T. K. VEERANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1981 DIGILAW 216 (KAR)

MALIMATH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in these six cases were dismissed from service by the concerned disciplinary Authorities after dispensing with the disciplinary Enquiry by the Governor. The petitioner in the first case was a Head Constable in the District of Tumkur, the petitioners in the next three cases were Police constables in the City Armed Reserve police at Bangalore, the petitioner in the 5th case was a Head Constable in the district of Coorg and the petitioner in the last case was a Police Constable in the District of Shimoga. As the facts in all these cases are similar and as the questions raised in these cases are also similar, with the consent of the parties, these writ petitions were heard together. Though counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents in W. P. No. 19090 of 1979, which is taken as the leading case, the same has been adopted as the statement of objections in respect of all the cases. For the sake of convenience, we propose to advert to the facts in WP no. 19090 of 1979 as the facts in the other cases are also similar. ( 2 ) THE Governor of Karnataka made an order on the 26th of November 1979 as per Ex. D dispensing in the interest of security of the State with the requirement of holding disciplinary enquiry against the petitioners. Thereafter, the Superintendent of police, Tumkur District Tumkur made an order as per Ex. E dated the 27th november, 1979 imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. It is the order made by the Governor as per ex. D and the order made by the disciplinary Authority, the Superintendent of Police, Tumkur District, tumkur as per Ex. E that are challenged in this writ petition. It is necessary to state, so far as the petitioners in the other writ petitions are concerned, that the order of the Governor dispensing with the enquiry is the common order made on the 26th of November, 1979. So far as the WP 19386, 19387 and 20448 of 1979 are concerned, the petitioners in those cases were dismissed from service by the Deputy Commissioner, City Armed Reserve Police, bangalore by orders made on the 26th november, 1979 itself. So far as the WP 19386, 19387 and 20448 of 1979 are concerned, the petitioners in those cases were dismissed from service by the Deputy Commissioner, City Armed Reserve Police, bangalore by orders made on the 26th november, 1979 itself. So far as the petitioner in W. P. No. 20084 of 1979 is concerned, he has been dismissed by the Superintendent of Police, Coorg by the order made on 27th of November, 1979. So far as the petitioner in WP no. 19773 of 1979 is concerned, he has been dismissed from service by the superintendent of Police, Shimoga by his order dated 27th of November, 1979. It is necessary to state at this stage that the orders of dismissal in all these cases are in identical terms. ( 3 ) THE petitioners in all these cases have challenged the order of the governor dispensing with the enquiry as also the respective orders of dismissal on various grounds. So far as the order of the Governor is concerned, the following contentions were urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners: (1) That the Governor has dispensed with the enquiry prescribed under rules 6, 7 and 8 of the Karnataka state Police Disciplinary Proceedings amendment Rules, 1965 and not the enquiry contemplated by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. It was therefore contended that the enquiry contemplated by Art. 311 (2) of the constitution ought to have been held before imposing the penalty on the petitioners; (2) that even though the enquiry contemplated by Rule 6 of the Rules has been dispensed with, an opportunity of hearing was required to be given by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner having regard to the statutory obligation cast on the Disciplinary authority by the last portion of Rule and of the Rules which requires the disciplinary Authority to consider the circumstances of the case and to pass such orders thereon as he deems fit. (3) That the Governor has not applied his mind to the relevant facts before making the impugned order dispensing with the enquiry. (4) In order to appreciate the first two contentions, it is necessary to extract the order of the Governor dispensing with the enquiry. It is as follows: - "whereas it is reported that the police Officials named below: - (1) to (6) xx xx (7) Sri Veerangaiah, H. Tumkur District. (4) In order to appreciate the first two contentions, it is necessary to extract the order of the Governor dispensing with the enquiry. It is as follows: - "whereas it is reported that the police Officials named below: - (1) to (6) xx xx (7) Sri Veerangaiah, H. Tumkur District. have been indulging in certain objectionable and illegal activities for which disciplinary action have been proposed to be taken; (2) And whereas after due inquiries have been caused to be made, it has also been reported that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry in accordance with the Rule 6 (1) of the karnataka State Police (D. P.) Rules, 1965; (3) And where as the Governor of karnataka is satisfied that in the circumstances stated above and in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow the procedure prescribed in the said Rule 6; (4) Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 9 (iii) of the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1965 read with Art. 311 (2) proviso (C) of the constitution, the Governor of Karnataka hereby dispenses, in the interest of the security of the State, with the requirement of holding an enquiry in accordance with the said Rule 6 for taking disciplinary action against the said policemen. " ( 4 ) ). The argument advanced by Sri muralidhara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners, on the basis of the language employed in Ex. D, is that the Governor has only dispensed with the enquiry under Rule 6 of the karnataka State Police (Disciplinary proceedings) Rules, 1965. Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution provides that penalty of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank shall not be imposed except after an inquiry in which he, has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution provides that penalty of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank shall not be imposed except after an inquiry in which he, has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Proviso to Art. 311 (2) provides that this clause shall not apply (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is npt reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President of the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. " the languge of Rule 9 of the Karnataka state Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as the 'rules') is similar to the one employed in the proviso to Art. 311 (2) of the constitution and reads as follows: "9. Special procedure in certain cases; Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 6, 7 and_8- (i) where a penalty is imposed on a police Officer on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the Officer concerned has absconded, or where the Officer concerned does not take part in the enquiry or where for any reasons to be recorded in writing, it is impracticable to communicate with him, or where the Disciplinary authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, is satisfied that it is* not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules; or (iii) where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to follow such procedure; the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit: provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such an order in any case for which such consultation is necessary. " ( 5 ) POINTED attention was drawn to the concluding portion of the order of the Governor which might suggest that what is sought to be dispensed is the enquiry in accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules. It is therefore that it was contended that though the enquiry contemplated by Rule 6 might have been dispensed with by the governor, the constitutional obligation imposed by sub article (?) of Art. 311 of the Constitution has to be discharged by the Disciplinary Authority before taking action to dismiss them from service. The argument of the learned advocate General, on the other hand, is that if the order is read as a whole, it will be clear that the Governor has dispensed with the enquiry not only the one contemplated by Rule 6 of the rules, but also the one contemplated by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. He further submitted that the Rules have been made to give effect to the requirements of Art. 311 (2) of giving reasonable opportunity and of holding an enquiry. That being the position, even if the enquiry contemplated by rule 6 is dispensed with by the governor, it has the effect of dispensing with the Enquiry contemplated by art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. If we agree with the contention of the learned Advocate General that the language of the order made by the governor makes it clear that the governor has dispensed with the enquiry contemplated not only by the rules, but also the enquiry contemplated by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, the question as to whether dispensation with the enquiry under the Rules has the effect of dispensation with the enquiry contemplated by Art. 311 (2) of the constitution need not be gone into. It is no doubt true that in paragraph ,3 of the order, the Governor has stated that he is satisfied that in the circumstances stated above and in the interest of the State, it is not expedient to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 6 of the Rules. But when we come to the operative portion of the order, the Governor not only invokes the power conferred on him by Rule 9 (3) of the Rules, but also the power conferred on him by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. But when we come to the operative portion of the order, the Governor not only invokes the power conferred on him by Rule 9 (3) of the Rules, but also the power conferred on him by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. It is after invoking both the sources of the power, the governor however states that he has dispensed with in the interest of security of the State, the requirement of holding enquiry in accordance with the Rule 6 for taking disciplinary action against the seven policemen. Invoking of Art. 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution by the Government is of paramount importance. If the Governor intended to dispose with the enquiry contemplated by Rule 6 of the Rule,s alone, he need not have adverted to Art. 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution. As Art. 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution in express terms, confers power on the Governor to dispense with the enquiry if he is satisfied, that it is not expedient to hold such enquiry in the interest of the security of the State, and as the governor has stated in the earlier part of the order that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry, we have no hesitation in taking the view that the Governor has invoked the power conferred under Art. 311 (2) (c) of the constitution along with Rule 9 (3) of the rules in order to dispense with the enquiry contemplated by the Rules as also by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. That being the position, it is not possible to accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Governor having dispensed with the enquiry contemplated by the rules, the Disciplinary Authority was required to hold an enquiry contemplated by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. ( 6 ) IT was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the last portion of Rule 9 which requires the Disciplinary Authority to consider the circumstances of the case, imposes an implied obligation on the Disciplinary Authority to associate the delinquent official and to hold at least the minimum enquiry even though regular and detailed enquiry need not be held. It was contended that when the statutory rule imposes an obligation on the Disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case; that obligation can only be discharged by associating the deliquent official and giving him an opportunity of showing cause in the matter. In support of this contention of his, Sri muralidhara Rao relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway v. T. R. Challappan, air 1975 S. C. 2216. That was a case in which the Supreme Court was required to consider the scope and ambit of Rule 14 of the Railway servants (Discipline and Appeal) rules, 1968 which is analogous to Rule 9 of the Karnataka State Police disciplinary Proceedings Rules, 1965. For the sake of convenience, the said rule is extracted as follows: "2. . Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13: - (i) Where any penalty is imposed on a Railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the matter provided in these rules; or (iii) where the President is satisfied that in the interest oi the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in these rules; the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit; provided that the Commission shall be consulted where such consultation is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule. " the case dealt with by the Supreme court was one in which penalty was imposed on the Railway servant on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge. On the basis of the conviction of the railway servant, the Disciplinary authority had imposed a penalty without holding any enquiry whatsoever. It was contended that the obligation cast on the Disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case implied that an opportunity of showing cause atleast in regard to proposed penalty should have been given to the concerned Railway servant in that case. It was contended that the obligation cast on the Disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case implied that an opportunity of showing cause atleast in regard to proposed penalty should have been given to the concerned Railway servant in that case. The relevant discussion in the judgment of the Supreme Court in paragraph 21 may usefully be extracted as follows: ~ "we now come to the third point that it is involved in this case, namely, the extent and ambit of the last part of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1968. The concerned portion runs thus: ". . . the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. " in this connection it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that this provision does not contemplate a full-dress or a fresh inquiry after hearing the accused but only requires the disciplinary authority to impose a, suitable penalty once it is proved that the delinquent employee has been convicted on a criminal charge. The rajasthan High Court in civil W. P. No. 352 of 1971 concerning CA No. 891 of 1975 has given a very wide connotation to the word 'consider' as appearing in Rule 14 and has held that the word 'consider' is wide enough to require the disciplinary ahthority hold a detailed determination of the matter. We feel that we are not in a position to go to the extreme limit to which the Rajasthan high Court has gone. The word 'consider' has been used in contradiction to the word 'determine'. The rule-making authority deliberately used the word 'consider' and not 'determine' because the word 'determine' has a much wider scope. The word 'consider' merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words, the term 'consider' postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of all the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words, the term 'consider' postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of all the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an inquiry would be a summary enquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. It is not at all necessary for the disciplinary authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry which is dispensed with under Rule 14 of the rules of 1968 which incorporates the principle contained in Art, 311 (2) proviso (a ). This provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering this matter the disciplinary authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features if any present in the case and so on and so forth. It may be that the conviction of an accused may be for a trivial offence as in the case of the respondent T. R. Challappan in C. A. No. 1664 of 1974 where a stern warning or a fine would have been sufficient to meet the exigencies of service. It is possible that the delinquent employee may be found guilty of some technical offence, for instance, violation of the transport rules or the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act and so on, where no major penalty may be attracted. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the factors which the disciplinary authority would have to consider, but I have mentioned some of these factors by way of instances which are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the factors which the disciplinary authority would have to consider, but I have mentioned some of these factors by way of instances which are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. In other words, the position is that the conviction of the delinquent employee would be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee and in the course of the inquiry if the authority is of the opinion that the offence is too trivial or of a technical nature it may refuse to impose any penalty in spite of the conviction. This is a very salutary provision which has been enshrined in these Rules and one of the purposes for conferring this power is that in cases where the disciplinary authority is satisfied that the delinquent employee is a youthful offender who is not convicted of any serious offence and shows poignant penitence or real repentence he may be dealt with as lightly as possible. This appears to us to be the