State of Maharashtra v. Anil Baloba Donbe and others
1981-08-18
DHARMADHIKARI, PURANIK
body1981
DigiLaw.ai
Judgement DHARMADHIKARI, J. :- We are really surprised by these repeated ap-plications being filed by the Police Offi-cer for cancellation of bail granted to the accused. On earlier two occasions applications for cancellation of bail were filed by the State and the said ap-plications were rejected by the orders dated 23rd June, 1980 as well as 5th Jan., 1981. In the present application it is contended that this Court rejected the said applications for cancellation of bail without passing speaking order. It is really surprising that such a complaint should have been made by the State Government. After hearing both the parties as this Court did not find any substance in the allegations made for cancellation of bail the said applications came to be rejected. The last of such ap-plications came to be rejected on 5th Jan., 1981 and therefore, apparently this Court had considered all the allegations made and existing till that date. In the present application no allegation is made about the involvement of the accused in any incident after 5-1-1981. In this view of the matter and in view of the earlier orders passed by this Court on 23-6-1980 as well as 5-1-1981, even Mr. Barday, learned Public Prosecutor, found it difficult to support the present application. In our view, these repeated applications are being filed only to harass the accused persons and cannot serve any useful purpose unless a fresh material is placed before this Court, which will make out a case for cancellation of bail. In this context, it is also pertinent to note that this Court granted anticipatory bail to the accused persons in Criminal Revision Applica-tion No.119 of 1981 on 10th March, 1981. Obviously the order for grant of anticipatory bail was passed after hear-ing the Public Prosecutor. In these cir-cumstances, we hold that no case is made out for cancellation of bail grant-ed to the accused. 2. In the result, therefore, Criminal Application No.846 of 1981 is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of Criminal Application No.846 of 1981, no order is necessary in Criminal Application No.1340 of 1981. The accused are entitled to continue on bail in view of the earlier order passed by this Court. Application dismissed. 1983 CRI. L. J. 1446 BOMBAY HIGH COURT SPECIAL BENCH M. N. CHANDURKAR, Actg. C.J., B. C. GADGIL AND V. S. KOTWAL, JJ.
The accused are entitled to continue on bail in view of the earlier order passed by this Court. Application dismissed. 1983 CRI. L. J. 1446 BOMBAY HIGH COURT SPECIAL BENCH M. N. CHANDURKAR, Actg. C.J., B. C. GADGIL AND V. S. KOTWAL, JJ. M/s. Varsha Publications Pvt. Ltd. and another, Petitioners Versus State of Maharashtra and others, Respondents. Criminal Writ Petn. No.723 of 1982 Ecided on : 3-5-1983. (A) Criminal P.C. (2 of 1974), S.95 - Grounds of opinion - Notification must state grounds - Mere statement in notification that article in weekly contained matter punishable under S.153A of Penal Code cannot constitute ground. 1961 (1) Cri LJ 815 (SC) and 1977 Cri LJ 186 (SC), Foll. (Paras 6, 7) (B) Criminal P.C. (2 of 1974), S.95 - Scholarly article on history and religion based on research - Action under S.95 on basis that it would promote enmity or hatred - Legality. Penal Code (45 of 1860), S.153A. It is true that sometimes in a given case even a truthful account may come within the mischief of S.153-A of the Penal Code. But, this will be too broad a proposition. Different considerations will prevail when we are to consider a scholarly article on history and religion based upon research with the help of a number of reference books. It will be very difficult for the State to contend that a narration of history would pro-mote violence, enmity or hatred. If such a contention is accepted, a day will come when that part of history which is un-palatable to a particular religion will have to be kept in cold storage on the pretext that the publication of such history would constitute an offence punishable under S.153-A of the Penal Code. The scope of S.153-A cannot be enlarged to such an extent with a view to thwart history. For obvious reasons, history and historical events cannot be allowed to be looked as a secret on a specious plea that if the history is made known to a person who is interested to know the history, there is likelihood of someone else being hurt. Similarly, an article containing a historical research cannot be allowed to be thwarted on such a plea that the publication of such a material would be hit by S.153-A. Otherwise, the position will be very precarious.
