JUDGMENT 1. - This revision is preferred against the order, dated September 30, 1980 of learned City Magistrate, Jodhpur, whereby, the ad inter in order of attachment of the disputed property passed on 16-8-1980 was not confirmed. 2. Briefly stated the facts are these. Petitioner Abdul Aziz and either moved an application under section 145, Cr. P.C. along with an application under section 146 (1), Cr. P.C. in the court of City Magistrate, Jodhpur. The allegations in the application under section 145 Cr. P.C. were these. There is a society named Darul Ulam Aleh Hadis (hereinafter referred to as the Society) in Jodhpur. In the name of society, the disputed properly was purchased on 16-9-74. The society started some construction over the land. Thereafter, the petitioners were given a special power of attorney to make and complete the constructions over this land and they were also handed over the possession. They were also given the power to manage the property and recover rents of the shops, in which, they were to keep the tenants. The shops had been completely constructed and given on rent, which was recovered by the petitioner. However, the construction is not complete. On 8-8-80, in the day at 2 p.m., the non-petitioner along with some other persons tried to take forcible possession of the property. The petitioners, therefore, approached the police. It is further alleged that the non-petitioners are trying to deprive the petitioners of the possession of the property. Thus, a dispute likely to cause breach of peace has arisen in respect to this property. In the application under section 146, Cr. P.C. it is alleged that an emergency has arisen and, therefore, property be attached and receive be appointed. On this application, on 16-8-80 learned City Magistrate drew a preliminary order under section 145 (1), Cr. P.C. and further passed an order under section 146 (1),Cr. In the application under section 146, Cr. P.C. it is alleged that an emergency has arisen and, therefore, property be attached and receive be appointed. On this application, on 16-8-80 learned City Magistrate drew a preliminary order under section 145 (1), Cr. P.C. and further passed an order under section 146 (1),Cr. P.C. in the following terms:- " bl ekeys esa /kkjk 147 tk0Qks0 ds vUrxZr Hkh vizkFkhZx.k us izkFkZuki= is'k fd;k gS rFkk izkFkhZ vCnqy vtht us bldh rkbZn esa viuk 'kiFk i= is'k fd;k gSA bu ij Hkh fopkj fd;k x;kA ;g ,d xaHkhj izd`fr dk ekeyk gSa blesa rkRdkyhu 'kkfUr Hkax gksus dk iwjk&iwjk [krjk izrhr gksrk gS blfy;s ;g ,d vkifrd ekeyk gSA lEcfU/kr okMZ ua0 21] 22 o 23 ls lEcfU/kr tk;nkn dh nqdkukr ds mij cuh gqbZ bekjr o nqdkukr ds uhps cuh ( vUMj xzkmUM ) bekjr dks ( nqdkuksa dks NksM+dj ) ge QkSju dqdZ djuk mfpr le>rs gSA QyLo:i vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr fooknxzLr bekjr dks QkSju dqdZ dh tkosA dqdhZ okjUV okLrs rkehy lacaf/kr iqfyl Fkkukf/kdkjh dks Hkstk tkosA cl vkns'k dh izfr;ka leLr i{kdkjksa dks nh tkos rFkk bldh ,d izfr tk;nkn eqruktk ij pLik dj izdkf'kr djkbZ tkosA ;g vkns'k bdrjQk lquk tkdj fn;k x;k gS bldh iqf"V nksuksa i{kksa dks lquus ds i'pkr gh dh tkosxhA i=koyh fnukad 30&8&80 dks is'k gksA " It further appears that the non-petitioners preferred Revision petition No. 273 of 1980 Abdul Shakoor and others v. Abdul Shakoor and others , which was dismissed with the following observations. "A perusal of the order of the learned City Magistrate shows that he has attached the subject of dispute in the proceedings under section 145, Cr. P.C. treating the case of emergency. But at the same time, he has observed that it is only an interim measure and after hearing both the parties he will pass final orders as to whether any case for attachment of the subject of dispute is made out or not. The petitioners, therefore, should appear before the learned City Magistrate and impress upon him, the arguments, which he wants to advance here and the learned City Magistrate, it is expected will pass final orders as observed by him after hearing the parties the non-petitioner opposed the application under section 145, Cr. P.C. and under section 146, Cr. The petitioners, therefore, should appear before the learned City Magistrate and impress upon him, the arguments, which he wants to advance here and the learned City Magistrate, it is expected will pass final orders as observed by him after hearing the parties the non-petitioner opposed the application under section 145, Cr. P.C. and under section 146, Cr. P.C. it was denied by the non-petitioner that there was any apprehension of breach of peace. It was disputed that the property was in possession of the petitioners The possession was alleged to be of the society and it was further stated that the school was run in the disputed property by the society. The allegations regarding the emergency were also denied. It is also stated that by the resolution, dated May 5, 1978, the special power of attorney in favour of the petitioners has been withdrawn by the society and they have no right to interfere with the property. The learned City Magistrate, after hearing the parties observed that there was no grave emergency and in this view did not confirm the order of attachment issued ex parte on 16-8-80." 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case carefully. 4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that it was not open to the Magistrate to vacate or not to confirm the order dated August 16, 1980 on the ground that there did not exit any grave emergency. Once an order under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. is made it can only be vacated after the proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C. has reached to its conclusion or such an order could be withdrawn when the Magistrate is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. 