scope and ambit of this provision. We must, however, hasten to add that we should not be understood as laying down that the last part of rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 contains a licence to employees convicted of serious offences to insist on reinstatement. The statutory provision referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fairplay. The disciplinary authority has the undoubted power after hearing the delinquent employee and considering the circumstances of the case to inflict any major penalty on the delinquent employee without any further departmental inquiry if the authority is of the opinion that ihe employee. has been guilty of a serious offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, it is not desirable or conducive in the interests of administration to retain such a person in service. has been guilty of a serious offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, it is not desirable or conducive in the interests of administration to retain such a person in service. " it was rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the case dealt with by the Supreme Court was one pertaining to dispensation of enquiry where penalty is sought to be imposed on the ground of conduct which has led to conviction on a criminal charge. The Supreme Court, in the circumstances, pointed out that the conviction on a criminal charge itself amounts to holding the concerned official guilty of a parlicular misconduct and that therefore, there is no need to hold any enquiry into the matter. The Supreme Court, however, held having regard to the obligation cast on the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case that the disciplinary authority is under an obligation to give an opportunity to the person who is convicted of a criminal charge of showing cause in regard to the punishment that may be imposed. The concluding portion of their Lordships judgment extracted above makes it clear that their Lordships felt having regard to the language employed in rule 14 and the context of the dispensation of enquiry in a case where the official is convicted of a criminal charge, that an enquiry in regard to the punishment that may be imposed is reasonably possible and practicable. In all cases where disciplinary enquiry is sought to be dispensed with on the ground that action is sought to be taken in respect of the conduct which has led to conviction on a criminal charge, it is reasonably possible and practicable to give an opportunity to the concerned official of showing cause in regard to the proposed penalty. Same thing cannot be said in regard to the dispensation of enquiry falling under the remaining two categories. Second category is one in which disciplinary enquiry itself may be dispensed with on the ground that the delinquent official is absconding or it is not reasonbly practiable to hold an enquiry. If the official himself is absconding, it is not possible to hold an enquiry. The question for consideration is as to whether it is possible to draw an inference that even in such circumstances, there is an obligation on the part of the disciplinary authority to hold a minimum enquiry atleast. If the official himself is absconding, it is not possible to hold an enquiry. The question for consideration is as to whether it is possible to draw an inference that even in such circumstances, there is an obligation on the part of the disciplinary authority to hold a minimum enquiry atleast. Same is the position in regard to the dispensation of enquiry falling under the last category. If the enquiry is dispensed with on the ground that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the security of the State, even holding of minimum enquiry may result in adversely affecting the security of the state inasmuch as the delinquent official has necessarily to be told minimum facts and circumstances which have pursuaded the authorities to take the disciplinary action. If the, holding of the very enquiry is considered to be against the interest of the security of the State, it is not reasonable to hold that some sort of minimum enquiry should be held and the delinquent official should be given an opportunity of showing cause. It is necessary to point out that the Supreme Court was dealing with the case falling only under the first category where an enquiry was dispensed with on the ground of conduct which had led the officials conviction on a criminal charge. The Supreme Court was not dealing with the cases falling under second and third categories. It was, however, contended by Sri muralidhara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the obligation to associate the delinquent official of the enquiry and to give an opportunity of showing cause flows from the obligation imposed by the rule on the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case. He submitted that the obligation is common to all the three categories. If in respect of cases falling under the first category, an opportunity of showing cause has to be given, it was urged, the same must automatically follow in respect of second and third categories as well. If an expression qualifies different sub clauses of a rule, the qualifying expression would normally have uniform application to all the sub-clauses. But if the concluding part of the Rule deals with different and diverse sets of circumstances, it may not have uniform application. If an expression qualifies different sub clauses of a rule, the qualifying expression would normally have uniform application to all the sub-clauses. But if the concluding part of the Rule deals with different and diverse sets of circumstances, it may not have uniform application. In such cases, it would be necessary to interpret the concluding part taking into consideration the peculiar context of each set of circumstances. It is in this context that it is necessary to ascertain the reasons which pursuaded the Supreme Court to hold in cases where disciplinary enquiry is dispensed with on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge that he should be given an