Similarly, an article containing a historical research cannot be allowed to be thwarted on such a plea that the publication of such a material would be hit by S.153-A. Otherwise, the position will be very precarious. A nation will have to forget its own history and in due course the nation wilt have no history at all. This result cannot be said to have been intended by the Legislature when S.153-A of the Penal Code and S.95 of the Cr.P.C. were enacted. If anybody intends to ex-tinguish the history (by prohibiting its publication) of the nation on the pretext of taking action under the above sec-tions, his act will have to be treated as mala fide one. (Para 12) Cases Referred : 1.1977 Cri LJ 186 : AIR 1977 SC 202 2.1971 Cri LJ 1519 : 1971 All LJ 760 3.1971 Cri LJ 324 : 72 Bom LR 871 : AIR 1971 Bom 56 4.1961 (1) Cri LJ 815 : AIR 1961 SC 1662 : 1961 All LJ 753 Advocates appeared: Ashok H. Desai with Miss Rajni Ayer, Govind H. Udeshi, M.D. Pathak and Krishnaraj Goswami, for Petitioners; P.P. Hudlikar, Public Prosecutor, for Respondents. Judgement CHANDURKAR, Acting C.J. :- I have read the judgment proposed to be deli-vered by my learned brother Gadgil, J., which sets out the relevant facts and the contentions raised on behalf of the peti-tioners. I agree with the view taken by Gadgil, J. that the impugned notification does not contain the grounds as contemplated by Section 95 of the Criminal P.C. and is, therefore, liable to be struck down on that ground. The instant case, in my view, is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Harnam Das v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1662 : (1961 (1) Cri LJ 815), and State of U.P. v. Lalai Singh Yadav, AIR 1977 SC 202 : (1977 Cri LJ 186). Since the impugned notification is liable to be struck down on the first ground canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, I do not consider it necessary to consider the second contention that the grounds, if any, have no nexus with the forming of opinion as contemplated by Sec.95 of the Criminal P.C., 1973. In the result, I agree that the impugned noti-fication is liable to be quashed and the copies forfeited should be returned to the petitioners. 2.
In the result, I agree that the impugned noti-fication is liable to be quashed and the copies forfeited should be returned to the petitioners. 2. GADGIL, J. (for himself and for Kotwal, J.):- The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 96 of the Cr.P.C. challenging the notification No. BAP-1282/3318/XXXIV dt. 31st July 1982, issued by the State Government declaring that every copy of the Marathi weekly "SHREE" stands forfeited as it contains certain matters which would be punishable under Section 153A of the Penal Code. This notification is issued under Section 95 of the Code of Crimi-nal Procedure and the concerned aggri-eved party is entitled to apply to the High Court for setting aside the said declaration of forfeiture. Sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Criminal P.C. provides that every such application shall be heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court composed of three Judges and it is in this manner the Writ Petition is heard by us and is be-ing decided by this judgment. 3. Petitioner No.1 is a limited com-pany carrying on the business of print-ing and publishing of certain weeklies at Bombay. The second petitioner is the editor, printer and publisher of these publications. The Marathi weekly known as "SHREE" is being published by the petitioners. In addition, two other weeklies, one in Gujarati and the other in Hindi are also published. The "SHREE" weekly has a circulation of over one Lakh copies per week. In the issue dt. 17th July 1882 an article written by Shri D.B. Pradhan with a title "AKHATI DESHAT VAIDIC DHARMA" was printed. The petitioners in their prior issue of the weekly dated 10th July 1982 had set out/advertised that in the next issue of the weekly dated 17th July 1982, such an article would be published. According to the petitioners, they had read certain articles by Shri D.B. Pradhan published in the maga-zine "Saptahik Gaukari" in the issue dated 21st, 28th June 1981 and 12th and 19th October 1981. They have also read in the popular Marathi daily "Sunday Loksatta" dated 9th May 1982 an article on the same subject. Petitioner No.2 found those articles very interesting and at his request Shri D.B. Pradhan sent the article in question based on his his-torical research.
