to be negligent. xxx xxx xxx The duty of a client is over when he consults a lawyer of standing, who is known as a careful lawyer, and if he bona fide acts on his advice, such a mistaken legal advice of his lawyer would be a sufficient ground for holding that the client acted in good faith within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If, however, there is negligence on the part of the lawyer, and he does not act bona fide, then certainly he could not be said to have acted in good faith, and, in such a case, the client could not take shelter under the mistaken advice of his pleader so as to be entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. (Paragraph 35 and 37) 12. I would, therefore, affirm the finding of the Court below and dismiss the appeal, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed