K.S. SIDHU, J —The petitioner, Thakuri Bai, obtained a rule in this case upon the State of Rajasthan to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the detention order, issued by the State Government against her son, Tillu alias Tillumal, son of Mianmal Sindhi, resident of Surajpole. Kota, vide No. F.2/21 (24) Home-5/80. dated. December 26, 1980, under section 3 (2), National Security Act, 1980 (for short, the Act) and consequently directing the release from detention of the said Tillu. 2. The facts necessary for the decision of this petition may be shortly stated here. On December 26, 1980. the State Government made an order under section 3 (2) of the Act directing that Tillu be detained, stating therein that it was satisfied that it was necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Tillu was arrested on December 27, in pursuance of that order, and sent to Central Jail, Jaipur, where he is being detained these days. The grounds of detention were communicated to Tillu, vide, letter, dated, December 30, 1980. from the Home Secretary to the Govt. of Raj. The Home Secretary made it clear in this letter that if Tillu was desirous of making any representation against the detention order, he could do so and forward the same to him through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jaipur. from the Home Secretary to the Govt. of Raj. The Home Secretary made it clear in this letter that if Tillu was desirous of making any representation against the detention order, he could do so and forward the same to him through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jaipur. The grounds of detention which are in Hindi may be reproduced here :— ^^egkfujh{kd vkj{kh jktLFkku] t;iqj }kjk ,df=r lqpukvksa ds vuqlkj Jh fVYyw mQZ fVYywey iq= fe;key fla/kh fuoklh lwjt iksy] dksVk ,d vijkf/kd izo`fr dk O;fDr gS rFkk bldh vijkf/kd xfrfof/k;ka yksd O;oLFkk lk/kkj.k ds izfrdwy gSA Jh fVYyw mQZ fVYywey }kjk tks izeq[k vijk/k uxj es fd, x, mudk fooj.k fuEu izdkj gS%& ¼1½ Jh fVYyw mQZ fVYywey us o"kZ] 1973 esa vtesjh gksVy Jhiqjk esa uwjeksgEen dks gksVy ij ekjihV dh ftl ij Fkkuk eDojk es eqDnek ua- 74] 26-4-73 /kkjk 451@323 vkbZ- ih- lh- iathc} gksdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ifjfk"N , o ch i`IB 1 ls 6½ ¼2½ fnukad 5-6-74 dks fVYyw us ;ke fla/kh dks idM+ dj pkdw ls et:c fd;k ftl ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 86 fnukad 5-6-74 /kkjk 324@34 vkbZ-ih-lh- Fkkuk eDojk ij iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjfk"B lh o Mh i`"B 7 ls 10½ ¼3½ fnukad 5-6-74 dks gh fnu ds 3 cts fQj fVYyw us eksVj LVs.M ij gksVy ;ke fla/kh esa nkf[ky gksdj xqIrh ,oa pkdw ls pksVs igqapkbZ ftl ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 87 fnukad 5-6-74 /kkjk 147@148@149@452@307@341 vkbZ-lh-ih- ithc} gksdj vnkyr es pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjfk"B lh o Mh i`"B 7 ls 10½ ¼4½ fnukad 27-12-77 dks fVYyw us fQj blh ;ke fla/kh ij vius lkFkh ds lkFk edku ij geyk dj xqIrh ,oa ryokj vkfn ls mldksa eka o vkSjr ds pksV igqapkbZ ftl ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 191 fnukad 17-12-77 /kjk 452@34 vkbZ-ih-lh- Fkkuk osFkwuksiksy ij iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼5½ fnukad 28-4-78 dh fQj blh ;ke fla/kh ij tc og viuh nqdku ij cSBk gqvk Fkk rks fYYyw us fiZLrksy fudky dj ml ij 3&4 xksfy;ka pyknh vkSj Hkkx x;kA blds lEcU/k es vfHk;ksx la[;k 78 fnukad 28-4-74 /kkjk 307 vkbZ-lh-ih- es Fkkuk osFkwuksiksy ij iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B th o ,p i`"B 18 ls 21½ ¼6½ fnukad 18-4-78 dks fVYyw us vius lkFkh vkkkuan ds lkFk gks Jh eweflag ij geyk dj pksV igqapkbZ bl lEcU/k esa Fkkuk osFkwuhiksy ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 84 fnukad 18-4-78 /kkjk 325@323 vkbZ-ih-lh- esa iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B vkbZ o ts i`"B 22 ls 27½ ¼7½ fnukad 22-8-78 dks fVYyw dh fukkansgh ls iqfyl }kjk ,d dV~Vk ¼filrkSy½ fcuk ykblsUl cjken fd;k x;k ftl ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 155 fnukad 22-7-78 /kkjk 3@25 vkeZl ,DV iathc} fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B ds o ,y i`"B 28 ls 38½ ¼8½ fnukad 14-7-78 dks fVYyw ls iqfyl }kjk ,d 14 lsfUVfeVj yEck pkdw cjken gqvk ftl ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 191 fnukad 14-7-78 /kkjk 4@25 vkeZl ,DV Fkkuk xqekuiqjk iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrq fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B ,e o ,u i`"B 33 ls 37½ ¼9½ fnukad 26-8-79 dks tc NhfB;ka vius ?kj vkdj jgk Fkk rks fVYyw vius lkFkh c`tjktflag ds lkFk ml ij izk.k?kkrd geyk fd;k ftlls mlds pksVsa vkbZA ml ij tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B vks o ih i`"B 38 ls 43½ ¼10½ fnukad 26-8-79 dks fVYyw us ryokjksa ls [ksjkrh iatkch ij izk.k ?kkrd geyk fd;k ftl ij Fkkuk oSFkwuhiksy ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 