They have also read in the popular Marathi daily "Sunday Loksatta" dated 9th May 1982 an article on the same subject. Petitioner No.2 found those articles very interesting and at his request Shri D.B. Pradhan sent the article in question based on his his-torical research. The petitioners allege that the said Shri D.B. Pradhan is a noted research scholar and historian and hence the petitioners got the article written from him. It is also alleged lhat the article in question was compiled from various text books and, reference books and it is based on historical evi-dence and the author has sought to bring to light certain historical facts hitherto unknown. The petitioners fur-ther allege that the said article is of academic interest and the author seeks to bring to the notice of others certain historical fads in the form of an inter-esting article published in a magazine widely road by a cross section of the public. According to the petitioner, the article sets out the religious, cultural and socio-historical backgrounds pre-vailing in Western Asia before the ad-vent of Islam. 4. The petitioners completed the printing of 1,26,000 copies of the issue dated 17th July 1982 by 11.30 p.m. on 10th July 1982. On the next day the police headed by Police Inspector Kadam, respondent No.3 came to the premises of the petitioners at about mid-night and seized more than 40,000 copies of the issue and certain other material such as plates, blocks etc. Before this seizure, over 50,000 copies were already despatched by the petitioners to the various destinations in Maharashtra and elsewhere in India and the petitioners say that the police seized more than 10,000 copies from various places after 11th July 1982. There are certain aver-ments as to how the petitioners ap-proached the Metropolitan Magistrate for getting those copies back on the ground that they were illegally seized by the police without any warrant and how ultimately they filed Criminal Writ Petition No.436 of 1982 in this Court. But, all those aspects would not be of much relevance for deciding this petition. 5. We have already observed that the State of Maharashtra has issued Noti-fication No. BAP-1282/2318/XXXIV dt.
But, all those aspects would not be of much relevance for deciding this petition. 5. We have already observed that the State of Maharashtra has issued Noti-fication No. BAP-1282/2318/XXXIV dt. 31st July 1982 under Section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure declaring the publication of the above issue for-feited on the ground that it contain-ed matters which would be punishable under Section 153A of the I.P.C. That section deals with a number of aspects. However, sub-section (a) is relevant for our purpose. As per that sub-section, whoever by words either spoken or writ-ten, promotes or attempts to promote, on the ground of religion and race, disharmony or ill-will would be guilty under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code. At this stage it would be con-venient to reproduce the impugned notification. It reads as follows:- "WHEREAS, it appears to the .........Government of Maharashtra that an article under the caption "AKHATI DESHAT VAIDIC DHARMA" written by Shri D.B. Pradhan in the Marathi weekly "SHREE" in its issue of 17th July 1982, printing press, Varsha House, 6, Jalaria Bunder Road, Sewri, Bombay 400015 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Publication") and the cover thereof contains matter which purports to prove that in Pre-Islamic times the ancient Indian culture and Hindu religion were in vogue in Arabia and that the Islamic religion, culture and art were greatly influenced by the Indian culture and religion and which thereby, promotes, on grounds of religion and race, disharmony or ill-will between the Muslim and Hindu communities and commits an act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between the said two com-munities and which is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. AND WHEREAS, the Government of Maharashtra on the grounds mentioned in the preceding paragraph is of the opin-ion that the publication of the said matter especially the matter at pages 4 and 6 of the said publication is punish-able under Section 153A Of the I.P.C., 1860 (XLV of 1860). NOW, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 (2 of 1974) the Government of Maharashtra hereby declares that every copy of the said publication shall be forfeited to Government." The petitioners have challenged this notification on various grounds. How-ever, the main submission made by Shri Ashok Desai for the petitioners is three-fold.
How-ever, the main submission made by Shri Ashok Desai for the petitioners is three-fold. He argued that Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. requires that the notification must state the grounds on the basis of which the State Government has formed an opinion that the issue in question contained matter which is punishable under Section 153A of the I.P.C. and that in the absence of such grounds, the notification will be bad in law and con-sequently the forfeiture of the copies of the issue dated 17th July 1982 would also be unlawful. The second conten-tion is that even if it is assumed that the notification contains certain grounds, these grounds are absolutely irrelevant for forming an opinion that the article contains matter which is punishable under Section 153A of the I.P.C. Ac-cording to him, the grounds even if they are assumed to be true would have no nexus with the forming of opinion as mentioned in the notification. His third contention is that a plain reading of the article in question would show that the article is based upon historical research and that under no circumstances, the Government would be able to contend that such research articles on history would promote or attempt to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, haired or ill-will between the Muslim and Hindu communities. 6. The Notification under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. must set out the grounds on which the State Government has formed a particular opinion. What has been stated in the notification is that the contents of the article (more parti-cularly the cover of the weekly and pages 4 and 6 of the said publication) contain matter which is punishable under Section 153A of the I. P. C. and it is on these grounds action under Sec-tion 95 is being taken. Mere mention of the article in the notification would not constitute giving or setting the grounds as contemplated by Section 95. There cannot be any dispute about this legal position as the Supreme Court has on a number of occasions considered this aspect. In the case of Harnam Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1961 SC 1662 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 815), the Government had issued a noti-fication under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. On page 1663, the said notification has been reproduced in verbatim.