opportunity to show cause in regard to the proposed punishment. It is after providing for dispensing with the enquiry that the rule provides that the disciplinary authority should consider the circumstances of the case and pass the order. It is because of this obligation to consider the circumstances of the case, that the Supreme court came to the conclusion that it is just and fair to infer that there is a minimum obligation on the part of the disciplinary authority of. associating the delinquent employee with the enquiry and to give him an opportunity to show cause in regard to the proposed punishment. The case dealt with by the Supreme Court fell under the first category and it was reasonably practicable to give an opportunity to the delinquent official to have his say in regard to the proposed punishment. We (have seen from the analysis of the second and third categories that it is not reasonably practicable to give such an opportunity. Principles of natural justice can be dispensed with by an express provision or by necessary implication. If the operation of the principles of natural justice is not excluded either by express provision or by, necessary implications, they being principles of justice and fair play, are read into the Rules. In regard to cases falling under the first category, the Supreme Court, on an elaborate analysis of the matter, came to the conclusion that it is reasonably possible and practicable to give an opportunity to the delinquent official to show cause in regard to the proposed penalty. In regard to cases falling under the first category, the Supreme Court, on an elaborate analysis of the matter, came to the conclusion that it is reasonably possible and practicable to give an opportunity to the delinquent official to show cause in regard to the proposed penalty. It is, therefore that the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the operation of principles of natural justice is not altogether dispensed with But if the disciplinary enquiry is dispensed with on the ground that it is in the interest of the security of the State to do so, can it be said that the principles of natural justice have to be complied with. If the holding of the disciplinary enquiry is considered to be against the interest of the security of the State, it follows that no enquiry whatsoever can be held. In such a situation it is difficult to infer that the authority is still required to follow the principles of natural justice as it will defeat the very purpose of dispensing with the enquiry. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the State, it is expressly averred that the disclosure of the case against the petitioners affect the interest of the security of the state and that therefore, it is not at all possible and practicable to inform the delinquent official of what is sought to be held against him. Without the delinquent official being told what the disciplinary authority holds against him, it is impossible to conceive of an opportunity being given to the delinquent official either in regard to the merits or in regard to the proposed punishment. If the delinquent official cannot be told the basis or the conclusion, no useful purpose will be served by simply asking the delinquent official to show cause in the matter. If the very disclosure is against the interest of the security of the State and it is for that reason that the enquiry is dispensed with, it follows that by necessary implication, the principles of natural justice are dispensed with We have have no hesitation in holding that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court applies only to cases falling under the first category where the penalty is sought to be imposed on the ground of conduct which has led to the official's conviction on a criminal charge. In our opinion, the principle laid down by the Supreme court does not apply to cases falling under the third category where the enquiry is dispensed with on the ground that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the security of the State. ( 7 ) OUR attention was invited to two more decisions in this behalf. The first case is Union of India v. Rajendra prasad Srivatsava, (1977) 2 Serlr 81. That is a decision of the Allahabad High Court holding that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court reported in air 1975 S. C. . 2216 also applies to cases falling under the second category. The second decision is of the Delhi High court reported in R. K. Mishra v. General Manager, N. Rly. , (1977) 2 Ser. LR 127. That is also a case. wherein it is held that the principle laid down by the Supreme court applies to cases failing under the second category. It is firstly necessary to observe that we are concerned with cases falling under the third category and no,t under the first or the second category. The allahabad and the Delhi High Courts have held in the aforesaid decisions that the principle laid down by. the supreme Court in respect of the first category of cases equally applies to cases falling under the second category. We have, after consideration of the principle laid down by the. Supreme court, come to the conclusion that the decision of the Supreme Court must be understood as laying down the law only in regard to cases falling under the first category. We have come to the conclusion that the principle laid down in the said decision does not govern cases falling under the second category. For the reasons already stated, with great respect, we find it difficult to agree with the view taken by the Allahabad and Delhi High courts in the aforesaid cases. ( 8 ) IT was next contended by Sri muralidhar Rao learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Governor has not applied his mind to the relevant facts and that therefore the impugned order dispensing with the enquiry is not legal and valid. ( 8 ) IT was next contended by Sri muralidhar Rao learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Governor has not applied his mind to the relevant facts and that therefore the impugned order dispensing with the enquiry is not legal and valid. On behalf of the state an application, I. A. 4 has been filed claiming privilege in regard to the records pertaining to the order of the governor invoking the provisions of s. 123 of the Evidence Act on the ground that the disclosure of the contents of the records placed before the Governor of Karnataka, is against public interest, as it is likely to endanger the security of the States. It is however stated that the said records are brought in a sealed cover and if the Court. so directs, the same will be produced for perusal, of the Court. In the statement of objections it is asserted that the governor, on the basis of the material placed before him, was duly satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold a disciplinory enquiry against the petitioners. The learned Advocate General contended that when the order of the governor in express terms discloses that the Governor is satisfied that on the material placed before him, it is not expedient to hold a disciplinary enquiry against the petitioners, it is not necessary to establish with reference to the relevant records, that the governor has applied his mind. As the petitioners have alleged that the governor has not applied his mind, we consider it absolutely necessary in these cases to look into the records to satisfy ourselves as to whether the governor has applied his mind to the relevant material. This Court has held in Medhi Ali v. Union of India, (1972) 1 Mys. L. J. 339 that the claim of privilege claimed under the provisions of the Evidence Act cannot be upheld when such claim comes in the way of this Court exercising its power under art. 226 of the Constitution. As we have come to the conclusion that it is necessary for the exercise of our powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution to look into the relevant records, we "reject the claim of the State regarding absolute privilege claimed under S. 123 of the Evidence Act. 226 of the Constitution. As we have come to the conclusion that it is necessary for the exercise of our powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution to look into the relevant records, we "reject the claim of the State regarding absolute privilege claimed under S. 123 of the Evidence Act. But, having regard to the fact that the material placed before the Governor in regard to the dispensation of the enquiry is on the ground that it is against the interest of the security of the State, we do not consider it just and proper to make available the records for the perusal of the counsel for the petitioners. For the limited purpose of satisfying ourselves on the question whether the Governor has applied his mind to the relevant materials, we have decided to peruse the relevant records which the learned advocate General has offered to place for our perusal on our negativing his claim for absolute privilege. ( 9 ) ). On a perusal of the records we noticed that relevant information about the conduct of all the petitioners was placed before the Governor. The report of the Inspector General of police and the opinion expressed by the secretary to the Law Depantment were also placed before the Governor for consideration. The material placed before the Governor, we are satisfied, was relevant material to enable the Governor to take a decision as to whether he should dispense wish the enquiry on the ground that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the security of the State. We also find from the records, that the Governor after looking into the entire records has written the order in his own hand to dispense with the enquiry against the petitioners. He has also signed the formal order, copies of which have been produced in these cases. We are therefore clearly satisfied that relevant material was placed before the governor, that the Governor has applied his mind and has passed the order dispensing with enquiry after being satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the security of the State. ( 10 ) ). As all the contentions in regard to the validity of the order of the governor have failed, it has to be held that the order of the Governor dispensing with the enquiry is legal and valid. ( 11 ) ). ( 10 ) ). As all the contentions in regard to the validity of the order of the governor have failed, it has to be held that the order of the Governor dispensing with the enquiry is legal and valid. ( 11 ) ). As regards the impugned orders dismissing the petitioners from service, the stand taken by all the petitioners is that they have been passed with a view to victimise the petitioners for taking leading part in the matter of establishing a new association for head-Constables and Police Constables. There exists a common association for all the officials of the Police Department, both high and low. It appears the petitioners and others felt that their interests are not being properly safe-guarded and therefore they thought that it is advisable to have an independent association of their own. It is stated that they formed such an association on 11. 11. 79. When the government refused to grant permission or recognition to the new association, it is their case, that they took steps to dissolve their newly formed association as per the resolution dated 28. 11. 79 produced in the case at annexure C. The order of the governor dispensing with the enquiry was made on the 26th November, 1979 and some of the petitioners were dismissed on the same day and others on 27. 11. 79. It is in this background that the petitioners assert that the conduct of the Petitioners has nothing to do with the security of the State which has persuaded the authorities to dismiss them from service. It is their case that what has really persuaded the authorities to dismiss the petitioners from service is the fact that they took very active part, in starting a new association of their own quite contrary to the wishes of the superior authorities and the state Government. The petitioner kaiappa in W. P. 20084179 has further pleaded that the order of dismissal is malafide on the ground that the superintendent of Police, Coorg, Sri kasmrirangan who passed the impugned order is biassed againss him for several reasons. Sri Kasturirangan has since been transferred from the district of Coorg. He has filed a counter affidavit controverting the allegations of malafides made against him. Sri Kasturirangan has since been transferred from the district of Coorg. He has filed a counter affidavit controverting the allegations of malafides made against him. Another contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the respective disciplinary authorities have not applied their mind and have mechanically passed the impugned orders in a stereotyped language merely because the governor has dispensed with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the State. We shall take up the last contention first for consideration. ( 12 ) ). Though the impugned orders have been passed by different authorities namely the Superintendent of police, Tumkur, the Deputy Commissioner of Police,. City Armed Reserve police, the Superintendent of Police, coorg, and the Superintendent of police, Shimoga all the orders are couched in identical language except for the names of the delinquent officials. It was contended, having regard to the stereo-typed orders, that there is intrinsic material to indicate that the authorities have not applied their mind and have mechanically passed the impugned orders. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to extract the order made in W. P. No. 19090/1979 and produced in the case as Ex. 'e' which reads as follows: " (1) Whereas, I am satisfied that certain acts of misconduct are alleged against you and they are of serious and grave nature and that retention of your service is prejudicial to the security of the State; (2) Whereas the Governor of Karnataka has, under Rule 9 (iii) of karnataka State Police (Disciplinary proceedings) Rules, 1965 read with proviso (c) of Article 311 (2) of the the Constitution of India, ordered that the requirement of holding an enquiry in accordance with Rule 6 for taking disciplinary action against you be dispensed with; A copy of the governor's order is enclosed. (3) I, the Disciplinary Authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal, hereby dismiss you from service with immediate effect. " as already- stated, every one of the impugned order is in identical language. The fact of dispensation of the enquiry by the Governor in the order of sequence should have come first. We find that in every one of these orders, the reference to dispensation of the enquiry is made in paragraph 2. " as already- stated, every one of the impugned order is in identical language. The fact of dispensation of the enquiry by the Governor in the order of sequence should have come first. We find that in every one of these orders, the reference to dispensation of the enquiry is made in paragraph 2. So far as the substantive portion of the impugned order is concerned, if it is properly analysed, it shows the following: (1) that the authority was satisfied that certain acts of misconduct are alleged against the delinquent official; (2) that the allegations are of serious and grave nature; and (3) that the retention of the. delinquent official is prejudicial to the security of the State. It is clear from what is stated by the disciplinary authority that his satisfaction is about the existence of allegations of misconduct against the petitioners and about these allegations being of serious and grave nature. What the authority is satisfied is that there are serious and grave allegations against the petitioners. The authority does not say that he is satisfied about the truth of the allegations made against the petitioners. The satisfaction is only in regard to the existence of serious and grave allegations of misconduct against the petitioners. After starting about this satisfaction, the disciplinary authority further holds that 'the retention of the delinquent official is prejudicial to the security of the State. This is really the opinion part which should necessarily be correlated with the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority in regard to the misconduct of the petitioners. Shri Muralidhar Rap, learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, contended that language of the order itself makes it clear that the disciplinary authority has really not applied its mind and has passed the order in a mechanical way. The fact that every one of the orders made by the disciplinary authorities is in identical terms makes the criticism of sri Muralidhar Rao more valid. It is on account of these intrinsic infirmities that we noticed in the impugned orders that we required the learned Advocate general to place all the relevant records pertaining to the dismissal of the petitioners by the concerned disciplinary authorities. The learned advocate General placed the relevant records pertaining to all the petitioners. It is on account of these intrinsic infirmities that we noticed in the impugned orders that we required the learned Advocate general to place all the relevant records pertaining to the dismissal of the petitioners by the concerned disciplinary authorities. The learned advocate General placed the relevant records pertaining to all the petitioners. On a perusal of these records we are satisfied that all these orders were made by the concerned disciplinary authorities after they received the copies of the the order of the Governor dispensing with the enquiry. We are also satisfied that the concerned disciplinary authorities have signed the original orders of dismissal against the petitioners. We are also satisfied that the files pertaining to each one of these petitioners contain materials and dossiers in regard to the activities of the petitioners. We also noticed that it is the Inspector General of police, who after collecting the material in repect of all the petitioners and after making a detailed enquiry sent a report recommending to the Governor to dispense with the requirement of holding the disciplinary enquiry against them in the interest of the security of the