115 fnukad 26-8-79 /kkjk 307@34 vkbZ-ih-lh- iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;kA ¼ifjf"B D;w o vkj- i`"B 44 ls 52½ ¼11½ fnukad 28-8-79 dks fVYyw ds ikl ls 3 ryokj /kkjnkj fcuk ykbZlsUl dh iqfyl }kjk cjken dh xbZ ftl ij mlds fo:} eqdnek la[;k 116 fnukad 28-8-79 /kkjk 4@25 vkeZl ,DV iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B ,l o Vh i`"B 53 ls 58½ ¼12½ fnukad 13-2-80 dks fVYyw us vius lkFk c`tjkt flag ds lkFk nqdku Jh dUgS;kyky fla/kh ij igaqp dj mls ekjihV dj 10]000@& :i;s dh ywVekj dh ftl ij vfHk;ksx lal[;k 18 fnukad 25-2-80 /kkjk 394@34 vkbZ-ih-lh- Fkkuk dks rokyh ij iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B ;w o oh i`"B 59 ls 67½ ¼13½ fnukad 14-2-80 dks bl fYyw dks kjkc ds uks es pkde lfgr iqfyl }kjk fxjrkj fd;k x;kA blds fo:} vfHk;ksx 24 la- fnukad 14-2-80 vUrZxr e/kfu"ks?k dkuwu o /kkjk 4@25 vkeZl ,DV es Fkkuk m/kksxuxj esa iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B MCyw o ,Dl i`"B 68 ls 73½ ¼14½ fnukad 25-4-80 dks fVYyw us vius lkfFk;ksa ds lkFk Jh xksj/kunkl fla/kh ij geyk dj mls pkdw vkfn ls pksVs igqapkbZA bl ?kVuk ds lEcU/k es eqdnek la[;k 136 fnukad 25-4-80 /kkjk 307@147@148@149 vkbZ-ih-lh- Fkkuk xqekuiqjk esa iathc} fd;k tkdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B okbZ o tSM i`"B 74 ls 79½ ¼15½ fnukad 30-8-80 dks fVYyw us vius lkfFk;ksa ds lkFk eksgu Vkfdt ij igap dj 2000@& :i;sa ekaxs vkSj dqflZ;ka mBk dj QSdh o rksM QksM+ dhA ftl ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 118 fnukad 30-8-80 /kkjk 341]385@452 vkbZ-ih-lh- esa Fkkuk nsFkwuhiksy ij QtZ gksdj pkyku izLrqr fd;k x;kA ¼ifjf"B ,, o chch i`"B 80 ls 83½ ¼16½ fnukad 31-12-77] 30-8-80] 20-10-78] 28-7-78] 30-8-80 o 3-9-80 dks mDr Jh fVYyw ds fo:} iqfyl }kjk bLrxkls Hkh izLrqr fd;s tks fopkjk/khu gSA ¼ifjf"B& lhlh] MhMh] bZbZ] ,Q,Q] thth] o ,p,p i`"B 84 ls 99½ ¼,y-,u- xqIrk½ x`g lfpo These grounds and the supportive documents were placed by the State Government before the Advisory Board constituted under the Act. On January 29, 1981, the Board considered the entire material and recorded the opinion that there was sufficient cause for detention of Tillu. On receipt of this report, the State Government confirmed the detention order on February 18, 1981, and directed that the detenu shall be kept in detention for the maximum period of 12 months from the date of his detention. In other words, the detenu has been ordered to be detained till December 26, 1981. 3. The petitioner challenged the detention order on a number of grounds pleaded in paragraphs 6, 7 and, 8 of the writ petition. These may be summarised here as follows :— (i) Most of the criminal prosecutions against the detenu which are mentioned in the grounds of detention supplied to him are the out - come of enmity of one Shyam Sindhi and his servants and supporters against the detenu. (ii) The detenu has already been acquitted in cases enumerated at Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 16 of the grounds of detention. He has not so far been convicted in any of the cases filed against him. He cannot be lawfully detained merely because a number of cases are still pending trial against him. (iii) None of the incidents detailed in the grounds of detention bears upon the maintenance of public order of the detenu acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order. All the said incidents are stray incidents relating to alleged disturbance of law and order instead of public order. 4. The State of Rajasthan filed a Written reply in answer to the writ petition. It pleaded that the impugned order of detention was passed by it after fully satisfying itself on the basis of the report of the Inspector General of Police that the detenu is a habitual offender whose criminal activities, as detailed in the report, pose a serious danger to the maintenance of public order. Details of all the incidents reported to the State Government by the Inspector General of Police on which the detention order was made were supplied to the detenu. The State reiterated that the detenu is a desperado who has created error in the locality and that the witness as in some of the cases pending against him. The State explained in this context that in the case mentioned at No. 1 in the grounds of detention, Noor Mohd. The State reiterated that the detenu is a desperado who has created error in the locality and that the witness as in some of the cases pending against him. The State explained in this context that in the case mentioned at No. 1 in the grounds of detention, Noor Mohd. the complainant compromised the case under the pressure of the detenu, with the result that the trial court convicted him under section 323 I.P.C., alone and acquitted him of the more serious charge under section 451 I.P.C. The State admitted that in three other cases referred to by the petitioner, the detenu had been acquitted by the courts concerned. The State placed on the record a large number of documents, Ex. R. I. to Ex. R. 36, stating that copies of these documents had been supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention and that the petitioner had deliberately suppressed this fact from the court in the writ petition filed by her for the release of the detenue. 5. We may therefore proceed to decide this case on the footing that the grounds of detention, as reproduced in an earlier part of this judgment, along with all the supportive documents, were supplied to the detenu, through the Superintendent of Central Jail, Jaipur, vide letter, dated, December 30, 1980, and that inspite of a clear notice to the detenu that if he wanted to make any representation against the detention order he could do so and forward the same to the Home Secretary through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jaipur, he did not make any representation against the impugned order. This does not, however mean that the petitioner is precluded from challenging the impugned order. Of course, it is open to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order on any ground on which it could possibly be quashed. We have already mentioned that the petitioner has challenged it in this writ petition on grounds which we have summarised into three different categories above. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner raised an additional ground in his submissions at the bar to the effect that the grounds of detention are vague and irrelevant. Ordinarily, a plea which is not taken up in the writ petition should not be allowed to be taken up for the first time in arguments. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner raised an additional ground in his submissions at the bar to the effect that the grounds of detention are vague and irrelevant. Ordinarily, a plea which is not taken up in the writ petition should not be allowed to be taken up for the first time in arguments. Having regard, however, to the fact that this is a habeas corpus petition, we heard Mr. Tyagi on the additional ground as well. 6. Taking up the additional ground first, we may straight - away point out that the grounds of detention do not suffer from any defect of vagueness or irrelevancy. All the incidents were detailed in the grounds of detention with reference to the F.I.R. registered in each case and the challan submitted in the court as a result of investigation by the police. It is significant to note that copies of all the F. I. Rs. and of the police charge-sheets submitted in various courts on the basis of these F. I. Rs. were also supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention. The argument that the grounds suffer from the defect of vagueness is therefore wholly devoid of force. 7. As for the argument that the grounds are irrelevant, Mr. Tyagis thesis is that since all the grounds bear upon law and order, rather than public order, they are irrelevant and therefore the detention order is bad. This argument is covered by item number (iii) of the summary of the grounds given by us in an earlier part of this judgment. It will therefore be dealt with presently when we take up those grounds. Ground No.(i) 8. We have carefully examined the various F.I.Rs. registered against the detenu and the police charge-sheets submitted as a result of investigation by the police into those F.I.RS. and find that, out of a tolal of as many as 15 criminal prosecutions and 6 criminal proceedings launched against the detenu during a period spread over nearly 6 years, Shyam Sindhi figured as a complainant in 4 criminal prosecutions only. It would not, therefore, be correct to say that most of the criminal prosecutions were launched against the detenu at the instance of Shyam Sindhi. It will be seen that the alleged criminal activities of the detenu during the aforementioned period were directed against a cross-section of the residents of the town of Kota. It would not, therefore, be correct to say that most of the criminal prosecutions were launched against the detenu at the instance of Shyam Sindhi. It will be seen that the alleged criminal activities of the detenu during the aforementioned period were directed against a cross-section of the residents of the town of Kota. The incidents which are proximate to the date of the making of the mention order include an incident of alleged robbery at the shop of Kanhyalal at point of knife at about 9.30 P.M. when he was in the process of closing the shop, and a similar foray into Mohan Talkis where he and his companions are alleged to have created terror by indiscriminately throwing pieces of furniture around in trying to extort a sum of Rs. 2,000/-from the manager of the sad cinema. The complaint in the latter case was kept wrongfully confined so that he could not inform the police for timely help. It is significant to note that the alleged criminal activities of the detenu were centred in the industrial and commercial town of Kota, extending to the localities covered by four different police stations of that town including the city centre of Kotwali. We are therefore not impressed by the argument that most of the criminal prosecutions relied on for making the detention order are the outcome of the alleged enmity between the detenu and one Shyam Sindhi. It is obvious that the detention order had to be made as a result of the cumulative effect of all these incidents, more particularly the incidents of the year 1980, Shyam Sindhi does not figure in the incidents of that year at all. Ground (ii) 9. The law is well settled that a person may be lawfully detained on the basis of an incident on which he was earlier prosecuted in a court of law and either discharged or acquitted by the court concerned. This proposition is of course not absolute, for the court may discover that the order of discharge or acquittal was recorded on the ground that the accusation brought against that person was false; & if so, no valid order of detention can be passed in connection with an incident, which was found to be definitely false. This proposition is of course not absolute, for the court may discover that the order of discharge or acquittal was recorded on the ground that the accusation brought against that person was false; & if so, no valid order of detention can be passed in connection with an incident, which was found to be definitely false. In Sahib Singh Duggal vs. Union of India (1), Sahib Singh, before the order of detention was made against him, had been prosecuted under section 3, Official Secrets Act, and discharged for want of evidence, because the prosecution had itself made an application for such discharge stating that no evidence was available to it to justify the framing of a charge against him. Immediately after Sahib Singh came out of the Jail, he was arrested and detained under the Defence of India Rules. The Supreme Court upheld the detention holding that it cannot be struck down as mala fide merely because the detenu had earlier been prosecuted and discharged. 10. Reference may also be made to Mohd. Salim Khan vs. C.C. Bose, (2) wherein the Supreme Court held that the fact that the particular file referred by the authority making the order of detention did not contain the information about the earlier discharge or acquittal of the detenu cannot affect the validity of the order of detention because the said authority might have otherwise got the said information, and moreover what is needed is subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and not that of the court, and for that reason the court is precluded from going into the question as to the adequacy or otherwise of the materials on which satisfaction has been reached. 11. Similarly, in Sasti Chowdhary vs. State of West Bengal, (3) the Supreme Court held that it is open to the detaining authority to make an order of detention in respect of an incident which constitutes an offence under the Penal Code, but in which the accused was not sent up for trial. Their Lordships pointed out in this context that where a person has been actually prosecuted in a court of law in respect of an incident and has been discharged by the trial magistrate, a valid order of detention can be passed against him in connection with that very incident. 12. Their Lordships pointed out in this context that where a person has been actually prosecuted in a court of law in respect of an incident and has been discharged by the trial magistrate, a valid order of detention can be passed against him in connection with that very incident. 12. Lastly, reference may be made to Bhut Nath vs. State of West Bengal, (4) wherein the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction for preventive detention is different from that of judicial trial in courts for offences and of judicial proceedings for prevention of offences. Their Lordships added in this context that even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would not operate as bar to a detention order or render it mala fide. 13. The petitioner in the instant case has not even alleged, much less proved, that the detenu was acquitted, in any of these cases with a definite finding that the incident in respect of which he was prosecuted was false. That being so, the acquittal of the detenu in a few cases out of the so many pending against him does not affect the validity of the order of detention. Acquittal of the detenu in a few cases arising out of the incidents which are included in the grounds of detention and absence of conviction in others which are still pending trial are circumstances for the detaining authority to consider, and if. inspite of them, it is still satisfied that the incidents in question are serious enough to prejudice the maintenance of public order, the court is precluded from going into question as to the adequacy or otherwise of those incidents on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority has been arrived at. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this ground of challenge also therefore fails. Ground (iii) 15. We have already indicated, while surveying the grounds of detention in the context of the arguments of the petitioners learned counsel under the heading "ground (][)", that the incidents of the year 1980 which are proximate to the order of detention are of such a grave nature that, besides being disruptive of law and order, they were bound to affect the even tenor of life of the public at large in the localities concerned and create terror in the area. It will be recalled that the incident mentioned at No. 12 of the grounds of detention occurred in a shop in Nai Sabji Mandi Kota on February 14, 1980, at 8 30 P.M. What happened was that the detenu, along with two others, is said to have entered the shop of one Kanhaiyalal brandishing a knife, just about the time when Kanhaiya Lal was counting his cash collections preparatory to closing the shop for the day, threatened him with death and thus robbed him of Rs. 10,000/-. Kanhaiya Lal was too terrified to report the occurrence to the police the same night. Instead, be first complained to the Sabzi Mandi Union on February 15, morning. It was only with the help of the Union that he mustered courage to lodge the report with the police on February 15 at 9.30 A.M. 16. The incident mentioned at No. 15 of the grounds of detention is of equally, if not more, grave nature. On August 30, 1980, at about 11.30 p.m. the detenu and his companions raided a cinema premises known as Mohan Talkis, situate in the town of Kota, created all round terror there by indiscriminately hurling pieces of cinema furniture around in trying to extort some money from the manager of the cinema. They kept the complainant wrongfully confined to prevent him from making a report to the police for timely help. 17. The Supreme Court has held time and again that the question whether a particular act causes a breach merely of law and order or is serious enough to disturb public order depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In Arun Ghosh vs. Ssate of West Bengal (5). Hidayatullah C. J. (as his Lordship then was), delivering the judgment of the Court observed :— "It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognised as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ Petn. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognised as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ Petn. No. 179 of 1968 (SC) drew a line of demarcation between the serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large from minor breaches of peace which do not affect the public and private crime. The analogy is useful but not to be pushed too far. A large number of acts directed against persons or individuals may total up into a breach of public order. In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohias case, 1966 -I SCR 709=( AIR 1966 SC 740 ) examples were given by Sarkar and Hidayatullah JJ. They show how similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community The question to ask is, Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed ? This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another." 18. Now, the incidents which we have mentioned above and which are clearly proximate to the order of detention definitely bear upon the maintenance of public order because what the detenu is alleged to have done in Sabzi Mandi Area affected the even tempo of life of large sections of the community in that area of Kota and jeopardised public order there. Similarly, he created a terror among the cinema fans of the town by openly committing acts of affray and vilence in the cinema on August 30, 1980, at 11.30 P.M. We are of the considered opinion that these are the kind of incidents which are definitely prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 19. Similarly, he created a terror among the cinema fans of the town by openly committing acts of affray and vilence in the cinema on August 30, 1980, at 11.30 P.M. We are of the considered opinion that these are the kind of incidents which are definitely prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 19. The other incidents enumerated in the grounds of detention do represent, in a sense, acts affecting persons or individuals and as such relating to law and order, but all these incidents, viewed in the context of the two incidents proximate to the order of