In the case of Harnam Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1961 SC 1662 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 815), the Government had issued a noti-fication under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. On page 1663, the said notification has been reproduced in verbatim. It recites that the Government is pleased to de-clare the book in question forfeited to Government on the ground that the book contains matters, the publication of which would be an offence under Section 295A of the I.P.C. This notification was issued under Section 99A of the old Cr.P.C. of 1898. The provisions of Sections 99A to 99D are similar to the provisions of Secs.95 and 96 of the new Cr.P.C. They are practically simi-lar word by word. The Supreme Court held that two things are clear. The first thing is that an order can be made only when the Government forms a cer-tain opinion that a particular writing contains matter, the publication of which is punishable under Sections 124A, 153A or 295A. The other thing is that before applying that section, the Gov-ernment has to state the grounds of its opinion. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the impugned order no doubt stated about the Government's opinion but it nowhere stated the grounds of its opinion. The Legislature has given a right to the aggrieved party to make an application to the High Court challenging such an order and in para.9 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has stated that it is this order, that is, the order based on the grounds stated, which the party affected has been given the right to move the Court to set it aside. The Supreme Court has fur-ther held that the question as to whe-ther the order was proper or not would depend only on the merits of the grounds on which it is passed and that the order must be accepted or rejected on the grounds so stated. If the order does not contain any grounds, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that such an order would be bad in law.
If the order does not contain any grounds, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that such an order would be bad in law. We would like to reproduce the relevant headnote which reads as follows:- "Reading Sections 99A, 99B and 99D together, the words "matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub-sec.(1) of Section 99-A" appearing in Sec.99-D mean only those matters on which the order of forfeiture was based, that is, those which for the reasons stated by it, the Government thought were punish-able under one or more of Sections 124-A, 153-A and 295-A, Penal Code men-tioned by it. They do not mean any matter of the nature as the High Court thought. Hence, it is the duty of the High Court under S.99-D to set aside an order of forfeiture if it is not satisfied that the grounds, on which the Govern-ment formed its opinion that the books contained matters, the publication of which would be punishable under any one or more of Sections 124-A, 153-A or 295-A of the Penal Code, could justify that opinion. It is not its duty to do more and to find for itself whether the book contained any such matter what-soever." The Supreme Court came to the con-clusion that mere statement that a parti-cular document contains any matter punishable under Sections 124-A, 153-A or 295-A would not do and that the notification must state the grounds. The position is made more clear by the Sup-reme Court in another case State of U.P. v. Lalai Singh Yadav reported in AIR 1977 SC 202 : (1977 Cri LJ 186). This matter before the Supreme Court arose out of the decision of the Allaha-bad High Court reported in 1971 Cri LJ 1519. On page 1521 of 1971 Cri. L.J., the impugned notification has been reproduced verbatim. The relevant portion of the notification is to the effect that, "The book............