5. On the other hand, it is argued by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners that it is not open to the learned counsel for the petitioners to contend and that an interim order could not be passed by the City Magistrate under section 146(1), Cr.P.C. This order was passed in favour of the petitioners and they never challenged it. More-over, this order bore the seal of approval of the High Court by its order passed in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 273 of 1980-Abdul Shakoor and others v. Abdul Shakoor and others. More-over, this order bore the seal of approval of the High Court by its order passed in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 273 of 1980-Abdul Shakoor and others v. Abdul Shakoor and others. Learned City Magistrate, after hearing the parties and the material placed before him has rightly came to the conclusion that no grave emergency existed. I have considered the rival contentions. There is no doubt that the proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C, does not come to an end on the passing of an order under section 146(1), Cr.P.C., there was some divergence of the opinion in the past, but the stands concluded by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Various authorities were brought to my notice in this regard. It is sufficient to refer to the following observations made in Maturalal v. Bhanwarlal and another (A.I.R. 1980 B.C. 242) - "In a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order under S. 145(1). There is no express stipulation in Section 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by Section 145, sub-s. (4) is against any such implication. The only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in S. 145(5) and it can be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of S. 146(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace." Thus once an attachment is made, it can only be withdrawn either on completion of the proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C. or under section 146(2) Cr.P.C. on the ground that there is no longer likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the property in dispute. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners appears to be not assailable in view of law. It further appears that section 146(1), Cr.P.C. does not contemplate or empower the Magistrate to pass an order like the one dated 16.8.80 of the ad interim order of attachment of the disputed property. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners appears to be not assailable in view of law. It further appears that section 146(1), Cr.P.C. does not contemplate or empower the Magistrate to pass an order like the one dated 16.8.80 of the ad interim order of attachment of the disputed property. But the fact remains that an order was passed for ad interim attachment of the property and the petitioners were satisfied with it. The non-petitioners aggrieved by this order, no doubt, filed a revision, but the same was dismissed, after making the observations that the Magistrate shall pass a final order after hearing the parties. I, therefore, feel that it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners that the order dated 16.8.80 for attachment of the dispute property was not an ad interim order and the Magistrate could not vacate it, after hearing the parties on the ground that no emergency or grave emergency existed. The order dated August 16, 1980 cannot be bifurcated to mean that the order of attachment was not an ad interim one and final and could only be vacated under the proviso to section 146, Cr.P.C. If the Magistrate had no power or jurisdiction to pass the order in the nature of the order passed on 16.8.1980 then in my opinion, no valid order of attachment came into existence and the petitioners has no cause for grievance. It is not possible to dissect the order and to hold that it was a complete order of attachment of the dispute property. I, therefore, hold that it was open to the Magistrate to consider whether the ad interim order passed on 16.8.80 should be confirmed and it was also open to him to come to a conclusion that no attachment order need be passed as it was not a emergency. The grievance, if any, which was occasioned to the petitioners was by the order dated August 16, 1980 whereby only an ad interim attachment of disputed property was made. But the petitioners were perfectly satisfied with in and, therefore, the order dated August 16, 1980 has to be given its full effect and it could not be said that it could only be withdrawn on the ground that there was no longer any apprehension of breach of the peace with regard to the disputed property. But the petitioners were perfectly satisfied with in and, therefore, the order dated August 16, 1980 has to be given its full effect and it could not be said that it could only be withdrawn on the ground that there was no longer any apprehension of breach of the peace with regard to the disputed property. The necessary consequences of the order dated August 16, 1980, which bore the seal of the approval of the High Court was that the Magistrate had to decide whether it was a case of emergency. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order suffers from no illegal infirmity. On merits about the emergency, the petitioners have no case. There is only bald affidavits and allegations that it was a case of emergency. It has been denied by the non petitioners in their reply and affidavits. Looking to the nature of the dispute, I feel that the learned Magistrate rightly observed that it was not a case of grave emergency. I have purposely refrained from making any observations with regard to the merits of the case, regarding the possession of the disputed property and the rights of the petitioners to claim the possession, as it is likely to prejudice them in the decision of their application under section 145, Cr.P.C. 6. In the result, I find no force in this revision petition and dismiss the same.Revision Dismissed. *******