detention and which are clearly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, cannot be ignored as irrelevant or insignificant incidents. These incidents cover the criminal activities of the detenu spread over a period of more than 6 years. They are definitely relevant in that they disclose the background and criminal history of the detenu culminating in the commission of criminal acts which have seriously prejudiced the maintenance of public order possession of illicit fire arms and dangerous weapons like illicit swords and knives and the commission of repeated acts assault and battery and attempts on nothing to do with the incidents which are be described as stray incidents having the life of individuals cannot, by any means more serious and thus directly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order We are quite clear in our mind that all the incidents detailed and in the 16 grounds of detention are interlinked and therefore the incidents which do not directly bear upon public order are relevant inasmuch they provide, so to say. a historical background to the incidents directly bearing on public order. We would, once again like to invite attention in this connection to that part of the observations of Hidayatullah C. J (supra) wherein his Lordship emphasised the fact that "a large number of acts directed against persons or individuals may total up into a breach of public order". 20. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner, cited a few rulings in support of his argument that an incident or incidents relating to law and order, if considered along with an incident or incidents relating to public order, would vitiate the detention order because in such a situation, as Mr. 20. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner, cited a few rulings in support of his argument that an incident or incidents relating to law and order, if considered along with an incident or incidents relating to public order, would vitiate the detention order because in such a situation, as Mr. Tyagi argued, one can never be certain to what extent the incident or incidents relating to law and order operated on the mind of the detaining authority. We have carefully perused these authorities & find that they have no application to the facts of this. We have already held that the incidents which do not directly bear upon public order are relevant in the facts and circumstances of this case, inasmuch as they informed the detaining authority about the background material connected with and culminating in the commission of serious crimes by the detenu against public order in 1980 which are proximate to the detention order passed against him. The Supreme Court cases cited at the bar relate to incidents which in the facts and circumstances of each case were held to be irrelevant. 21. We may refer here to a few cases and see how each case turned on its own facts. In Pushkar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal (6), three of the five incidents rolled upon in the grounds of detention related to assault on individuals causing bodily hurt to them and the remaining two incidents were incidents which may properly be considered as jeopardising public order. It will be seen that the former three incidents of assault and battery on individuals stood in a category apart from the other two incidents inasmuch as there was nothing to interlink the two categories. Moreover, this case was subsequently noticed by the Supreme Court in Arun Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal (Supra) with the remarks that Ramaswamy J. who delivered the judgment of the Court had pushed the distinction between public and private crimes too far. 22. Reference may then be made to Sudhir Kumar vs. Police Commissi- oner, (7). This is a case involving three incidents which were described by the Supreme Court as stray incidents having no inter-link with one another. This again is a ruling which was noticed by the Supreme Court subsequently in Kanu Biswas vs. State of West Bengal (8). 22. Reference may then be made to Sudhir Kumar vs. Police Commissi- oner, (7). This is a case involving three incidents which were described by the Supreme Court as stray incidents having no inter-link with one another. This again is a ruling which was noticed by the Supreme Court subsequently in Kanu Biswas vs. State of West Bengal (8). stating that it deserved to be viewed as a "solitary decision" as against many others which supported the view the Court was inclined to take in Kanu Biswas case on the facts of that case. 23. For all these reasons, Ground (iii), also fails and is rejected. 24. In conclusion, we do not find any good ground for the grant of a writ of habeas corpus in this case. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed and the rule is hereby discharged.