This matter before the Supreme Court arose out of the decision of the Allaha-bad High Court reported in 1971 Cri LJ 1519. On page 1521 of 1971 Cri. L.J., the impugned notification has been reproduced verbatim. The relevant portion of the notification is to the effect that, "The book............ and the book.........contain matters detailed in the appendix to this notification, which are delibera-tely and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class of citi-zens of India........,..." After making these recitals, the notification further states that, "On the grounds mentioned above, the notification under Section 99-A of the Cr.P.C. is being issued." Thus, in the notification before the Supreme Court there is reference not only to the books but certain extracts therefrom have been appended to the notification as appendix and the said notification has stated that the books contained matters appended in the ap-pendix and the contents thereof would be an offence punishable under Sec-tion 295-A. The question arose as to whether such a notification can be said to have complied with all the necessary requirements of Section 99-A. The Allahabad High Court answered this question in the negative and quashed the notification. The relevant observations in the judgment of the Allahabad High Court appear in paragraph 13. They read as follows:- "The formation of opinion, therefore, was not subjective but it had necessarily to be objective. The very fact that the State Government is required to state the grounds of its opinion shows that it is required to mention the particular facts, reasons and circumstances upon or on the basis of which it had come to form the opinion forerunning the order forfeiting the said two books. The order, therefore, has to be so to say, a speaking order and the High Court under Section 99-D of the Code has to satisfy itself with reference to the grounds of the opinion of the State Government stated in the impugned order published in the Gazette and come to a decision as to whether the books in question con-tain matters of such a nature as is re-ferred to in sub-section (1) of Sec.99-A of the Code ............" In paragraph 14, the Allahabad High Court construed the notification in the following words:- "But the notification to our mind does not contain the grounds of the opinion of the State Government which it had to state as required by sub-section (1).
The notification merely states that the books in question contain matters de-tailed in the appendix to the notification which are deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class of citizens in India namely, Hindus by insuring their re-ligion and religious beliefs. It does not give the grounds for the formation of the opinion by the State Government. …….." When the matter went to the Sup-reme Court, it was urged that the noti-fication itself contained grounds as it had referred to certain portions from the books. This contention has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the following words:- "Shri Uniyal, counsel for the State, submits that though there is no express enunciation of the grounds for Government's opinion, the appendix makes up for it. He argues that the numbers of the pages and the lines of the offending publication supply both the 'matters' and the 'grounds', the latter being so patent that the omission is inconsequen-tial. Mere reference to the matter, suffi-ciently particularised functionally sup-plies, by implicit reading or necessary implication, the legal requirement at statement of grounds. The office of fur-nishing the reason or foundation for the governmental conclusion is substan-tially, though not formally, fulfilled where the appendix, an integral part of the order, sets out self-speaking mate-rials. When the grounds are self-evi-dent, silence is whispered in speech and the law does not demand their separate spelling out as a ritualistic formality. The counter-contention is that express conditions for barricading the funda-mental freedom of expression designedly imposed by the Code cannot be whittled down by the convenient doctrine of im-plication, the right being too basic to be manacled without strict and manifest compliance with the specific stipulations of the provisions." In paragraph 8, the Supreme Court has held that the drastic restriction on the right of a citizen calls for strict consid-eration especially when quasi-penal consequences also ensued. It is also material to note that in paragraph 8, the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "The Court cannot make a roving in-quiry beyond the grounds set forth in the order and if the grounds are al-together left out, what is the Court to examine?" The Supreme Court thereafter came to the conclusion that the impugned noti-fication did not contain any grounds and that it has been properly struck out. 7.
7. If we analyse the impugned noti-fication in the present case with the help of the law laid down by the Sup-reme Court in the abovementioned two cases the impugned notification will have to be struck out as it does not contain any grounds. In the present case the notification reproduced in paragraph 4 (Paragraph 5 in this report-Ed.) above is practically similar to the notifications which were before the Supreme Court in the abovementioned two cases. There is only one difference, namely, in our notification after referring to the arti-cle, there is a mention that it contains matters "which purports to prove that in pre-Islamic times the ancient Indian culture and Hindu religion were in vogue in Arabia and that the Islamic religion, culture and art were greatly influenced by the Indian culture and religion." Shri Hudlikar for the State frankly stated before us that this averment cannot be construed as grounds, as according to him, they are only propositions. According to him, the cover page and more particularly the contents of the article on pages 4 and 6 should be read as grounds. Thus, he wants to urge that mere mention of the article or a part thereof in the notification would constitute grounds contem-plated by Section 95. In our opinion, it is this very contention that has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the abovementioned two cases and hence, it will be very difficult for the respond-ents to contend that the notification in question has stated grounds and has complied with the mandatory provisions of law. 8. The position would not be different even if we assume that the portion of the notification which is reproduced in the abovementioned paragraphs is treat-ed as grounds. As a matter of fact these words allege that by writing the article, the author purports to prove that in pre-Islamic times the ancient Indian cul-ture and Hindu religion were in vogue and alleges that Islamic culture, religion and art were greatly influenced by the Indian culture and religion. It is mate-rial to note that just below the printed article, there is a reference list consisting of more than 15 books and other mate-rial. Obviously, the author has made use of these various books and other material for preparing the article. Re-spondents Nos.1 and 3 have filed their separate returns.
