Judgment S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. VIKRAMA Singh, opposite party no. 3, filed a suit against one Baldeo Singh for specific performance of a contract of sale. This suit was decreed ex-parte on 25th March, 1975. On 13th July, 1976, Baldeo Singh moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree. On 17th February, 1977, before the application could be disposed of, Baldeo Singh died. After the death of Baldeo Singh, the petitioner Surya Dev Singh filed an application for substitution in place of Baldeo Singh and sought permission to prosecute the application moved by Baldeo Singh. The trial court allowed the application on 11th October, 1979. Against the judgment dated 11th October, 1979, Vikrama Singh filed a revision in the court of the District Judge, Azamgarh. The revisional court allowed the revision on 17th December, 1979, and set aside the order dated 11th October, 1979. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 17th December, 1979, has filed the present petition in this Court. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has urged that the trial court as well as the revisional court have recorded a finding that on 9th August, 1974, the property in dispute had been transferred by Baldeo Singh to the petitioner Surya Dev Singh. The property in dispute being the house, which was transferred to the petitioner and the petitioner claiming title in respect of the house through Baldeo Singh, he was entitled to be substituted and continue the application moved by Baldeo Singh. Section 146 OPC reads as under : "146. Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceedings may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him." The petitioner was claiming title to the property through Baldeo Singh and, as such, he was entitled to make an application for setting aside the exparte decree. 5. 5. LEARNED counsel for the respondent has urged that under Sec 146, CPC, the petitioner could only have made an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree, but, since, in the instant case, an application had already been made, he had no right to continue the application made by Baldeo Singh. 6. IN Smt. Saila Bala Dassi v. Smt. Nirmala Sundari Dassi, AIR 1958 SC 394 , Sec. 146, CPC came up for interpretation. It was opined by the Supreme Court that Sec. 146, CPC has to be liberally construed so as to advance justice and should not be interpreted in a restricted or technical sense. It was further held that the right to file an appeal must, therefore, be held to carry with it the right to continue an appeal which had been filed by the person under whom the applicant claims. Similar principle, in my opinion, would apply to a case of an application. If an application is made by a person who, subsequently, dies or for some reason, cannot continue the application, the person who is claiming title under the person who made the application will be entitled to continue the application under the above provision. In my opinion, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to continue the application, which was made by Baldeo Singh for setting aside the ex-parte decree. 7. LEARNED counsel for the respondent has laid stress on the provisions of Sec. 2(1)), CPC which defines 'legal representatives'. In my opinion, whether a person is a legal representative or not was not relevant to the controversy. The question, which was relevant was as to whether the applicant, who was claiming under Baldeo Singh, was entitled to continue the application moved by him for setting aside the ex parte decree. In these circumstances, the argument made by the learned counsel for the respondent, in my opinion, does not have substance. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner was entitled to continue an application and to be substituted in place of Baldeo Singh and is further entitled to continue the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The view taken by the revisional court is, therefore, manifestly erroneous. 8. IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 17th December, 1979,1s quashed and that of the trial court dated 11th October, 1979, is restored. The view taken by the revisional court is, therefore, manifestly erroneous. 8. IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 17th December, 1979,1s quashed and that of the trial court dated 11th October, 1979, is restored. IN the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.