State. In other words, we are satisfied that relevant material was collected and it was available before the respective disciplinary authorities in regard to the conduct of the petitioners to enable them to form an opinion in regard to the alleged misconduct of the petitioners. But, we do not find any material whatsoever from the records to show that the concerned disciplinary authorities had applied their mind to the relevant materials. In the records we only find the materials against the petitioners and the final order made by the disciplinary authorities. There is nothing to show that the disciplinary authorities applied their mind to the same. There is not even an office-note about consideration of the materials. The records do riot at all indicate that the disciplinary authority perused the material and formed the necessary opinion against the petitioners. The fact that all the impugned orders though made by different authorities are in identical language makes it abundantly clear that the disciplinary authorities had not applied their mind and had proceeded to pass the impugned orders immediately after they received the copies of the Governor's order dispensing with the enquiry. The fact that all the impugned orders though made by different authorities are in identical language makes it abundantly clear that the disciplinary authorities had not applied their mind and had proceeded to pass the impugned orders immediately after they received the copies of the Governor's order dispensing with the enquiry. We are clearly satisfied that the impugned orders have been made without the application of the mind by the respective disciplinary authorities. Hence all the impugned orders of dismissal are liable to be quashed on this short ground alone. ( 13 ) ). So far as the contention of the petitioners that they have been dismissed by way of victimisation is concerned, since we have come to the conclusion that the impugned orders have been made without the application of the mind, the said contention does not survive for consideration. If the conduct of the petitioners has a bearing on the security of the State and that conduct amounts to misconduct, it cannot be said that the same cannot be taken into consideration merely because the said conduct has also connection with their activities pertaining to the forming of a new association. ( 14 ) ). So far as the allegation of malafides against Sri Kasturi Rangan by shri Kalappa, the petitioner in W. P. No. 2008411979 is concerned, it is necessary to state that it need not be examined in detail having regard to the fact that the impugned orders of dismissal are being quashed on another ground and also because Sri Kasturirangan against whom allegation has been made has since been transferred from the District, of Coorg. After having gone through the allegation made by Sri Kalappa and the counter-affidavit of Sri Kasturirangan, we are also satisfied that there is no substance in the allegation of mala fides made by sri Kalappa against Sri Kasturirangan. ( 15 ) ). We must advert to another argument of Sri Muralidhar Rao in this connection. He contended that the impugned orders of dismissal do not indicate that the disciplinary authorities formed the opinion as contemplated by sec. 23 (1) of the Karnataka police Act, 1963. ( 15 ) ). We must advert to another argument of Sri Muralidhar Rao in this connection. He contended that the impugned orders of dismissal do not indicate that the disciplinary authorities formed the opinion as contemplated by sec. 23 (1) of the Karnataka police Act, 1963. The said provision provides that the Government and any prescribed authority or officer may, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, impose on any member of the police force who, in the opinion of the Government or the prescribed officer, is cruel, perverse, remiss, or negligent in the discharge of his duties or unfit for the same or guilty of any breach of discipline or misconduct or for any other sufficient reason, any of the penalties mentioned in that section which includes the penalty of dismissal from service. The learned Advocate General does not dispute that the disciplinary authority can exercise the power of dismissal from service only if the appropriate authority forms an opinion as contemplated under Sec. 23 (1) of the Act. If the disciplinary authorities come to the conclusion that the delinquent officials are guilty of any particular misconduct which render their retention in service undesirable or they are unfit for any other reason, there is no doubt that the disciplinary authorities can take appropriate action as contemplated under S. 23 of the Karnataka police Act. As we are allowing these writ petitions and quashing the orders of dismissal challenged in these writ petitions, it is for the appropriate authorities to pass fresh orders having regard to the provisions of S. 23 of the Act. ( 16 ) ). For the reasons stated above, while rejecting the petitioners' prayer for quashing the order of the Governor dated 26. 11. 79 dispensing with the holding of the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioners (produced in she case at Annexure-D in W. P. No. 19090 of 1979), we" partly allow all the writ petitions and quash the impugned orders of dismissal made by the disciplinary authority against the respective petitioners. The petitioners are entitled to all consequential benefits flowing as a result of our quashing the impugned orders of dismissal from service. The petitioners are entitled to all consequential benefits flowing as a result of our quashing the impugned orders of dismissal from service. Having regard to the fact that action was sought to be taken in the interest of the security of the State we consider it just and proper to reserve liberty to the appropriate disciplinary authorities to take fresh and appropriate action, in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made in the course of this order, if they choose to do so. ( 17 ) IN the circumstances, the parities shall bear their respective costs in all these cases. --- *** --- .