It is mate-rial to note that just below the printed article, there is a reference list consisting of more than 15 books and other mate-rial. Obviously, the author has made use of these various books and other material for preparing the article. Re-spondents Nos.1 and 3 have filed their separate returns. Though the returns are separate, the contentions and aver-ments are on similar lines. In the grounds in the petition, the petitioners have contended that the said article is a historical and literary composition car-ried out by the author, and that too in a temperate language. In paragraph 15 of its return, the State has alleged as follows:- "I further state that the intention and purpose of writing the said article as mentioned in the said ground may be correct as per the contentions of the petitioner. ............... If the reaction can be reasonably con-templated to come within the mischief of Section 153-A of the I.P.C. then whatsoever laudable purpose may be in writing the said article can be of no consequence for contending that notification under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. is bad in law." In paragraph 18, respondent No.1 has stated that the article in question may be a scholarly article and then contended that such a scholarly article with a view to making research is of no con-sequence. In Para. 20, it is alleged that if at the time of "Ramzan", the Muslim community were to know that their prophet Mohammed came from Hindu family of 'Shaivas' they would have re-acted very violently. Police Inspector Kadam has also stated in Paragraph 6 that the publisher may have published the said article so as to bring out cer-tain socio-historical facts or certain re-ligious and cultural facts before the advent of Islam as prevailing in Western Asia. He has however alleged that the Government apprehended that though the article may contain the true facts, still the question before the Gavernment was whether these facts were likely to create disharmony between two sections of different religions.
He has however alleged that the Government apprehended that though the article may contain the true facts, still the question before the Gavernment was whether these facts were likely to create disharmony between two sections of different religions. In Paragraphs 10 and 11 he stated that the reference books given at the end of the article may be correct and that the article may be a scholarly research-ed article, in paragraph 12, he stated that the fact that the author has used temperate, dignified and mild language in the said article and that it is a scholarly piece of work is not relevant and in spite thereof the matter may come within the provisions of Section 153-A. It is material to note that the respond-ents while making all the above aver-ments have proceeded on the basis that the corresponding averments in the petition may be true. They did not deny the truth of the averments in the peti-tion. And hence the petitioners are right when they contend that the respondents admit that the article is a historical and literary composition written in a temperate and dignified language and based upon the research made by the author with the help of the reference books mentioned below the article. Similarly, the article gives certain socio-historical as well as religious and cultural facts. 9. The notification makes it clear that the very purpose of the article is to prove that in pre-Islamic times, the ancient Indian culture and Hindu reli-gion were in vogue in Arabia and that the Islamic religion, culture and art were greatly influenced by the Indian culture and religion. It was contended by Shri Desai that the Government has rightly construed the purpose which was in the mind of the author when he wrote the article. He further argued that the purpose was to show the position as was prevalent in the pre-Islamic times and that this purpose would be absolutely irrelevant and cannot form the basis to come to a conclusion that the discus-sion about the said pre-Islamic period would promote on the grounds of reli-gion and race disharmony and ill-will between the Muslim and Hindu commu-nities. According to him, the discussion of the pre-Islamic position would have no nexus when we have to consider its effect after the advent of Islam.
According to him, the discussion of the pre-Islamic position would have no nexus when we have to consider its effect after the advent of Islam. He particularly drew our attention to the fact that in the pre-Islamic times there would not be any Islam religion and that whatever discussion appears in the article about the pre-Islamic times has no bearing for considering the question of alleged disharmony or ill-will be-tween the Muslim and Hindu communi-ties on the basis of religion. He argued that the discussion in the article per-tains to the period when there existed no Islam religion and then posed a ques-tion as to how one can legitimately say that such a discussion can create any disharmony or ill-will between the Hindus and Muslims. In our view this contention of Shri Desai is well founded and that no reasonable man can form his opinion that the said discussion would promote on the ground of religion any disharmony or ill-will between the Muslims and Hindus. 10. The second ground in the noti-fication is that the Islam religion, cul-ture and art were greatly influenced by Indian culture and religion, and the author has discussed both these cul-tures and religions and has made the above statement. Shri Desai is right when he contends that such a scholarly and historical discussion cannot be construed by any man of ordinary prudence as a ground which would promote disharmony or ill-will between the Muslim and Hindus. Thus, the two grounds (if at all treated to be grounds) mentioned in the notification would not enable the Government to form any reasonable and rational opinion that the article would promote disharmony or ill-will as al-leged. Consequently, the notification will have to be struck down if we take it that the notification does not contain any grounds. Similarly, the position would not be different if the above-mentioned two grounds are construed to be grounds inasmuch as those grounds have no nexus for forming the necessary opinion. 11. We have already observed that Shri Hudlikar has contended that the article and its contents would constitute grounds under S.95 and it is for this reason that he wanted to rely upon cer-tain statements in the article. It is not necessary to reproduce the entire article in the judgment.
11. We have already observed that Shri Hudlikar has contended that the article and its contents would constitute grounds under S.95 and it is for this reason that he wanted to rely upon cer-tain statements in the article. It is not necessary to reproduce the entire article in the judgment. As far as the alleged purpose of creating disharmony and ill-will between the Hindus and Muslims is concerned, we will have to read the article as a whole. The article states that though an impression may be created that Islam and Islamic countries are ut-terly different from Indian culture and religion, still the historical research would show otherwise. After making this preamble, the author has given a resume as to what was the position prevailing in pre-Islamic times. He has mentioned that in those times an Indian King by name Harith lived in the Gulf country in 169 B.C. Then he has refer-red to a book known as 'Sayar-ul-Okul' and a poem written by poet Labi-bin-E-Akhtab-E-Turk who lived 2,300 years before the Prophet Mohomed and in that poem there is a mention of four Vedas and their importance. He has re-ferred to Tamilian colonies in pre-Isla-mic Arabia and at that time Shaiv reli-gion was prevailing in those colonies. He has also referred to a poem by Usmabin-E-Hashsham who was the uncle of Pro-phet Mohomed and a prayer offered by this uncle to Shiva as it appears from the poem is reproduced in the article in the following words :- "Oh Lord Shankar ! If I were able to live for even a single day in India where man attains salvation, I would willingly surrender my entire life for that single day." In the background of this fact, there is a mention in the article that the family of Mohomed was previously Vaidik Shaiv Hindu. Similarly, the cover page con-tains a picture of 'Kaba' and the letter 'Om'. In our opinion this cover and the title depict nothing more than the theme of the article. It is than stated that in pre-Islamic days, Vedic Hindu religion was in vogue in Gulf countries. The religious ceremonies which are offered at Mecca are also discussed by the au-thor. To take a Pradakshana is not the ceremony which exists in any other holy place of Islam while at Kaba such a Pradakshana is taken by the pilgrims.
It is than stated that in pre-Islamic days, Vedic Hindu religion was in vogue in Gulf countries. The religious ceremonies which are offered at Mecca are also discussed by the au-thor. To take a Pradakshana is not the ceremony which exists in any other holy place of Islam while at Kaba such a Pradakshana is taken by the pilgrims. The author has stated that at Mecca initially there were Hindu temples con-sisting of 300 deities (one of which was Shiva deity) and that Prophet, Mohomed destroyed these temples and converted the temples into places of worship for Muslims. The article then states that there was a Shiva temple which was hidden by Prophet Mohomed in a wall. However, due to old traditional influence of idol worship, the newly converted Muslims used to worship that wall which is known as Kaba. It appears that these statements are made on the basis of the reference books listed below the article. All this discussion appears on page 4 of the issue dated 17th July 1982. On page 5 there is some discussion about Hindu Mythology namely, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Then there is a statement that the Islamic architecture and art reveals the influence of ancient Hindu architecture, for example, the arches of the ancient Buddhist Chaityas are the arches in Mosques while the domes in the mosques are similar to the Kalasha of a temple. There is also a discussion as to how Bakar-Id of Muslims and Yagna of Hindus have a similar ceremony of sacrificing a goat. The Eka-dashi Day of the Hindus and the Gyaravi (Eleventh) Sharif of the Muslims also appear to the author as similar. As far as Haj is concerned, the author states that it is derived from the word 'Vraj'. On this very page 5, there is also reference to the Zorostrian religion as was prevalent in pre-Islamic Iran and then there appears a discussion that in pre-Islamic Iran, Vedic culture prevailed there. The important facets of the Zorostrian religion and Hindu religion have been considered to show the similarity in both. On page 6, there is also mention as to how the Zorostrians and Hindus used to have liquor and Som at the time of their religious functions.
The important facets of the Zorostrian religion and Hindu religion have been considered to show the similarity in both. On page 6, there is also mention as to how the Zorostrians and Hindus used to have liquor and Som at the time of their religious functions. The article then states that Chitpavan Brahmins of Maharashtra must have come from Iran and that the famous Gokhales of Maharashtra must have come from the Gokalan Province on the border of Iran. He has also stated on page 7 that some experts are of the view that the Ashoka pillar with lions which has been adopted as the Indian State emblem is an Iranian Art. The article contains some details of Hindu Mythology in the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. But the impugned noti-fication imputes an intention to create a feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will amongst Muslims. In this background we do not intend to consider certain statements in the articles for the pur-pose of finding out as to whether they are intended to create such feeling among the Hindus. Hence it is not neces-sary to give the details of the statements. 12. The above is the thrust of the article and the Government itself has formed an opinion that the very pur-pose of the article is to show as to how in pre-Islamic times the ancient Hindu culture and Hindu religion were in vogue in Arabia and how Islamic cul-ture, religion and art were greatly in-fluenced by Indian culture and religion. The article does not intend or exhibit any insult to any religion. It is true that a sentence here or a sentence there taken without context may make some-what clumsy reading. However, this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. Union of India reported in 72 Bom LR 871 : (1971 Cri LJ 324) has discussed the ques-tion as to how the book or the article should be read and construed. That case was also one under S.99-A. The rel-evant portion of the head-note reads as follows:- "The matter charged as being within the mischief of S.153-A must be read as a whole.
That case was also one under S.99-A. The rel-evant portion of the head-note reads as follows:- "The matter charged as being within the mischief of S.153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on stray isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning........" We have already observed that the very purpose of writing the article is a sort of historical research and it is based on a number of reference books and other material. It is true that sometimes in a given case even a truthful account may come within the mischief of S.153-A. But, this will be too broad a proposition. Different considerations will prevail when we are to consider a scholarly article on history and religion based upon research with the help of a number of reference books. It will be very difficult for the State to contend that a narration of history would promote violence, enmity or hatred. If such a contention is accepted, a day will come when that part of history which is unpalatable to a particular religion will have to be kept in cold storage on the pretext that the publication of such history would consti-tute an offence punishable under S.153-A of the I.P.C. We do not think that the scope of S.153-A can be enlarged to such an extent with a view to thwart history. For obvious reasons, history and historical events cannot be allowed to be looked as a secret on a specious plea that if the history is made known to a person who is interested to know the history, there is likelihood of someone else being hurt. Similarly, an article containing a historical research cannot be allowed to be thwarted on such a plea that the publication of such a material would be hit by S.153-A. Otherwise, the position will be very pre-carious. A nation will have to forget its own history and in due course the nation will have no history at all. This result cannot be said to have been intended by the Legislature when S.153-A of the I.P.C. and S.95 of the Cr.P.C. were enacted.
A nation will have to forget its own history and in due course the nation will have no history at all. This result cannot be said to have been intended by the Legislature when S.153-A of the I.P.C. and S.95 of the Cr.P.C. were enacted. If anybody intends to extin-guish the history (by prohibiting its publication) of the nation on the pretext of taking action under the above sections, his act will have to be treated as mala fide one. 13. The result, therefore, is that the petition succeeds. The impugned noti-fication is quashed and the forfeiture of the copies is set aside. The copies so for-feited by the respondents should be re-turned to the petitioners forthwith. The petitioners are entitled to get their costs from the respondents. Petition allowed.